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ABSTRACT  
The orthodox view is that the prerogatives of the Crown are textually incorporated, or 
sourced, in the language of s 61 of the Australian Constitution. This work challenges that 
assumption by examining the text, structure and history of ss 2, 61 and 64 of the 
Constitution. In particular, the inclusion of the words “under the Crown” and “shall be the 
Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth” in the preamble and s 64 respectively 
are, it is argued, textual indicators (and devices) that the prerogative is textually recognised 
or affirmed by those provisions, and ought to be seen as emanating from the Crown, and 
recognised by common law – and not as emanating from s 61 of the Constitution. 
Having argued that the executive power of the Commonwealth (that is, s 61) is not the 
textual source, or recognition, of the prerogatives of the Crown, this dissertation then posits 
a theory as to how s 61 should be construed. True to its Montesquieuian heritage, it is 
argued that the executive power of the Commonwealth ought to be understood in a 
functionalist sense. 
The evidence considered to support these propositions is the text, structure and history 
of the constitutional provisions. In particular, this dissertation examines the historical 
concept of the prerogatives of the Crown; the way that body of constitutional doctrine 
became part of the Australian constitutional landscape; and how the prerogative was 
understood to operate in pre-Federation Imperial and colonial case law.  
The Debates of the Constitutional Conventions of the 1890s are closely examined to 
ascertain how the framers sought to affirm the operation of the prerogative, and what 
interpretative assistance the Debates might give in the construction of ss 2, 61 and 64 of 
the Constitution. A particular focus is placed upon the decision of the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria in Toy v Musgrove (1888) 14 VLR 349, as the reasoning in that 
widely reported case figures prominently in the framers’ deliberations; and it is therefore of 
significant interpretative assistance. 
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This dissertation offers a theory about the way the prerogative was textually affirmed in 
the Constitution, and what the consequence of that recognition is for the construction of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth. 
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GLOSSARY  
Australian Constitution refers to the Constitution. This variant is used when a 
distinction is being drawn in the text between the United States Constitution, or, on 
occasions, the British North America Act 1867, and the context requires emphasis on the 
fact that it is the Australian Constitution being identified. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia (or “the Commonwealth”) refers to the body politic 
established by the enactment of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 
(Imp). 
 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) is the enactment of the 
Imperial Parliament establishing the Commonwealth of Australia.  
 
Constitution refers to the contents of clause nine of the Constitution Act – being, the 
original one hundred and twenty-eight sections of the Constitution, as amended, and the 
contents of the Schedule which sets out the oath and the affirmation, including the “Note” 
to the Schedule which refers to the name of the King or Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland for the time being. 
 
Constitution Act refers to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp). 
When the Constitution Act is referred to, it should be understood that the author is referring 
to the entire enactment, being the preamble, the nine covering clauses, and the contents of 
clause nine, being “The Constitution”. 
 
Constitutional Conventions (or the “Federation Conventions”) is a reference to the 
First and Second Conventions collectively. These expressions do not, unless a contrary 
intention is expressed, include the other conventions or assemblies convened during the 
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Federation decade to consider the question of federation, or promote the object and 
purposes of the Federation movement. For example, the Australasian Federation 
Conference, which was held in Melbourne in 1890, and saw the premiers or chief 
secretaries of the colonies, and other senior colonial statesmen, assemble to agitate for 
momentum in the Federation movement. 
 
Debates (or the “Convention Debates”) refers to the Official Reports and Official 
Records of the Federation Conventions. 
 
Executive power of the Commonwealth is the subject of examination and reflection in 
this dissertation. Chapter 5 sets out what this author posits as the correct construction of the 
scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth, which is able to be arrived at once the 
true relationship between the prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth is 
appreciated. 
 
First Convention refers to the Australasian Federal Convention, held in Sydney in 
March and April of 1891.  
 
The framers refers to the delegates appointed by their respective colonies to the 
Australasian Federal Convention, held in Sydney in 1891, and the representatives who 
were elected (or nominated by the Parliament in the case by the Western Australian 
delegates) to the three sessions of the National Australasian Convention held in Adelaide, 
Sydney and Melbourne in 1897 and 1898. Unless the context reveals otherwise, the 
expression “the framers” is not intended to refer to Crown law officers, the officials in 
Whitehall, or the members of the Imperial Parliament who were all, at various stages, 
involved in the drafting of the constitutional text. In constitutional literature, the expression 
“the founders” is sometimes used. This expression is avoided in this work (unless used in 
the American context); preferring to focus upon the authors of the constitutional text being 
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the persons who “framed” the language, rather than the wider meaning that “founders” 
suggests. 
 
The prerogative (or the “prerogatives of the Crown”, or the “royal prerogative”) is the 
subject description and reflection in Chapter 2. What is included within the prerogative, 
and its relationship with the executive power, is central to the purpose of this dissertation 
and necessarily requires a historically-focused description. 
 
Second Convention refers to the three sessions of the National Australasian 
Convention, held in Adelaide in 1897, then Sydney and Melbourne in 1898.  
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PREFACE  
This dissertation is the result of over a decade of thinking about what Sir Ninian Stephen 
described as “the notoriously obscure area”1 of the prerogatives of the Crown, and the 
prerogative’s relationship with the executive power. 
As the author has noted elsewhere,2 immediately after the announcement of his 
appointment as the Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, Stephen Gageler SC (as his 
Honour then was) remarked to The Australian newspaper that Chapter III of the 
Constitution “is where the action is”.3 The new justice of the High Court of Australia was 
drawing attention to the importance, or preponderance, of the High Court of Australia’s 
more recent Chapter III jurisprudence which could be measured by way of such cases as 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW),4 and the many cases that followed in 
which litigants sought to apply what has come to be known as the Kable principle.5 
This is no longer the case. Chapter II of the Constitution is now where the action is. 
Chapter II is the new frontier. The preponderance of executive power cases of recent times 
has meant that the battlefield of Australian constitutional law is currently focused upon 
Chapter II jurisprudence.6 What is, or is not, within the executive power of the 
                                                          
1  N M Stephen, “Foreword”, in H V Evatt’s The Royal Prerogative, 1987, v. 
2  R W Haddrick, “The Judicature, Bills of Rights, and Chapter III” in J Leeser, R Haddrick, Don’t Leave 
Us with the Bill: The Case Against an Australian Bill of Rights, 145. 
3  M Pelly, “Black-belt Solicitor-General says he lacks the killer instinct”, The Australian, 18 July 2008, 
33. 
4  (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
5  Silbert v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2004) 217 CLR 181; Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) 
(2004) 223 CLR 575; North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146; 
Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532; Forge v 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45; Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 
CLR 307; K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501. 
6  Illustrated by Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 (“Pape”); Williams v 
Commonwealth [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156 (“Williams [No 1]”); Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] 
(2014) 252 CLR 416 (“Williams [No 2]”); CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
(2015) 255 CLR 514 (“CPCF”); Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
(2016) 257 CLR 42 (“Plaintiff M68”). 
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Commonwealth is now a highly contested area in constitutional litigation, particularly in 
respect of the contents of the non-statutory executive power. 
This dissertation is an examination of the relationship between the prerogatives of the 
Crown – that is, those rights, privileges, immunities and capacities that the Crown enjoys 
and are recognised by the common law, and the constitutional authority described as the 
executive power of the Commonwealth. 
With the Debates of the Australian Federation Conventions from the 1890s now a 
permissible, and indeed regular tool of constitutional interpretation,7 this author presents 
an argument about the relationship between the prerogative and the executive power that 
draws upon British and Australian colonial jurisprudence, and takes account of the 
significant historical evidence left by the framers in the Federation Conventions as to how 
the key provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) were 
intended to operate.  
In reading the Debates, what is striking is the depth of analysis in which the framers 
delved in attempting to ensure that the constitutional text properly reflected their authorial 
intentions – which was to textually affirm the devolution or investment of the prerogative 
of the Crown in the new Commonwealth polity. This dissertation argues that the 
sophistication of the in-committee consideration of the key draft clauses warrants judicial 
attention. And, contrary to the view expressed by French CJ, provides significant 
interpretative assistance.8 
The originality of this dissertation arises in three ways. First, its invocation of history to 
separate the concepts of the prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth, 
and, by doing so, its focus upon the history of the prerogative as a quality of the 
Sovereign’s title. Second, the dissertation looks to the framers’ intention, as revealed 
through the use of the Debates and their reliance upon the Supreme Court of Victoria’s 
                                                          
7  Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360. 
8  Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 202 [56]. 
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decision in Toy v Musgrove9 to assist with arriving at an understanding of the place of the 
prerogative within the Australian constitutional framework, and the prerogative’s 
consequential affirmation in the constitutional text, through the use of the words in s 64 of 
“and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”. Third, having made 
the argument that the prerogative is a creature of the Crown, recognised by the common 
law, and textually affirmed as part of the constitutional law of Australia through the 
preamble and ss 2, 44(iv), 64 and 74, the dissertation then reflects upon what this 
fundamental assumption means for the scope or nature of the executive power (particularly 
the non-statutory executive power) of the Commonwealth, understood in a functionalist 
sense, and in contradistinction to the prerogative.  
The dissertation advances a theorem that, when English constitutional history and 
practice is examined, the prerogative is best understood as a bundle of qualities or 
attributes that have emerged around the Sovereign’s title, and are recognised by the 
common law – that is, they are given effect by the common law, but they are attributes of 
the Crown which doctrinally predate the emergence of the common law. Those qualities or 
attributes manifest themselves as rights, capacities, immunities and preferences. In the 
context of a written constitution which distributes the roles of making, executing and 
interpreting the laws to three separate and distinct constitutional organs, those qualities are 
able to be legislated with respect to, executed or administered by, and interpreted by, the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary respectively. 
In terms of the executive power of the Commonwealth, the theorem is that the executive 
government is charged with the “execution and maintenance” of those rights, capacities, 
immunities and preferences. Those rights, preferences and capacities do not spring from 
the executive power, but the executive power is the constitutional authority to 
administratively give effect to those qualities of the Crown recognised by the common law 
– just as the legislative power is the constitutional authority to legislate with respect to 
                                                          
9  (1888) 14 VLR 349. 
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those qualities, and similarly, the judicial power is the constitutional authority to interpret 
and adjudicate between subject and subject, or subject and Crown, as to common law 
rights, preferences and capacities of the Crown. In this, it is argued that a proper 
understanding of non-statutory executive power necessitates a clear, and historically-
sound, understanding of the place of the prerogative in British constitutional history; and 
how the prerogative was received in the Australian constitutional landscape. 
The importance of this dissertation stems from four sources. First, its topicality. Such is 
the nature of current emphasis in constitutional litigation that the relationship between the 
prerogatives of the Crown and the executive power is becoming a much fought-upon 
battlefield. Second, the High Court has displayed, in Pape, and particularly in Williams 
[No 1], an enthusiasm to consider (or reconsider) the fundamental assumptions about the 
nature of the executive power. Third, and perhaps the most important reason: the current 
state of executive power jurisprudence is that the non-statutory executive power is to be 
understood as a constitutional authority which is part functionalist authority, understood in 
some vague “nationhood” sense, and part successor to the British prerogative. As French 
CJ said: “The history of the prerogative powers in the United Kingdom informs 
consideration of the content of s 61, but should not be regarded as determinative”.10 The 
disentangling of the prerogative from the executive power of the Commonwealth is 
important as it potentially has significant ramifications for any description of the non-
statutory executive power. Understanding the nature of the recognition of the prerogative 
in the constitutional text is basal to understanding the non-statutory executive power; and 
therefore the scope of the Commonwealth to utilise the non-statutory executive power. And 
fourth, a correct understanding of the nature of the prerogative and its relationship to 
executive power (in British constitutional practice) is necessary for better understanding 
the prerogative in right of each of the States of the Commonwealth. 
 
 
                                                          
10  CPCF (2015) 255 CLR 514, 538 [42] (emphasis added). 
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A  NOTE ON THE TEXT  
Throughout this dissertation, the author has chosen to modernise the spelling of language 
which is arcane or obscure. Where the language is rendered in American English, the 
author has also chosen to change the spelling to modern Australian English. 
Whenever in this dissertation text is presented as a quotation, footnotes that appear 
within that quotation (if any) are taken verbatim from the original source. If footnotes that 
appear within quotations have been retained, the text of the footnote is retained as is from 
the original source. If footnotes that appear within quotations have been omitted, that is 
identified in the reference for the quotation. 
The glossary sets out the meaning of the terms used throughout this dissertation. The 
case law and legislation identified in this work was current as at 22 March 2017. 
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C  H A P T E R  O  N E  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
I  THE PURPOSE  
William Shakespeare described the English Realm as “this scept’red isle”.1 This 
description of the Kingdom as being “scept’red” imputes a divine quality to the English 
Crown; the sceptre being a regal ornament, belonging to the Sovereign, and representing 
divine royal authority. In this elegant description of the English Crown, written in the 
closing years of the Elizabethan Age, the Bard was describing the quality of the 
Sovereign’s title at the end of the reign of the House of Plantagenet. The origin of royal 
authority has always been attributed to Divine Providence.2 We see manifestations of this 
divine quality not just in high literature, but also in art; in the Wilton Diptych there is an 
unmistakable demonstration of Richard II’s “literal belief in his anointed divinity”.3 
The power and authority at any given time of the English Throne (subsequently 
described as the British Crown), is nothing more than a static description of the evolving 
quality of the princely title. The Crown is what one historian described as “the frame of 
law, ritual and memory”.4 To describe the Sovereign’s quality is to describe the 
Sovereign’s power and authority. And any description of the Sovereign’s qualities is not 
susceptible to a pure analytical assessment; it is, by necessity, adjectival. What the 
                                                          
1  W Shakespeare, King Richard II, Act II, Scene I. 
2  R Tombs, The English and Their History, 99. 
3  D Jones, The Plantagenets, The Kings Who Made England, 559. 
4  M Rubin, The Hollow Crown, A History of Britain in the late Middle Ages, 321. 
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Sovereign’s quality is, and what he or she has tended to become, is the only sure way to 
describe the quality of the English Crown. 
From the time of the reign of Richard II, the kings of England have consistently 
appropriated the title of “majesty”.5 To offend against the king was to offend against “the 
king’s majesty”. The word “majesty” derives from the Latin majestas, meaning greatness 
or grandeur,6 and speaks to the quality of the occupant of the throne, and their princely 
title. To offend against the Sovereign’s majesty was, and is, to offend against the 
Sovereign’s greatness and grandeur; it is to offend against the quality of the Sovereign’s 
title. The Sovereign’s title is measured in the language of the Sovereign’s “prerogative”, 
the “royal prerogative”, or “the prerogatives of the Crown”. The prerogative is nothing 
more than the manifestation of the historically-evolved description, quality, or nature of the 
Sovereign’s regnal title. That evolved description has, with the passage of centuries of 
English history, manifested itself in the form of rights, capacities, responsibilities, 
immunities and authorities that inhere in the king or queen regnant’s title. For example, the 
quality (or maxim) that the king can do no wrong extended into Crown immunity against 
suit. Similarly, the description of the king or queen as the fountain of honour extended into 
the Crown’s common law authority to bestow civil and military honours. 
An understanding of the quality of the English Crown (and therefore, the Australian 
Crown) is, by necessity, a study of its history. The nature of the kingly office must be 
studied for what it was, to understand what it became. It is only through an historical 
analysis that the nature of the prerogative is properly elucidated; culminating in what might 
be described as the qualitative veneer of the Sovereign’s princely title. 
This dissertation is a study of the relationship between the prerogatives of Kings and 
Queens of England (as that prerogative has been received into Australian constitutional 
law), and the executive power of the Commonwealth, being the textually-expressed 
constitutional authority found in Chapter II of the Australian Constitution. 
                                                          
5  N Saul, The Three Richards; Richard I, Richard II, and Richard III, 60. 
6  The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary (Fourth Edition), 847. 
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This dissertation is not a general treatise on the prerogative, in the sense that either H V 
Evatt’s doctoral thesis7 was; or Joseph Chitty’s taxonomy of the prerogatives8 was. Rather, 
this dissertation is more akin to George Winterton’s doctoral thesis.9 That is, it is 
argumentative in nature. Nor does this dissertation attempt to provide a comprehensive 
theory of the content of prerogative, or the content of the executive power or the 
Commonwealth. Therefore, the scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth is not 
either comprehensively or conclusively set out, nor are the various sub-species of the 
prerogative’s rights, capacities, preferences or immunities. 
This dissertation attempts to achieve is four things. First, it describes the nature of both 
the prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth. Second, it makes the 
argument that the prerogative and the executive power are two different constitutional 
species, and examines their relationship in contradistinction to one another. Third, it 
considers in detail how the prerogative is textually recognised or affirmed within the text 
of the Australian Constitution. And fourth, by necessity, having identified the nature of the 
prerogative, and presented a theorem (in this thesis, described as the “core argument”) 
about how the prerogative is textually recognised or affirmed in the Constitution, the 
dissertation then proceeds to reflect upon the nature of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth if it is to be understood as not, of itself, affirming or recognising (or in the 
words of Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ, “import[ing]”)10 the prerogatives of the Crown – 
but as the constitutional authority provided to execute, maintain, or give administrative 
effect to the prerogative. 
                                                          
7  H V Evatt, Certain Aspects of the Royal Prerogative, A Study in Constitutional Law – a thesis submitted 
for the award of Doctor of Laws at the University of Sydney in 1924, and published as The Royal 
Prerogative in 1987. 
8  J Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown: And the Relative Duties and Rights 
published in 1820. 
9  G G Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General – a thesis submitted for the award 
of Doctor of Juridical Science at Columbia University, published by Melbourne University Press in 
1983. 
10  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 [215]. 
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In correctly understanding the nature of the prerogative, and by having regard to the 
executive power as it was understood as an aspect of the common law in the colonial 
setting, and, having regard to the way in which the prerogative is textually recognised or 
affirmed in the constitutional text, it is then possible to posit a general theory as to the 
nature of the executive power of the Commonwealth. It is through the de-coupling of these 
two concepts that this dissertation is able to sketch out a functionalist understanding of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth. 
By necessity, the dissertation requires a close and detailed examination of the key 
portions of the Debates of the Federation Conventions in 1891 and 1897-98, so as to make 
an assessment about the quantity and quality (or comprehensiveness) of the consideration 
by the framers of the key issues central to this thesis. This requires a recitation of the actual 
words used by the delegates at the critical points in the in-committee phase of the 
Conventions in a fashion that is more laborious than one might ordinarily find in a judge’s 
reasons for judgment. This is necessary for two reasons. It illustrates the depth of either 
analysis or understanding of constitutional principle by the delegates. It also illustrates the 
nuanced way in which the delegates sought to achieve their constitutional choices through 
the crafting of carefully chosen text. 
A particular difficulty associated with considering the nature of the prerogative is that 
there are precious few cases – both in the United Kingdom and Australia – that expressly 
consider or concern the nature of the prerogative. In fact, as Brigid Hadfield pointed out 
“no case on the prerogative came before the House of Lords after the seventeenth century 
Revolution Settlement until the immediate aftermath of the First World War”.11 Since then 
                                                          
11  B Hadfield, “Constitutional Law”, L Blom-Cooper, et al, The Judicial House of Lords, 1876-2009, 504. 
There have, of course, been a number of other decisions that concern the prerogative in the Privy 
Council in respect of colonial matters, or in inferior courts like the High Court of Justice. 
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(and including the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom), the recent Brexit case aside,12 
there have been only seven such British cases in the House of Lords.13 
In Australia, the situation is a little better. The theorem articulated in this dissertation 
has benefited from the effluxion of time. Since the research was commenced in 2010, the 
High Court of Australia has decided five important cases that significantly illuminate the 
moorings of the executive power of the Commonwealth (and, by implication, the 
prerogative) – making it clear that the members of the Court construe the executive power 
in what has come to be described as “the inherent view”.14 Pape v Commissioner of 
Taxation,15 Williams v Commonwealth [No 1],16 Williams v Commonwealth [No 2],17 
CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection,18 and Plaintiff M68/2015 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection19 have greatly added, as will be seen in 
Chapter 3, to the jurisprudence in respect of construing the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in a functionalist sense. As will be seen in Chapters 3 and 5, the 
emergence of the inherent view in the High Court’s jurisprudence has been incorporated 
into one of the key assertions advanced in this work – that the constitutional text provides 
for both a common law understanding of the prerogative and a functionalist (or inherent) 
                                                          
12  Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union v R (on the application of Miller and Anor) [2017] 
UKSC 5, which was an appeal from R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768.  
13  Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508; Re a Petition of Right [1915] 3 KB 649; 
Burmah Oil Co Ltd v The Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75; Attorney-General v Nissan [1970] AC 179; R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513; Council of 
Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (the GCHQ case), and R (Bancoult) 
v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [No 2] [2009] 1 AC 453. There have, of 
course, been a number of other cases (and not in the House of Lords), but in the Privy Council in 
relation to the dominions, like Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Ltd v The King (1916) AC 566 
which was an important prerogative case heard by the Board. 
14  The inherent view and the common law view are set out in Chapter 5. 
15  (2009) 238 CLR 1. 
16  (2012) 248 CLR 156. 
17  (2014) 252 CLR 416. 
18  (2015) 255 CLR 514. 
19  (2016) 257 CLR 42. 
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view of the executive power of the Commonwealth – both of which operate side-by-side to 
one another, and correlatively to each other. 
The overarching thematic of this work is to advocate for the importance (in line with the 
High Court’s more recent constitutional cases) of constitutional interpretation to be based 
upon the text, structure and history of the Constitution, and in doing so, giving due regard 
to authorial intention where such intention can be clearly and properly identified. It does 
this by relying upon what Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy described as “moderate 
originalism”.20 That is, using “original meanings” and “original intentions”, as revealed in 
the Debates, to aid in the construction of the constitutional text. 
 
*** 
 
The constitutional balance between the political strength of the executive and the 
legislature is not confined to the discipline of political science. It is also a feature of 
constitutional law; and concerns those who study and practise statecraft. What the prince 
(or, in modern constitutional usage, “the executive government”) may do without the 
express approval of the legislature is a particularly relevant and contemporary topic of 
constitutional scholarship in most democracies. 
The election of the Whitlam government in 1972, and the decisions of that 
administration, saw the constitutional issue as to what formed part of the prerogative or the 
executive power of the Commonwealth being agitated in the High Court of Australia.21 
Since then, the law in relation to the prerogative in right of the Commonwealth, and the 
executive power of the Commonwealth, has been periodically litigated in Australia’s 
Federal Supreme Court. In more recent times, the initiatives of the Howard, Rudd and 
Abbott governments have led to an increase in litigation which centres upon, or necessarily 
                                                          
20  J Goldsworthy, “Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation”, (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 1. 
21  Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477; Victoria v Commonwealth and Hayden (the AAP Case) 
(1975) 134 CLR 338; Johnson v Kent (1975) 132 CLR 164. 
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turns upon, the doctrinal limitations of the prerogative, or the Commonwealth’s executive 
power. The Howard government’s actions to control the unauthorised entry into Australia 
of non-citizens,22 and the introduction of Commonwealth funding of programmes which 
rely entirely upon ministerial guidelines,23 have both been the cause of high profile 
constitutional litigation. The Rudd government’s initiatives to stimulate the national 
economy during a significant period of global economic downturn has also been the 
catalyst for litigation in relation to the executive power.24 So too has the Abbott 
government’s initiatives to facilitate the offshore detention of refugee claimants in 
Nauru.25 
Coupled with this increase in frequency in which executive power cases are being 
litigated in the High Court, there is also the temptation (in a political environment where 
the executive government has great difficulty obtaining Senate approval of controversial 
legislation) for the ministry of the day to explore the scope of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in order to achieve seemingly unattainable legislative objectives. 
II  THE IMPUGNED ORTHODOXY  
This dissertation contests the orthodox jurisprudence of the High Court of Australia that 
the prerogatives of the Crown are textually sourced from, or are incorporated in, the words 
of s 61 of the Constitution and, therefore, the meaning of and the source of the prerogative 
in the Australian context, emanates from the words of s 61 of the Constitution. 
The orthodox position is explained in more detail later,26 but can be summarised this 
way. Originally commencing with Williams J saying that the executive power of the 
                                                          
22  Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Inc v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 
110 FCR 452 (North J); Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (Black CJ, Beaumont and French JJ); 
Vadarlis v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] HCATrans 625. 
23  Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156; Williams [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416. 
24  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1. 
25  Plaintiff M68 (2016) 257 CLR 42. 
26  See Chapter 5. 
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Commonwealth “included such of the then existing prerogative powers of the King in 
England”,27 the typical starting point for the orthodox view is the words of Mason J in 
Barton v Commonwealth where his Honour opined that s 61 “includes the prerogative 
powers of the Crown, that is, the powers accorded to the Crown by the common law”.28  
More recently, French CJ in Pape said that the prerogatives of the Crown “form part of 
but do not complete, the executive power” of the Constitution.29 The Chief Justice 
affirmed this view in Cadia Holdings v New South Wales, where he said that the:30 
 
Prerogative powers and rights enjoyed by the Crown in the colonies before 
Federation may be seen as informing, or forming part of, the content of the 
executive powers of the Commonwealth and the States according to their proper 
functions. 
 
Gummow, Heydon, Hayne and Crennan JJ also expressed the view in Cadia that s 61 of 
the Constitution “includes the prerogative powers accorded the Crown by the common 
law”.31 In Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General, four members of the High 
Court viewed the prerogatives of the Crown as “now encompassed in the executive power 
conferred by s 61”.32 
                                                          
27  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 231. 
28  Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 498. French CJ approvingly quotes this passage in Pape 
(2009) 238 CLR 1, 61 [130]; French CJ also approvingly quotes in Pape the words of Mason CJ, Deane 
and Gaudron JJ in Davis v The Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93, where their Honours said: “... s 
61 confers on the Commonwealth all the prerogative powers of the Crown except those that are 
necessarily exercisable by the States under the allocation of responsibilities made by the Constitution 
and those denied by the Constitution itself”, at 62 [131]. 
29  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [126] and [127]. 
30  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 210 [30] and [31]. 
31  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 226 [86] (footnotes omitted), and approvingly quoted by Gummow and Bell JJ in 
Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 227 [123]. 
32  (2013) 249 CLR 645, 636 (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
  9 
     
There is a slight difference in the views of the justices as to which particular phrase in s 
61 “incorporates” or “imports” the prerogative. Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ said in 
Pape that:33 
 
… the phrase “maintenance of this Constitution” in s 61 imports more than a 
species of what is identified as “the prerogative” in constitutional theory. It 
conveys the idea of the protection of the body politic or nation of Australia. 
 
Whereas, in contrast, according to French CJ in Williams [No 1]:34 
 
The mechanism for the incorporation of the prerogative into the executive power 
is found in the opening words of s 61 which vests the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in “the Queen”. This has been described as a “shorthand 
prescription, or formula, for incorporating the prerogative – which is implicit in 
the legal concept of “the Queen” – in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth”.  
 
This orthodox view paraphrases the commentary of the leading modern scholar of Chapter 
II of the Constitution, the late Professor George Winterton. In his The Parliament, the 
Executive and the Governor-General, Winterton concludes that “the vesting of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth in the Queen has had the effect of including, within 
the executive power of the Commonwealth … all of the prerogatives relevant to the 
Commonwealth’s sphere of activity”.35 He said, more explicitly:36 
 
The prerogative is incorporated in s. 61 of the Constitution by virtue of its 
                                                          
33  Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 [215]. 
34  Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 185 [23] (footnotes omitted). 
35  G G Winterton, The Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General, 27; see also 23-24. 
36  G G Winterton, The Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General, 50, 51. 
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having vested ‘the executive power of the Commonwealth’ in ‘the Queen.’ 
When seen against the British constitutional background, the vesting of 
executive power of the Crown was, in effect, a shorthand prescription, or 
formula, for incorporating the prerogative – which is implicit in the legal 
concept of ‘the Queen’ – in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. 
 
Two aspects of this orthodox view are challenged. First, the assertion that the textual 
incorporation, or inclusion, of the executive power implicitly “incorporates”, or “imports” 
the prerogative is contested. Second, the theorem that within British constitutional history 
or practice, the mere replication of the executive function of government (manifested, or 
expressed as “the executive power”) carries with it the prerogatives of the Crown, is also 
contested. 
In respect of the second aspect of the orthodox view, this author takes issue with the 
assumption, evident in the statements of principle by French CJ and Professor Winterton 
supra, that the prerogative is a species of, or part thereof, the executive power – therefore 
(according to that assumption) where goes the executive power of the Crown, so goes the 
prerogative. This assumption is misconceived. It is premised on a misunderstanding of 
both the nature and history of the prerogatives of the Crown and of the executive power of 
the Crown, and their relationship to one another. French CJ’s expression that the “content” 
of the executive power “extend[s] to” the prerogative powers is conceptually incorrect.37 
These two aspects are challenged because they lead to the view that the prerogative and 
the executive power are conflated as one species of constitutional authority. This has 
resulted in the emergence of the non-statutory executive power, construed as a 
constitutional authority vested in the executive government, which permits executive 
action, as an ill-defined species of executive power – being a blend between the British 
prerogative and an emerging inherent authority. The definitional or descriptive limits of 
                                                          
37  CPCF (2015) 255 CLR 514, 538 [42]. 
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this Australian executive power is detached from its common law origins, and defies easy 
reconciliation with a textual and structural description in terms of the depth of the power. 
In challenging the two aspects, the author has attempted to set out some first principles 
of the Australian Constitution, and then set out how those first principles impact upon the 
construction of the key provisions of the Australian Constitution. 
III  THE CORE ARGUMENT INTRODUCED  
The role of the Crown in the Australian Constitution has become unfashionable of late.38 
In contrast, the traditional view is that the Crown pervades the Constitution.39 The 
Constitution was drafted by its framers against the backdrop of the law, practice and 
conventions of the British Crown. The Hon Michael McHugh has described the Crown as 
“a chameleon-like institution that has protected itself by remaining in the background”.40 
The Crown’s powers and functions which are recognised by the common law are part of 
the pre-existing jurisprudence that forms the backdrop against which the framers of the 
Australian Federation established the Commonwealth of Australia. The Constitution 
evinces this.  
The preamble of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp)  
proclaims that “[w]hereas the people” of the original states had “agreed to unite in one 
indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution hereby established”.41 The constitutional 
text – from the very first sentence – commands the reader to conclude that the Federal 
Commonwealth is established “under the Crown … and under the Constitution hereby 
                                                          
38  C Saunders, “The Concept of the Crown”, (2015) Melbourne University Law Review, Vol 38, 873; N 
Condylis, “Debating the Nature and Ambit of the Commonwealth’s Non-Statutory Executive Power”, 
(2016) Melbourne University Law Review, Vol 39, 385, 409. 
39  L Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, 339; and affirmed in the Sixth Edition  (published as 
Zine’s The High Court and the Constitution, and authored by Professor James Stellios), 368; J Quick, R 
R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 294.  
40  M McHugh in A Twomey, The Chameleon Crown, The Queen and Her Australian Governors, v. 
41  Emphasis added. 
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established”.42 The polity created is expressly a creature of the Crown and of the 
constitutional text. It is this duality of the Constitution’s doctrinal heritage that is of basal 
significance. 
There is nothing new in recognising the importance of the antecedent common law to 
constitutional interpretation. Sir Owen Dixon said in 1957 that:43 
 
In Australia we have paid but little attention to a distinction, which appears to 
me to be fundamental, between American constitutional theory and our own. It 
concerns the existence of an anterior law providing the sources of juristic 
authority for our institutions when they came into being … In Australia we 
begin with the common law … the foundation of its authority to do so was the 
pervasive common law. 
 
The rights and powers of the Crown are, in English constitutional jurisprudence, in part, 
rights and powers recognised by the common law. Whilst it is possible to debate whether 
those rights and powers are part of the common law; they are certainly recognised by the 
common law.   
It is against this backdrop that this dissertation advances the contention that the common 
law powers of the Crown still, despite the enactment of the Constitution, obtain their force 
by reason of the antecedent common law, and the prerogatives of the Crown are not 
textually sourced in s 61 of the Constitution; rather, the constitutional text expressly 
affirms the continuing operation of the prerogatives of the Crown. French J’s statement 
(when his Honour was a puisne judge of the Federal Court) that: “The executive power of 
                                                          
42  Emphasis added. 
43  O Dixon, “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation”, Jesting Pilate, 203; see also 
198-202. 
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the Commonwealth under s 61 cannot be treated as a species of the royal prerogative”,44 is 
challenged. 
This dissertation advances the following propositions. First, the Constitution was 
enacted against the background of the common law. Second, as already mentioned, the law 
of the Crown is antecedent to the Constitution. Third, the prerogatives of the Crown are a 
set of rights, preferences, immunities and capacities which are wider than the species 
sometimes described as “executive prerogatives”. Fourth, the executive power of the 
Commonwealth was not intended to be the textual source, or affirmation, of the vesting in 
the Commonwealth Crown of the prerogatives of the Crown. Fifth, s 64 of the Constitution 
provides that the ministers “shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth”, and it is this provision that was intended to affirm that the 
Commonwealth ministry has the prerogative powers that the Imperial ministry had in 
respect of the new Commonwealth, as appropriate to Australia’s conditions. Sixth, the 
executive power of the Commonwealth, not being the textual source of the prerogatives of 
the Crown, ought to be construed in a functionalist sense, in contradistinction to the 
legislative and judicial powers of the Commonwealth. In advancing these propositions, the 
orthodox understanding of the relationship between the prerogative and the executive 
power is challenged – the statement that “the prerogative is an executive power”,45 is 
contested. In sum, the reader is asked to conclude that the rights, preferences, immunities 
and capacities of the Crown recognised by the common law, are textually affirmed by the 
language of the preamble, and ss 2, 64 and 74 of the Constitution. 
This dissertation attempts to support the third, fourth and fifth contentions by way of 
historical analysis, and the interpretive power of a detailed examination of the Debates to 
ascertain the framers’ objects and purpose behind their textual choices for the Constitution. 
                                                          
44  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540 [183] (French J). 
45  A Twomey, “Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power – Pape, the Prerogative and Nationhood 
Powers”, (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review, 313, 325 (emphasis added). 
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This argument is described in this dissertation as the “core argument”. It is set out in full 
in Chapter 5. As a by-product of the core argument, it is possible to embark upon the task 
of describing the executive power of the Commonwealth, particularly the non-statutory 
executive power, which is a by-product of the disentangling of the concepts of the 
prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth. 
IV  THE USE OF THE WORD “PREROGATIVE”  
The words “prerogative”, “prerogatives”, “royal prerogative” and “prerogatives of the 
Crown” are interchangeably used to refer to that body of rights, preferences, capacities and 
immunities that the common law of England (and then the common law in Australia)46 
came to recognise, in the course of history and practice, that the reigning Sovereign47 (be it 
the King or Queen regnant) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(and now, Australia)48 was, or is, invested with. 
It is necessary to distinguish the “prerogative” or “royal prerogative”, as those words are 
used in this dissertation, from the concept, also called the “prerogative”, used by John 
Locke in his Second Treatise of Civil Government, first published in 1689. Locke wrote of 
the need for the executive to have a discretionary power for the public good. He wrote:49 
 
This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the 
prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called 
prerogative: for since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always 
in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite 
to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to 
provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make 
                                                          
46  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 80. 
47  That is, reigning pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Settlement 1701 (Imp), and being a descendant 
of the most Excellent Princess Sophia Electress and Duchess Dowager of Hannover. 
48  Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, 489-490 [56] and [57] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
49  J Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, § 160. 
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such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on 
all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is 
a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the 
laws do not prescribe. 
 
Whilst the prerogative in the British sense contains elements, or aspects, of Locke’s 
prerogative, Locke and others use the word “prerogative” in a sense which does not accord 
with the sense in which it is used in this dissertation. In short, Locke’s prerogative includes 
a dimension of extra-legality, or extra-constitutionality. That is, the power described is a 
power which is asserted to be reposed in the executive which is necessary for the public 
good, and is able to be exercised extra-legally in the sense that the constitution of the state 
does not accommodate the power. 
In the British sense, the prerogative is, and always has been, a discretionary power 
recognised by the British Constitution (in the ancient sense), and is recognised as being 
lawfully within power. The word “prerogative” refers (incorrectly says this author) to “a 
specific type of executive power, exercised in Britain in the name of the Crown and not 
requiring parliamentary consent”.50  
Nonetheless, it is important to be aware in constitutional scholarship that there is a sense 
in which “prerogative” is used that does not accord with the sense in which the word (and 
the body of doctrine associated with that word) has come to be used in describing a 
centuries-old feature of British constitutional practice. 
In Chapter 2, the conceptual origin and general nature of the prerogative of the Crown is 
discussed and contrasted against the executive function of government. In Chapter 5, in 
setting out the core argument about how the prerogative is textually recognised, or 
affirmed, the relationship between the prerogative and the executive power of the 
Commonwealth becomes clearer. 
                                                          
50  T M Poole, Reason of State; Law, Prerogative and Empire, 6 (emphasis added). 
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V  THE USE OF THE WORDS “EXECUTIVE POWER”  
Accuracy demands an appreciation of the different senses in which the expression 
“executive power” is used in speech, legal and political theory and in general scholarship. 
There is a danger in the unnuanced use of the words “executive power”. That danger arises 
because of the multiple uses (or the plasticity) of those words. It is the plasticity of the 
expression “executive power” which allows the author to offer an argument about how the 
preferred sense of the term should be understood and applied. The expression “executive 
power” can be observed in British constitutional and colonial literature to be used in at 
least the following three senses. 
First, the words can be used in a functionalist, or Montesquieuian sense. That is, the 
executive power is that power which belongs to any sovereign power, and is typically 
vested in a separate arm or branch of government, which administers, enforces, or 
completes the laws of the state. In this sense, the meaning of “executive” very closely 
resembles that of “administrative”. In this sense, “executive power” is a product of the 
historical forces that saw light after the English Civil War. In Chapter 2 the history of the 
emergence of a recognised executive function of government is outlined. 
The best example of executive power in this sense is demonstrated by Article II of the 
United States Constitution: the “executive Power” of the United States is vested in the 
President of the United States. The power of the President is to administer and enforce the 
laws of the United States. The scope of the President’s executive power is deduced from 
the laws that the President is required to administer.51  
In the Montesquieuian sense, the power is best described rather than defined. And it is 
best described, or understood in contradistinction to the legislative and judicial powers. 
The legislative power being the power to enact laws in respect of the subject and state; the 
judicial power being the power to quell controversies between the state and subject, or 
between a subject of the state and another subject, according to law. 
                                                          
51  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson J). 
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Second, “executive power” is used to denote in British constitutional history those 
powers that the king has which are said to be the “executive part of government”. These 
powers do not necessarily accord with any functionalist understanding of their purpose – 
rather, they are powers or activities which are carried out by the king or the magistrate, 
rather than by the parliament. The identification of these functions is best understood 
through the prism of history. The meaning of the words “executive power” in this sense 
accords with Adam Tomkins’ theory of “Crown vs Parliament” which is canvassed in 
Chapter 2, and which bundles together what would otherwise be a concept called judicial 
powers and functions (and some legislative ones as well) in the functionalist or 
Montesquieuian sense. 
Third, the words “executive power” are sometimes used in a very loose and 
grandiloquent sense. That is, the use of the word “executive” in “executive power” is an 
intensifier and ennobling word or a word of amplification. Similar to the use of the word 
“executive” in the titles “executive chef”, “executive secretary” or “executive officer”. The 
word “executive” in this sense does not denote a functionalist meaning; rather, it denotes 
seniority, standing or prestige. In this sense, Blackstone’s description of the king as “the 
supreme executive power of the English nation”, might be understood as a grandiose way 
of describing the king’s supreme power.52 So too can Joseph Chitty’s description of the 
king as the “executive magistrate”.53 Much difficulty and confusion arises from the 
plasticity in the use of the word “executive” in constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
 
*** 
 
Blackstone defined the prerogative as “the special pre-eminence, which the King has, over 
and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of 
                                                          
52  W Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk I, 183. 
53  J Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, 6. 
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his royal dignity”.54 He divided the prerogative into direct or incidental prerogatives. The 
direct prerogatives are such parts of the royal character and authority as are rooted in and 
spring from the King’s political person. The incidental prerogatives “bear always a relation 
to something else distinct from the King’s person”.55 Blackstone divided the direct 
prerogatives into “three kinds”, namely “The King’s royal character; his royal authority; 
and his royal income”.   
After describing the aspects of the King’s royal character, Blackstone described the 
royal authority as “those branches of the royal prerogative, which invest this our sovereign 
lord ... with a number of authorities and powers; in the execution whereof consists the 
executive part of government”.56 For as much as Blackstone commences his chapter 
concerning the King’s title with the declaration that: “The supreme executive power of 
these Kingdoms is vested by our laws in a single person, the King or Queen”,57 a close and 
global reading of Blackstone’s Commentaries makes it plain that the prerogative is to be 
understood as a bundle of characteristics, powers, rights and preferences, attributable to the 
King – the executive part of government being a species of royal authority. Blackstone 
makes this clear when introducing his chapter on the King’s revenue, when he said:58  
 
Having, in the preceding chapter, considered at large those branches of the 
King’s prerogative, which contribute to his royal dignity, and constitute the 
executive power of the government, we proceed now to examine the King’s 
“fiscal prerogatives, or such as regard his revenue ...” 
 
                                                          
54  W Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk I, 232. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid 242. 
57  Ibid 183. 
58  Ibid 271. 
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As “supreme executive magistrate”, Blackstone said, “the King possesses, subject to the 
law of the land, exclusive, deliberate, and more decided, more extensive and more 
discretionary rights and powers”.59 He then took “a view of [the King’s] principal and 
transcendent prerogatives as executive magistrate”.60 In this sense, caution should be taken 
when observing Blackstone’s use of the word “executive” in his declaration that the 
“supreme executive magistrate” in the kingdom is the king or queen. Apparently, 
Blackstone:61  
 
… was ever the poet, attentive to the plasticity of words, long after his career as 
a published poet ended. Much seeming contradiction begins to fade if we read 
Blackstone with this in mind. 
 
The same caution applies in United States’ constitutional scholarship. The fact that 
“supreme executive authority” and “executive magistrate” were used by authors of United 
States’ constitutional texts62 prior to Australian Federation to describe the presidential 
power – a power that did not, as is explained in detail in Chapter 6, inhere the royal 
prerogatives of the British Crown – demonstrates that those expressions (and their use of 
the word “executive”) ought not automatically lead to the conclusion that what is being 
described is an office or power which includes the prerogatives of the Crown. 
 
*** 
 
The use of the word “executive” in the context of a part, or function, of government is also 
problematic for a historical reason. The Montesquieuian division of legislative, executive 
and judicial functions of government did not just appear overnight in English (then British) 
                                                          
59  J Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, 3. 
60  Ibid 5-6. 
61  P D Halliday, “Blackstone’s King” in W Prest (ed), Re-Interpreting Blackstone’s Commentaries, A 
Seminal Text in National and International Contexts, 170. 
62  A de Chambrun, The Executive Power in the United States, xvi, xi, and xii. 
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or North American colonial governments.  Nor does the Montesquieuian trinity accurately 
describe the nature of English, or colonial governments, at the time of the publication of 
the Spirit of the Laws. After all, Lord Mansfield (then the sitting Chief Justice of the King’s 
Bench) was a member of Lord North’s Cabinet until 1782,63 although this was the subject 
of some criticism.64 What has become regarded as the judicial function or power of 
government was, until well into the nineteenth-century, considered part of the executive 
function. As the pre-eminent historian of the creation of the American Republic, Gordon 
Wood, has written:65 
 
In the colonial period judges had been regarded essentially as appendages or 
extensions of royal authority embodied in the governors; they were lesser 
magistrates tied to the governors or chief magistrates. Consequently many 
colonists concluded that there were really “no more than two powers in any 
government, viz. the power to make laws, and the power to execute them; for the 
judicial power is only a branch of the executive, the chief of every country being 
the first magistrate.” Even John Adams in 1766 regarded “the first grand 
division of constitutional powers” as “those of legislation and those of 
execution,” with “the administration of justice” resulting in “the executive part 
of the constitution”. 
 
This state of affairs was equally the case in Great Britain during that period.66 There is 
more to the expressions “the King’s Courts” and “the King’s judges” than mere deference 
                                                          
63   N S Poser, Lord Mansfield: Justice in the Age of Reason, 143. 
64  Ibid 144 (the Public Advertiser commented in December 1777 that “a man clothed with the robe of 
magistracy ought not to be a politician; a political judge was an improper and dangerous engine”). 
65  G S Wood, “Comment” in A Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation; Federal Courts and the Law, 54-55 
(footnotes omitted). 
66  And continued until the early twentieth century: New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, 
89 (Isaacs J). 
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to the Crown. The history of the development of, and purpose for, the prerogative writs 
demonstrates this.67 
As an additional caution, the terms “executive magistrate”, or “chief executive 
magistrate” can be found in much of the earlier English and the pre- Revolutionary and 
early republican American literature.68 The use of the word “magistrate” almost invariably 
refers to the king, or in the American context, the President (or the governor of the colony). 
When contrasting the English kingship with the French kingship in his Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, Edmund Burke referred to the “executive magistracy”.69 
“Magistrate” should not be understood in the modern sense of a junior judicial officer – 
rather, magistrate is used in a sense that is best described as the person exercising public 
power, and as described supra, that often involves the three Montesquieuian powers. For 
example, the king might be described as the “magistrate of the nation”, whereas his judges 
may be described as his inferior magistrates. Both perform judicial functions. Again, 
attention is drawn in Chapter 2 to the point at which the executive power emerged as a 
separate and distinct function of government – at or around the time of the English Civil 
War. 
Great care needs to be exercised when the expressions “the executive”, or “executive”, 
or “executive magistrate” are encountered in the literature. Does it mean the function or 
power of executing or administering the law? Or does the context suggest the function or 
power of quelling controversies between subjects or citizens, or between the State and its 
                                                          
67  H Woolf, et al, de Smith’s Judicial Review, 858-860. As was said by Brett LJ in Worthington v Jeffries 
(1875) LR 10 CP 379, 381 (and quoting from Bacon’s Abridgment): “As all external jurisdiction, 
whether ecclesiastical or civil, is derived from the Crown, and the administration of justice is committed 
to a great variety of Courts, hence it hath been the care of the Crown that these Courts keep within the 
limits and bounds of their several jurisdictions prescribed them by the laws and statutes of the realm. 
And for this purpose the writ of prohibition was framed, which issues out of the superior courts of 
common law to restrain inferior courts. … The object of prohibition in general is the preservation of the 
right of the King’s Crown and Courts, and the ease and quiet of the subject …”. 
68  For example, James Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton use the phrase “executive magistrate” 
throughout The Federalist Papers – see particularly Federalist No. 67, published on 11 March 1788, 
and authored by Alexander Hamilton. 
69  E Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 201. 
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subjects or citizens? The plasticity of the use of the word “executive”, both in the English 
and American contexts, and both before and after the American Revolution, means that 
great care and attention needs to be taken in ascertaining which, if any, of the three 
meanings above is being referred to. 
For the avoidance of doubt, unless the context reveals otherwise, throughout this 
dissertation, the word “executive” is used in its functionalist or Montesquieuian sense – 
that is, it ought to be understood in contradistinction with the legislative and judicial 
functions and powers. 
VI  THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE B INARY CHOICE  
A core assumption relating to the subject-matter of this dissertation was agitated in a 2003 
article written by a then judge of the Federal Court of Australia, the late Bradley Selway.70 
Justice Selway’s All At Sea – Constitutional Assumptions and ‘The Executive Power of the 
Commonwealth’, advocated the necessity for an assumption in constitutional interpretation 
as to what is meant by the executive power of the Commonwealth. Selway noted the 
absence of any internal definition of executive power. He posited two possibilities 
(grounded on two possible assumptions). The choice (he said) was between a construction 
based on a meaning of executive power which accords with the British Constitution; or a 
construction based on a meaning of executive power which accords with the United States 
model. Selway favoured the British model as the preferable assumption.  
The core argument suggests that it is not necessary to make such a binary choice 
between a British and American understanding of executive power – to the operational 
exclusion of the other model. Instead, the executive power of the Commonwealth should 
be construed in a functionalist sense, similar to the way the “executive Power of the 
President of the United States of America” is construed in Article II, section 1 of the 
United States Constitution; that is, a power construed in contradistinction to the legislative 
                                                          
70  B Selway, “All At Sea - Constitutional Assumptions and ‘The Executive Power of the 
Commonwealth’”, (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 495. 
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and judicial powers. But in arriving at this construction of the executive power, this author 
proposes an alternative vehicle for the recognition and affirmation of the prerogatives of 
the Crown in the Commonwealth constitutional framework. The core argument posits a 
construction of the executive power of the Commonwealth and the prerogative that 
accommodates both a British colonial understanding of the receipt of the prerogative in the 
Queen’s dominions, coupled with a functionalist understanding of the executive power as a 
power to execute and maintain (or administer) the laws of the Commonwealth, and “this 
Constitution”. It does this by demonstrating how the prerogative is executed or maintained 
as “an adjunct” to the executive power; that is, the executive power permits the execution 
of the prerogative rights, preferences, capacities and immunities. In this sense, the 
executive power is the power to give effect to the rights, preferences, capacities and 
immunities of the Crown, but is not the source of those rights, preferences, capacities or 
immunities. In this sense, the binary choice posited by Justice Selway is circumnavigated, 
and a step forward is made in achieving doctrinal clarity in the construction of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth. 
In one respect, this dissertation takes the executive power of the Commonwealth 
jurisprudence one step further than where Justice Selway left it. It presents a theory 
whereby the British and American concepts of the prerogative and the executive power 
respectively sit side-by-side within the Australian constitutional framework, and operate in 
a consistent and co-ordinated manner. In this sense, there is no need for a binary choice 
between the British and American doctrine – the Australian Constitution, as the beneficiary 
of both constitutional traditions, absorbed not both of Selway’s assumptions, but both of 
Selway’s frameworks. More broadly, the idea that the Australian Constitution incorporates 
both a British understanding of the prerogatives of the Crown, and an American sense of 
the expression “executive power” runs contrary to the doctrinal gymnastics that has seen 
several justices of the High Court of Australia seek to reconcile the executive power either 
within, or around, a traditional British executive power framework. 
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VII  AN IMPORTANT D ISTINCTION  
Critical to any analysis of the prerogative and the Constitution is an appreciation of three 
aspects of prerogative jurisprudence which are related, but distinct, and which concern the 
relationship between the prerogatives and the executive power of the Commonwealth. 
First, the author considers how the Constitution recognises or affirms the continued 
operation of the prerogative as part of Australian constitutional law. This is described as the 
recognition or affirmation aspect of the relationship. Second, the author touches upon what 
discrete prerogatives have been devolved to, or invested in, the executive government of 
the Commonwealth – that is, how much of the prerogative is statutorily devolved to the 
Commonwealth from the Crown, or has been invested by the Queen in the governor-
general. This is described as the devolution or investment aspect of the relationship. Third, 
having established that some part of the prerogative is devolved or invested in the 
executive government of the Commonwealth, the author touches upon the mechanism used 
to exercise that prerogative right, preference, capacity, or immunity. This is described as 
the execution aspect of the relationship. The focus of the author’s dissertation is the 
recognition or affirmation aspect. The core argument relates to the recognition or 
affirmation aspect. Nonetheless, it is necessary at some points to traverse the devolution or 
investment aspect, and the execution aspect, in some detail to properly trace the 
relationship between the prerogative and the executive power. Additionally, examining the 
second and third aspect helps shine a light on the first aspect. For example, the operation of 
s 2 of the Constitution is a mechanism for the achievement of the execution aspect, but it 
also demonstrates why the author says that the prerogatives remain vested in the Crown, 
and the continued operation of them in the Australian constitutional setting is recognised, 
or affirmed, by the presence of ss 2, 44, 64 and 74. Alternatively, how the framers saw the 
devolution or investment aspect operating (as explored in some detail in Chapter 4), by 
necessity throws light upon how the framers at least tacitly understood the recognition or 
affirmation aspect operating. 
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There is a further issue that needs to be flagged. The devolution or investment aspect 
also has a federalism dimension. That is, has the prerogative attribute been devolved or 
invested in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, or the Crown in right of the, or a, 
State, or both the Commonwealth and the States? For example, does the prerogative right 
to royal metals (gold and silver) inhere in right of the Crown of the Commonwealth or each 
State and has it been delegated to the governor of the State to administer? For the purposes 
of this dissertation it is by and large unnecessary to consider the process by which 
individual prerogatives became exercisable by the Crown in right of a State (save in the 
global sense which it is discussed in Chapter 2). It is sufficient to simply acknowledge at 
this point that there is a dimension to the devolution and investment aspect which 
necessitates an examination as to whether a particular right, preference, capacity of 
immunity has devolved or been invested in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth or of 
the States, and if the later, then how that prerogative attribute is made exercisable within 
the constitutional machinery of that State. 
VIII  THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE  
This dissertation is not the first attempt to reconcile the relationship between the executive 
power of the Commonwealth and the royal prerogative. In addition to the three Federation-
period constitutional treatises which served as the foundational commentaries upon the 
Australian Constitution,71 there are three recognised works on the relationship between the 
executive power of the Commonwealth and the prerogative. 
The first was by H V Evatt, who submitted his Certain Aspects of the Royal 
Prerogative, A Study in Constitutional Law for his Doctor of Laws thesis at the University 
of Sydney in 1924.72 The thesis was published, and therefore made available to a wider 
                                                          
71  J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, published in 1901; 
W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, published in 1902; A Inglis 
Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law, published in 1901. 
72  Subsequently a justice of the High Court of Australia (1930-40), and later, Chief Justice of New South 
Wales (1960-62). 
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audience, in 1987 under the title The Royal Prerogative. Some of what Dr Evatt opined in 
his doctorate dissertation found judicial recognition in his judgment in Commissioner of 
Taxation v E O Farley Ltd73 – in particular, his scheme for classifying and sorting the 
rights, powers, preferences and immunities of the Crown into three categories: “executive 
powers”, “certain immunities and preferences” and “proprietary rights”.74 
Dr Evatt’s work is outstanding scholarship, but it too sided with the incorrect orthodoxy 
already outlined supra. Dr Evatt’s Royal Prerogative made an important, and basal, 
contribution to prerogative jurisprudence. It demonstrated an understanding of the 
prerogative that is historically-based. That is, the prerogative came to Australia with the 
British settlers, and the British Crown was invested with the prerogative quite apart from 
the enactment of any statute by the Imperial Parliament. Dr Evatt wrote:75 
 
The Colonists at once owed allegiance to the King and so his proprietary rights, 
and the immunities and privileges to which he was by the Prerogative entitled as 
well as the Prerogatives in the nature of the executive powers were all 
reasonably applicable to the Colony from the outset. 
 
Evatt correctly pointed out that “the common law is to be regarded as implicit in the 
Commonwealth Constitution”, and that “[n]ecessary implication is as much part of the 
contents of a document [including the Constitution] as its express statements”.76 But he 
went on to express a view that “when one comes to consider the terms of Section 61 itself 
… it is indeed rather questionable whether the Courts will have need to invoke [the 
doctrine that the common law is implicit in the Commonwealth Constitution]”.77 
                                                          
73  (1940) 63 CLR 278, 319. 
74  H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative, 29-31. 
75  Ibid 140. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Ibid 177. 
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In considering the relationship between the prerogative and the Constitution Act, Dr 
Evatt pointed out that Viscount Haldane LC asked during the Privy Council’s hearing of 
the appeal in the Engineer’s case:78 
 
Did they [the High Court] consider on the first point a Section which is 
somewhere in the Commonwealth Act, and which I have always thought 
requires consideration. In the Canadian Constitution the executive power 
remains in the Crown, delegated to the Governor General, but in Australia is not 
all the power of the Crown vested in the Governor General? 
 
Dr Evatt recorded Mr Dixon as replying to the Board:79 
 
That is not so, I submit. The Constitution of Australia is a true Federation, as I 
think your Lordships observed in the Colonial Sugar Refining case. The State 
Governments retain their autonomy parting only with those subject matters of 
legislative powers which are vested in the Commonwealth Government for the 
whole of Australia … 
 
To which Dr Evatt recorded the Lord Chancellor as responding:80 
 
We know that. We follow all that. No doubt the Commonwealth of Australia is a 
true Federation, and, as you would expect from its being a true Federation, no 
power is given to the Central Parliament to make laws generally for the peace, 
order and good government of Australia; it is only given under the enumerated 
heads. That is not the difficulty. The difficulty is that under Section 61 it is 
                                                          
78  Ibid 189. 
79  Ibid 190. 
80  Ibid (original emphasis). 
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declared ‘The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen 
and is exercisable by the Governor General as the Queen’s representative and 
extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and the laws of 
the Commonwealth’. No doubt that does not take away the power of the 
Governors of the States as representing the Sovereign within their limits, but 
does it not put the Sovereign in the position of having parted, so far as the 
affairs of the Commonwealth are concerned, with every shadow of act of 
intervention in their affairs and handing them over, unlike the case of Canada, 
to the Governor General? 
 
Without recording Mr Dixon’s answer to the Lord Chancellor’s question, Dr Evatt 
expressed his view:81 
 
… that the position here suggested by Viscount Haldane may fairly be accepted 
now as the true legal view determining the exercise of the King’s Prerogative in 
respect of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
It is respectfully suggested that despite correctly appreciating that the unwritten law of the 
Crown is part of the fabric of the constitutional framework, Dr Evatt nonetheless erred. Dr 
Evatt failed to properly have regard to the history of the prerogative, and, despite 
acknowledging it in another context,82 has failed to de-couple the idea of the prerogative 
and the executive power of the Crown. 
It is argued that Dr Evatt has, in not having regard to those portions of the Debates 
which are set out Chapter 4, failed to appreciate the nuanced way that the prerogative is 
thought to have been textually affirmed by the framers, and how the executive power of the 
                                                          
81  Ibid. 
82  Ibid 12. 
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Commonwealth was not suggested by any framer as including the prerogatives of the 
Crown. 
Additionally, Dr Evatt appears to have erred in his reading of the High Court’s decision 
in Farey v Burvett83 where Dr Evatt said that there were “clear statements by the Court” 
that s 61 incorporated the prerogative.84 In Farey v Burvett, Isaacs J said:85 
 
… Besides the legislative power, there is the executive authority of the 
Commonwealth. By sec. 61 of the Constitution that is vested in the Sovereign 
and (subject to sec. 2) is exercisable by the Governor-General as the royal 
representative, and, says sec. 61, this executive power extends to the execution 
and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth. 
These provisions carry with them the royal war prerogative, and all that the 
common law of England includes in that prerogative so far as it is applicable to 
Australia.  
 
Dr Evatt’s appears to have given the final sentence too wide a meaning. Isaacs J 
commenced this sentence with the words “These provisions …”, and by that, he was 
referring to ss 2 and 61 of the Constitution – not just the executive power of the 
Commonwealth. The better reading of Isaac J’s passage, recited above, is that his Honour 
is saying that the combined operation of those two provisions – sections 2 and 61 – permit 
that operation of the war prerogative. That is, the individual prerogative right is delegated 
by operation of s 2 of the Constitution, and then that prerogative is executed and 
maintained by operation of s 61 of the Constitution. 
                                                          
83  (1916) 21 CLR 433. 
84  H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative, 181. Despite Dr Evatt’s involvement as the Minister for External 
Affairs in the assignment of the war prerogative in 1941, his reliance upon ss 2 and 61 to advise the 
Sovereign to delegate the war prerogative (some seventeen years after he wrote his thesis) does not, of 
itself, demonstrate that he had a correct appreciation of constitutional principle at the time he wrote his 
doctorate dissertation. 
85  (1916) 21 CLR 433, 452. 
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The second work was by Professor George Winterton, lately a Professor of Law at the 
University of Sydney and before that, New South Wales, who wrote his Doctor of Juridical 
Science thesis for Columbia University on the topic of the executive power. His doctorate 
became the core of his subsequent work, The Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-
General, A Constitutional Analysis, which was published as part of an “Australian 
Federation Series”, by Melbourne University Press in 1983. Chief Justice French described 
Winterton’s publication as “a seminal work in the field”.86 Winterton’s is a scholarly work. 
It proposed a framework for considering whether executive action (including prerogative 
acts) is lawful. Winterton wrote:87 
 
… the limits of the executive power of the Commonwealth must be ascertained 
relative both to the powers of the States and the powers of the other branches of 
the federal government. The former component, the ‘federalism’ aspect, will be 
referred to as that of ‘breadth’; and the latter, the ‘separation of powers’ aspect, 
as that of ‘depth’. Although these two components of federal executive power 
have, occasionally, been blurred, the correct approach to ascertaining the 
validity of challenged Commonwealth executive action is to consider, first, 
whether the act falls within the breadth of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth, and only if it does, need one go on to consider whether it also 
falls within the depth of that power; only if both aspects – breadth and depth – 
are satisfied, will the action be validly carried out. Although there have been 
relatively few High Court decisions on s. 61, this model for ascertaining the 
validity of Commonwealth executive action has weighty authority; it represents 
the approach recently taken by the High Court in Johnson v Kent. 
                                                          
86  R S French, “The Executive Power”, The Inaugural George Winterton Lecture, Sydney Law School, 
The University of Sydney, 18 February 2010; P Gerangelos, “The Executive Power of the 
Commonwealth of Australia: Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, ‘Nationhood’ and the 
Future of the Prerogative”, (2012) 12(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 97, 105. 
87  G G Winterton, The Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General, 29-30. 
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This method of analysing impugned executive action has proved popular with the justices 
of the High Court. Gageler J said recently:88 
 
Without attempting to define Commonwealth executive power, Professor 
Winterton usefully drew attention to its dimensions when he distinguished its 
“breadth” from its “depth”: “breadth” referring to the subject-matters with 
respect to which the Executive Government of the Commonwealth is 
empowered to act having regard to the constraints of the federal system; "depth" 
referring to the precise actions which the Executive Government is empowered 
to undertake in relation to those subject-matters. 
 
A year later, in 1984, former Commonwealth Crown Solicitor, Harold Renfree’s The 
Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia was published by Legal Books. The 
publication is less cited in subsequent literature than Winterton’s treatise, but Renfree’s 
Executive Power is a comprehensive examination of the powers of the executive 
government, and is particularly useful in considering the construction and operation of s 2 
of the Constitution. 
A distinct advantage that this author has over the distinguished writers that have written 
in this area of constitutional jurisprudence previously is that the Debates of the Federation 
Conventions are now regular, and acceptable, aids in interpreting the Constitution.89 
Reference to what the framers had to say is a regular and acceptable form of constitutional 
reasoning. Whilst Professor Winterton did consider the contents of the Debates, this author 
has sought to make it a focus of the argument, so that this dissertation reflects an historical 
and doctrinal approach to the understanding of the prerogative, and the executive power of 
                                                          
88  Plaintiff M68 (2016) 257 CLR 42, 96 [130]. 
89  See Chapter 4. 
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the Commonwealth. This is reflected through the depth of consideration of the Official 
Reports and Official Records of the Conventions in Chapter 4. 
IX  THE CHAPTERS OUTLINED  
This introduction identifies the dissertation’s entire argument. That said, the detail of the 
argument in terms of the third, fourth and fifth contentions requires a depth of analysis 
which cannot be conveyed in one chapter. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 descend into the detail of the 
history necessary for the making of the core argument in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 2 identifies the origin of scholarly inquiry of the attributes of sovereignty; it 
then identifies the origin of the prerogative in English and colonial constitutional law and 
practice by positing a theory – that the prerogative commenced juristic life as the quality of 
the prince’s title. The chapter then sets out the history of the prerogative, making the 
argument that the prerogative pre-dates the emergence of a distinct executive department 
of government.  
Chapter 3 identifies the rich heritage of the decisional law which predates the 
Constitution and informs the textual choices made by the framers, and has, of itself, 
interpretative power in respect of the Constitution’s text. The chapter identifies how three 
decisions of the Privy Council and two twin decisions of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales describe the powers of colonial governorship. The chapter then examines the 
Supreme Court of Victoria’s decision in Toy v Musgrove;90 and concludes by identifying 
how the Privy Council disposed of the appeal without considering the constitutional issues 
in that decision.91 
Chapter 4: This dissertation’s argument relies on the history of the prerogative 
jurisprudence before the enactment of the Constitution, and the history of the enactment of 
the Constitution. Chapter 4 identifies what use can be made of the Debates in constitutional 
interpretation and then examines in detail the available evidence as to how the framers saw 
                                                          
90  (1888) 14 VLR 349. 
91  Musgrove v Toy [1891] AC 272. 
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the prerogative operating in the new Commonwealth and its relationship to the executive 
power of the Commonwealth. The contributions to the Debates by the delegates to the First 
and Second Conventions are examined closely to see what interpretative assistance can be 
obtained. The Chapter identifies three conclusions that should be drawn from the Official 
Reports. 
Chapter 5 identifies the orthodox view as to the nature of the relationship between the 
prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth. It does so by setting out the 
case law in respect of the two streams – the older authorities, and the emergence of a newer 
view in the High Court of Australia’s more recent case law. The common law and inherent 
schools of thought are then set out. Having brought the jurisprudence up to date, the 
Chapter then sets out the high point of this dissertation – the core argument. The chapter 
sketches a theory about the relationship between the (correctly understood) prerogative, 
and the executive power of the Commonwealth; it is not intended as a comprehensive 
study of the executive power of the Commonwealth – rather, an assertion of the broad 
outline of the nature of the executive power of the Commonwealth now that it is textually 
(and doctrinally) decoupled from the prerogative.  
Chapter 6 focuses upon various aspects of historical material, textual features, and 
doctrinal choices which this author describes as pillars which support the correctness of the 
core argument. In that sense, the material identified, and the arguments made, form the 
substratum of the core argument. When each pillar is considered, the reader is invited to 
conclude that the relationship between the prerogative and the executive power of the 
Commonwealth ought to be understood in accordance with the core argument. To do this 
this author has identified and used the various modalities of interpretation to show why 
there is substance to the core argument, and how it is fortified. 
Chapter 7 identifies some recent developments emanating from the High Court of 
Australia’s two most recent executive power cases – Williams [No 2]92 and Plaintiff M6893 
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– to demonstrate where the core argument accords with the emerging jurisprudence. The 
Chapter also reflects upon the way in which the non-statutory executive power, including 
the prerogative non-statutory executive power, is amenable to judicial supervision and 
reflects more generally on the prerogative as a core aspect of a political constitution by 
identifying how the prerogative continues to have contemporary operation as both a bundle 
of legal rights, preferences, capacities and immunities, as well as a mechanism for political 
restraint. 
X  THE IMPORTANCE OF DOCTRINAL CLARITY  
In any dissertation, the question arises, why? Why proffer the thesis or theorem set out in 
the dissertation? What utility does the thesis or theorem have in respect of the development 
of Australian constitutional law? 
The nature of both the prerogative of the Crown and the executive power of the 
Commonwealth have significant ramifications for the legal authority of the executive 
government of the Commonwealth, and therefore for the citizenry of the Commonwealth. 
What the ministers of state of the Commonwealth can, and cannot do, without express 
statutory authority; or what the officers of the Commonwealth can, and cannot do, without 
express statutory authority, is of basal concern to the Commonwealth, and its peoples. 
This dissertation seeks doctrinal clarity. Doctrinal clarity is important. It aids in the 
orderly exposition of constitutional principle; it protects against unwarranted attempts by 
executive governments from using the lack of clarity to achieve political objectives in a 
climate of constitutional uncertainty. 
If the source (and therefore the scope) of the prerogative can be properly identified, then 
its content and relationship to the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the 
Commonwealth can be correctly appreciated. If the content (and therefore the scope) of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth, and its relationship with the prerogatives of the 
Crown can be correctly ascertained, then the exercise of the executive power of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
93  Plaintiff M68 (2016) 257 CLR 42. 
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Commonwealth can be held to account by the exercise of the legislative and judicial 
powers of the Commonwealth. 
As was demonstrated in the Full Court of the Federal Court’s decision in Ruddock v 
Vadarlis (the Tampa case),94 the scope of the prerogative as well as the scope of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth have very significant public policy consequences. 
Doctrinal clarity as to the outer limits of the executive power of the Commonwealth, and 
the accountability for the exercise of that power – in the Parliament and in the courts – is 
best achieved by a satisfactory degree of precision in the identification of how the power is 
textually recognised and affirmed in the constitutional text, and an understanding of its 
relationship to the text and structure of the Constitution, and to other constitutional 
doctrines. 
The recent significant decisions in Pape, and Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2], also 
demonstrate the importance in achieving doctrinal clarity in respect of the relationship 
between the prerogatives of the Crown and the executive power of the Commonwealth. In 
those cases, what fell within the scope (or depth) of non-statutory executive power was 
critical to the outcome of the litigation, and, given the nature of the litigation, of particular 
public importance. 
The importance of striving to achieve doctrinal clarity can be seen in the words of 
French CJ in CPCF, where the Chief Justice said:95 
 
Any consideration of the non-statutory executive power must bear in mind its 
character as an element of the grant of executive power contained in s 61 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution. The history of the prerogative powers in the 
United Kingdom informs consideration of the content of s 61, but should not be 
regarded as determinative. The content of the executive power may be said to 
extend to the prerogative powers, appropriate to the Commonwealth, accorded 
                                                          
94  (2001) 110 FCR 491. 
95  CPCF (2015) 255 CLR 514, 538 [42]. 
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to the Crown by the common law. It does not follow that the prerogative content 
comprehensively defines the limits of the aspects of executive power to which it 
relates. 
 
What does, or does not, fall within the depth dimension (described below) of non-statutory 
executive power requires the doctrinal resolution of the relationship between the 
prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth. To do so, it is necessary to 
clarify two things. First, which prerogatives have (or have not) been Australianised? 
Secondly, what are the nature and scope of the powers that fall within the non-statutory 
executive power, but which are not traditional prerogatives requires clarification? 
Doctrinal clarity around the nature, scope and content of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth, and its relationship to the prerogative, guards against the temptation for 
the executive government of the Commonwealth to seek to expand the operation of the 
executive power by exploiting an absence of doctrinal certainty. 
Doctrinal clarity also aids both the courts and potential litigants who seek judicial 
review of the exercise of acts of both statutory, and non-statutory executive power. As is 
set out in detail in Chapter 6, greater doctrinal clarity around the nature of both the 
prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth (understood in a functionalist 
sense) makes the task of judicially reviewing purported exercises of either a more 
analytical task, and reduces the likelihood, or need, for judges to resort to idiosyncratic, or 
abstract theories as to what an executive government can, and cannot do, without the 
express authority of the legislature. If this author is correct, and the executive power is 
correctly understood as a functionalist authority best described in contradistinction to the 
legislative and judicial powers, then judicially reviewing the acts of the executive 
government becomes more predictable for the executive government, and citizenry alike. 
Finally, doctrinal clarity is important should there ever be a further attempt to amend the 
Constitution and remove the Crown from the Constitution and create a republican 
Commonwealth of Australia. If the core argument is correct, then there would need to be 
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enacted in the Constitution a new provision which affirms that the President has vested in 
him or her all the powers and functions which the Queen retained (as inhering in Her 
Majesty) prior to the removal of the office of Queen of Australia from the Constitution Act. 
This would ensure that those powers, capacities, immunities and preferences did not 
evaporate upon the change from a monarchical form of government to a republican form of 
government. 
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C  H A P T E R  T  W O  
THE PREROGATIVE  
 
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce the royal prerogative and set out the 
relationship between the prerogative and executive power. The Chapter canvasses five 
aspects of the nature of the prerogative. First, the Chapter sets out the origins of scholarly 
enquiry into the nature of kingly power in England, commencing with the fusing of Roman 
jurisprudence with English law by Henry de Bracton. Second, the Chapter demonstrates 
that the prerogative, as a feature of the royal title, predates the emergence of the trinity of 
powers and doctrine associated with Montesquieu. Third, the Chapter identifies the point at 
which a discrete executive function of government emerged in English public law. Fourth, 
the Chapter identifies the competing definitions of “the prerogative”. Fifth, the Chapter 
demonstrates, by reference to scholarly works and legal commentators of historical 
significance, that “the prerogative” has historically been given a wider meaning than “the 
executive power”. Consequently, the executive part of government (exercising the 
executive power) is (to a substantial degree) part of, and not the sum of, the prerogative. 
That is, the two concepts are not coextensive. 
II  JURISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SOVEREIGN’S POWER  
The power and nature of monarchy emerged as a subject of scholarly enquiry in twelfth-
century Europe. Definitions of princely authority in the early Middle Ages were said to be 
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“descriptive of rank, legitimacy, prerogatives, or privileges”.1 Frederick Barbarossa – the 
Holy Roman Emperor – ruled “the most powerful state of twelfth-century Europe”.2 
Frederick I is credited with recognising the importance of Roman law and the role of 
“jurists in shaping a theory of empire”,3 and prerogative jurisprudence.4 It was in the court 
of Frederick I that scholars first sought to describe the “rights of regalia”.5 The Emperor 
took a special interest in the law school at Bologna and Frederick’s jurists “formulated a 
concise, succinct definition of imperial power based upon Roman precedents”.6 As legal 
historian, Randall Lesaffer, recorded:7 
 
In 1158, at the Imperial Diet in Roncaglia, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa 
promulgated a list of royal prerogatives and powers that belonged exclusively to 
the king (regalia or iura regia). For this, Frederick appealed to the quattuor 
doctores, the four great doctors or scholars of Roman law. 
 
It was Frederick’s deeds that “provided the jurists with ample inspiration to contemplate 
the authority and rights of the prince”.8  In this centre of scholastic endeavour, we find the 
birth of scholarly enquiry into the nature of kingship: what it meant to hold a princely title, 
where the quality, features and functions of the princely title stem from, and what they tend 
to become. In fact, whilst Frederick’s jurists have the credit, the “bureaucratization and 
legalisation of power was a Europe-wide tendency at this time”.9 
                                                          
1  K Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 9. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Ibid 12. 
4  R L Benson, “Political Renovatio: Two Models from Roman Antiquity”, in R L Benson, et al, 
Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, 360-367. 
5  K Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 13. 
6  Ibid 14. 
7  R C H Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, 231. 
8  K Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 15. 
9  R Tombs, The English and Their History, 65. 
  40 
     
The prerogative “is, both in fact and theory, the oldest part of the English 
constitution”,10 and, whilst it can be dated from antiquity,11 scholarly enquiry into the 
nature of kingly power is a more recent endeavour.  
Kenneth Pennington gave an account of how the jurists of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries came to use the word “princeps” (or “prince”), reserving the generic title “for 
monarchs who had no superiors”.12 The princeps title can be traced back to its adoption by 
Augustus and was said to be a “perfectly colourless title”.13 In time, English “[w]riters 
were borrowing phrases from Roman law books and applying them to the English 
kingship”.14 Professor Pennington recorded that:15 
 
In the second half of the thirteenth century, a number of jurists attempted to 
fashion a more restricted definition of the prince. They argued that “prince” 
could only be used to describe the emperor as defined by Roman law. The prince 
had prerogatives and authority that kings did not possess. In particular, these 
jurists insisted that kings could not lay claims to the authority granted to the 
emperor by Roman law. 
 
He further noted that when academic jurists considered the constitutional status of the 
monarchs of Europe:16  
 
                                                          
10  W C Richardson, “The Surveyor of the King’s Prerogative”, (1941) The English Historical Review (Vol 
56), 52. 
11  J Allen, Inquiry into the Rise and Growth of the Royal Prerogative in England, 8-13. John Allen dates 
the rise of the prerogative to the Roman provincials. 
12  K Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 90. 
13  T M Taylor, A Constitutional and Political History of Rome, From the Earliest Times to the Reign of 
Domitian, 413. 
14  C W Prosser, M Sharp, A Short Constitutional History of England, 29. 
15  K Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 91. 
16  Ibid. 
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… they often equated the authority of a king with that of the emperor. By the 
late Middle Ages, after the national monarchs has established themselves as not 
only equal to, but, in real life, more powerful than emperors, this equation, king 
equals emperor, became an unexceptional commonplace.  However, the 
academic lawyers rarely allow us to see European kings as the jurists themselves 
must have seen them: embroiled in disputes with their nobles over rights 
enshrined in customary law – “the good old law” – or hard pressed by 
developing institutions, like parliament, that demanded a share in the power to 
tax, wage war, judge and legislate. 
 
Whilst there is a significant body of evidence suggesting the arrival of Roman law 
principles before the time of Henry III,17 Professor Pennington identified Henry de 
Bracton as the principal source of the blending of the Roman law concept of kingly traits 
with the municipal law of England soon after the effective demise of the Angevin Empire. 
Pennington wrote that:18 
 
When Bracton discussed the relationship of the king and the law, he tried to 
explain the status of the king in English law and to incorporate into his work the 
new (for English lawyers) Roman law doctrines ... 
 
A “jurist of Bologna would have extracted a coherent doctrine of legislative sovereignty by 
the year 1200”,19 and in his use of Roman law in his treatise on the laws and customs of 
England, Bracton had “cooked a heady broth”.20 This is how Pennington described 
                                                          
17  R V Turner, “Roman Law in England Before the Time of Bracton”, Journal of British Studies (Vol 15), 
1. 
18  K Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 92; see also T G Barnes, Shaping the Common Law, From 
Glanvill to Hale, 1188-1688, 104,105 and 156. 
19  K Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 93. 
20  Ibid 92. 
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Bracton’s attempt to “to fit [the] massive structure of English private law into the rather 
flimsy framework of Romanesque public law”.21 Roman ideas about the quality of English 
kingship, along with juristic analysis of English kingship, can be dated back to this point.22 
III  THE ORIGIN OF “THE PREROGATIVE”  
The origin of the concept, known today as “the prerogative”, can be traced by examining 
its manifestation. As Churchill observed of the Angevin Crown, “[i]n an unwritten 
Constitution the limits of the King’s traditional rights were vaguely defined”.23 In the 
unwritten English constitution, the conceptual source of royal power is necessarily one of 
evolution, and must be found in the pages of English history, rather than on the pages of a 
canonical text. 
The word “prerogative” comes to us from antiquity. As Thomas Poole recently wrote, 
“[t]he Latin praerogativa not only referred to the tribe that voted first in the Roman 
Republican Comitta (and, by extension, a prior preference, privilege or claim) but also 
meant a token or omen”.24 The prerogative has always been a mystery. This mystery led 
Paul Halliday to observe:25 
 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the nature of the prerogative had become a 
matter of Trinitarian complexity, elusive owing to the inherent mystery of the 
concept and the greatness of the being who made it manifest. It had not always 
been so. In the later Middle Ages, commentators on the prerogative focused on 
                                                          
21  Ibid 93; see also B Tierney, “Bracton on Government”, Speculum (Vol. 38), 295-317; S J T Miller, 
“The Position of the King in Bracton and Beaumanoir’”, Speculum (Vol. 31), 263-296; see also Lord 
Pearce’s reference to Bracton in Burmah Oil Company Limited v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, 147. 
22  T F T Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 244-250; F W Maitland, The Constitutional 
History of England, 17 and 18. 
23  W S Churchill (editor), W S Churchill’s The Great Republic: A History of America, 410. An 
abridgement of the author’s A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, and edited by the author’s 
grandson and namesake. 
24  T M Poole, Reason of State; Law, Prerogative and Empire, 22. 
25  P D Halliday, Habeas Corpus, From England to Empire, 65. 
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those rights in land peculiar to the king. By this feudal view, prerogative was 
largely a list of uniquely royal possibilities for control over property rather than 
a theory or power. Lawyers disagreed about which items belonged on the list: 
various forms of escheat, wardship, and so on. While some might have thought 
the list longer than others, all were more interested in the king as landlord than 
in the king as lord. 
 
The origin of the prerogative concept may be described as the evolution of power in what 
became the English royal court. Allen wrote that “[t]he government of the Roman world 
had been for ages a pure, unmitigated despotism”, and “[t]he prince possessed in theory, 
and exercised in practice, every power of the state”.26 He continued: “The legislative, 
judicial, and executive functions of government, were united in his person”.27 Adam 
Tomkins wrote more recently that “[i]n England power started with the Crown”.28 Power 
was not the by-product of some revolutionary event but rather “emerged”.29 Allen went as 
far as to say that “[i]n law, [the English king’s] prerogative has been held to be the same 
with that claimed or possessed by the Roman Emperors”.30 
The prerogative, as a body of principle which evolved into legal doctrine, commenced 
its juristic life as a quality: the quality of sovereignty, or the quality of the princely title. 
The quality of the English king’s title was, as Poole has recently written, “bound up with 
the idea of majesty”.31 This is illustrated by the older treatises on the prerogative which 
commence their consideration of the subject matter by proclaiming the exalted, and 
formerly divine, nature or quality of English kingship. Kings are oft-described in older 
                                                          
26  J Allen, Inquiry into the Rise and Growth of the Royal Prerogative in England, 13. 
27  Ibid. 
28  A Tomkins, Public Law, 39. 
29  Ibid. 
30  J Allen, Inquiry into the Rise and Growth of the Royal Prerogative in England, 24 (original emphasis). 
31  T M Poole, Reason of State, Law, Prerogative and Empire, 22 (original emphasis). 
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authorities as God’s “lieutenant on earth”.32 It has been said “that Roman imperialist 
doctrines were being appropriated to enhance the status of the English monarch at the time 
of the investiture contest”.33 The description of the English kingship can also be said to 
have originated with Bracton, who wrote in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 
(and which was approvingly quoted by the Great Commentator) that: “Rex est vicarious et 
minister Dei in terra: amnis quidem sub eo est, et ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub Deo”.34 
Halsbury’s Laws of England traced the prerogative to “the times of Bracton”.35 And 
Bracton was said to have “founded the royal authority on law”.  
Historian David Carpenter goes back earlier when he wrote of Henry II rebuking the 
Bishop of Chichester for challenging the King’s “God-given majesty, dignity and rights of 
the crown”; and telling us that “[t]he concept of the incorporated crown, to which rights 
and possessions attached (as opposed to them being attached to the person of an individual 
king), had come to prominence under Henry I”.36 Sir Owen Dixon traced the majesty of 
kingship from a little later, saying that:37 
 
The conceptions of the royal office which prevailed for so many centuries are 
the product of the century in which Bracton lived. In the thirteenth century they 
spread over Europe. Many of the notions of royalty, including the doctrine, 
                                                          
32  Cawley’s Case (1591), 5 Co. Rep. 8b, 77 ER 10 (Sir Edward Coke); Case of the Master and Fellows of 
Magdalen College (1615), 11 Co Rep, 72a; 77 ER 1243 (Sir Edward Coke), and citing Sir John 
Fortesque, De Laudibus, 23-24. 
33  R V Turner, “Roman Law in England Before the Time of Bracton”, Journal of British Studies, 1975 
(Vol. 15), 3; quoting from N F Cantor, Church, Kingship and Lay Investiture in England 1081-1135, 
Princeton University Press, 1958, 280. Some Commonwealth judges in the Pacific believe that: “The 
royal prerogative can be traced back 1,000 years to the Norman Conquest”: Qarse v Bainimarama 
[2009] FJCA 67 at [120] (Gates ACJ, Byrne and Pathik JJ). 
34  W Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk I, 234: “The King is the vicegerent and minister of God on earth: all 
are subject to him; and he is subject to none but to God alone”.  
35  Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 8(2), (Fourth Edition), paragraph 368, n. 1; see also S Payne, “The 
Royal Prerogative”, in M Sunkin & S Payne’s The Nature of the Crown, A Legal and Political Analysis, 
86-87; J Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy, 22-28. 
36  D Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery, 196. 
37  O Dixon, “The Law and the Constitution”, Jesting Pilate, 40-41. 
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which appears so strange to us, of the divine right of Kings, originated in the 
majesty of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The divinity which 
surrounded his office was transferred to other monarchies. 
 
During the reign of Richard II the blending of the Roman law concepts of sovereignty with 
the English kingship intensified. Ricardian historian Nigel Saul wrote that Richard’s 
kingship owed much to the ideas of the thirteenth century writer Giles of Rome. Giles 
argued that “all honour and privilege in society flowed from the king … [and] the king’s 
subjects should be obedient to him”.38 Richard II was “seen in ritualistic terms as a sacred 
icon, supreme and all-powerful. He was invested with a mystical, almost a godlike, 
quality”.39 Richard was the first monarch to be known by the title “your highness and royal 
majesty” or “your most excellent and powerful prince”.40 Richard elevated the quality of 
his princely title to almost Augustus-like proportions. 
During the reign of Elizabeth I the sovereign was described as “the most excellent and 
worthiest part or member of the body of the common wealth” to whom “honour, dignity, 
prerogative and pre-eminence” was attributed.41 Indeed, the “nature and extent of regal 
authority not having been accurately defined during the time which preceded the reign of 
the Tudors, the exorbitant power of the princes of that house had gradually introduced 
political prejudices of even an extravagant kind”, said de Lolme in 1784.42 
During the reign of Charles II the Imperial Crown of England was said to be an 
“absolute and independent Power, the Supreme Dignity of England, that acknowledged no 
                                                          
38  N Saul, Richard II, 250. 
39  Ibid 239. 
40  Ibid 238; see also N Saul, The Three Richards; Richard I, Richard II, and Richard III, 60; D Jones, The 
Plantagenets, The Kings Who Made England, 558. 
41  W Staunforde, An Exposition of the King’s Prerogative collected out of the great Abridgment of Justice 
Fitzherbert, and other old Writers of the Laws of England, Ch I. Classical authors like Bracton, 
Staunforde, and Chitty were cited and considered in respect of the prerogative by the superior courts of 
England in the years just prior to Federation, see for example Perry v Eames [1891] 1 Ch D 658, 663, 
668. 
42  J L de Lolme, The Constitution of England, 83. 
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Superior, but God Almighty, not to be Divided, Communicated, nor transferred to any 
person whatsoever”.43  
 
*** 
 
At the time of the Stuart Restoration, Sir Matthew Hale wrote in his History of the 
Common Law that the common law included Lex Prerogativa, and further describing it as 
“that which asserts, maintains, and with all imaginable Care provides for the Safety of the 
King’s Royal Person, his Crown and Dignity, and all his just Rights, Revenues, Powers, 
Prerogatives and Government, as the great Foundation (under God) of the Peace, 
Happiness, Honour and Justice, of this Kingdom …”.44 
Indeed, the life and writings of Sir Matthew Hale45 are particularly illuminating in 
respect of the qualities of the English Crown. Whilst much of Hale’s writings were not 
published during his lifetime, three in particular are illuminating as to the royal authority. 
The manuscripts for Incepta de Juribus Coronae, then Preparatory Notes touching the 
Rights of the Crown, and finally, Prerogativa Regis were each drafted by Hale between the 
Civil War (most likely towards the end of the Interregnum, or early after the Restoration) 
and during the reign of Charles II, but were not published during his lifetime. The Rights of 
the Crown and Prerogativa Regis became available in select circles at or around 1790 and 
1788 respectively. All three were brought together and incorporated into a single text by D 
E C Yale for the Selden Society in 1976, and entitled Sir Matthew Hale’s The Prerogatives 
of the King. Whilst this text (as an amalgam) was not published until 1975, the way in 
which Hale described the prerogatives of the Crown especially illuminates how the 
prerogative was viewed (particularly by Chief Justice Hale as the most senior member of 
                                                          
43  J Brydall, His Majesties Royal Rights and Prerogatives Asserted, Against Papal Usurpations, and all 
other Anti-Monarchical Attempts and Practices, 2. 
44  M Hale, History of the Common Law, 1713. Written during Hale’s life (1609-1676), and probably soon 
after the Restoration. 
45  Matthew Hale was successively a justice of the Court of Common Please (1654-1658), the Chief Baron 
of the Exchequer (1660-1671), and finally the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench (1671-1676). 
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the King’s Bench) during the Restoration, and provides valuable historical material as to 
the nature of the prerogative in English history.  
Hale’s Prerogatives is particularly important for three reasons. First, Hale’s 
Prerogatives is the earliest taxonomy of the prerogatives of the Crown. Just as Joseph 
Chitty’s Prerogatives of the Crown (published in 1820) is the most recent taxonomy; 
Hale’s Prerogatives is the earliest that this author can locate. The idea that the prerogative 
can be conceptually illustrated diagrammatically is demonstrated by the seven tables (or, as 
Hale called them, his Tabulae Prerogativae Regis) set out at the commencement of Hale’s 
Prerogatives.46  
Second, as his editor David Yale wrote, Hale set out that the prerogative is “[t]he sum of 
the king’s powers of government [which] he called the jura summi imperii”. Hale 
identified those “principal powers” as: “(1) Declaring war and peace. (2) Giving value and 
legitimation to coin. (3) Pardoning the punishment of public offences. (4) Administering 
the common justice of the kingdom, civil and ecclesiastical. (5) Raising forces by land and 
sea. (6) Making laws.”47  
Third, whilst the language of “executive”, or “executive power” had not, at the time, 
taken a foothold in English jurisprudence, we can see that Hale compartmentalised the 
origins of the executive function of government under two headings in his notes. In 
Chapter X, entitled “Concerning the King’s Council, And First of His Concilia Ordinaria 
and His Privy Council”, Hale described the king’s four councils as “[first] his private or 
privy council, secondly, his legal council, thirdly, his military council, fourthly the council 
domestical or of his household”.48 Of his legal council, Hale said that it is “sometimes 
styled concilium ordinarium”, and that it “consisted of the great officers of state and justice 
within the kingdom”. The legal council included the Chancellor, Treasurer, Keeper of the 
Privy Seal, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Justices of both Benches, Barons of the 
                                                          
46  D E C Yale, Sir Matthew Hale’s The Prerogatives of the King, xii to xx. 
47  Ibid xlvii. 
48  Ibid 105. 
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Exchequer, Master of the Rolls, King’s attorney and serjeants, Masters of the Chancery, 
and the Chancellor of the Duchy. According to Hale, the members of the council “were 
bound to advise the king in such questions as concern law or government”.49 He further 
described the members of the council as “the distributors of the king’s judgment and will 
according to rule, for he [the king] neither speaks nor doth anything in the public 
administration of the realm but what he doth by these or some of these [members of 
council], especially the chancellor”.50 
In Chapter XVIII, entitled “Of Temporal Coercion, Process, Continuance, and 
Executions, And of The King’s Powers Therein”, Hale said that:51 
 
Coercion is that whereby the judicative power is acted and without which there 
can be no jurisdiction, and whereby the king upon complaint either of a 
particular man or of a country, as by indictment, or of his attorney, may enforce 
the person complained of to come to judgment and to execute it. 
 
Hale continued:52 
 
 … there be two general parts of legal coercion viz. that which precedes 
judgment, and that which follows. The coercion preceding the judgment is the 
process of law, that which follows is the execution. 
 
These views of Hale, written in an age just prior to, or contemporaneously with, the 
emergence of a discrete executive function of government (discussed in the next part of 
                                                          
49  Ibid 106. 
50  Ibid 107. 
51  Ibid 191. 
52  Ibid. 
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this Chapter), demonstrate that the quality of the English Crown included a developing 
machinery for the execution of the royal rights, dignities and capacities. 
During the reign of George II, the noted author of various legal treatises, Giles Jacob, 
wrote in his treatise on the prerogative of the Crown that, “if the Crown descend to the 
Right Heir, he is Rex before Coronation, as there must be always a King in whose Name 
Laws are to be maintain’d and executed”.53 Describing the prerogative of the King as “so 
very extensive and excellently contriv’d”,54 Jacob went on to summarise the prerogative. 
What is evident is how extensive and detailed Jacob was in setting out the common law 
attributes of the Crown. What is also evident is how much the detail of the rights, 
preferences, capacities and immunities of the Crown, recognisable to a twenty-first century 
constitutional lawyer, were clearly well-established in the learned literature of almost 300 
years ago.55 
Additionally, there are three features of Jacob’s exposition which ought to be 
emphasised. First, Jacob described the Sovereign’s authority to maintain and execute the 
laws of the realm as being a function of the Sovereign (and he included that function as 
part of his consideration of the prerogative); second, Jacob particularised a further set of 
prerogative matters – which broadly accord with (or at least are recognisable as) the 
modern state of the prerogative in Britain; and third, it is clear that by the time of George 
II, the prerogatives of the Crown were well developed and known, at least in scholarly 
circles. Indeed, in this respect, it has been said that the prerogative “has been hardwired 
into British constitutional thinking” since at least the seventeenth century.56 
During the reign of George III, William Blackstone described the king as “the supreme 
executive power of the English nation”,57 and set out the quality of the king’s title in his 
                                                          
53  G Jacob, Lex Constitutionis, 65. 
54  Ibid 71. 
55  Ibid 71-73. 
56  T M Poole, “United Kingdom: The royal prerogative”, ICon (2010), Vol 8, No 1, 147. 
57  W Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk I, 183. 
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Commentaries on the Laws of England as a precursor to describing the various branches of 
the king’s prerogative.58 Blackstone’s Commentaries are widely cited in respect of the 
prerogative.59 His description of the quality of the kingly power commenced with an 
observation that “by the word prerogative we usually understand that special pre-eminence, 
which the king hath”.60 The king’s direct prerogatives are said to stem from “such positive 
substantial parts of the royal character and authority, as are rooted in and spring from the 
king’s political person, considered merely by itself”.61 The kingly quality, or dignity, “was 
supported, in the eyes of the people, not only by the splendour of his royalty, but by the 
lowly reverence paid him by the greatest of his lords”.62  
Paul Halliday made a similar observation about the quality of Blackstone’s king. 
Professor Halliday saw in Blackstone’s Commentaries an ascription to the king not of a 
“sacredness”, but of a certain “quality”. He observed:63 
 
At first blush, chapters 3 (Of the King and his Title), 6 (Of the King’s Duties), 
and 7 (Of the King’s prerogative) of Book I look like standard fare, easily read 
in terms familiar for centuries. Blackstone opens chapter 3 with confidence: 
‘The supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a 
single person, the king or queen...[who] is immediately invested with all these 
ensigns, rights and prerogatives of sovereign power’. The monarch has ‘(in 
subservience to the law of the land) the care and protection of the community’; 
                                                          
58  Ibid Chapter III. 
59  R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [No 2] (2009) 1 AC 453, 484 
[43] (Lord Hoffman), 491 [70] (Lord Bingham), 496 [87] (Lord Rodger), 508 [124] (Lord Carswell), 
529 [151] (Lord Mance). 
60  W Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk I, 232. 
61  Ibid 232-233. 
62  F S Sullivan, Lectures on the Constitution and Laws of England with a Commentary on Magna Carta, 
and Illustrations of many of the English Statutes, 235. 
63  P D Halliday, “Blackstone’s King” in Wilfrid Prest, Re-Interpreting Blackstone’s Commentaries, A 
Seminal text in National and International Contexts, 174. 
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to the king ‘in return, the duty of allegiance of every individual are due’. In 
chapter 6 – and again in chapter 10, on aliens and natives – Blackstone develops 
this point, drawing straight from Calvin’s Case: ‘protection and subjection are 
reciprocal’. Blackstone offers further definition of the prerogative in chapter 7. 
By the word prerogative we usually understand that special pre-eminence, which 
the king hath, over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of 
the common law, in right of his regal dignity’. There is nothing here of the 
mystical being that one encounters in discussions of the prerogative two 
centuries earlier. But Blackstone obliges soon enough, noting how ‘The law 
therefore ascribes to the king ... certain attributes of a great and transcendent 
nature ... by law the person of the king is sacred’. 
 
Joseph Chitty, soon after the accession of George IV, described the king of England in his 
Prerogatives of the Crown as “not only the chief, but properly the sole, magistrate of the 
nation; all others acting by commission, and in due subordination to him”. The quality, or 
“attributes” of the kingly throne “are principally sovereignty or pre-eminence”, and 
“perfection”.64 Before setting out a taxonomy of the prerogatives then recognised, Chitty 
grandiloquently said that the king is the “supreme executive magistrate”.65 
With the vicissitudes of the Tudor, Stuart and Hanoverian reigns, the prerogative 
morphed from being described as the quality of kingship (and by the time of Mary Tudor, 
queenship),66 to the rights, preferences, capacities and immunities of kingship. Thus, the 
quality of the king begot the king’s prerogatives. The king was said to be sovereign, thus 
the king’s power of legislating, suspending laws and making proclamations developed. The 
king was said to demand allegiance from his subjects, thus the king’s capacity to send and 
                                                          
64  J Chitty, Prerogative of the Crown, 4. 
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receive ambassadors emerged with the evolution of the modern European state. The king’s 
quality made him the fountain of justice, thus he enjoyed immunity from suit from his 
subjects in the king’s courts. The transition from a broad conception of the quality of 
kingship to a prescriptive understanding of the scope and ambit of the king’s rights, 
preferences, capacities and immunities was essentially “the result of a constitutional 
struggle”.67 Or, as Sheldon Amos put it, the king “simply retains to the full all the 
attributes, capacities, functions and dignity which revolutions and silent constitutional 
changes have not taken away”.68 
In this sense, there is another way to understand the concept of the prerogative; and that 
is in terms of it as a political reality. Referring to the historical analysis of Maitland, 
Sebastian Payne presented the prerogative as “a reflection of the strength of the King rather 
than being the source of the King’s strength”.69 In that sense, he said that constitutional 
theory “was not a guiding force but a reaction or a rationalisation of the prevailing political 
reality”.70 It is in this sense that the prerogative must always be understood in terms of 
historical analysis, and the body of rules that constitute the prerogative are, as Sir William 
Wade put it, “rules legitimated by history”.71 This understanding of the prerogative draws 
a further conceptual aspect to the fore. Whilst the prerogative is understood in British 
constitutional terms as a body of the Sovereign’s rights, capacities, immunities and 
preferences recognised by the common law, the expression “prerogative” is also used in the 
language of political science. When Locke wrote of the prerogative in his Second Treatise 
of Civil Government he was referring to the prerogative in terms of political discourse – 
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rather than to constitutional principle.72 The observation of the prerogative being “a 
reflection of the strength of the King rather than being the source of the King’s strength” is 
more reflective of political science, rather than legal science. And it demonstrates the close 
proximity that there is (as there is in most areas of constitutional law and theory) between 
the prerogative as recognised by the common law, and the felt necessity for the executive 
magistrate to be able to “act according to discretion, for the public good, without the 
prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it”.73 
IV  THE ORIGIN OF THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT  
Whilst it is not central to this dissertation’s purpose to delve into the history of the 
separation of powers, it is important to identify the point at which, in English constitutional 
theory, philosophers begin to recognise or reflect the emergence of an executive function, 
or power, of government within the English Constitution. 
Professor Maurice Vile’s Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers is a relatively 
recent and elegant survey of the history of the doctrine. It identified the emergence of the 
executive function of government between the English Civil War and the end of the 
seventeenth century. 
Tracing the executive function back to the writings of the fourteenth century Italian 
scholar, Marsilius of Padua, Vile quoted Marsilius as saying: “The execution of legal 
provisions is effected more conveniently by the ruler than by the entire multitude of 
citizens since in this function one or a few rulers suffice.”74 Writing in respect of 
Marsilius, Professor Vile expressed the view that the Italian scholar:75 
 
                                                          
72  L C Feldman, “Lockean Prerogative: Productive Tensions”, in C Fatovic and B A Kleinerman, Extra-
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73  J Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, § 160. 
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… had a clear distinction of functions in mind, and he placed them in distinct 
hands, but his concern was with the division of labour on grounds of efficiency, 
not with an attempt to limit the power of government by setting up internal 
division; he was not, therefore, directly concerned with the “separation of 
powers” as we have defined it.  
 
Writing in reference to the judicial power (as distinct from an executive power), a modern 
scholar has noted that whilst Marsilius “does not speak directly to the independence of the 
judiciary … the executive’s function is judicial in nature” in Marsilius’ theory.76 The 
gradual separation of the judicial and executive functions led Professor Vile to caution 
against seeing too much in the writings of pre-English Civil War scholars:77 
 
… the use of the term executive by Marsilius, and its use by most writers until 
the end of the seventeenth century, is that Marsilius meant by this essentially 
what we should describe as the judicial function, the function of the courts 
headed by the ruler, which put the law into effect. He did not distinguish 
between the judicial and the executive functions, and indeed the idea of a 
separate executive function is a relatively modern notion, not being fully 
developed until the end of the eighteenth century. Marsilius saw the legislative 
and “executive” functions as branches of the over-all judicial function.  
 
Professor Vile further explained:78 
 
… the roots of the idea of a judicial “power” distinct from the executive go a 
long way back into seventeenth-century England, nevertheless the dominant 
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view of the division of government functions remained a twofold division into 
“legislative” and “executive”. The modern notion of an executive power distinct 
from the machinery of law enforcement through the courts, could hardly be 
envisaged in an age when almost the only impact of government upon the 
ordinary citizen was through the courts and the law-enforcement officers. The 
“executive power” meant, then, either the function of administering justice under 
the law, or the machinery by which the law was put into effect.  
 
Evincing the correctness of this view, Professor Vile pointed to the writings of the Bishop 
of Winchester (and an acolyte of Thomas Cranmer), John Poynet, who, in 1556, expressed 
this principle in his Short Treatise of Politicke Power. Bishop Poynet, writing of the 
authority to make laws and of the power of the magistrates to execute them, commented, 
said Vile, that: “lawes without execution, be no more profitable, than belles without 
clappers”.79 
In demonstrating that the prevailing orthodoxy of the time was to view the executive 
and judicial functions as one and the same thing, Professor Vile identified a number of 
seventeenth-century writers as broadly according with the view that the executive and 
judicial functions are, or ought to be, viewed as a single function of government.80 
First, Vile identified James Harrington, who (originally in 1656) defined the “executive 
order” as that part of the science of government which is styled “of the frame, and course 
of courts or judicatories”.81 Second, Vile pointed to parliamentarian and republican 
political writer, Algernon Sidney, who, writing somewhat later in 1680, defined the 
executive function in terms which we should today consider purely judicial. Sidney 
divided government between “the sword of war” and “the sword of Justice.” “The Sword 
of justice comprehends the legislative and executive Power: the one is exercised in making 
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Laws, the other in judging controversies according to such as are made”.82 Third, the great 
poet and Commonwealthsman, John Milton, wrote of the need for the execution of law by 
local county courts so that the people “shall have Justice in their own hands, Law executed 
fully and finally in their own counties and precincts”.83 And finally, in 1656, Marchamont 
Nedham defined those who held the executive power (Vile tells us), as the constant 
administrators and dispensers of the law and justice.84 Summarising the prevailing pre-
Civil War theory, Professor Vile wrote:85 
 
It is not clear how far seventeenth-century writers included in the “executive 
power” aspects of the government machine other than the courts, or included 
ideas about those functions of government which we should today label 
“executive” or “administrative,” rather than “judicial.” Certainly many writers 
mention non-judicial officials and non-judicial functions of the prince.  
 
After touching upon the views of Jean Bodin, Walter Raleigh, Thomas Hobbes and Samuel 
Pufendorf, Professor Vile summarised:86 
 
Broadly speaking, then, we must see the seventeenth-century abstraction of the 
functions of government as a twofold one in which “executive” was generally 
synonymous with our use of “judicial,” and in fact in the latter part of the 
century the two words were used synonymously.  
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Professor Vile continued:87 
 
It took a century, from the English Civil War until the mid eighteenth century, 
for a threefold division to emerge fully and to take over from the earlier twofold 
division. However, the notion of an independent “judicial power,” at any rate in 
the sense of the independence of the judges, goes back beyond the seventeenth 
century, and during the English Civil War the basis was laid for a threefold 
division which never quite managed fully to materialize … the view that there 
were three distinct “powers” of government seems to have emerged during the 
English Civil War. 
 
Professor Vile credited the first sprouting of the idea that there is a distinct executive 
function of government to the administrative leadership of the Cromwellian Protectorate.88 
In 1649, Oliver Cromwell’s private secretary, John Sadler, used the analogy of the writs to 
develop a threefold category of government functions, legislative or original, judicial, and 
executive: “If I may not grant, yet I cannot deny, Originall Power to the Commons, 
Judiciall to the Lords; Executive to the King”.89 Sadler wrote: “It may be much disputed, 
that the legislative, judicial, and executive power should be in distinct subjects by the law 
of nature”.90 Less than a decade later (in 1657), the most effective use of Sadler’s 
description was made by George Lawson (a cleric and critic of Thomas Hobbes) who also 
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formulated the threefold legislative, judicial, and executive division of functions and, as 
Vile said, argued it out to a much greater extent than Sadler.91  
Professor Vile cautioned against concluding that the use of these terms by John Sadler 
and George Lawson was characteristic of their modern usage. Vile said that Sadler and 
Lawson “saw the judicial and executive functions, respectively, in terms of judgement, and 
the carrying out of the sentence of the Court”.92 
Professor Vile also identified a work, dated 1648, and entitled The Royalists Defence, 
and attributed to Charles Dallison, who was a Recorder of Lincoln. Vile tells us that 
Dallison made a clear distinction between the “soveraigne power of government,” which is 
in the King, and the authority to judge the law. “The Judges of the Realme declare by what 
Law the King governs, and so both King and people [are] regulated by a known law”.93 
Charles Dallison did not use the term “executive power,” as he was splitting the 
seventeenth-century executive function into two parts, the functions of governing and of 
judging. In addition, Parliament had the function of making the law, so he arrived at a 
threefold division of government functions very close to that which came to be generally 
accepted a century later. “It is one thing to have power to make Lawes, another to expound 
the Law, and to governe the people is different from both”.94 Professor Vile concluded 
that:95  
 
… the cauldron of the [English] Civil War [has] hastened the evolution of the 
ideas of the functions of government and formed them into two main streams. 
The dominant conception was still the twofold division of executive and 
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legislative which reflected an older tradition about the functions of government, 
but the first elements of a new basis for ideas about these functions were being 
developed.  
 
After the Stuart Restoration, the constitutional ideas that germinated during and soon after 
the English Civil War were not lost “for the elements in Sadler, Lawson, and Dallison all 
reappear in the theory of the balanced constitution at the opening of the eighteenth 
century”.96 Furthermore, the idea that the execution of the law was a royal duty was well 
established by the time that Edmund Burke wrote his Reflections in 1790.97 A century later 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales was explicitly recognising that it was for the 
executive to execute the law.98 In Ex parte Woo Tin, in addition to making some strident 
remarks about the rule of law, Darley CJ said (referring to the ministry) that the Court finds 
itself “disregarded” by those who were:99 
 
… by the duty they owe their country, and by their oath of allegiance to their 
Sovereign, bound to see that the law of their country as pronounced by properly 
constituted authorities (the Judges of the land), is duly and faithfully carried into 
execution. The constitution of our country does not provide the Judges with a 
separate staff of officers for the purpose of enforcing obedience to the decrees 
and judgments of the Court.  The constitution casts this duty upon the executive, 
and never before in the history of any British community, so far as our 
knowledge extends, has this sacred duty been disregarded. 
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Priestley JA provided a useful modern description of the executive function (in the context 
of the government of New South Wales) which can now be taken to be an accurate 
description of the executive function of government. His Honour said in Egan v 
Chadwick:100 
 
… the function of the Executive is to administer the carrying out of existing law 
in accordance with its policy from time-to-time, to keep all its administrative 
policies under review, and to formulate further policy which it thinks desirable 
in the public interest which can be put into effect either on the basis of the law as 
it stands or if parliament passes legislation which will enable the further policy 
to be lawfully carried out. All of this is to be done in the public interest. 
V  THE PREROGATIVE PREDATES MONTESQUIEU’S TRINITY  
The modern tripartite division of governmental functions and powers into the legislative, 
the executive and the judicial is usually attributed to Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de 
Montesquieu, and his De l’esprit des lois (the Spirit of the Laws), published in 1748. 
Whilst Montesquieu told us little about sovereignty, said Theodore Plunkett, “he has a 
good deal to say about liberty”.101 “He regards liberty as best assured by the supremacy of 
law rather than of men, and to achieve this the best way, in his opinion, was the separation 
of powers”.102  Montesquieu’s formulation of the separation of powers is indebted to the 
earlier writings of English philosopher John Locke.103 Montesquieu said in relation to the 
British Constitution:104 
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In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive 
in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard 
to matters that depend on the civil law. 
 
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual 
laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the 
second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the 
public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes 
criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter 
we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of 
the state. 
 
Montesquieu warned that:105 
 
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in 
the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions 
may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to 
execute them in a tyrannical manner.  
 
Whilst English writers borrow Montesquieu’s descriptions of “legislative”, “executive” and 
“judicial” powers, the Montesquieuian division of governmental powers is a framework 
and theory of dividing power (for the purpose of protecting liberty) which significantly 
post-dated the emergence of the prerogatives of the Crown. The distinct body of powers, 
preferences, capacities and immunities of the Crown had well and truly emerged from the 
quality of kingship by the time Montesquieu analysed the British Constitution. At least four 
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centuries had passed since Henry de Bracton first attributed certain qualities to English 
kingship.  
The prerogatives of the English Crown significantly predate the emergence of an 
“executive” in the Montesquieuian sense. Evidence of this can be found as far back as a 
Year Book case from 1461. Sir Walter Moyle, a justice of the Common Pleas said that “the 
king is held (as a matter) of right to administer law to each of his subjects”.106 Evidence of 
this can also be found in John Brydall’s short treatise, written in 1680 (and sixty-eight 
years before Montesquieu’s masterpiece), where Brydall wrote in reference to the 
Sovereign’s prerogative right to tribute that: “It is (said Plowden in his Commentaries) the 
Office of the King, to preserve his Subjects in Peace, and their Preservation doth consist, in 
the due Execution of the Laws, and in Armour to defend them against al Hostility”.107 
Further evidence of the advanced development of the prerogatives of the Crown by the 
time of the emergence of the executive function of government is present in the three sets 
of notes prepared by Sir Matthew Hale, which were ultimately published as Sir Matthew 
Hale’s Prerogatives of the King. 
The point was made by Sir William Anson:108 
 
In our constitution we can say not only that the executive and legislative 
processes are distinct … , but that we can trace the process by which their 
powers have become distinct.  The common element in both is the Crown; the 
Crown in council once made laws and also conducted the business of 
government, and its powers in these matters have gradually and for different 
reasons passed into the hands of two different bodies.  The need for money 
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which the Commons alone could supply, gave them, as we have seen a hold 
upon legislation; while the jealousy of the great feudal lords who made up the 
Council, and the inevitable of business beyond the capacity of an individual to 
transact, tended to place the conduct of the executive in the hands of servants or 
ministers of the Crown. The legislative and executive powers of the Crown 
have, as it were, bifurcated, and there is a real dualism in our constitution, the 
Crown in Parliament, and the Crown in Council ... 
 
Sir William continued:109 
 
We shall understand our constitution better if we remember that the Crown in 
Council was once the sole repository of sovereign power, whether executive or 
legislative; and that this power has now passed into two different sets of hands, 
Ministers and Parliaments. The Crown, through its Ministers, does the acts of 
State; the Crown in Parliament, enacts laws. 
 
The same point was made by Professor Adam Tomkins in his Public Law where he 
presented the view that English public law was not founded on an historical evolution of a 
discrete English legislature, executive and judiciary. Rather, Tomkins made the argument, 
that “English public law is based on a separation of power not between legislature, 
executive and judiciary, but between the Crown and Parliament”.110   
Power in England originated in the Crown. In the course of English history power 
shifted from the Crown to Parliament as a consequence of the great constitutional 
struggles. This is evinced through Thomas Macaulay’s very partisan exhortation of the 
Whig view of English history:111 
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When I look back on our history, I can discern a great party which has, through 
many generations, preserved its identity, [which] has always been in advance of 
the age, [which] steadily asserted the privileges of the people, and wrested 
prerogative after prerogative from the Crown … To the Whigs of the 
seventeenth century we owe it that we have a House of Commons. To the Whigs 
of the nineteenth century we owe it that the House of Commons has been 
purified. 
 
In more recent times, another writer wrote when comparing aspects of the English and 
French Constitutions that “the history of English constitutional law is to a great extent the 
history of the struggle between the rights based on the prerogative and the rights of 
Parliament”.112 Tomkins proffered the view that English power is separated and divided 
between the Crown and Parliament.  Rather than “being based on a separation of powers 
between legislature, executive, and judiciary, to the extent that there is a separation of 
powers in English public law it is a separation between the Crown on one hand, and the 
Parliament on the other”.113 Tomkins opined that there is a separation of power; in 
contrast to Montesquieu’s separation of powers.114 
If this is the true separating and dividing of powers that is historically evident in the 
English ‘state’, it is a division of powers (or power) that predates the emergence of the 
Montesquieuian trinity by many centuries. In that sense, “the English constitutional order 
had already emerged before the radical genius of Montesquieu, Tom Paine, and James 
Madison had become available”.115 The emergence of a set of rights, preferences, 
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capacities and immunities of the Crown (which evolved into the modern day prerogative) 
is a more historically sound theory of the nature of the Crown, than Montesquieu’s theory.  
As a central or dominant organising principle for English public law, the “Crown vs 
Parliament” theory has much to commend it. It reconciles the establishment of the Crown 
and the emergence of the Parliament as the two defining public law institutions of the 
British Constitution. It recognises that the judicature is a function or activity of 
government, which was historically shared by the king and the Parliament. And it accounts 
for the centuries of constitutional struggle which can be summed up by the observation that 
the history of English public law is the history of the Parliament’s limitations and restraint 
upon the prerogative. 
A similar organising principle for English public law – whereby power in the English 
‘state’ is effectively shared between the Crown and the legislature – was espoused by the 
Swiss-born lawyer Jean-Louis de Lolme. Writing in 1784, de Lolme offered the view that 
the point at which the “power of administering justice to individuals” became separated 
from the military power of the Sovereign is “the origin of a regular system of laws in a 
nation”.116 De Lolme positioned the “judicial authority” as a subset of the executive 
power. De Lolme wrote in his Constitution of England that the English king:117 
 
… assumed the prerogative of imposing taxes. He invested himself with the 
whole executive power of the government. But what was of the greatest 
consequence, he arrogated to himself the most extensive judicial power by the 
establishment of the court which was called Aula Regis, - a formidable tribunal, 
which received appeals from all the courts of the barons, and decided, in the last 
resort, on the estates, honour and lives of the barons themselves; and which, 
being wholly composed of the great officers of the crown, removable at the 
king’s pleasure and having the kind himself for president, kept the first 
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nobleman in the kingdom under the same control as the meanest subject. 
 
Thus, having observed that the prerogative was historically understood by the leading 
writers of the time as a wider concept than the mere executive power (understood in a 
functionalist or administrative sense) of the Crown, one can see that this view remained the 
prevailing view until soon after Federation. Sir William Anson was able to say in 1907:118 
 
Of these three aspects of prerogative the most succinct and by far the most 
important are the customary rights, legislative and executive, which the Crown 
possesses in relation to Parliament, to the executive and to the Courts … 
VI  THE COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF ‘THE PREROGATIVE’  
Having set out the origin of scholarly enquiry into the quality of the English kingship, and 
having identified that the prerogative significantly predates the Montesquieuian doctrine of 
the separation of powers, it now falls to consider what the prerogative, royal prerogative, 
or prerogatives of the Crown are.  
The academic literature on this question is significant. At its heart, there is a rather stale 
debate centred on reconciling, or approving, the two most oft-cited definitions of the 
prerogative, which are attributed to Blackstone and Dicey, and are canvassed below. 
As has been already identified, the answer to the question, “what is the prerogative?”, 
begins with Henry de Bracton, who said: “The king is prerogative”.119 During the time of 
Elizabeth I (in 1573), Sir William Staunford defined the prerogative as “a privilege or pre-
eminence that any person hath before another, which as it is tolerable in some, so is it most 
to be permitted and allowed in a prince or sovereign government of a realm”.120  
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The first of the two “most often-quoted definitions of the royal prerogative”121 was 
offered by Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. He described the 
prerogative as “that special pre-eminence which the king hath, over and above all other 
persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his royal 
dignity”.122 “It signifies in its etymology, (from prae and rogo)”, Blackstone said, 
“something that is required or demanded before, or in preference to, all others”.123 The 
prerogative’s defining feature is that “it must be in its nature singular and eccentrical; that 
it can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the king enjoys alone, in 
contradiction to others, and not to which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects”; 
Blackstone concludes that if “any one prerogative of the Crown could be held in common 
with the subject, it would cease to be prerogative any longer”.124 It has been suggested that 
Blackstone appropriated this definition from a writer a century earlier.125 The most 
comprehensive taxonomy of the prerogatives of the Crown, Joseph Chitty’s Prerogatives of 
the Crown, published in 1820, adopts Blackstone’s description of the prerogative as correct 
law.126 Blackstone’s description has “the prerogative [as] a closed list of identifiable and 
discrete powers covering areas of government which are its especial province”.127 Indeed, 
a cursory examination of Chitty’s Treatise is said to show that “there is no grand criterion 
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or principle that encompasses the disparate powers and functions of the executive at 
common law”.128 
Blackstone’s definition has found favour in the recent decisions of the High Court.129 In 
Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales, four members of the Court said:130 
 
Blackstone described the prerogative as part of the common law of England but, 
given its nature, as being out of the ordinary course of the common law. The 
“prerogative” in the context of the present case concerns the enjoyment by the 
executive government of preferences, immunities and exceptions peculiar to it 
and denied to the citizen or, more specifically, of an exceptional right which 
partakes of the nature of property. 
 
In Williams [No 1], French CJ saw an attractive quality to Blackstone’s definition when 
compared against the second of the two often-quoted definitions:131 
 
There is, nevertheless, a point to Blackstone’s [definition]. It avoids the 
temptation to stretch the prerogative beyond its proper historical bounds. 
Moreover, as appears below, one of the Commonwealth submissions suggested 
that the exercise of the executive “capacities” was not subject to the same 
constraints as the exercise of the prerogative.  
 
The second of the two definitions comes from Albert Venn Dicey’s classic work, An 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, where Professor Dicey described 
the prerogative as “the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any time is 
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legally left in the hands of the crown”.132 It is Dicey’s broader description that has found 
favour in House of Lords and Privy Council case law in the last century.133  
Blackstone and Dicey’s definitions are, in truth, more descriptions than definitions. 
Indeed, it was acknowledged as early as 1680 that the prerogative can really only be 
described, rather than defined, by the prolific text-writer and Oxonian lawyer, John 
Brydall.134 Blackstone and Dicey’s “definitions” are unsatisfactory because of their 
vagueness. Frederic Maitland said in 1919 that the “law then as to the extent of the royal 
prerogative in many directions is often very vague”.135 
Despite their vagueness, some features of these two definitions need to be emphasised. 
First, the Blackstone and Dicey definitions are descriptive in nature, and not functionalist. 
They are both posited as concepts to be understood in contradistinction to one another; that 
is, what they are not.  And second, they both necessitate an informed (and necessarily 
historical) analysis to determine what falls within the definition and what falls outside the 
definition.136 It would be constitutional heresy to suggest that the prerogatives of the 
Crown could expand. As Diplock LJ famously said in British Broadcasting Corporation v 
Johns:137 
 
... it is 350 years and a civil war too late for the Queen’s courts to broaden the 
prerogative.  The limits within which the executive government may impose 
obligations or restraints upon the citizens of the United Kingdom without any 
statutory authority are well settled and incapable of extension. 
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Citing British Broadcasting Corporation v Johns, Bingham LJ made it plain that “[o]ver 
the centuries the scope of the royal prerogative has been steadily eroded and it cannot 
today be enlarged”.138 Ascertaining what falls within the ambit of the prerogative requires 
historical analysis. Again, his Lordship opined, “when the existence or effect of the royal 
prerogative is in question the courts must conduct an historical inquiry to establish whether 
there is any precedent for the exercise of the power in the given circumstances”.139 Lord 
Reid made the same point in Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate,140 where his 
Lordship said:141 
 
The prerogative is really a relic of a past age, not lost by disuse, but only 
available for a use not conceded by statute.  So I would think the proper 
approach is a historical one: how was it used in former times and how has it 
been used in modern times?  
 
Sir William Wade said that the prerogative is “a bundle of miscellaneous powers and rights 
which are inherent in the Crown and in no one else”.142 Perhaps the best description that 
can be made about the prerogative is that: “The defining characteristic of the prerogative is 
that its exercise does not require the approval of Parliament”.143 To search for an analytical 
description, or an organising principle, which explains what the various prerogatives have 
in common (other than belonging to the Crown, and not requiring the approval of 
Parliament) is a barren exercise. As the late Professor Leslie Zines wrote, “there is no 
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grand criterion or principle that encompasses the disparate powers and functions of the 
executive at common law”.144 
VII  THE PREROGATIVE IS W IDER THAN THE EXECUTIVE POWER  
The foundation of this dissertation is an historically accurate understanding of the nature of 
the prerogative of the Crown, and the doctrinal emergence of what became known as the 
“executive prerogatives”, or the “executive power” of the Crown, as a species of the 
prerogative in British constitutional history. Evidence for this view can be drawn from 
Blackstone, Chitty, and Hallam, and from some of the leading constitutional scholars of the 
British Empire. 
William Blackstone dissected the prerogative into the “direct” and “indirect” 
prerogatives. The direct prerogatives are further divided, he said, into those prerogatives 
relating to the royal “character”, those prerogatives relating to the royal “authority”, and 
those prerogatives relating to the royal “income” or “revenue”. Having considered those 
aspects of the prerogative that touch upon the royal character, Blackstone then turned to 
royal authority, and set out:145 
 
… those branches of the royal prerogative, which invest this our sovereign lord, 
thus all-perfect and immortal in his kingly capacity, with a number of authorities 
and powers; in the exertion whereof consists the executive part of government. 
This is wisely placed in a single hand by the British constitution, for the sake of 
unanimity, strength and dispatch. 
 
Blackstone’s use of the words “in the exertion whereof consists the executive part of 
government”, suggests that the exertion (or performance of) those authorities and powers 
consists of what is now described as the executive government. This suggests that those 
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prerogatives (and only those prerogatives) fall within what might be described as the 
executive prerogatives as they pertain to the executive part of government. That 
Blackstone’s description of the prerogative divides the prerogative into a sub-class called 
the “royal authority”, or “royal power”, and of that sub-class, the exercise of it “consists of 
the executive part of government” suggests that the prerogatives of the Crown are wider 
than that power which is now described as the “executive power” of the Crown. 
This conclusion as to the nature of Blackstone’s taxonomy of the prerogative finds 
further textual support when, in introducing the subsequent chapter on the king’s revenue 
prerogatives in his Commentaries, Blackstone noted that “in the preceding chapter, [he] 
considered … those branches of the king’s prerogative, which contribute to his royal 
dignity, and constitute the executive power of the government”.146 He then proceeded to 
examine another branch of the king’s prerogative; the king’s fiscal prerogative. 
In fact, a wider view of how Blackstone structured his Commentaries is useful in 
ascertaining the relationship between the prerogative and the executive power. In his 
chapter “Of the Parliament”, Blackstone wrote:147 
 
In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or the right both of 
making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and 
the same body of men; and wherever these two powers are united together, there 
can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute 
them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of 
justice, with all the power which he as legislator thinks proper to give himself. 
But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the 
former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power, as may take 
care not to entrust the latter with so large a power, as may tend to the subversion 
of it’s [sic] own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject. With 
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us therefore in England this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one 
legislative, to wit, the parliament, consisting of king, lords, and commons; the 
other executive, consisting of the king alone. It will be the business of this 
chapter to consider the British parliament; in which the legislative power, and 
(of course) the supreme and absolute authority of the state, is vested by our 
constitution. 
 
Blackstone (consistent with some of the writers identified supra) viewed “supreme power” 
as being divided into two branches: “legislative power” vested in the parliament, which 
consisted of the “king, lords, and commons”; and “executive power” vested in “the king 
alone”. In his chapter entitled “Of the King, and His Title”, Blackstone affirmed that the 
“Supreme executive power of these kingdoms” is vested in “the king or queen”.148 
Again, at the commencement of his chapter entitled “Of Subordinate Magistrates”, we 
see Blackstone’s scheme for seeing two great powers. He wrote:149 
 
In a former chapter of these commentaries we distinguished magistrates into two 
kinds; supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; and 
subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere. We have hitherto 
considered the former kind only, namely, the supreme legislative power or 
parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to 
proceed to enquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate 
magistrates. 
 
Blackstone went on to say that, when setting out the powers and duties of the “subordinate 
magistrates” that he won’t, at that point, “treat of the office and authority of the lord 
chancellor, or the other judges of the superior courts of justice, because they will find a 
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more proper place in the third part of these commentaries”. Nonetheless, Blackstone 
clearly grouped together the judges (including sheriffs, coroners, justices of the peace, 
constables, etc.) within the overarching category of “subordinate magistrates”. 
At the same time as Blackstone published his Oxford lectures, the Royal Professor of 
Common Law at the University of Dublin wrote of “the nature and constitution of a feudal 
monarchy”, the “constituent parts thereof, and what were the chief of the peculiar rights 
and privileges of each part”. Commencing with a general description of the “splendour of 
his royalty”,150 Dr Sullivan wrote of some of the powers and immunities of the king – for 
example, the “sacred, and guarded” nature of the king’s person, resulting in “the most 
horrible punishment for attempts against him” – and then said:151 
 
But the greatest of the kingly power consisted in his being entirely entrusted 
with the executive part of the government, both at home and abroad. At home 
justice was administered in his name, and by officers of his appointment. 
 
Dr Sullivan’s use of the words “the greatest” (by a writer who was very familiar with the 
writings of Montesquieu)152 suggests that of the kingly power, that part which can be 
described as “the executive part of government”, is best understood as a part of, but not the 
sum of, the kingly power. 
Joseph Chitty’s Prerogatives of the Crown is the leading academic work on the content 
of the Crown’s prerogative in the nineteenth-century British Empire. Published in 1820, it 
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is still widely cited in both British153 and Australian154 courts as an authoritative 
exposition on the nature and content of the prerogative.  
Chitty made the point that the king’s powers are wider than merely “executive” when he 
wrote of the interconnectedness between the king’s “legislative prerogatives” and the 
king’s “executive prerogatives”. He said at the commencement of his Prerogatives of the 
Crown:155 
 
The rights of sovereignty, or supreme power, are of a legislative and executive 
nature, and must, under any form of government, be vested exclusively in a 
body or bodies, distinct from the people at large. In this country, the legislative 
and executive authorities are wisely placed in different hands: the power of 
making laws being allotted to the King, Lords and Commons, who constitute the 
Parliament; and the right to administer and execute them being assigned to the 
King, who in his political capacity of supreme executive magistrate, must in 
general consider the laws, not his own will, as the criterion of his conduct. That 
government is arbitrary in which the legislative and executive departments are 
inseparable; but when firmly and inalienably secured in separate hands, the 
different branches of government operate as a check on each other, and form that 
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mixed monarchical constitution which has been considered by most writers on 
political subjects to be best calculated to secure the happiness and liberty of the 
subject. 
 
Chitty went further. He made it clear at the start of his Chapter VII, which is entitled “Of 
the King as the Fountain of Justice and Office, and Administrator of the Laws”, that:156  
 
The prerogative of creating courts and officers has been immemorially exercised 
by the Kings of England, and is founded on the capacities of executive 
magistrate, and distributor of justice, which the constitution of the country has 
assigned to the Sovereign. 
 
Chitty went on to describe public offices as “either judicial or ministerial”.157 As to 
“public offices merely of a ministerial nature”, Chitty observed that though “his Majesty 
cannot execute them himself”, he “has an undoubted prerogative right to appoint officers to 
fill them”.158 Chitty described the King’s power to constitute new ministerial offices, and 
appoint persons to them. He advised that “it is not in the power of the Crown to create any 
new office inconsistent with the constitution or prejudicial to the subject”.159 Chitty’s 
description of ministerial office, and contrasting it against judicial office, leaves the reader 
of his Prerogatives with the distinct impression that Chitty saw the ministerial office as one 
type of administrator, or executor, of the law, and “instituted … for the benefit of the 
State”.160  
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Support for the proposition that the executive power and the prerogative are not 
correlative, and that a substantial part of the executive power is part of, and not the sum of, 
the prerogative can also be found in the elegant writings of the noted Whig constitutional 
historian (and early nineteenth century barrister), Dr Henry Hallam. He wrote in 1818:161 
 
The word prerogative is of peculiar import and scarcely understood by those 
who come from the studies of political philosophy. We cannot define it by any 
theory of executive functions. All these may be comprehended in it, but also a 
great deal more. It is best, perhaps, to be understood by its derivation; and has 
been said to be that law in case of the king, which is law in no case of the 
subject. 
 
Walter Bagehot published his The English Constitution in the English press in 1867. Dr 
John Quick and Robert Garran told us in their Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth that they were indebted to Bagehot for his Constitution for providing 
“valuable assistance”.162 We know that some of the delegates to the Constitutional 
Conventions of the 1890s were also familiar with the words of Bagehot;163 in fact, Sir 
George Reid quoted Bagehot at length in the debate concerning draft s 2 of the 
Commonwealth Bill, during the Second Convention in Adelaide.164 Bagehot told us at the 
start of his second chapter on “The Monarchy”, that:165 
 
… the ancient theory holds that the Queen is the executive. The American 
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Constitution was made upon a most careful argument, and most of the argument 
assumes the king to be the administrator of the English Constitution … 
 
Turning to the early post-Federation literature; soon after Federation, William Harrison 
Moore published his work The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. In his 
chapter on the executive power and the organisation of the executive government, Harrison 
Moore described the work of the executive as “the execution of the law”,166 and adopted 
the terms “administrative”, “stewardship”, or “management” of government to describe 
that type of function or activity which provides for “controlling the management of the 
state affairs”.167 It is plain that in that chapter, the sense in which Harrison Moore used the 
term “executive power” is in the Montesquieuian sense. Harrison Moore went on to say 
that:168 
 
The executive power in every part of the Queen’s dominions is part of the 
prerogative, and therefore section 61, so far as it vests generally the executive 
power of the Commonwealth in the Crown, is merely declaratory of the common 
law. 
 
Quick and Garran in their Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth took 
the view that “the exercise of the ordinary Executive authority by the Crown, through 
Ministers of State” is an example of a “prerogative”.169 
In the first edition of his Laws of England, the Earl of Halsbury, made it clear: “The 
executive authority is vested in the Crown as part of the prerogative”.170 Under the 
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heading “The Executive”, Lord Halsbury adopted the division of “special privileges” 
assigned to the Sovereign by Blackstone; the special qualities of ‘pre-eminence and 
dignity’; the “various powers and authorities”, afforded to the sovereign “as the supreme 
executive officer in the State”; and the “special privileges enjoyed by the sovereign”.171 Dr 
Evatt agreed. He said that “the executive authority under the British system of government 
is vested in the King and exercised by virtue of the Prerogative on the advice of 
Ministers”.172 So too did William Holdsworth, who told us that the king’s “prerogative 
was the source of the executive authority in the state …”.173 
In his first edition of his Responsible Government in the Dominions, Arthur Berriedale 
Keith identified the same distinction between the prerogative and executive power; namely 
that the “executive power” is a component of, and not correlative to the full sum of the 
prerogatives of the Crown. In a footnote (which was also noticed by Dr Evatt),174 
Berriedale Keith observed that:175 
 
The prerogative and executive power are sometimes used as convertible terms 
(e.g. by Barton, Melbourne Federal Debates, pp. 2253, 2254: Quick and Garran, 
Constitution of Commonwealth, p. 406; cf pp. 472, 707; and the Ontario 
Government, Sess. Pap., 1888, No. 37); sometimes the prerogative is restricted 
to the discretionary power of the Crown as opposed to power regulated or 
granted by statute. Cf . Anson, Law of the Constitution, II I. 3; Dicey, Law of the 
Constitution, pp.420 seq, In any case, prerogative means more than executive 
power, for there is a judicial prerogative and a legislative prerogative also. A 
Governor has a full delegation of executive authority as regulated or granted by 
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statute, but not necessarily of other executive authority. 
 
Notably, Berriedale Keith’s last sentence drew a distinction between the power that a 
governor is delegated by statute (for example, by section 61 of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in the Queen), and “other executive authority”. By “other executive 
authority”, Keith appeared to be endorsing the view that there is a specie or species of 
“executive authority” which is commonly associated with, or connected to, the executive 
government. 
There is further support for the proposition that the executive power and the prerogative 
are not correlative (and that the executive power should be understood in a functionalist 
sense, akin to “administering” and “enforcing” of laws) in the writings of the celebrated 
legal historian, Frederic Maitland. 
Maitland questioned the assumption that the executive power and the prerogative were 
one and the same in 1919. In his Constitutional History of England, Maitland challenged 
the accuracy of the assertion that “the executive power is vested in the king alone, and 
consists of the royal prerogative”. He said that “[n]ow most people know that this is not 
altogether true to fact”.176 After making the point that the powers attributed to the king 
“are really executed by the king’s ministers, and that the king is expected to have ministers 
who command the confidence of the House of Commons”177 whilst recognising this as a 
rule of “constitutional morality”, he observed that “most people” would say “that legally 
the executive power is in the king, though constitutionally it must be exercised by 
ministers”.178 But, according to Maitland, “this old doctrine is not even true to law”, 
explaining that “England is now ruled by means of statutory powers which are not in any 
sense [ … ] the powers of the king”.179 Maitland gave two examples:180  
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Look at the police force, that most powerful engine of government. That force 
was gradually created by means of a series of statutes ranging from 1829 to 
1856. To some extent it was placed under the control of local authorities, of the 
justices of the peace in the counties, of watch committees in the boroughs: but a 
power of issuing rules for the government was given – to whom? not to the 
queen, but to one of H.M. principal Secretaries of State, which means in practice 
the Home Secretary. It is not for the queen to make such regulations: it is for the 
Secretary. So as to the administration of the poor law. In 1834, when the law 
was remodelled, a central authority was created with a large power of issuing 
rules, orders and regulations as to the relief of the poor. This power was given, 
not to the king, but to certain poor law commissioners, and it has since been 
transferred to the Local Government Board. 
 
Therefore, Maitland arrived at the conclusion:181 
 
In my view [ …] we can no longer say that the executive power is vested in the 
king: the king has powers, this minister has powers, and that minister has 
powers. 
 
And Maitland warned:182  
 
If you are told that the crown has this power or that power, do not be content 
until you know who legally has the power – is it the king, is it one of his 
secretaries: is this power a prerogative power or is it the outcome of statute? 
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In this sense Maitland challenged the utility of that “great phrase” that “the executive 
power is in the king and is exercised by the ministry”.183 Earlier in his History, in 
describing the “executive power”, Maitland said:184 
 
… the executive or administrative or governmental power was the king’s. You 
will be familiar with such terms as these, they pass current in modern political 
life and of course they have a meaning. When we have marked off the work of 
legislation, the imposing of general laws upon the community, and also the work 
of judicature, the hearing and determining criminal charges and civil actions, 
there yet remains a large sphere of action, which we indicate by such terms as 
these. Governmental seems to me the best of these terms; executive and 
administrative suggest that the work in question consists merely in executing or 
administrating the law, in putting the laws in force. But in truth a great deal 
remains to be done beyond putting the laws in force – no nation can be governed 
entirely by general rules. We can see this very plainly in our own day – but it is 
quite as true of the Middle Ages: - there must be rulers or officers who have 
discretionary powers, discretionary coercive powers, power to do or leave 
undone, power to command that this or that be done or left undone. The law 
marks out their spheres of action, the law (as we think) gives them their powers. 
 
That Maitland described the executive power in a Montesquieuian sense – that is in a 
functionalist sense – and then further into his History, opined “with some diffidence” that 
the constitutional principle that the executive power is vested in the king is no longer a 
truism (because of the growth of the administrative state, vesting administrative powers in 
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officials other than the sovereign) evinces that Maitland drew a distinction between 
executive power and the prerogative. 
The executive power, Maitland reserved for that power described above; the 
prerogative, is the collection of powers, capacities and immunities that he set out 
prerogative-by-prerogative in his History. One way of reading Maitland’s History is that he 
appeared to hold the view that the executive power is shared by the king with his ministers, 
and other public officials; but that the prerogative power remained vested in the king. A 
similar point about the executive power was made by Dr Evatt in his thesis.185 
In modern British case law there is some judicial acceptance of the view that there is a 
difference between the prerogative and the power to execute the law. In Burmah Oil, 
Viscount Radcliffe asked: “What, then, do we mean by the prerogative …?”186 He 
answered his own question by saying that in “our history the prerogatives of the Crown 
have been many and various, and it would not be possible to embrace them under a single 
description”. He went on to describe some of them as “beneficial or sources of profit to the 
Crown”. Others, he said “were as much duties as rights and were vested in the Sovereign 
as the leader of the people and the chief executive instrument for protecting the public 
safety”.187 After identifying John Locke’s description of the prerogative in True End of 
Civil Government, his Lordship continued, saying that:188 
 
The essence of a prerogative power, if one follows out Locke’s thought, is not 
merely to administer the existing law – there is no need for any prerogative to 
execute the law – but to act for the public good, where there is no law, or even to 
dispense with or override the law where the ultimate preservation of society is in 
question. 
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The true relationship between the prerogative, and the concept or species of power 
described as executive power is the same as that between a steam train and its carriages – 
(putting aside executive power conferred by statute) one is the whole, and the other is 
merely part, or subset, thereof, albeit a very substantial part thereof. The two terms are not 
correlative. There is considerable support for the proposition that the power to execute the 
law, or that power to execute, complete, or administer the law (again, putting aside 
executive power conferred by statute) is a discrete part of the prerogative of the Crown, 
and is not the sum of the prerogative. 
The fact that the prerogative is the sum of more than just the administering and 
enforcing arm of government is further illustrated by the recognition of what are 
sometimes referred to as the non-executive prerogatives. Writing for his doctorate, H V 
Evatt opined that the prerogatives of the Crown could be collected together into three 
groups. First, there were “executive prerogatives”, or “executive powers”. Second, there 
were “immunities and preferences”, and third, there were “proprietary rights”. He said of 
these two last categories of prerogatives respectively:189 
 
In the second place, a number of the Prerogatives are essentially different in 
character.  They are negative in the sense that they do not connote isolated and 
occasional action on the part of the King.  They refer more to permanent and 
continuous characters and capacities of the Monarch existing independent of 
time, place and circumstance.  Thus, the King is entitled to be paid as against a 
debtor, before all other creditors.  Does this involve any action?  No doubt, the 
Prerogative must be claimed in order to be effective but it is closely related to 
the continuing and permanent principle that the King is immune from the 
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ordinary process of his Courts.  Similarly, apart from statute, he cannot be mulct 
in costs.  He cannot be compelled to give discovery.  It is accepted law that he is 
not bound by statutes except under certain circumstances and conditions.  All 
these powers and rights of the King are in the nature of immunities and 
preferences.  They are not in the nature of Executive powers nor are they in the 
nature of rights of property. 
 
In the third place, certain Prerogatives are clearly in the nature of property.  For 
instance, the right to escheats, the Prerogative right to gold and silver mines, the 
right to treasure trove, and the right to Royal fish, ownership of the foreshores 
and of the bed of the ocean within territorial limits – all these and such like 
Prerogatives, including, for instance, the ownership of lands in a new Colony, 
are ordinary rights of property against all the world. 
 
It would seem, therefore, that for practical purposes all the Prerogatives of the 
King can be divided into executive powers, certain immunities and preferences, 
and proprietary rights. 
 
Again, the very acknowledgment that there are prerogatives which cannot be classified, or 
at least cannot be easily classified, as “executive powers”, evinces that the prerogatives of 
the Crown are a wider set of rights, preferences, capacities and immunities than can be 
adequately caught within the meaning of “executive power”. As Dr Evatt concluded further 
in his Royal Prerogative:190 
 
Executive power and Prerogative are therefore not synonymous or 
interchangeable terms, and it is submitted that the analysis already made of the 
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classification of the Prerogatives of the King properly allows to the Prerogative 
a distinct if not entirely separate sphere from that of executive power. 
 
In summary, the point of this part of this Chapter has been to demonstrate that when 
French J, then sitting in the Full Court of the Federal Court, said that: “The executive 
power of the Commonwealth under s 61 cannot be treated as a species of the royal 
prerogative”,191 his Honour was, respectfully, incorrect – at least when the relationship 
between the prerogative and the executive power is understood against the backdrop of the 
writings of the learned authors, and the historical record.  
VIII  THE W IDTH OF THE PREROGATIVE IN THE COLONIES  
If the identification of prerogatives of the Crown which are wider than those prerogatives 
described as “executive” is insufficient to illustrate the point that a part of the executive 
power is a sub-species of the prerogative, then the point is further made by an examination 
of the Sovereign’s colonial powers. The prerogative runs throughout all the Queen’s 
common law dominions unless excluded by statute.192 As Churchill said of the American 
colonies, “[t]he Royal Prerogative, so drastically modified in England after the Revolution 
of 1688, still flourished in the New World”.193 
The reception of the prerogative into the Australian colonial setting provides a useful 
illustration as to why the prerogatives of the Crown and the executive power of the Crown 
are not correlative of one another. Whilst the prerogative may be erroneously interchanged 
with a less than precise use of the words “executive power” in English constitutional 
practice, the accepted powers of the Crown in the Australian colonies (prior to the 
establishment of self-government) demonstrates that the exercise of the prerogative was 
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significantly wider in the colonial setting than in England. The late Dr Bruce McPherson 
wrote in his magisterial The Reception of English Law Abroad:194 
 
… the royal prerogatives of and incidental to government are, except where 
limited by local statute, as extensive in the colonies as they are at common law 
in England.195 In administering colonial governments and in reviewing colonial 
legislation in the old empire before 1776, it was a pressing concern of the 
imperial [C]rown and its officers to ensure that the colonial prerogatives of the 
[C]rown were not diminished or compromised.  Whether Parliamentary 
enactments like the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 or the Bill of Rights 1689 limited 
royal prerogatives in the overseas possession as they did in England was for 
some time a matter of contention between the [C]rown and colonists.  
 
Dr McPherson identified Lord Wensleydale’s words from Kielley v Carson196 as good law. 
Speaking for the Board, Baron Parke said in 1842:197 
 
… there is no doubt that the settlers from the mother-country carried with them 
such portion of its common and statute law as was applicable to their new 
situation, and also the rights and immunities of British subjects. Their 
descendants have, on the one hand, the same laws and the same rights, unless 
they have been altered by parliament; and on the other hand, the Crown 
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possesses the same prerogative and the same powers of government that it does 
over its other subjects. 
 
The breadth of the Imperial Crown’s prerogative to govern (prior to the establishment of 
self-government), spanning as it did, legislative, executive and judicial functions in the 
colonies (at least in conquered or ceded colonies),198 was further described by Dr 
McPherson:199 
 
While having no general power independently of Parliament to legislate for 
settled colonies,200 the [C]rown was regarded as competent in the exercise of its 
prerogative to authorise the establishment of English settlements abroad and to 
invest them with a form of government which included an elected legislative 
assembly.201 … Early charters did not differentiate between legislative, 
executive and judicial functions of government, but ran all three of them 
together in the form of a single power to “correct, punish, pardon, govern and 
rule ... all our subjects and others” inhabiting the newly settled lands, and to do 
so “according to such statutes, laws and ordinances” as were established by the 
promoters of the settlement. This formula for colonial government, first 
embodied in the charter granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert of 1578,202 owed 
much of its language to the terms of earlier and contemporary letters patent 
issued to companies formed to foster overseas trade203 or granted to 
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communities of English merchants trading and residing in foreign countries.204 
 
Indeed, this remains the orthodox view in Britain today. As Lord Hoffman pointed out in R 
(Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2),205 the “law 
is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England”, and:206 
 
In a conquered or ceded colony the Crown, by virtue of the prerogative, has full 
power to establish such executive, legislative and judicial arrangements as the 
Crown thinks fit, and generally to act both executively and legislatively, 
provided the provisions made by the Crown do not contravene any Act of 
Parliament extending to the colony or to all British possessions. The Crown’s 
legislative and constituent powers are exercisable by Order in Council, Letters 
Patent or Proclamation … 
 
The breadth of the Crown’s powers and functions in the Empire’s colonies has been 
judicially recognised. As Renfree set out in his Executive Power,207 it was the rule of the 
common law that English law, so far as applicable, applied to each colony. This had the 
result that, subject to any charter granted to the colonists, the Queen’s prerogatives in the 
colony were precisely those prerogatives which she could exercise in “the mother 
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country”;208 or, as was said by Lord Westbury LC in the case of Re Lord Bishop of 
Natal:209 
 
After a colony or settlement has received legislative institutions, the Crown 
(subject to the special provisions of any Act of Parliament) stands in the same 
relation to that colony or settlement as it does to the United Kingdom. 
 
Therefore, in the Australian context, as in other colonies, once the Crown established 
municipal legislatures and courts in a colony, the prerogative of the Crown to further 
exercise legislative and judicial authority was extinguished; and the superintendence of the 
legislative and judicial authority in a colony was a matter for the Imperial Parliament. 
The breadth of the prerogative (prior to the establishment of self-government) in so 
far as it permitted the Crown to exercise legislative, executive and judicial functions in the 
colonies demonstrates why, in an Australian context, the prerogative was wider than what 
might be simply styled as the executive prerogatives. The very acknowledgement of the 
former validity of legislative and judicial prerogatives in the colonial setting weighs 
against a construction that the expression “executive power of the Commonwealth” in s 61 
of the Constitution should be construed as vesting in the Queen all those prerogatives that 
Queen Victoria enjoyed with respect to Her Australian colonies before the enactment of 
Imperial legislation – and particularly, the Constitution. It rather makes the opposite point. 
The acknowledged previous breadth of the prerogative in the colonial setting (including, as 
it did, powers which are more aptly characterised as legislative and judicial in nature) 
renders the choice of the word “executive” within the expression “executive power of the 
Commonwealth”, to mean something less than the prerogatives of the Crown generally 
recognised to appertain to the Queen in the closing years of the eighteenth century. 
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IX  THE COMMON LAW EXECUTIVE POWER  
As has been demonstrated supra, at common law the initial exercise in the Crown’s 
colonies of the king’s prerogative of legislative power and judicial power, are both vested 
in the Crown – that is, the common law recognises that the powers to legislate and 
adjudicate, are vested in the Queen, and exercisable by the Crown until such time as the 
Imperial Parliament legislates to vest the colonial legislative and judicial powers in other 
entities, such as a colonial parliament. That being so, it should be uncontroversial that the 
Crown has a correlative function (and therefore power), recognised at common law, to 
execute, or administer, those laws that the Queen has enacted for her colony or dominion – 
a common law executive power. As William Harrison Moore wrote, the common law is the 
source of the rule that “[t]he executive power in every part of the Queen’s dominions is 
part of the prerogative …”.210 Executive power emanating from the common law (or more 
precisely, recognised by the common law) can conveniently be described as common law 
executive power. 
 In a colony, all public power, unless or until vested in another entity (such as a colonial 
governor), is vested in the Crown, until such time as it is delegated, or invested in that 
entity. What, therefore, is the criterion for what part of the executive power has been 
delegated to the governor? In 1820, Chitty wrote that “[t]he governor … derives his power 
from, and is substantially a mere servant or deputy of the Crown, appointed by commission 
under the great seal”. He continued: “The criterion for his rules of conduct are the King’s 
instructions, under the sign manual”.211 The leading decision of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council was that of Musgrave v Pulido.212 In that case, the then governor of 
Jamaica sought to plead (in defence of the seizure and detention of the vessel, Florence), 
that he acted “in reasonable exercise of his discretion and that the action taken was an act 
of state”. In rejecting this plea, Sir Montague Smith approved the dictum of Lord 
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Broughton in Hill v Bigge where his Lordship described a colonial governor as “having 
only the functions delegated to him by the terms of his commission, and being only the 
officer to execute the specific powers with which that commission clothes him”.213 Sir 
Montague went on to say in Musgrave v Pulido that:214 
 
… the Governor of a colony (in ordinary cases) cannot be regarded as a Viceroy; 
nor can it be assumed that he possesses general sovereign power. His authority 
is derived from his commission and limited to the powers thereby expressly or 
impliedly entrusted to him. Let it be granted that for acts of power done by a 
Governor under and within the limits of his commission, he is protected, 
because in doing them he is the servant of the Crown, and is exercising its 
sovereign authority; the like protection cannot be extended to acts which are 
wholly beyond the authority confided to him. Such acts, though the Governor 
may assume to do them as Governor, cannot be considered as done on behalf of 
the Crown, nor to be in any proper sense acts of state. 
 
In opining that “a Governor has no special privilege like that of the Crown”, the 
commentator on Imperial constitutional law, Arthur Berriedale Keith, summarised that “… 
apart from statutory powers, the Governor has a delegation of so much of the executive 
power as enables him effectively to conduct the Executive Government of the territory”.215 
His statement that “the Governor has a delegation of so much of the royal prerogative as is 
required for the conduct of the executive government of the Dominion or State” in 
Imperial Unity and the Dominions is consistent with the view that the executive power is a 
species of the prerogative.216 
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This is a narrowly cast proposition. In concluding that the prerogative permits the 
delegation of an executive power, and that executive power is limited to doing acts which 
enable a governor to “conduct the Executive Government of the territory”, Berriedale 
Keith limited that power to matters pertaining to the administration of “the Executive 
Government”; and, presumably, not to matters that go beyond the administration of the 
executive government – which he saw as including “practically all the prerogatives of the 
Crown in the United Kingdom”.217 
It is important to note two aspects. First, the common law authority of a governor to 
administer the executive government of a territory flows from the prerogative, properly 
delegated. Second, there would appear to be a quantitative imbalance between a governor’s 
prerogative authority, and the governor’s executive power. Given that the common law 
executive power was drawn narrowly, and the vast bulk of each governor’s powers 
comprise of prerogative rights, preferences, capacities and immunities delegated to the 
governor in his commission, by and large the discretionary authority exercised by each 
governor comprised primarily in prerogative acts (other than purely executive acts). 
Other than some support in the pre-Federation constitutional literature,218 this assertion 
that there must be a species of executive power that is recognised by the common law must 
necessarily be so for two reasons. First, as will be seen later, the executive power of the 
Commonwealth is a variation of the executive power at common law – it is enlarged or 
modified, both expressly and by implication, by the words of the Constitution. The 
executive power of the Commonwealth is the common law executive power as modified 
by the Constitution. 
The second reason is more basal. The constitutions of each of the States of Australia 
necessarily operate upon the assumption that the executive power of the State is vested in 
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the Queen or the governor of that State.219 None of the constitutions of the States of 
Australia have a clause or provision similar to s 61 of the Australian Constitution which 
vests (or, on one construction, establishes) the executive power of that State. Surely each 
State has an executive power, or function, which gives rise to a power, implicitly found in 
the constitutional framework of that State? If this is so, that power, which supports the 
function of the State Government, and gives meaning to the phrase “the executive 
government of the State”, must be impliedly found within the constitutional statutes of 
each State – most likely within the provisions affirming that there is to be a governor of 
each State, appointed by the Queen – or within each governor’s commission issued by the 
Queen. The fact that each State has an executive power and the scope or ambit of that 
implied executive power must, by necessity, be sourced within the common law, is further 
evidence that there is, or would be a common law executive power. And just as the 
common law executive power is modified by the provisions of the constitutions and 
statutes of the States, the common law executive power in respect of the Commonwealth is 
modified by the express and implied modifications of the Constitution. 
X  EXPRESS PREROGATIVE R IGHTS AND THE NEED FOR RECOGNITION  
The Australian Constitution is founded upon a written text. This was necessary so as to 
give effect to the establishment of a Federation that distributes legislative, executive and 
judicial powers between the central government (being the Commonwealth) and the 
original States (being the former colonies) and any new States established after Federation. 
Whilst the written text was modelled on the text and structure of the Constitution of the 
United States,220 any reader of the Australian Constitution who is familiar with the British 
constitution will be immediately struck by the replication in express provisions of powers 
or functions which, in traditional British constitutional practice, are prerogatives of the 
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Crown which were recognised by the common law of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and (at the time of Federation) Ireland. 
The Constitution expressly provides for the replication of a number of rights that were 
traditionally rights of the Crown which date to either before the time of the commencement 
of the common law (that is, the accession of Richard I),221 or have been recognised by the 
common law since that time – and were generally accepted as prerogative rights of the 
Crown within the Westminster system of responsible government as that system of 
government had evolved to at the end of the reign of Queen Victoria. Those rights now 
have a statutory basis in the Commonwealth context, and are vested in different 
constitutional actors. As is pointed out in Chapter 5, the Constitution’s text differentiates 
the senses in which the Queen, the Governor-General (acting pursuant to text of the 
Constitution), and the Governor-General (acting pursuant to a delegated authority on 
behalf of the Queen) have their powers and functions vested in them. 
The constitutional powers and functions given to the Governor-General and replicated 
in the constitutional text are: to power to legislate222 (with the concurrence of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives), pursuant to s 1; the power to “appoint such times for 
holding the session of the Parliament …” as well as summonsing and proroguing the 
Parliament,223 and dismissal of the Senate and the House of Representatives, pursuant to ss 
5 and 57; the power to issue writs for a general election of the members of the House of 
Representatives,224 pursuant to s 33; the granting of Royal assent to proposed laws;225 the 
command of the naval and military forces,226 pursuant to s 68; and the power to appoint 
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(and dismissal with the concurrence of Parliament) the judges227 of the High Court and the 
other courts created by the Parliament, pursuant to s 72. These express powers and 
functions are reposed in the Governor-General. Furthermore, pursuant to s 74, there is an 
express affirmation that, subject to that section, the Queen retains “Her Royal prerogative 
to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council”. This is a 
replication of the traditional prerogative right of the Queen (to have Her Privy Council hear 
and determine appeals from Her dominions).228 
Additionally, as this Chapter argues, the executive power of the Crown, being the 
Crown’s power to execute and administer the law of the realm, is a traditional prerogative 
right of the Crown. It is argued in this dissertation that the framers sought to include this 
traditional species of the prerogative in s 61 of the Constitution. As a consequence of this, 
and also as a consequence of the Constitution expressly replicating (and modifying for 
Australian purposes) some of the traditional rights of the Crown in the text of the 
Constitution, as set out above, it is necessary to ascertain whether the Australian 
Constitution also provides for the continuation of the royal prerogative (being those rights, 
preferences, capacities and immunities not expressly replicated or averred to) in respect of 
the Commonwealth as a polity. Arguably, by expressly providing for some, but not all the 
rights, preferences, capacities and immunities of the Crown in the written text of the 
Constitution, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius has relevance and application. 
Ordinarily, as a matter of statutory construction, the express inclusion of some rights leads 
to the conclusion that others are not included. This necessitated recognition or affirmation 
of the prerogative more generally in the text of the Constitution. 
This dissertation argues that the prerogative operates against the constitutional text in 
the same way that it operates in respect of s 1A of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), 
and s 8A of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). That is, those statutes did not expressly establish 
the prerogative, rather, they are drafted and enacted on the assumption that the prerogative 
                                                          
227  J Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, 75-78. 
228  J Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, 410-411. 
  97 
     
exists in the background and continues to operate. Those statutes operate on the 
assumption that they were not enacted in a vacuum; and that the silent operation of the 
prerogative is an underlying assumption to the efficacy of those statutes. The author 
contends that the same is true of the Constitution, and that express mention of some 
prerogative rights (including the prerogative power to execute and maintain the laws of the 
Commonwealth in s 61), does not limit the underlying operation of the prerogative because 
the continued operation of the prerogative is recognised and affirmed by the Constitution, 
and through the drafting choices of the framers, it is devolved and invested in the Crown in 
right of the Commonwealth. 
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C  H A P T E R  T  H R E E  
THE PRE-FEDERATION CASE LAW 
 
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION  
In his Sir Maurice Byers Lecture in 2007,1 Justice Heydon drew attention to the words of 
an original member of the High Court, Justice Richard O’Connor, who said in Tasmania v 
Commonwealth:2 
 
I do not think it can be too strongly stated that our duty in interpreting a Statute 
is to declare and administer the law according to the intention expressed in the 
Statute itself. … The intention of the enactment is to be gathered from its words. 
If the words are plain, effect must be given to them; if they are doubtful, the 
intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the other provisions of the 
Statute aided by a consideration of surrounding circumstances. In all cases in 
order to discover the intention you may have recourse to contemporaneous 
circumstances—to the history of the law … In considering the history of the law 
… you must have regard to the historical facts surrounding the bringing the law 
into existence … You may deduce the intention of the legislature from a 
consideration of the instrument itself in the light of these facts and 
                                                          
1  J D Heydon, “Theories of constitutional interpretation: A taxonomy”, N Perram & R Pepper (eds), The 
Byers Lectures, 2000-2012, 132, 136. 
2  (1904) 1 CLR 329, 358-359; Justice Heydon points out that: “In this respect the Constitution differs in 
no way from any Statute of the Commonwealth or of a State”. 
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circumstances, but you cannot go beyond it. 
 
Referring to the “liberal aspects”, or permitted aspects, of O’Connor J’s passage supra, 
Justice Heydon said in his Lecture: “Among the relevant historical facts are the technical 
meaning of the language as used in a legal context, the subject matter of the legislation, 
what the law was at the time the statute was enacted, and what particular deficiencies 
existed in the law before the statute was enacted”.3 Justice Heydon sourced these 
principles to the late Elizabethan era.4 
In Chapter 5, the thesis articulates a core argument which sets out how the Constitution 
jurisprudentially rests upon the common law. The Constitution Act, the Constitution, and 
the common law all recognise and affirm the common law of the Crown as being part of 
the constitutional law of Australia. This is done to demonstrate how the rights, preferences, 
capacities and immunities of the Crown which are recognised by the common law are also 
recognised by the Constitution Act, and are therefore executed and maintained by the 
Crown in exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth. 
Before setting out that core argument, it is necessary to set out what “the historical facts 
surrounding the bringing [of] the [Constitution Act] into existence” were, and “what the 
law was at the time the [Constitution Act] was enacted”. To do so has interpretative power 
in two ways. It has interpretive power on its own, and consistent with the reasoning of 
O’Connor J in Tasmania v Commonwealth (recited supra); a fortiori, it has interpretative 
power when the case law is set out, and it is seen how the framers understood the effect of 
that case law, and then crafted the constitutional text around the generally understood state 
of the case law. This second form of interpretative power has an intensity that commands 
recognition. It is supported by reading Chapters 4 and 6 consecutively to see (in the words 
of Justice Heydon) “what the law was at the time the [Constitution Act] was enacted”, and 
                                                          
3  J D Heydon, “Theories of constitutional interpretation: A taxonomy”, N Perram & R Pepper (eds), The 
Byers Lectures, 2000-2012, 137. 
4  Ibid 137, fn 21, citing Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a at 7b; 76 ER 637 at 638 (Coke LCJ). 
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to see “what particular deficiencies existed in the law before the [Constitution Act] was 
enacted”; which then allows one to see what “the technical meaning of the [constitutional] 
language as used in a legal context” is. 
It is therefore necessary to consider the English, British and colonial case law touching 
on the nature of the prerogative and the executive power. This is done in order to ascertain 
the state of the decisional law available in the law reports prior to the Federation 
Conventions, and which was available to the leading lawyers present at the 1891 and 1897-
98 Conventions during which the Federation Bill was drafted. This examination of the 
decisional law is split into four parts. 
The first part analyses the leading cases from the late Elizabethan period (when the 
English State began to take a shape recognisable today) up until the Glorious Revolution 
(at which time the most basic principles concerning the divide between royal authority and 
parliamentary authority were settled in favour of the Whigs, then dominant at 
Westminster). These cases are broadly described as the early English case law. 
The second part addresses the case law of the nineteenth century. This comprises, on the 
one hand, decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, emanating from such 
places as Jamaica, and touching upon the constitutional jurisprudence of the British 
Empire; and on the other, a series of cases from the Australian colonies (occasioned by 
immigration disputes), which the colonial statesmen were aware of, and which culminated 
(in the third part) in the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Toy v Musgrove.5 The 
fourth part briefly considers the appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of 
the Toy v Musgrove decision.6  
II  THE EARLY ENGLISH CASE LAW  
Having set out in the previous chapter that the prerogative is that body of doctrine 
recognised by the common law, and touching upon the quality of the princely title, it is 
                                                          
5  (1888) 14 VLR 349. 
6  [1891] AC 272. 
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now necessary to turn to the late Elizabethan and early Jacobean period of history. As has 
been noted earlier, “no case on the prerogative came before the House of Lords after the 
seventeenth century Revolution Settlement until the immediate aftermath of the First 
World War”.7 This is peculiar, particularly as there was an intensity of cases that 
considered the scope or operation of the prerogative (or at least a description of its quality) 
in that crucible of the English State – the closing years of the reign of Elizabeth I and the 
early years after the accession of James Stuart in 1603. Much of this intensity is focused 
upon the career of one man, Sir Edward Coke. Barrister, Solicitor-General, Speaker of the 
Commons, Attorney-General, judge, chief justice (first of Common Pleas, then of King’s 
Bench) and parliamentarian, Coke LCJ and his Reports were, and are, central to early 
prerogative jurisprudence. If Coke LCJ wasn’t the author of the leading statements of 
principle, he was the recorder of them in his Reports. It has been said that Sir Edward Coke 
“worked since his early career to protect and even amplify royal power and the 
prerogative”.8 Dr David Chan Smith went on to say:9 
 
Coke’s understanding of the relationship between the common law and the 
prince relied on a historical sociology drawn from his reading of Fortescue, but 
mostly indebted to Bracton. The relationship between subject and sovereign 
began primordially outside society in the law of nature, ‘that which God at the 
time of creation … infused into [man’s] heart, for his preservation and 
direction’. 
 
Dr Smith pointed out that because human society required government, Bracton had 
explained that “[t]o this end is a king made and chosen, that he do justice to all men that 
                                                          
7  B Hadfield, “Constitutional Law”, L Blom-Cooper, et al, The Judicial House of Lords, 1876-2009, 504. 
8  D C Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the Reformation of the Laws, Religion, Politics and Jurisprudence, 
1578-1616, 2014, 251. 
9  Ibid 252. 
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the Lord may dwell in him”.10 In quoting Sir Thomas Fleming (the then Chief Baron of the 
Exchequer) and again following Bracton, Dr Smith said: “God had given him [the king] 
power, the act of government, and the power to govern”.11 Fleming CB said the king’s 
prerogative “is both ordinary and absolute … absolute power existing for the nation’s 
safety, [and] varies with the royal wisdom”. Coke LCJ described the king as “the head of 
the commonwealth … the fountain of all honour and dignity”.12 And Coke LCJ affirmed 
the earlier words of Sir Walter Moyle who said that “the king is held (as a matter) of right 
to administer law to each of his subjects”.13 
Dr Smith argued that “responsibility implied an important consequence for the king that 
was repeated throughout Bracton”, the king “must surpass in power all those subjected to 
him”. In Calvin’s case, Coke LCJ spoke of the “mutual bond and obligation between the 
King and his subjects” which the relationship of allegiance required.14 In the Case of 
Monopolies, Coke LCJ said that:15 
 
The duty of the queen towards the subject consists in protection … the duty of 
the subject to the sovereign is loyalty and obedience. The protection of the 
queen of her subjects is to guard them in peace and plenty. The first is to be 
performed by the execution of justice which is the principal means to preserve 
the peace. 
 
                                                          
10  Ibid. 
11  Case of Impositions (or Bate’s Case) (1606), Lane 27, 145 ER 271. 
12  The Prince’s Case (1606) 8 Co Rep 18b, 77 ER 481, [1606] EWHC Ch J6; see also Hugh Manney’s 
Case, 12 Co Rep. 101, 77 ER 1377; Nevil’s Case (1604), 7 Co Rep. 33b, 77 ER 461. 
13  Year Book, Hilary Term, 39 Henry VI, pl. 3, ff. 38b-40b per Sir Walter Moyle, a justice of the Common 
Pleas; approvingly quoted by Sir Edward Coke, see D C Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the Reformation 
of the Laws, 260. 
14  Calvin’s Case (1608), 7 Co Rep. 13a, 77 ER 392, 388, 392-393. 
15  Case of Monopolies (or simply as Darcy v Allein) (1599) 74 ER 1131; (1602) 77 Eng Rep 1260 and 
(1599) Noy 173. 
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“The emphasis”, Dr Smith noted, “on protection and preservation explained the purpose of 
God’s abundant delegation or power to the queen and was the kernel of the bond between 
her and her subjects”.16 
Sir Edward Coke’s much-celebrated decisions in Prohibitions del Roy in 1607 and the 
Case of Proclamations in 1611 illustrate the contested breadth of the prerogative at that 
point in history. As to the proposition that the prerogative permitted the king to resolve 
judicial disputes himself (and thereby exercise a judicial prerogative), Lord Coke’s 
frequently quoted words in Prohibitions del Roy were:17 
 
His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm, and causes which concern 
the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be 
decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, 
which law is an act which requires long study and experience, before that a man 
can attain to the cognizance of it. 
 
In the Case of Proclamations, Lord Coke said that “the King by his proclamation or other 
ways cannot change any part of the common law, or statute law, or the customs of the 
realm” and “the King cannot create any offence by his prohibition or proclamation which 
was not an offence before for that was to change the law, and to make an offence which 
was not”.18 Coke LCJ articulated in the Case of Proclamations a principle that Sir Stephen 
Sedley described as “having become and still is the foundational principle of a 
constitutional monarchy”.19 Lord Coke said: “The King hath no prerogative but what the 
law of the land allows him”.20  
                                                          
16  D C Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the Reformation of the Laws, 254. 
17  Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 64; 77 ER 1342, 1343. 
18  Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Reps 74; 77 ER 1352, 1353. 
19  S Sedley, Lions Under the Throne, Essays on the History of English Public Law, 128. 
20  (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, 77 ER 1352. 
  104 
     
Adam Tomkins said that Coke LCJ’s decisions in Prohibitions del Roy are “generally 
regarded to have laid down fundamental restrictions on the prerogatives of the king as they 
affect judicial power”.21 And Tomkins observed (quoting Professor Paul Craig) that “what 
Prohibitions del Roy achieved for the divide between executive and judicial power, the 
Case of Proclamations did for the crucial division between executive and legislative 
competence”.22  
If Prohibitions del Roy and the Case of Proclamations were celebrated for forging a 
partial divide between the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial functions, then the 
upheaval of the Stuart Restoration saw the high point of the judicial recognition of the 
supremacy and absolute nature of the king’s prerogative in the case of Godden v Hales,23 
which concerned the “legality of the use of the dispensing power”24 of the sovereign. In an 
act of “rampant royalism”25, the then Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Sir Edward 
Herbert, gave judgment for the defendant (and, in effect for James II), by concluding 
that:26 
 
… the Kings of England were absolute Sovereigns; that the laws were the 
King’s laws; that the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of 
Government as he saw necessity for it; that he was sole judge of that necessity; 
that an Act of Parliament could take away that power; that this was such a law; 
that the case of sheriffs in the second year of Henry the Seventh, was law, and 
always taken as law; and that it was a much stronger case than this. 
                                                          
21  A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, 70. 
22  Ibid; see P Craig, “Prerogative, Precedent and Power” in C Forsyth and I Hare (eds), The Golden 
Metwand and the Crooked Cord, 67. 
23  (1686) 11 St Tr 1165; 2 Show KB 475; 89 ER 1050. 
24  Said to be the ancient authority to dispense with compliance by a person with a statutory requirement; in 
this case, to relive the requirement that papists are obliged to swear the oath of supremacy required by 
25 Car II c. 2, within three months of receipt of their commissions of office. 
25  A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, 100. 
26  (1686) 89 ER 1050, 1051. 
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Other historical materials available record a sharper resolution of the principles in the 
king’s favour. In the State Trials reports, Sir Edward Herbert’s reasons were said to be:27 
 
1. That the kings of England are sovereign princes. 2. That the laws of England 
are the king’s laws. 3. That therefore ‘tis an inseparable prerogative in the kings 
of England to dispense with penal laws in particular cases and upon particular 
necessary reasons. 4. That of those reasons and those necessities the king 
himself is sole judge ... 5. That this is not a trust invested in or granted to the 
king by the people, but the ancient remains of the sovereign power and 
prerogative of the kings of England, which never yet was taken away from them, 
nor can be. 
 
The foregoing discussion of the early English case law serves to make four points. First, 
the prerogative was well on the way to taking shape as a quality of the princely title prior 
to the English Civil War, and, is perhaps, one of the causes of the English Civil War. 
Second, the prerogative was accepted as resembling (over five hundred years ago, and well 
before the emergence of the Montesquieuian trinity) a diverse set of qualities or attributes 
of the Sovereign, which went beyond what would today be described as executive 
functions. Third, having regard to the “relevant historical facts” and “the technical meaning 
of the language” as Justice Dyson Heydon described those interpretative aides supra, 
English constitutional jurisprudence (and more particularly, the constitutions of the British 
colonies) inherited the prerogative’s jurisprudential canon which was forged during the life 
of Shakespeare. And fourth, when, in Chapter 5 this author comes to describe “the law of 
the Crown” as textually affirmed by the language of the preamble, and ss 2, 64 and 74 of 
                                                          
27  (1686) 11 St Tr 1165.  
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the Constitution Act, the trail of that common law of the prerogative can be traced back to 
the time of Elizabeth I.  
More generally, and permeating our modern understanding of the executive power of 
the Crown, historian Robert Tombs has written of the period of English history 
encapsulated by the life of Lord Coke, that:28 
 
From this time originates our instinctive belief that law is, or should be, more 
than a collection of executive orders and directives, and that ‘law’ and ‘rights’ 
embody intangible and permanent values. ‘The rule of law’ became central to 
English ideas of freedom and civilisation. 
III  THE N INETEENTH-CENTURY CASE LAW  
This part of this chapter explores the case law concerning the powers of the Crown in a 
British colony, and how, if at all, the prerogatives of the Crown are devolved or invested in 
the sovereign’s representative in the colony. The House of Lords’ and Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council’s decisions, commencing from roughly the start of self-government in 
New South Wales, up until Federation, and some early Federation Privy Council decisions 
are relevant. The relevance of these decisions is two-fold. First, the framers of the 
Australian Federation, and the draftsmen who participated in drafting the early drafts of the 
Australian Constitution, as well as participating in the two Conventions of 1891, 1897-98, 
were aware of some, if not all, of the pre-Convention cases. Second, in construing the 
effect of the text of the Australian Constitution, the point has been made by Sir John 
Latham that the Australian Constitution (unlike the United States Constitution) was not 
enacted in a vacuum.29 This distinction between the American Constitution and the 
                                                          
28  R Tombs, The English and Their History, 206. 
29  See also In re Richard Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd; Uther v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 
CLR 508, 521 (Latham CJ). 
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Australian Constitution, Sir Owen Dixon opined, was “fundamental”.30 The then Chief 
Justice said that “[i]n Australia we begin with the common law”.31 
The truth of this observation has, at least to those judges of the High Court of Australia 
who rely upon history as a guiding modality of constitutional interpretation, a fundamental 
effect. Sir Owen Dixon further observed in the same speech that:32 
 
… the common law was in fact an antecedent system of jurisprudence and has 
been instinctively so regarded. If it had been otherwise, probably the High Court 
would not have been established as a court of appeal for Australia. We act every 
day on the unexpressed assumption that the one common law surrounds us and 
applies where it has not been superseded by statute; but it remains true, I think, 
that as a distinction between American and Australian federalism the fact has 
received insufficient attention. Federalism means a rigid Constitution and a rigid 
Constitution means a written instrument. It is easy to treat the written instrument 
as the paramount consideration, unmindful of the part played by the general law, 
notwithstanding that it is the source of the legal conceptions that govern us in 
determining the effect of the written instrument. 
 
This was not a one-off observation of Sir Owen Dixon. He made the same point when 
considering the prerogatives of the Crown and the construction and operation of s 61 of the 
Constitution in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of E O Farley Ltd 
(in Liq).33 There his Honour said:34 
 
… the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Crown, which, of 
                                                          
30  O Dixon, “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation”, Jesting Pilate, 203. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Ibid 205. 
33  (1940) 63 CLR 278. 
34  (1940) 63 CLR 278, 304. 
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course, is as much the central element in the Constitution of the Commonwealth 
as in a unitary constitution. The United-States Government did not succeed to 
the sovereignty of the British Crown and therefore inherited none of its 
common-law powers or privileges. The reasons why the United-States 
Government has none but a statutory preference have no application to our 
Constitution: Cf., per Story J., United States v. State Bank of North Carolina. 
The Commonwealth Constitution, an enactment of the Imperial Parliament, took 
effect in a common-law system, and the nature and incidents of the authority of 
the Crown in right of the Commonwealth are in many respects defined by the 
common law. The prerogative which gives Crown debts priority over those due 
to a subject is in this way carried into the executive authority of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The High Court has regularly turned to British constitutional law and history to assist with 
construing the operation of the Constitution, and particularly ss 61 and 64 of the 
Constitution. Writing extra-curially, Justice Gummow noted that “[p]erhaps the most 
significant field where the High Court attends to matters of history is that of constitutional 
law”; continuing “I should have thought the text of the Constitution invites, perhaps 
requires, such activity”.35 Quoting the three foundation members of the Court, Justice 
Gummow has said:36 
 
It is true that what has been called an “astral intelligence,” unprejudiced by any 
historical knowledge, and interpreting a Constitution merely by the aid of a 
dictionary, might arrive at a very different conclusion as to its meaning from that 
                                                          
35  W M C Gummow, “Law and the Use of History”, in J T Gleeson and R C A Higgins’ Constituting Law, 
Legal Argument and Social Values, 72. 
36  Ibid; quoting from Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 at 1106; c f Justice 
Gummow’s subsequent statement at 72: “Too much should not be made of the history of the common 
law as determinative of the construction of the Constitution”. 
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which a person familiar with history would reach. 
 
Those general observations having been made, the High Court routinely turns to British 
and colonial constitutional history (including drafting history) to assist in construing the 
operation of Chapter II of the Constitution. 
In respect of s 61 of the Constitution, matters of English and colonial constitutional 
practice and drafting history have been considered by the justices of the High Court in 
construing that provision. In Pape, French CJ comprehensively considered the drafting 
history of s 61.37 Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ expressly made use of “matters of 
Imperial and colonial history” when considering the operation of s 61,38 and examined 
“the executive power exercised in the United Kingdom up to the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution”.39 Hayne and Kiefel JJ similarly considered the drafting history relevant, 
and affirmed the rule in Cole v Whitfield”.40 In Williams [No 1], French CJ said that “the 
text, context and purpose of s 61 informed by its drafting history” is relevant to that 
section’s construction,41 and that recourse may be had to the “drafting history and the 
concept of executive government which informed” the drafting of s 61.42 The Chief Justice 
then dedicated five pages of the Commonwealth Law Reports to considering the drafting 
history of s 61.43 More generally, Hayne J spoke of “the carefully crafted checks (worked 
out in England over so many years and reflected in Australia in the Constitution, especially 
Ch IV) that effect parliamentary control …”.44 And Crennan J considered “the institution 
of responsible government and the exercise of executive power under the Westminster 
                                                          
37  (2010) 238 CLR 1, 56-60 [114]-[127]. 
38  (2010) 238 CLR 1, 75-79 [188]-[200]. 
39  (2010) 238 CLR 1, 89 [233]. 
40  (2010) 238 CLR 1, 106 [298]; Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385. 
41  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179 [4]. 
42  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 193-194 [39]. 
43  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 194-199. 
44  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 258 [216]. 
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system of Britain” relevant in considering the operation of Chapter II, and s 61 more 
specifically.45 
A note of caution ought to be made here. Whilst the history of the prerogative in British 
and colonial constitutional practice, as well as the Debates of the Federation Convention 
are a relevant interpretive tool in ascertaining the meaning and operation of s 61 of the 
Constitution – that presupposes (at least in respect of the Debates) that meaning can be 
gleaned from their content. In this respect, the learned Chief Justice concluded that “[t]here 
is little evidence to support the view that the delegates to the National Australasian 
Conventions of 1891 and 1897-1898, or even the leading lawyers at those Conventions, 
shared a clear common view of the working of executive power in a federation”.46  
In respect of s 64 of the Constitution, in the context of considering the power of the 
Governor-General to appoint more than one minister of state to administer individual 
departments of state of the Commonwealth, as the constitutional text provides for in s 64, 
McHugh J said:47 
 
The Constitution is contained in a statute of the United Kingdom Parliament, 
and its meaning must be determined by the ordinary techniques of statutory 
interpretation. It must therefore be interpreted according to the ordinary and 
natural meanings of its text, read in the light of its history, with such necessary 
implications as derive from its structure.  
 
In Re Wakim, I pointed out that the starting point for a principled interpretation 
of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its makers, which can only 
be deduced from the words that they used in the historical context in which they 
used them. 
                                                          
45  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 349 [508], and 350 [510-512]. 
46  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 202 [54]. 
47  Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 426 [106] and [107] (footnotes omitted). 
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The recognition that Imperial and colonial history, coupled with the framers’ intentions as 
gleaned from the Convention Debates in 1891 and 1897-98 are relevant, and of assistance 
in construing the operation of Chapter II of the Constitution, and ss 61 and 64 more 
specifically, means that it is relevant to consider the English, British and colonial case law 
that predates the drafting of the constitutional text. In particular, the nature of gubernatorial 
office in the British Empire, and the powers and functions that are vested in a governor, or 
delegated to a governor from the Sovereign, and an examination of the process by which a 
colonial governor becomes seized of the authority to exercise the prerogatives of the 
Crown. 
Cameron v Kyte 
The first decision is that of Cameron v Kyte,48 heard by the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in 1835. The case was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the British 
Colony of Berbice. The circumstances of the case were that George Hallam was appointed 
by the late King George III as vendue master in the Colony of Berbice. The vendue master 
is entitled to a commission of five percent on the amount of the purchase money on the 
sale of goods. In 1810 the Lieutenant Governor of the Colony, Robert Gordon, is said to 
have reduced the commission payable to a vendue master from five percent to one and half 
percent on the gross amount of biddings. In 1824, Charles Kyte obtained an appointment as 
deputy vendue master, and for some time received commission upon execution sales at the 
five percent rate, until 1829. The appellant, Donald Cameron, purchased a cane field in 
1829, and opposed the deputy vendue master’s claim for the higher rate than one and a half 
percent – alleging that the exaction of such rate was illegal pursuant to Lieutenant 
Governor Gordon’s notification in 1810. Amongst other things, the questions for the 
Supreme Court and the Privy Council involved a consideration of the powers of a colonial 
                                                          
48  (1835) 3 Knapp 332; [1835] 12 ER 678. 
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governor. The reasons for decision were given by Baron Parke. The five percent fee was 
declared to be a lawfully set fee, “unless it has been reduced by competent authority”. 
Parke B affirmed the concessions made before the Board that “the King might” by 
“virtue of his Sovereign authority, alter the legal amount of the fees or compensation, 
though such act would be of a legislative nature”.49 Approving the principle laid down by 
Lord Mansfield CJ in Hall v Campbell,50 Parke B said, “The King having the whole 
legislative authority in a conquered colony, insofar as he may not have parted with it by 
capitulation, or by his own voluntary grant”.51 “But it was contended”, said Lord 
Wensleydale, “that the Governor in that character had not any such power; that none such 
was delegated to him by the King expressly or by implication”.52 The decision is an 
important marker in British constitutional law as it stands for the proposition that the 
sovereign’s regal power (or prerogative) is not vested in a colonial governor (however so 
described) unless expressly or implicitly so vested. Lord Wensleydale opined on behalf of 
the Board that:53 
 
… no authority or dictum has been cited before us to show that a Governor can 
be considered as having delegation of the whole Royal power, in any colony, as 
between him and the subject, when it is not expressly given by his commission. 
 
His Lordship said:54 
 
We are therefore of opinion that the Governor does not in the sense above 
mentioned represent the Sovereign, and has not the character of a delegate of all 
                                                          
49  [1835] 12 ER 678, 682. 
50  (1774) 1 Cowp 204; [1774] 98 ER 1045. 
51  [1835] 12 ER 678, 682. 
52  [1835] 12 ER 678, 682. 
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the Royal power. If, therefore, the Governor be an officer only with limited 
powers, which do not expressly include the Act in question, is such an Act 
authorised by implication? Implied powers may be given to an office as incident, 
either because they are necessary to its due execution, or because they are such 
as have been usually exercised by those who have borne it. 
 
The passage just recited was approvingly summarised as good law by the learned author of 
a leading pre-Federation text on constitutional jurisprudence in the British colonies.55 
Hill v Bigge 
The second decision is that of Hill v Bigge,56 heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in 1841. The case was an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Civil 
Jurisdiction of the Island of Trinidad. The circumstances of the case were that the 
appellant, Sir George Hill, became bound in 1825 by his writing to the respondent, Thomas 
Bigge, and his partners, who were jewellers in the city of London for the sum of £825 13s. 
Sometime after the “giving the said bond”, Hill was appointed as Lieutenant Governor of 
the Island of Trinidad and its dependencies. In 1837, Thomas Bigge and his surviving 
partners brought an action in the Court of First Instance for the recovery of the debt. In 
1877, the Lieutenant Governor came into Court under protest and pleaded that the Court 
could not give judgment against him “because, at the time of the commencement of the 
said action, he was, and still continued, Lieutenant Governor of the Island of Trinidad, and 
its dependencies, and that he was therefore not liable to be sued in the said Court”.57 
                                                          
55  W Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law and the various points of English Jurisprudence, 
Collected and Digested from Official Documents and other Sources, 80; “The Governor of a colony has 
not a delegation of the whole royal power, as between him and a subject, which is not expressly given 
by his commission; nor does any commission to Colonial Governors convey such an extensive 
authority. They have merely a limited authority from the Crown, and their assumption of an act of 
sovereign power out of the limits of the authority so given to them is purely void”. 
56  (1841) 3 Moore 465; [1841] 13 ER 189. 
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Before the Board, counsel for the appellant, Mr Burge QC, submitted that: “By the 
terms of his commission, he is vested with the legislative as well as the executive power”, 
and “his exemption cannot therefore, be merely personal, as from arrest, but is much 
higher; he is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts; they are incompetent to entertain a 
suit, or to pronounce judgement therein against him”. Mr Burge continued: “By that, all the 
powers of the executive government within the Island are vested solely in the Governor for 
the time being”.58 These submissions were rejected by the Board. Lord Brougham said:59 
 
If it be said that the Governor of a Colony is quasi Sovereign, the answer is, that 
he does not even represent the Sovereign generally, having only the functions 
delegated to him by the terms of his commission, and being only the officer to 
execute the specific powers with which that commission clothes him… 
 
“The Governor”, said Lord Brougham (and quoting De Grey LCJ in Fabrigas v Mostyn,60 
when that case was before the Common Pleas), “is the King’s servant: his commission is 
from him, and he is to execute the powers he is invested with under that commission; 
which is to execute the laws of Minorca, under such instructions as the King shall make in 
Council”.61 
His Lordship affirmed the holding in Cameron v Kyte, and rejected “a claim to represent 
the Sovereign and hold the royal power by delegation” had been established.62 
Again, Lord Brougham’s holding was approvingly quoted by William Forsyth QC in 
Forsyth’s Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law.63 
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Musgrave v Pulido 
The third decision that informed the delegates and representatives of the nature of the 
authority of a colonial governor was Musgrave v Pulido64 – a decision of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Jamaica on the trial 
of an action for trespass for seizing and detaining a vessel. 
The facts of the case were that the respondent, Jose Ignacio Pulido, claimed from the 
appellant, Sir Anthony Musgrove, a sum of £14,000 in damages for trespass for the 
unlawful detention by the appellant of the respondent’s vessel, the Florence, and her cargo, 
in the Port of Kingston, Jamaica. The Florence was on a voyage from Colon to the Island 
of St Thomas, and was compelled to berth in the Port of Kingston for repairs. The 
appellant was at the time the Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of the Island of 
Jamaica and its dependencies. The matter was heard by the Supreme Court of Jamaica, and 
the defendant appealed the Supreme Court’s decision to the Privy Council. The issue for 
the appeal was whether the act of state doctrine protected the appellant’s actions, and 
precluded the respondent from claiming for damages. 
In considering the defendant’s plea that the acts complained of were protected by the 
doctrine of acts of state, the Privy Council was required to consider what was the true 
nature of the lawful authority of a governor of a British colony. Sir Montague Smith, 
delivering the Board’s reasons for judgment approved the following passage from the 
earlier decision of Baron Parke of Wensleydale in Cameron v Kyte,65 where his Lordship 
said:66  
 
There being, therefore, no express authority from the Crown, the right to make 
such an order must, if it exist at all, be implied from the nature of the office of 
                                                          
64  (1879) 5 AC 102; consisting of Sir James W Colvile, Sir Barnes Peacock, Sir Montague E Smith, Sir 
Robert P Collier, and Sir Henry S Keating. 
65  (1835) 3 Knapp, 332; 12 ER 678. 
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Governor. If a Governor had, by virtue of that appointment, the whole 
sovereignty of the colony delegated to him as a Viceroy, and represented the 
King in the government of that colony, there would be good reason to contend 
that an act of sovereignty done by him would be valid and obligatory upon the 
subject, living within his government, provided the act would be valid if done by 
the Sovereign himself, though such act might not be in conformity with the 
instructions which the Governor had received for the regulation of his own 
conduct. The breach of those instructions might well be contended on this 
supposition to be matter resting between the Sovereign and his deputy, rendering 
the latter liable to censure or punishment, but not affecting the validity of the act 
done. 
 
Sir Montague Smith then approvingly quoted the words of Parke B, cited supra. Also 
approved by Sir Montague Smith were the following words of Lord Parke: “All that we 
decide is that the simple act of the Governor alone, unauthorised by his commission, and 
not proved to be expressly or impliedly authorised by any instructions, is not equivalent to 
such an act done by the Crown itself.”67 Sir Montague Smith concluded that:68 
 
It is apparent from these authorities that the Governor of a Colony (in ordinary 
cases) cannot be regarded as a Viceroy; nor can it be assumed that he possesses 
general sovereign power. His authority is derived from his commission, and 
limited to the powers thereby expressly or impliedly entrusted to him. Let it be 
granted that, for acts of power done by a Governor under and within the limits of 
his commission, he is protected, because in doing them he is the servant of the 
Crown, and is exercising its sovereign authority; the like protection cannot be 
extended to acts which are wholly beyond the authority confided to him.  
                                                          
67  (1879) 5 AC 102, 110. 
68  (1879) 5 AC 102, 111. 
  117 
     
 
Musgrave v Pulido did not go unnoticed in the Australian colonies. The future President of 
the First Convention in 1891, Sir Henry Parkes, was aware of the Musgrave v Pulido case. 
The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Sir Henry had undertaken a “lengthy 
constitutional analysis of the right and wrong doctrines which are prevalent on the position 
of the Governor”.69 The Herald editorialised that:70  
 
Most of the false reasoning and vicious conclusions which affect the treatment 
of colonial topics come from a wholesale and indiscriminate practice of 
jumbling all English dependencies into one mess, and then affirming 
propositions which, if true of any, are said to be true of all. The erroneousness of 
the style of reasoning is nowhere near conspicuous than in the matter of colonial 
Governorships.  
 
The Sydney Morning Herald continued:71 
 
Nevertheless the judgment here referred to [Musgrave v Pulido] emphasises 
afresh some broad constitutional principles, which are of as universal a character 
as any that the subject admits of. The Governor of a dependency is not outside 
the law, but is within the law ... The popular error is for observers to be so far 
dazzled by the local elevation to which he is temporarily raised, as to believe 
that he occupied a position nearly analogous to that of his Sovereign.  
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Interestingly, two years after the reasons for decision were published, on the other side of 
the continent a mysterious author penned the following letter to the editor of the West 
Australian newspaper:72 
 
THE CORRECT VIEW OF A GOVERNOR’S POSITION  
TO THE EDITOR OF THE WEST AUSTRALIAN 
 
Sir, - I noticed in last Saturday’s Herald a paragraph concerning a certain ‘well-
known politician’ who, it was alleged, had, in absenting himself from the late 
festivities in Geraldton, forgotten the respect due to “the representative of Her 
Majesty.” Having on several occasions observed other remarks in the public 
press, from which I gathered that the writers had very exaggerated notions of the 
powers and prerogatives of a Governor, I beg you will kindly allow me to give 
the correct view of a Governor’s position.  
 
In the case of Hill v. Biggs (3 Moore, P.C. 465), which was an action for a 
private debt brought against the Governor of Trinidad, the defendant pleaded, as 
a persona privilege, exemption from being sued in the courts of the colony. Lord 
Brougham delivered the judgement of the Judicial Committee, and the claim to 
such exemption was thus met: “If it to be said that the Governor of a colony is a 
quasi Sovereign, the answer is, that he does not even represent the Sovereign 
generally, having only the functions delegated to him by the terms of his 
commission, and being only the officer to execute the specific powers with 
which the commission clothes him.” In his judgment, in Musgrave v. Pulido (5 
App. Ca. 102), Sir Montague Smith, after quoting the above and other cases, 
said: “It is apparent from these authorities that the Governor of a colony in 
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ordinary cases cannot be regarded as a viceroy; nor can it be assumed that he 
possesses general sovereign power. His authority is derived from his 
commission, and limited to the powers thereby expressly or impliedly entrusted 
to him. 
        Your obedient servant,  
          Z 
Perth, 1st Nov.  
 
Whilst Musgrove v Pulido considered the application of the doctrine of act of state; and did 
not expressly consider the operation of the prerogatives of the Crown in so far as they were 
vested in colonial governors; the decision does afford a very useful authority for the first 
principle that a colonial governor is not a viceroy, and his gubernatorial authority is 
derived from his commission, and limited to the powers expressly or impliedly entrusted to 
him. The decision was known in the colonies, and forms the starting point for considering 
the operation of constitutional principles as they pertain to the power and authority of a 
colonial governor. 
Ex parte Lo Pak 
Less than three years before the 1891 Convention in Sydney, the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales heard the case of Ex parte Lo Pak73. The facts of the case were 
that the applicant, a subject of the Emperor of China, was a passenger on board a 
steamship, the S.S. Afghan. He was for many years (and, importantly, on 6 December 1881 
– the time of enactment of 45 Vic. No 11, the Influx of Chinese Restriction Act) a resident 
of the colony of New South Wales.  Having proved to the satisfaction of the appropriate 
persons that he was a resident of the colony on that date, he obtained under section 9 of 
that Act a certificate of exemption, permitting his re-entry to the colony in the event of 
                                                          
73  (1888) 9 NSWLR 221; constituted by Chief Justice Sir Frederick Darley, Justice (later Sir) William 
Windeyer and Justice Sir Joseph Innes. 
  120 
     
leaving it. The applicant departed the colony, and travelled to China. He returned on board 
the Afghan with other subjects of the Emperor of China. Upon returning to the port of 
Sydney Harbour, colonial police boarded the ship and forcibly prevented the Chinese on 
board the Afghan from landing. 
On 14 May 1888, an ex parte application was heard by the Chief Justice in chambers for 
a rule nisi for a writ of habeas corpus requiring the officer in charge of the colonial police 
and the Captain of the Afghan to show cause why the applicant should not be released and 
permitted to land. The Full Court heard the motion to make the rule nisi absolute. 
As part of the oral argument of the case, counsel for the respondent, Julian Salomons 
QC (who, in 1866, controversially accepted and then turned down the Chief Justiceship of 
the Colony), argued that “the Queen’s prerogatives are as great as in England, and are 
exercised by the Governor in Council, and the Governor possesses both the prerogative of 
pardon and prerogative of excluding aliens”.74 The Full Court of the Supreme Court was 
required to consider what prerogatives the Colonial governor was vested with. The Full 
Court consisted of Darley CJ, Windeyer and Foster JJ. As a first principle, Darley CJ 
stated:75 
 
I am distinctly of opinion that, even supposing the King or Queen of England 
have power by proclamation to prevent aliens from entering the kingdom, and a 
statute to be unnecessary, yet that power so vested is a power personal to the 
Sovereign, and cannot be delegated either to the Governor, or the Government of 
this colony. I am therefore of opinion that, if the Government have made a 
proclamation forbidding aliens of any nation to land – although it is not alleged 
that any such proclamation exists – it is illegal, and has not the effect of 
suspending the operation of the writ here asked for. Much has been said about 
the prerogative of the Crown to make proclamations, and it is said that 
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proclamation when issued must be obeyed. That is only so if the proclamation 
be itself legal. Proclamations which enunciate the law of the country are 
binding, but no proclamation contrary to the law, the statutes, and the customs of 
the realm, is legal. That is distinctly laid down in Bacon’s Abridgment, vol. vi., 
p.451, under the title “Prerogative” where the law upon the subject is perhaps 
better gathered together than in any other text-book. It is a text-book of the 
highest authority, and there it is stated that any proclamation of the king contrary 
to the laws, statutes, or customs of the realm is unlawful and of no force 
whatever. 
 
In finding for the applicant, Darley CJ opined that the proper course would have been for 
the legislature to enact legislation so permitting the Colonial Government to preclude the 
landing of persons in the circumstances of the applicant. Furthermore, the Chief Justice 
was of the view that even if the British Sovereign had the power by proclamation to 
prevent aliens from entering the kingdom, and a statute was unnecessary, power so vested 
is a power personal to the Sovereign which cannot be delegated either to the Governor or 
the Government of the Colony.76 If a prerogative to refuse entry to aliens was not a 
prerogative of the Crown in England, then the Chief Justice came to the conclusion that it 
is not a prerogative that can or had been delegated. 
In concurring with the Chief Justice that the Governor of New South Wales did not have 
such a prerogative to expel an alien, Windeyer J said:77   
 
There cannot be the slightest doubt, however, that the Constitution of England, 
under which we all live, has always regarded with extreme jealousy the exercise 
of any power on the part of the Crown as expressed by Royal proclamation. The 
law on this subject is abundantly clear, and is thus laid down in Chitty’s 
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Prerogatives of the Crown, p.104:- “And it is clear that by the Constitution of 
the country, this prerogative respecting proclamations merely enables the King 
as executive magistrate to command and enforce the performance by his subjects 
of existing laws, and to make or alter regulations over which His Majesty has a 
peculiar jurisdiction, and does not entitle him to break through those 
fundamental principles on which the legislative portion of the Government is 
founded, by commanding the observance of matters not sanctioned by 
Parliament.” 
 
His Honour continued:78   
 
Whatever may be the inherent prerogative of the Crown with regard to its power 
to exclude foreigners from its territory, the question here is, whether, in the 
absence of any Royal proclamation, the executive Government of this colony 
has the right to exercise such a power of exclusion as is claimed for it under the 
circumstances of this case …  In deciding upon the facts before us, that the 
executive has no such power, we are in no way endangering the security of the 
country, or the welfare of its inhabitants, nor are we abridging its limited powers 
of self government. 
 
Whilst concurring with Darley CJ in one respect – that the executive government of the 
Colony had no such prerogative to exclude aliens – Windeyer J differed from the Chief 
Justice in his reasoning in one key respect:79   
 
Argument has been addressed to us as if the executive Government of the colony 
were the executive Government of a Sovereign State, whereas it has no more 
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powers than such as are given to it under our Constitution Act, and as are 
necessary for its administration. 
 
... in the absence of any such legislation, it appears to me that the executive 
Government of the colony is not clothed with any such powers as the executive 
Government of the mother country may possess under Royal proclamation. 
 
… If it is necessary that such a power should be exercised by the Governor and 
executive Government of this colony, the possession of the power must first be 
conferred by Imperial authority. 
 
The difference between the reasoning of Darley CJ and Windeyer J is this: the Chief 
Justice denied that the Sovereign had such a prerogative to delegate; Windeyer J said that 
even if there were such a prerogative, it needed to be properly delegated by the Imperial 
Parliament or the Sovereign, and had not been in this instance. 
Foster J concurring also found for the applicant, and his reasoning was consistent with 
both aspects of Darley CJ’s reasons, and Windeyer J’s reasons. Foster J observed that he 
was “by no means satisfied that the executive of a colony possesses the powers of a 
sovereign state, for that seems to me inconsistent with the existence of the sovereign power 
elsewhere.”80 But his Honour also noted that: “It is admitted that a colonial executive has 
not all the powers of a Sovereign – for instance, a colony cannot declare war – and no 
sufficient reason has been put before us for supposing that it has this special power of 
excluding foreigners.”81 Foster J concluded that in any event, it was unnecessary to decide 
this point.82 
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The Lo Pak case also attracted significant media attention. The Argus reported under the 
headline “The Chinese Question, the Situation at Sydney”, that the Full Court had dealt 
with the application to make absolute a show cause why the great writ should not issue. 
The Argus reported Mr Salomons QC as arguing that “the Executive in declining to allow 
the Chinese to land here, were exercising a prerogative with which the Supreme Court 
could not intervene”.83 Such was the public and political interest in the case, and the 
ramifications to “The Chinese Question”, that the leader of the Free Traders in the New 
South Wales Legislative Assembly, William (later Sir William) McMillan gave notice of 
his intention to move a motion of censure in the government for the language used by the 
government in their cable to the Secretary of State “as well as their illegal procedure in 
dealing with Chinese immigrants”.84  
The Lo Pak case caught the attention of the South Australian Register which reported in 
detail the arrival of the Afghan, and the detention of Lo Pak, and the subsequent 
application for a writ of habeas corpus.85 Again, reporting the legal proceedings under the 
heading “The Chinese Question”, the South Australian Register also reported upon the 
Premier of South Australia, Thomas Playford, sending a telegram to the Premiers of 
Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and New Zealand, proposing the calling of a 
“Chinese Conference” to respond to the perceived threat of an influx of Chinese 
immigrants.86  
The Lo Pak case caught the attention of colonial newspapers to the North as well. 
Rockhampton’s Morning Bulletin reported it in the intercolonial news of the day from 
Sydney. After reporting upon the apparently important issue of the departure from Sydney 
of the New South Wales “contingent of the Intercolonial Rabbit Commission”, which had 
left for Melbourne, the Morning Bulletin reported that the formal proceedings associated 
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with the “Chinese difficulty” had taken place on 15 May 1888.87 The Morning Bulletin 
also reported that Mr Salomons submitted to the Court that “there was no exemption paper 
bearing the name of Lo Pak, though there was a paper in the name of Li Kong, which Lo 
Pak claimed as his, he having changed his name during his absence” from the Colony.88 
Another northern newspaper, The Queenslander, also reported on “the Chinese difficulty” 
in the New South Wales Supreme Court, and Parliament.89 
Two days later, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that the Full Court had been 
engaged throughout the day before in dealing with the Lo Pak matter. The Herald reported 
that it was argued that the Sovereign of every state had the right to prevent the influx of 
foreigners,90 but that the Chief Justice said that he was of the opinion:91  
 
… that the Governor of this colony possessed no such power. It might be said 
that the Sovereign of England had that power; but even supposing that the 
Queen had the power by proclamation to do this, this power was vested in the 
English Sovereign personally, and not transferred to the Governor or 
Government of this colony. 
 
The Sydney Morning Herald in its ‘Law Report’ on 18 May 188892 reported the in banco 
hearing of Ex parte Lo Pak in full with a detailed summary of counsels’ submissions and 
Darley CJ’s reasons for judgment. Whilst it is unusual by today’s newspaper standards, the 
Herald, in publishing the Chief Justice’s reasons in full, reports that Darley CJ was of the 
opinion that any power to exclude an alien from landing was a personal power to the King 
or Queen and cannot be delegated. The Sydney Morning Herald reports the Chief Justice as 
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having exclaimed: “Now, with respect to proclamations. We have heard a great deal about 
the prerogative of the Crown, and the power of the Crown to make proclamations”.93 
The Herald promised to publish Mr Justice Windeyer’s judgment in extenso in the 
following day’s edition. And on Saturday, 19 May 1888, the Herald made good on its 
promise. By doing so the Herald drew to the attention of discerning readers that Windeyer 
J opined:94 
 
The argument has been addressed to us as if the Executive of the country were 
an executive sovereign State, whereas it has no more powers than are stated 
under our Constitution Act. If it is necessary that the Executive Government 
should be armed with powers of that kind they could be obtained by legislation 
in the mother country or by legislation in this country, approved by the mother 
country: but in the absence of such legislation it appears to me that the 
Executive Government here is not clothed in the powers, that the Executive 
Government at home possesses of issuing royal proclamations. 
 
And on the same day, 19 May 1888, the Queanbeyan Age reported upon the Lo Pak case.95 
The Lo Pak case was reported on in detail by other colonial newspapers.96  
The significant newspaper coverage of the Lo Pak case warrants attention. It evinces 
that this decision was well known amongst the informed members of the colonies. The Lo 
Pak case and the details of the case, including the issue of the Executive Government’s 
prerogatives cannot be said to have gone unnoticed by the colonial Crown law officers as 
well as those framers who were lawyers. The newspaper coverage shows that there was 
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broader interest in the devolution and investment aspect of how the prerogative came to be 
exercisable by the colonial governors. 
Ex parte Leong Kum 
The fourth decision that constituted the background to the drafting of the clauses that were 
eventually enacted as sections 2, 61 and 64 of the Constitution was Ex parte Leong Kum.97 
That case may be considered the twin case to Ex parte Lo Pak. It was heard at the same 
time by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales as Lo Pak, and by Darley 
CJ, Windeyer and Innes JJ – the first two justices also hearing the Lo Pak matter. Again, 
Julian Salomons QC appeared for the applicant. 
The facts can be stated briefly. The applicant was a subject of the Emperor of China and 
had never resided in the Colony of New South Wales. The applicant arrived on the s.s. 
Menmuir, and was prohibited from landing by the Collector of Customs. Acting under the 
instructions of the Colonial Government, the Collector of Customs refused to allow the 
Applicant to pay the £10 sum, which was tendered as the poll-tax. The Collector of 
Customs refused to allow the Applicant to leave the ship, and the applicant brought an ex 
parte application for the Collector of Customs to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus 
should not be issued. 
The reasons for judgment of each of the judges should be read in concert with their 
reasons in Lo Pak. Darley CJ, Windeyer and Innes JJ all find for the applicant. Darley CJ 
said:98 
 
.... but with regard to the question whether this colony has the power of a 
sovereign State, I desire to add a few words. I stated that in my opinion this 
colony had no such power, and after having paid every attention to the 
arguments put before us I am the more firmly convinced that the opinion which I 
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then formed is correct. 
 
Darley CJ concluded that the right the Government is said to have “cannot exist in a colony 
such as this, dependent as it is on a superior Government”.99 Windeyer J concurred:100 
 
As I stated in my judgment the other day in the case of Lo Pak, it appears to me 
that the fallacy of Mr. Salomons’ argument lies in the assumption that the 
executive power of this country – which is usually termed the Government – has 
the same sovereign right with regard to the exclusion of aliens from the country, 
that is possessed by the executive power of a sovereign state. Mr. Salomons, 
throughout his argument, assumed that the executive of this country had that 
power, but he has advanced nothing to satisfy my mind that it has or was ever 
given any such power. His argument has proceeded on the assumption that the 
Crown has parted with its prerogative, or that it has delegated the exercise of 
that prerogative to the executive Government of this country; but although this 
has been broadly stated, no authority has been advanced which goes in any way 
to convince me that there has been either such a surrender of this prerogative by 
her Majesty or any delegation of the exercise of such prerogative to the 
Government of this country. There is nothing in the Act under which the 
legislative powers of responsible government were given to this country which 
in any way points to the conclusion that Her Majesty surrendered her 
prerogative in this regard either to the Legislature or to the Executive of this 
country... 
 
Innes J also concurred with the Chief Justice and Windeyer J:101 
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... I am clearly of opinion that no such authority is vested in any person or body 
of persons in this colony, at all events other than the Parliament of the colony 
speaking by a statute. 
 
Innes J continued:102 
 
My brother Windeyer has shewn clearly that it is altogether futile to contend that 
the powers of a sovereign State are possessed by a colonial executive. 
 
Similar to the Lo Pak case, the Leong Kum case attracted newspaper attention.103 The 
Argus set out in great detail the parties’ submissions.104 The Sydney Morning Herald 
published a comprehensive report of the Supreme Court’s decision and the judges’ reasons 
for judgment, along with counsels’ submissions.105 
Interestingly, there was a further decision of the Supreme Court which followed the 
Leong Kum case, and whose facts were nearly identical. On 5 June 1888, the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales made absolute a rule nisi for habeas corpus in Ex parte Woo 
Tin.106  
IV  TOY V MUSGROVE  
The fifth key judicial decision which preceded the Constitutional Conventions of the 
1800s, and was known to the framers of the 1891 draft Bill to federate the Colonies, was 
the 1888 decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Chung Teong Toy v 
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Musgrove,107 and the subsequent appeal to the Privy Council. The appeal to the Privy 
Council was heard by the Board only a matter of three weeks before the commencement of 
the 1891 Convention in Sydney, and the Attorney-General of Victoria (at the time of the 
Full Court decision), Henry Wrixon QC, was counsel for the State of Victoria before the 
Board. By necessity of travelling time, Wrixon, who was a delegate for Victoria at the 1891 
Convention in Sydney, was a late arrival in Sydney on account of his travel back from 
London from appearing before the Board for the Colony. As will become apparent in 
subsequent chapters, Henry Wrixon and Alfred Deakin placed significant emphasis upon 
the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court in advocating and eventually 
convincing the delegates to the 1891 Convention to make a textual reference to the 
devolution and investment of the prerogative rights, preferences, capacities and immunities 
of the Crown when Chapter II, “The Executive Government” is considered in the 
committee stage of considering the draft Bill to federate the Australian Colonies. 
Toy v Musgrove was a significant decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria. Like Ex parte Lo Pak and Ex parte Kum, it was heard in 1888, and was heard 
before a Full Court consisting of six justices.108 Counsel for the Plaintiff, Chung Teong 
Toy, was Dr John (later Sir John) Madden, who was to be appointed as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court less than five years later in 1893. Counsel for the defendant was Henry 
(later Sir Henry) Wrixon who was the serving Attorney-General in the Gilles-Deakin 
administration. It had been Wrixon who elevated then Justice Higinbotham to the office of 
Chief Justice two years before the case. 
The facts of Toy v Musgrove are strikingly similar to the contemporaneous decision of 
Ex parte Lo Pak. Reading the facts from Higinbotham CJ’s reasons for judgment, the 
plaintiff, Ah Toy was a subject of the Emperor of China, and was not a subject of Queen 
Victoria. The Plaintiff arrived on the British ship Afghan in the Port of Melbourne on 27 
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April 1888. The Afghan was the same ship involved in the Ex parte Lo Pak matter. Ah Toy 
was an immigrant within the meaning of the Chinese Immigrants Statute 1865, and The 
Chinese Act 1881, and was entitled upon the payment of a poll-tax to land in the Colony of 
Victoria. Central to the consideration of the case were two issues. First, to what extent is 
the defendant, the Collector of Customs protected from suit, and secondly, what, if any, 
prerogatives of the Crown of England might have been vested either in the governor of the 
Colony, as the representative of the Crown, or in the members of Her Majesty’s 
Government for Victoria. 
The case was brought to the attention of the Colony’s Parliament. On 9 October 1888, 
Wrixon tabled a 164 page document which was a transcript of the four day hearing.109 
Whilst considerations of space do not allow for it to be included here, a detailed 
examination of the transcript of the hearing shows that the Court was focused very closely, 
for four days, upon the issue as to how the Colonial executive government, or the Colonial 
Governor, became vested with the authority to exercise the prerogatives of the Crown. 
Reading the transcript, one is struck by the command that the parties had of the issues in 
contention, and the depth and breadth of the sources of jurisprudence that the parties were 
drawing to the Court’s attention. Blackstone, Chitty, Hearn, May Todd, Comyns, Hallam, 
Broom, Dicey, Wheaton, Stephen, Bacon and all the cases mentioned supra; the parties’ 
references to these authorities are repetitiously cited throughout the transcript of the 
hearing. Dr John Madden summarised the plaintiff’s position as:110 
 
… it is not competent for Ministers in Victoria to exercise any prerogative of 
Her Majesty the Queen, except through the Governor of the colony, or at all 
events with his acquiescence. And I go further, and contend that Ministers 
cannot, even with the acquiescence of the Governor, exercise any prerogative 
                                                          
109  “A Copy of the Report of the Arguments and Judgment in the case of A Toy v Musgrove – Supreme 
Court of Victoria”, which was a return to an order of the Legislative Assembly dated 9 October 1888; 
the hearing spanned from Tuesday 10 July 1888, until Friday, 13 July 1888. 
110  Ibid 22. 
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other than lies within the limits of his Excellency’s commission. 
 
The case attracted considerable attention from the colonial newspapers. It could hardly be 
said that the matter was not known, at least in a general sense, to the leading political 
actors of the day. Newspapers from one side of the continent to the other reported on the 
case and commented upon its significance. The fact that the subject matter of the case was 
immigration, and the inability of the colonial administrations to restrict the influx of what 
were then considered undesirable immigrants – the Chinese – meant that the newspapers 
were naturally attracted to reporting the case. 
The parties brought to the attention of the Full Court most, if not all, of the leading 
works on the prerogatives of the Crown and related constitutional literature.111  
Toy v Musgrove is a comprehensive decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. It stands 
as a significant milestone in the career of Attorney-General, and then Chief Justice, George 
Higinbotham. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were represented by the most able 
counsel in the Colony. The Full Court gave judgment for the plaintiff and divided four to 
two. For the purposes of this chapter, and given the express reliance that the framers 
(especially Henry Wrixon) placed upon the case in formulating the constitutional language 
of what eventually became section 64 of the Constitution, it is necessary to consider in 
detail the reasons for judgment of each of the six judges who heard the case. This 
jurisprudence illustrates the historical backdrop to the drafting of the Constitution – 
especially the drafting undertaken at the 1891 Convention in Sydney. Each judge’s 
consideration of what, if any, of the Sovereign’s prerogatives had been delegated to the 
Governor of Victoria, and what, if any, provision or feature of the Victorian Constitution – 
                                                          
111  The parties drew to the Court’s attention, and the judges individually considered, the following works: 
Chitty’s Prerogatives of the Crown, Blackstone’s Commentaries, May’s Constitutional History of 
England, Dicey’s The Law of the Constitution, Todd’s Government of British Colonies, Todd’s 
Parliamentary Government , Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, de Lome’s English Constitution, 
and Hearn’s Government of England . The Full Court was also referred to the earlier decision of the 
Privy Council of Musgrave v Pulido, and the earlier English decisions that were considered in 
Musgrave v Pulido: Hill v Bigge and Cameron v Kyte. 
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The Constitution Act, as amended by The Constitution Statute, lawfully devolves or invests 
the Governor the prerogatives of the Crown, will now be considered in detail. 
Chief Justice Higinbotham 
Higinbotham CJ’s judgment is consistent with His Honour’s reputation as a radical. His 
Honour’s judgment “forms a sort of link between Higinbotham, Chief Justice, and 
Higinbotham the practical politician”.112  
After reciting the factual background to the litigation, Higinbotham CJ identified that 
the pleadings disclosed two questions of law that are “distinct and distinguishable”113 
which have been relied upon by the defendant, the Collector of Customs. The first defence 
“denies the jurisdiction of the Court”; the second defence presents as “an answer to the 
action on the merits”.114 The first defence is that the acts of the defendant, having been 
ratified and adopted by the Colonial Government of Victoria, are an act of state, and are 
consequently not cognizable in the municipal courts of Victoria.115 In acknowledging that 
“all the prerogatives and powers of the Sovereign are not vested by law in the Queen’s 
representative in Victoria”,116 Higinbotham CJ found that a Victorian Minister of the 
Crown cannot advise the Governor to exercise those prerogatives that are associated with 
acts of state (declaring war and peace, entering into treaties with foreign powers, engaging 
in diplomatic relations). Therefore, as a Minister of the Crown for Victoria can only 
exercise those powers vested by law in the Governor, consequently, “the power to do an act 
of state does not appear to be one”.117 
                                                          
112  E Morris, A Memoir of George Higinbotham: An Australian Politician and Chief Justice of Victoria, 
265. 
113  (1888) 14 VLR 349, 372. 
114  (1888) 14 VLR 349, 375. 
115  (1888) 14 VLR 349, 375. 
116  (1888) 14 VLR 349, 376-377. 
117  (1888) 14 VLR 349, 377. 
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Turning to the second line of defence advanced by the defendant, the learned Chief 
Justice began:118 
 
In England all the prerogatives and powers of government are lodged absolutely 
in the Sovereign. The Sovereign’s responsible advisers have no legal powers of 
government whatever vested in them. They have the right to advise the 
Sovereign, and it is their duty to obey, and to carry into executive act, the 
commands of the Sovereign, founded upon such advice. “The Constitution Act,” 
following the English exemplar, creates and vests in the Governor certain 
powers, but none in his advisers. The Governor is appointed by the Sovereign, 
and he derives his constitutional powers from “The Constitution Act,” to which 
the Sovereign has assented. He is, therefore, properly styled and regarded as the 
representative of the Crown, in his character as the depositary of his statutory 
powers. Victorian Ministers are appointed by the Governor. They have no legal 
powers of government whatever vested in them by “The Constitution Act.” 
 
After discussing the defendant’s submission that there is a prerogative to prevent aliens 
from landing on British soil, and noting that the “kindred institutions of the United States 
of America”119 have recognised such a right, nevertheless, Higinbotham CJ formed the 
view that “it is unnecessary … to consider whether the right to exclude aliens is, or is not, a 
continuing prerogative of the Crown of England”.120 
The Chief Justice then identified the next question that emerged: whether a power 
equivalent to this prerogative had, or had not, been vested by law in the representative of 
the Crown in Victoria, and can be exercised by the representative of the Crown upon the 
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advice of his responsible Ministers.121 His Honour recognised that this question “raises for 
the first time in this Court constitutional questions of supreme importance”.122 
Having declined to form a concluded view on the continued existence, or otherwise, of a 
prerogative to exclude aliens, Higinbotham CJ said:123 
 
We are called upon for the purpose of adjudicating upon the rights of the parties 
in this case to ascertain and determine what is the origin and source of the 
constitutional rights of self-government belonging by law to the people of 
Victoria, and, if such rights exist, what is the extent and what are the limits 
assigned to them by law. 
 
In conducting that adjudication, Higinbotham CJ traced the source of the Governor of the 
Colony’s (and the Executive Government of the Colony’s) lawful authority to the Imperial 
statute law; The Constitution Act, as amended by The Constitution Statute. In defining the 
Governor’s authority as flowing from The Constitution Act; which “cannot lawfully be 
interfered with by either Her Majesty or Her Majesty’s Imperial advisers”,124 the Chief 
Justice described the Governor’s authority as a “new and distinct authority”,125 which is 
“for all purposes within the scope of the Act of the Victorian Legislature, the local 
Sovereign of Victoria”.126 He expressly rejected the notion that the Governor’s authority is 
of a “dual character”;127 that is the Governor’s authority is not a composite of The 
Constitution Act, and the Royal Commission and Instructions. Therefore, in adjudicating as 
to the constitutional rights of self-government belonging by law to the people of Victoria, 
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his Honour said “we are compelled to the conclusion that The Constitution Act, as amended 
and limited by The Constitution Statute, and in that Act alone, we must look for the 
legislative grounds of the self-governing powers of this people”.128 If they are not to be 
found in that Act, or cannot be ascertained and defined with reasonably sufficient certainty 
in that Act alone, then Higinbotham CJ concluded that those constitutional rights do not 
exist.129 
Acknowledging the “momentous questions” being considered – the extent of the powers 
assigned to the representative of the Crown in Victoria, and the Ministers of the Crown – 
his Honour accepted that the “answer may possibly depend upon the extent which may be 
permitted to the field of judicial vision”.130 In answering the question as he has formulated 
it, Higinbotham CJ’s method of interpretation was to look to history and the circumstances 
of the enactment of The Constitution Act. He elevated the subjective intentions of the 
drafter of the Act – his predecessor (both as Attorney-General and Chief Justice), Sir 
William Stawell, to the first relevant consideration in defining the scope of the Act – 
putting aside what he described as “[t]he general rule that the Parliamentary history of an 
enactment is not admissible to explain its meaning”131 because “the framer of a Bill is 
known to have had special qualifications for his task”.132 
Ultimately, after having considered these factors, and applied rules of statutory 
construction, the Chief Justice summarised his, quite frankly, radical views as to the second 
question asked of the Court – what are the origins and source of the constitutional rights of 
self-government belonging by law to the people of Victoria, and, if such rights exist, what 
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was the extent and what are the limits assigned to them by law? His Honour concluded 
that:133 
 
… “The Constitution Act” as amended and limited by “The Constitution 
Statute” is the only source and origin of the constitutional rights of self-
government of the people of Victoria.  
 
And that:134 
 
… the Executive Government of Victoria possesses and exercises necessary 
functions under and by virtue of “The Constitution Act” similar to, and co-
extensive, as regards the internal affairs of Victoria, with the functions possessed 
and exercised by the Imperial Government with regard to the internal affairs of 
Great Britain.  
Justice Kerferd 
Justice Kerferd also dissented. Like Higinbotham CJ, Kerferd J was a former Attorney-
General, and perhaps brought to his judicial opinion his experience as a former member of 
the colonial legislature. In similar terms to Higinbotham CJ, Kerferd J stated the competing 
arguments in these terms:135 
 
… the question for our decision was narrowed down during the argument to a 
claim on behalf of the Crown that “The Constitution Act,” or the powers derived 
under it, must be interpreted as conferring all the prerogatives and powers 
necessary for the administration of the law and conduct of public affairs in this 
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colony, including the right to exclude aliens. On the other hand, the plaintiff 
denies that any prerogative other than those expressly specified in “The 
Constitution Act,” 19 Vic., and the Governor's Commission, can be exercised 
here by responsible Ministers of the Crown. 
 
Kerferd J answered the question this way. The Constitution of Victoria was created by and 
under the authority of the Imperial Act, 18 and 19 Vic c. 55. That Act delegated to the 
Legislature of Victoria the authority to repeal, alter, or vary all or any of the provisions of 
that Act, and to substitute others in lieu thereof. Quoting Dicey, Kerferd J said that the 
Legislature of Victoria “is a ‘subordinate’ assembly, because its powers are limited by the 
legislation of the Imperial Parliament; it is a constituent assembly, since it can change the 
articles of the Victorian Constitution”.136 Recognising that “the administrative acts of 
responsible Ministers (in the exercise of those discretionary powers of Government vesting 
in the Royal Prerogative) have been frequently challenged”.137 Kerferd J proffered the 
view:138 
 
… that the Constitution under which Victoria is governed rests on a wider basis 
than the actual terms of “The Constitution Act,” 19 Vict., would appear to 
indicate. If the plaintiff’s contention were a sound one, it would follow that the 
prerogatives forming part of the common law, which are separate from those in 
connection with the Legislature, and which before and since the inauguration of 
responsible government have been enforced by this Court, have been so 
enforced illegally. For if the Crown is restricted to the use of those prerogatives 
mentioned in “The Constitution Act” and the governor's Commission, then all 
other prerogatives must be deemed to be excluded. I can find no authority in 
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support of such a contention, but I think there is some authority the other way. 
 
His Honour asked the question “what was the intention of the Imperial Parliament in 
passing the Act 18 and 19 Vic c. 55, of which our Act 19 Vic formed the schedule?”139 His 
answer was: “to grant to the people of Victoria responsible government”, observing 
that:140  
 
A glance at the Act 19 Vic. will show that its provisions were intended to enable 
the Parliament called into existence to work out the necessary machinery for the 
purpose of giving full effect to the operation of responsible government, and that 
it was not intended thereby to restrict the government to the use of the 
prerogatives mentioned, because there are prerogatives not mentioned which are 
absolutely essential to give life to responsible government. 
 
The system of responsible government, his Honour said, “would be utterly unworkable 
without the discretionary prerogative powers vested in the Crown, and which are not 
provided for by any [s]tatute”.141 Kerferd J concluded that the prerogative of excluding 
aliens existed, and was a prerogative that the law must take cognizance of,142 and was one 
that the Government of Victoria could exercise.143 His Honour arrived at this conclusion as 
he said the question as to whether the Government of Victoria can exercise such a 
prerogative power is a matter between the Colony and the mother country.144 From an 
international law point of view, the act of the Government of Victoria would be the act of 
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the British nation145 – so long as the Government of Victoria’s acts are within the authority 
of the law, Kerferd J concluded that the Supreme Court is not concerned as to the grounds 
of justification.146  
Justice Williams 
Williams J delivered the leading judgment for the majority. His Honour found for the 
plaintiff, Ah Toy, and set down the maxims of law which this dissertation seeks to 
demonstrate that the framers were aiming to correct (or avoid) in respect of their 
establishment of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth. 
As to the act of state defence, Williams J said that it is no defence at all as it can only be 
a defence if ratified by a sovereign power.147 He said:148 
 
… this colony is not a Sovereign power; as far as we are concerned, the Imperial 
Government alone occupies that position, nor is the Sovereign power vested in 
the Governor of this colony; and to render the act complained of an act of 
State... 
 
His Honour approvingly quoted the opinion of Lord Wensleydale in Cameron v Kyte when 
Williams J said:149 
 
If the Governor of this colony has the Sovereign power vested in him, it is clear 
that outside his commission there is nothing else which so vests it. But there is 
no such delegation, or anything approaching to it contained in his commission. 
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The Governor of this colony is clearly not a Viceroy, as is commonly supposed, 
and the term Vice-Regal is inappropriate to the position he occupies. “He is 
merely an officer of the Imperial Government, with a limited authority from the 
Crown, and his assumption of an act of Sovereign power out of the limits of the 
authority so given to him is purely void, and the Courts of the colony over which 
he presided could give it no legal effect.”  
 
Williams J (who publicly said in 1888 that Australia should separate from Great 
Britain),150 said that Higinbotham CJ’s assertion that the Victorian Government had full 
authority over internal affairs is “a proposition which is not only startling but positively 
unintelligible to me”.151 With “great reluctance”, his Honour concluded:152 
 
I have been for years, in common with, I believe, very many others, under the 
delusion (as I must term it) that we enjoyed in this colony responsible 
government in the proper sense of the term. I awake to find, as far as my opinion 
goes, that we have merely an instalment of responsible government. It would 
have given me sincere satisfaction to have been enabled, in pronouncing my 
judgment, to have expressed my concurrence with the conclusion of the Chief 
Justice upon this point; but I have felt myself forced as a lawyer, construing our 
law as a lawyer, to differ from him on this most important question, namely, as 
to what is the system of responsible government which we have had granted to 
us in Victoria. 
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Williams J assumed that the prerogative to exclude aliens did exist in England, and has not 
fallen into disuse,153 but his Honour observed under the Victorian Constitution “… that a 
system or a measure of responsible government is created by the Act”,154 not a full system 
and measure of responsible governent. Therefore, Williams J concluded that: “... under 
“The Constitution Act,” we do not possess the power which forms the principal subject 
matter of the defence now under consideration”.155 
Justice Holroyd 
Holroyd J joined the majority. His Honour’s view was that The Constitution Act vested the 
prerogatives of the Crown in the Governor and Government of the Colony of Victoria. His 
Honour observed that “... nobody has disputed the Attorney-General’s proposition, that by 
international law every nation has the right of excluding foreigners from its territory, as 
well as friends as enemies”,156 and that “[t]he power to exclude aliens in time of peace, 
both by forbidding them to enter and by compelling them to depart the realm, has been 
claimed for the Crown as part of its prerogative down to quite modern times”.157 In terms 
of “responsible government”, he said:158 
 
... we must not be misled by abstract terms. No such thing as responsible 
government has been bestowed upon the colony by name; and it could not be so 
bestowed. There is no cut-and-dried institution called responsible government, 
identical in all countries where it exists. 
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In respect of the prerogative powers, Holroyd J concluded:159 
 
Powers of this class [that is, powers of a prerogative nature] having been 
bestowed in express terms, we ought to presume according to the ordinary rule 
of construction that no others of the same class were intended to pass. The rule 
is not one of universal application; but in the present instance it should be rigidly 
applied, inasmuch as it is still a fundamental maxim that the Crown is not bound 
by any Statute unless expressly therein named, and, as a corollary, the Royal 
prerogative cannot be touched except in so far as therein expressed. 
Justice á Beckett 
In a short set of reasons, substantially concurring with Holroyd J,160 á Beckett J said that 
in assuming that the right to exclude aliens subsisted in England as part of the prerogative 
when the “Constitution Act” was passed:161 
 
I can find nothing in the Act, or in the system of Government which it 
originated, authorising the exercise of this right by the advice of Ministers in 
Victoria. It was argued that the authority must be given because responsible 
government was given, as if the phrase “responsible government” had a definite 
comprehensive meaning, necessarily including the power in question. The 
phrase has to my mind no such force. 
Justice Wrenfordsley 
The fourth member of the majority was Wrenfordsley J, who was a very experienced 
colonial judge.162 His Honour also considered the question: to what extent have the 
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prerogative rights of the Crown been either granted or lessened by The Constitution 
Act?163 His Honour remarked that he was “not aware of any authority to the effect that in a 
settled colony, like Victoria, the Act of Constitution carries with it powers outside or 
beyond the exact terms of the grant itself”.164 Wrenfordsley J said:165 
 
I have endeavoured to consider very carefully the several powers and provisions 
conferred by the Act of Constitution, and I fail to see that they go further than to 
provide for a perfect scheme of local government, limited to its internal 
relations. When I say a perfect scheme, I mean a system of responsible self-
government, complete within itself, so far “as representative institutions of a 
popular character can be said to be perfect.” 
   
Wrenfordsley J approvingly cited the earlier opinions of the Privy Council:166 
 
Lord Brougham, in Hill v. Bigge and which is cited in the comparatively recent 
case of Musgrave v. Pulido, says- “If it is said that the Governor of a colony is 
quasi Sovereign, the answer is, that he does not even represent the Sovereign 
generally, having only the functions delegated to him by the terms of his 
commission, and being only the officer to execute his specific powers with 
which that commission clothes him”. 
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Taking a slightly different view of the correct approach, Wrenfordsley J said that a 
Governor acts under the express power from the Crown; and “in the case of a colony 
possessing representative institutions, he only represents the prerogative of the Crown in 
respect of those instances which are directly included in the terms of his commission...”.167 
Wrenfordsley J arrived at the conclusion that the status of the Colony of Victoria “is of a 
much more limited character than is suggested by the words of the plea”.168 Wrenfordsley 
J opined that:169 
 
… there does exist in this colony a form of Government, consistent with a full 
grant of representative institutions, limited, no doubt, in the application of 
prerogative rights, but possessing ample power with respect to all internal 
administration … 
 
... this colony did not as a State receive any recognition from the Imperial 
Government with respect to its external relations; nor could such a recognition 
take place under its existing connection with the mother State; but I think that, 
for the purpose of all necessary intercourse with other countries, the rights of the 
Crown have been sufficiently reserved. 
 
His Honour concluded that given the prerogative the Crown pleaded was a prerogative 
which goes to the external relations, it was not prerogative that is exercisable by the 
Governor or government of the Colony, and therefore the only authority with the power to 
exercise the prerogative claimed was Her Majesty’s Imperial advisers.170 
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V  MUSGROVE V TOY  
The sixth precedent that the delegates to the 1891 Convention were aware of was the 
appeal of Toy v Musgrove to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Musgrove v 
Chun Teeong Toy (Musgrove v Toy)171. The appeal was heard on 13, 14 and 19 November 
1890, and judgment was delivered on 18 March 1891 – less than a month before the 
delegates to the First Convention assembled in Sydney to begin drafting a Bill to federate 
the Australian colonies. To hear the appeal, the Board was constituted by a particularly 
strong composition of Lords: the Lord Chancellor, Lord Halsbury LC; the former Lord 
Chancellor in the last Gladstone Administration, Lord Herschell; Lord Hobhouse; Lord 
Macnaughten; Sir Barnes Peacock; Sir Richard Cough and Mr Shand (Lord Shand of 
Scotland). 
The appellant, Musgrove, the Collector of Customs, was represented by Sir Horace 
Davey QC (subsequently Lord Davey), who was the leader of the London equity bar and 
was an highly experienced and well regarded advocate before the House of Lords and the 
Board.172 Henry Wrixon QC travelled to London to appear with Davey. The respondent 
was represented by Sir Walter Phillimore QC (subsequently Lord Phillimore), and juniored 
by JW McCarthy. Both parties had the advantage of very distinguished and experienced 
counsel. Judgment was delivered by the Lord Chancellor. The Board gave judgment for the 
appellant – but not for the constitutional grounds (act of state, and exercise of the 
prerogative) which were the appellant’s defence, both in the Supreme Court of Victoria and 
at the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Rather, the Board decided the case by 
having regard to only the enactments of the Parliament of Victoria – that is, the Chinese 
Immigrants Statute 1865 and the Chinese Act 1881. 
                                                          
171  [1891] AC 272. 
172  In his memoirs, the former Lord Chancellor Viscount Haldane described Horace Davey as “the finest 
advocate on pure points of law that I have ever seen. In legal matters he had a mind like a razor, and he 
was accurate to the last degree”, and observed that: “It was in the House of Lords and the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council that his power became apparent”: Richard Burdon Haldane: An 
Autobiography, 35 and 36. 
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The plaintiff arrived on the Afghan in the Port of Melbourne, which was carrying 268 
Chinese immigrants on board, being 254 more Chinese immigrants then was permitted 
under the statute that a vessel might lawfully bring into the Port of Melbourne. Lord 
Halsbury LC formulated the issue for the Board as “whether, upon these facts, the plaintiff 
has shewn that there was a breach of duty towards him committed by the defendant; and 
that a legal right which he possessed has been infringed”.173 The defendant’s submission 
was that the plaintiff was ready, willing and able to pay the £10 sum, payable under s 3 of 
the Chinese Act 1881, and the defendant refused to receive the sum. But as the Lord 
Chancellor said, “it is obvious that this will not aid him, unless he can establish that there 
was a legal obligation on the part of the collector to receive the sum, and that, as the refusal 
to receive it constituted a breach of duty.174 True it was that a subject of the Emperor of 
China needed to pay the £10 sum upon landing, but against that, the Board was of the view 
that “the manifest object of the code was to prevent … what the legislature thought to be 
an excessive number of Chinese, landing in the colony, and not merely to impose a tax”.175 
The Board concluded that:176  
 
… where the master of a vessel has committed an offence by bringing a greater 
amount of Chinese into a port of the colony than the statute allows, he can have 
no right to require the collection of customs to receive payout in respect of such 
injustice...  
 
As this was the case, the plaintiff’s cause should fail, said the Lord Chancellor, as the 
plaintiff could only make out his cause if it could be shown that the refusal to receive the 
                                                          
173  [1891] AC 272, 280. 
174  [1891] AC 272, 280. 
175  [1891] AC 272, 281. 
176  [1891] AC 272, 280. 
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payment was unlawful. Having dispensed with this dispute between the parties, their 
Lordships therefore did:177 
 
… not think it would be right on the present appeal to express an opinion upon 
which the question which was elaborately discussed in the learned judgments 
delivered in the Court below – viz., what rights the executive government of 
Victoria has, under the constitution conferred upon it, derived from the Crown. 
It involves important considerations and points of nicety which could only be 
properly discussed when the several interests concerned were repeated, and 
which may never become of practical importance, and their Lordships feel 
bound, upon the grounds which they have indicated, to abstain from 
pronouncing upon them on the present occasion. 
 
Given that the Judicial Committee abstained from considering the accuracy of the 
majority’s reasons in Toy v Musgrove in respect of the question of the constitutional rights 
of the executive government of the colony, the issue of the source and nature of a colonial 
governor’s powers remained unresolved by the then ultimate appellate tribunal of the 
Empire. The Board could have placed the issues beyond dispute, but in declining to 
express an opinion, left Crown law officers throughout the Empire with two competing 
views on if, and how, the prerogatives of the Crown were devolved and invested in a 
colonial government.  
The Privy Council proceedings were closely followed in Australia. Leave to appeal to 
the Privy Council was granted in January 1889.178 It was known in April 1890 that the 
Board would likely hear the appeal in November of that year179, and in June 1890, it was 
reported that the Attorney-General of Victoria was not likely to travel to London for the 
                                                          
177  [1891] AC 272, 283. 
178  “Ah Toy Versus Musgrove”, The Mercury, 25 February 1889, 3. 
179  South Australia Register, 11 April 1890, 5. 
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appeal.180 But by August 1890, Mr Wrixon was being fêted at a luncheon by his fellow 
parliamentarians prior to his departure for London to represent the Colony before the 
Board.181 He arrived in London in late October 1890.182 Interestingly, the Tasmanian press 
reported that “owing to the delay of counsel instructed by Ah Toy, the case will probably 
be heard ex parte on 15 November proximo”,183 whereas the Victorian press presented a 
different picture: “In consequence of the delay on part of the Victorian Government in 
appointing counsel to represent the plaintiff, it is possible that the case will be heard by the 
Privy Council ex parte on December 15”.184  
In early 1890, there was an issue as to whether Wrixon would appear for the Colony, 
having vacated the office of Attorney-General whilst in transit between Melbourne and 
London as a consequence of the resignation of the ministry.185 
On 5 November 1890, The Argus reported that Sir Horace Davey QC, the former 
Attorney-General of England would appear with Henry Wrixon in the appeal, and on 7 
November 1890, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Sir Walter Phillimore would be 
the leader of Ah Toy’s case.186 
On 17 November 1890, The Argus reported that “[t]he Court seemed to be in favour of 
the view that it is a prerogative of the Crown to prevent the admission of aliens”.187 This 
view was also reported in Sydney;188 but by 21 November 1890, the Victorian press was 
                                                          
180  Portland Guardian, 11 June 1890, 2. 
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prophesising that it was “probable that the Court will ignore the constitutional aspects of 
the case”.189 
Before departing London, the Adelaide press reported that Wrixon was “investigating 
precedents in reference to Canadian federation in view of the expected establishment of 
federation in Australia”.190 As does the Melbourne press.191 At Christmas 1890, a degree 
of frustration at the delay in the Privy Council giving judgment is evident in the Sydney 
press.192 
The Brisbane press carried a lengthy interview with Wrixon upon his return to 
Melbourne but prior to the publication of the Privy Council’s judgment.193 Judgment was 
delivered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on 18 March 1891, and on 19 
March 1891, The Argus reported upon the Colony’s victory, but that the Board had 
expressed no opinion with regard to the prerogative rights conferred under the Victorian 
Constitution.194  
The Australian press repeated the editorial of The Times in London which said that it 
would have been a “misfortune” if the judgment “hampered the free national growth of 
constitutional relations between Great Britain and the great autonomous colonies”.195 
On 20 March 1891, the West Australian reported on the Colony of Victoria’s victory and 
detailed the competing submissions, including Henry Wrixon’s submissions regarding the 
prerogative.196 Even the Cairns Post reported that “[t]he Privy Council has reversed the 
decision of the Colonial judges”.197 Also in the West, the Western Mail editorialised that 
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the decision of the Privy Council had “been awaited with much interest by Australians, as 
well as by those ... who more generally concern themselves with the rights and powers 
acquired by the self-governing colonies”.198 Indeed, the Sydney papers recorded interest in 
the Musgrove v Toy case as being Empire-wide, with Canada making preparations for the 
introduction of similar legislation that is in operation in Australia, as a result of the 
decision of the Privy Council,199 and so did the South Australia Register.200 The judgment 
also came to the attention of the Supreme Court of the United States in Fong Yue Ting v 
United States.201 
In 1904, memory of the Privy Council decision had not yet disappeared. The West 
Australian reported on a case in Capetown where Musgrove v Toy was applied in what was 
described as a “Jewish Alien Immigration case”. The West Australian reminded readers that 
Musgrove v Toy was a cause celebre.202 The Sydney Morning Herald carried a similar 
report.203 
Given the widespread reporting of the case, and the importance of the constitutional 
issues involved, we may infer that Toy v Musgrove, and Musgrove v Toy, were both 
decisions that were widely known, and contributed greatly to the constitutional 
jurisprudence in the colonies prior to 1891. As a matter of legal history, they are instructive 
about the existing state of the common law, and of the textual choices that confronted the 
delegates to the Convention in Sydney in 1891. 
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C  H A P T E R  F  O U R  
THE FRAMERS AND THEIR PREROGATIVE 
 
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION  
Originalism, as a school of constitutional interpretation, is conventionally thought to be a 
quintessentially American idea. Originally an American scholar, Dr Lael Weis, has argued 
that originalism (understood through the prism of formalism) is just as much an Australian 
idea as it is to the disciples of Antonin Scalia.1 What the framers intended the 
constitutional text to mean, or how they intended the constitutional machinery to operate, 
is more than just interesting; authorial intention is instructive to the interpretation of the 
text and structure of the Constitution. 
This Chapter sets out what evidence there is as to how the framers thought ss 2, 61 and 
64 of the Constitution would operate – particularly what the framers thought they were 
doing when they amended clause 4 (subsequently s 64) to add the affirmation that the 
Federal ministers “shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”. 
In searching for authorial intention, unlike the American Founders, whose best record of 
their deliberations was James Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 
1787, the framers of the Australian Constitution left the complete transcripts of the two 
Federation Conventions – relevantly described as the Official Record or Official Report of 
the First Convention, or session of the Second Convention. The adoption by the framers of 
the parliamentary processes familiar to them as colonial politicians – particularly the 
                                                          
1  “Originalism in Australia”, an address to the Samuel Griffith Society’s annual conference, 12 August 
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process of submitting draft legislation to the committee phase – resulted in a clause-by-
clause consideration of the draft Constitution, ensuring the creation of a detailed transcript 
of the debate associated with each provision. 
Through examining the contents of the Debates, an appreciation can be developed as to 
how the framers sought to textually recognise or affirm the continued operation of the 
prerogative, or understood the prerogative to operate. 
This chapter considers in detail the Official Records of the Constitutional Conventions 
of the 1890s in so far as the contents of the Debates reveal the location of the textual 
recognition or affirmation of the royal prerogatives, or the meaning of the executive power 
of the Commonwealth. 
It does this not by way of looking backward; that is examining ss 2, 61 and 64, to 
ascertain where the text came from in a rather decontextualised fashion. Rather, this 
chapter examines the drafting history of those sections looking forward, that is, how they 
were changed to meet the competing desires of the framers during the Conventions 
process. The “looking backwards” method is utilised by French CJ in the Pape decision, 
where his Honour traced the drafting history of s 61.2 In this work, the day by day 
consideration of the draft Commonwealth Bills as they emerged from the drafting 
committees of the Conventions is considered. The committee of the whole, or in-
committee phase of consideration of individual draft provisions allows the nuances of the 
framers’ work to be identified and explored. 
Whilst this chapter traces the relevant portions of the Debates, the best and most 
nuanced explanation of what the framers intended can only be obtained from reading the 
Debates word-for-word, which, considerations of space prevent this author from setting out 
verbatim. 
                                                          
2  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 57-58 [119]-[121]. 
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II  THE USE OF THE OFFICIAL REPORTS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERATION CONVENTIONS IN INTERPRETATION  
Central to this thesis is the assertion that recourse to words spoken at the Federation 
Conventions is not just possible, but instructive. In terms of the High Court’s practice, 
recourse to the Official Reports and Official Records of the Conventions for the purposes 
of constitutional interpretation has not always been possible. During the hearing of 
Municipal Council of Sydney v Commonwealth,3 Griffith CJ said of the Debates:4  
 
They are no higher than parliamentary debates, and are not to be referred to 
except for the purpose of seeing what was the subject-matter of discussion, what 
was the evil to be remedied, and so forth. 
 
Speaking extra-judicially, Heydon J has said of that statement of Griffith CJ, that the High 
Court “[h]ereafter adopted the practice of not referring to the Convention Debates”.5 The 
reasoning behind this rule or practice of the High Court isn’t too difficult to fathom. The 
founding justices of the High Court – Sir Samuel Griffith, Sir Edmund Barton and Justice 
Richard O’Connor – were all significant figures in colonial politics, and Barton and 
O’Connor were both members of the first House of Representatives and Senate 
respectively. Griffith, Barton and O’Connor were all delegates to the Conventions, and 
were literally the drafters (as members of the drafting committees) of the constitutional 
text. All three men had their own views as to what the constitutional text meant; views that 
were fortified by being participants in the text’s creation. To permit parties to quote one 
Convention delegate off against another as part of a party’s submissions would have run 
the risk of the original members of the Court re-arguing what the three justices had argued 
                                                          
3  (1904) 1 CLR 208. 
4  (1904) 1 CLR 208, 213-214. 
5  J D Heydon, “Theories of Constitutional Interpretation: a taxonomy”, 2007 Sir Maurice Byers Lecture 
(3 May 2007), New South Wales Bar Association, Bar News, Winter 2007, 12, 15. 
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as Convention participants. There was an understandable reason to not permit litigants to 
ask the Court to prefer the words of one delegate over another. It was also said to be 
contrary to the common law tradition.6 Thereupon, that rule or practice remained for 85 
years. 
That approach to the use of the Debates by the High Court remained effectively 
undisturbed until it was emphatically discarded in Cole v Whitfield. All seven justices 
opined that:7  
 
Reference to the history [including the Convention Debates]… may be made, 
not for the purpose of substituting for the meaning of the words used the scope 
and effect – if such could be established – which the founding fathers 
subjectively intended the section to have, but for the purpose of identifying the 
contemporary meaning of language used, the subject to which that language was 
directed and the nature and objectives of the movement towards federation from 
which the compact of the Constitution finally emerged. 
 
Cole v Whitfield concerned the meaning of the expression “absolutely free” in s 92 of the 
Constitution; it more than just opened the door to the use of the Convention Debates by the 
High Court in constitutional interpretation, it “thereby settled a long running, if not 
especially passionate, debate”.8 
The High Court continues to have recourse to the Debates. In particular, the High Court 
has had recourse to the Debates when considering questions in relation to the interpretation 
of Chapter II of the Constitution generally, and the executive power of the Commonwealth 
specifically. French CJ has been the member of the Court who has shown the greatest 
analytical interest in the executive power of the Commonwealth. In Pape French CJ made 
                                                          
6  G Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, 1901-1929, 329. 
7  (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
8  N Perram, R Pepper (editors), The Byers Lectures 2000-2012, 129. 
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extensive use of the Debates in considering the relationship between the executive power 
of Commonwealth and the appropriation of funds from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.9 
Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ also approvingly made reference to the “scope of 
constitutional interpretation” and the use of “the successive draft bills for the Constitution 
which were debated in 1891, 1897 and 1898”,10 in the context of the operation of the 
appropriations power and its relationship to the executive power of the Commonwealth. 
Heydon J also spoke of the use of the framers’ intentions.11  
In respect of the use of history more generally (that is, not expressly in reference to the 
use of the Convention Debates), Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ opined in Pape that 
knowledge of legal history is indispensable to an appreciation of the essential 
characteristics of the power of appropriation in the Constitution; and affords an 
understanding of the setting in which the Constitution was formulated. Their Honoude 
make the point of emphasising the importance of the words of Gleeson CJ in Singh v 
Commonwealth.12 That “[a] knowledge of the law, including legal history is indispensable 
to an appreciation of their essential characteristics”.13 In Singh, Gleeson CJ said that:14 
 
The public record of the Convention Debates is evidence of what some people, 
involved in the framing of the Constitution, said about various drafts of the 
instrument. It is a partial record of the drafting history of most of the provisions 
of the Constitution. It reveals what some people understood, knew, believed, 
thought, or intended about the proposed instrument, and the circumstances 
surrounding some of the events involved in its preparation. For the reasons 
already given, what the record shows about the subjective beliefs or intentions of 
                                                          
9  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 56-58, [115]-[123]. 
10  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 75-76, [187] to [188]. 
11  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 148-149, [429]-[432]. 
12  (2004) 222 CLR 322, 331–332, [8]-[10]. 
13  (2004) 222 CLR 322, 332 [10]. 
14  (2004) 222 CLR 322, 337. 
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some people may be interesting but, of itself, is not a relevant fact. Many people, 
in Australia and the United Kingdom, were involved, directly or indirectly, in 
decisions about the form of the Constitution. Not all of them participated in the 
Convention Debates. Furthermore, as at all gatherings of lawyers or politicians, 
those who had the most to say were not necessarily the best informed or the 
most influential. A search for the collective, subjective intention of the framers 
of the Constitution would be impossible, and the individual subjective intention 
of any one of them, if it could be established, would not be relevant, because it 
would not advance any legitimate process of reasoning to a conclusion about the 
meaning of the text. Nevertheless, the drafting history of the Constitution, 
including the record of the Convention Debates, may be capable of throwing 
light on the meaning of a provision. Whether this will be so depends upon the 
nature of the problem of interpretation that arises, the nature of the information 
that is gained from the drafting history, and the relevance of that information to 
the solution of the problem. Whether information is capable of assisting in the 
rational solution, by a legitimate process of reasoning, of a problem about the 
meaning of the text, depends upon the nature of the problem, and the nature of 
the information.  
 
Similarly, in Williams [No 1]15 the High Court made extensive use of the Debates in the 
interpretation of s 61 of the Constitution, and the executive power of the Commonwealth. 
Just as his Honour did in Pape, French CJ considered in significant detail the drafting 
history of s 61, as evinced by the Convention Debates and contemporaneous literature.16 
Heydon J (albeit in dissent) also made use of the drafting history.17 In Williams [No 2] the 
                                                          
15  (2012) 248 CLR 156. 
16  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 194 [40] to 205 [61]. 
17  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 296 [346] to 287 [349]. 
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plurality further confirmed that “[t]he history of British constitutional practice is important 
to a proper understanding of the executive power of the Commonwealth”.18 
Additionally, in respect of construing s 64 of the Constitution, in Re Patterson; ex parte 
Taylor,19 the justices of the High Court had reason to consider (and therefore deem 
relevant) the words used by the framers in the two Conventions relating to that provision.20 
Chief Justice French has extra-curially criticised the search for “authorial intention”, but 
at the same time emphasised the qualification that Griffith CJ placed upon the permissible 
use of the Debates in Municipal Council of Sydney.21 The Chief Justice made his view 
plain: the application of ordinary principles of interpretation are entirely consistent with 
“the use of history including the Constitutional Debates to better understand the context 
and purpose of the language of the Constitution”.22 
Against these propositions, it is also important to observe that the High Court has 
previously (post-Cole v Whitfield) disavowed the use of the Convention Debates as an aid 
in constitutional interpretation. For example, the majority in the WorkChoices case was 
quite dismissive of the utility of the Debates in construing the corporations power.23 Their 
Honours said:24 
To pursue the identification of what is said to be the framers’ intention, much 
more often than not, is to pursue a mirage. It is a mirage because the inquiry 
assumes that it is both possible and useful to attempt to work out a single 
                                                          
18  (2014) 252 CLR 416, 468 [80] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), Crennan J agreeing at 
471 [99]. 
19  (2001) 207 CLR 391. 
20  (2001) 207 CLR 391 at 398 [1] (Gleeson CJ), at 426-427 [106]-[109] (McHugh J), at 462 [215] 
(Gummow and Hayne JJ), and at 470 [267] (Kirby J). Additionally, in Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor 
Gleeson CJ speaks of the framers’ purposes in broadly outlining in s 64 “some of the structural elements 
of a system of government” at 402 [13] and [14]. 
21  R S French, “Interpreting the Constitution – Words, History and Change” Monash University Law 
Review (2014) (Vol 40, No 1), 35, 38. 
22  Ibid 43-44. 
23   New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1. 
24  (2006) 229 CLR 1 at 97 [120] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
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collective view about what now is a disputed question of power, but then was 
not present to the minds of those who contributed to the debates. And even if a 
statement about the framers’ intention can find some roots in what was said in 
the course of the Convention Debates, care must be taken lest, like the reserved 
powers doctrine, the assertion assumes the answer to the very question being 
investigated: is the law in issue within federal legislative power? For the answer 
to that question is not to be found in attempting to attribute some collective 
subjective intention to all or any of those who participated in the Convention 
Debates. And when it is said that a particular construction of the constitutional 
text does, or does not, accord with the framers’ intention, the statement 
compares competing constructions of the Constitution, both of which must be 
based in its text, interpreted in accordance with accepted principles. 
 
That said, the construction of ss 2, 61 and 64 of the Constitution, and the operation of the 
executive government of the Commonwealth, cannot be properly understood without 
having regard to the history of the Imperial executive, the executive governments of the 
Australian colonies at the time of Federation, and the authorial intention of (so far as it can 
be properly ascertained and attributed to) the framers. 
III  RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND THE PREROGATIVE  
Fundamental to understanding the Constitutional Debates, and how the prerogative was 
recognised and affirmed in the constitutional text by the framers, is an appreciation of the 
ongoing debate about the establishment of responsible government within the new 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
There is no provision in the Constitution that expressly states that the doctrine or system 
of responsible government (as that system had come to be known) is incorporated in the 
Constitution. It is only through a construction of the text and structure (aided by a 
knowledge of British constitutional practice and history) that one is able to form the view 
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that the Constitution seeks to establish for the Commonwealth a system of responsible 
government. 
The great challenge for the constitutional drafters was to effectively blend together the 
Westminster system of responsible government with a bicameral legislature of co-equal 
powers. 
The British system of responsible government – that is, where the officers of state who 
are charged with administering the executive government are drawn from the legislature 
(and politically answerable to the legislature) was, and remains, an organic constitutional 
institution. 
In the 1890s, it was a known, accepted, and aspired to, method of government; but it 
was also known to be in a state of development. For example, the political convention that 
the head of government (the prime minister, premier, or chief secretary) should come from 
the lower house which represents the country, had yet to be fully developed and accepted. 
In the Imperial Parliament, it wasn’t until the appointment of Arthur Balfour as prime 
minister in 1902 by Edward VII that the practice of commissioning a member of the House 
of Lords as prime minister and First Lord of the Treasury came to an end. 
Whilst responsible government was still undergoing growth, the fundamental tenets of 
responsible government had taken foot throughout the Empire: that those who were 
charged with administering the executive government in the Sovereign’s name were 
required to hold a seat in the legislature; and they were accountable to the legislature for 
their administration of the government. If the ministry lost the confidence of the lower 
house of the legislature, then the ministry was obliged to resign, or go to the country, that 
is, request that the Sovereign or the Sovereign’s representative dissolve the legislature. 
The framers clearly wanted to replicate the system of government that they were most 
familiar with in their respective colonies. The delegates to the First Convention in Sydney, 
and the Second Convention in Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne were the principal 
political actors of their colonies. They were familiar with the ebb and flow of changes in 
ministries associated with the ordinary operation of responsible government. 
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Coupled with a desire to replicate responsible government, the framers sought to 
replicate the Connecticut Compromise of 1787, where the founders of the American 
Republic protected the interests of the “small states” in the new Republic by requiring that 
the United States’ Senate comprise of equal representation from each of the States. As 
French CJ put it: “The tension between the operation of executive powers and functions 
under a system of responsible Cabinet government and a federal constitution with a 
bicameral legislature, one element of which was a States’ House, represented a difficulty 
for some leading figures in the Federation movement”.25 G W Hachett said at the 1891 
Convention in Sydney, “either responsible government will kill federation, or federation … 
will kill responsible government”.26 
Crennan J said that “[i]t has often been recognised that s 61 and, more generally, Ch II 
of the Constitution were shaped by the institution of responsible government and the 
exercise of executive power under the Westminster system of Britain, as at the date of 
Federation. Responsible government was seen then as a ‘government under which the 
Executive is directly responsible to – nay, is almost the creature of – the legislature’”.27 
It is against this backdrop that two issues emerged. The first being how to reconcile 
responsible government with bicameralism consisting of chambers of equal powers to 
approve expenditure. The second issue that emerged is: even if responsible government 
were able to be replicated in the Federal Constitution, and, in some textual way, the organic 
convention be incorporated into the constitutional text, what powers and functions should 
those charged with administering the executive government have, and how are those 
                                                          
25  Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 203 [58] (French CJ). 
26  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 280. 
27  Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 349 [508] (Crennan J), quoting Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 147 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ), 
who, in turn, were approving the words of Lord (Richard) Haldane, who, as a member of the House of 
Commons, introduced the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill into the Imperial Parliament – 
to distinguish it from the United States Constitution. See also J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1907 edition), 703. 
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powers and functions textually recognised or affirmed (if at all) in the constitutional text? 
These two issues ought to be kept in mind. 
Coupled with these questions is the repetitious use of the Supreme Court of Victoria’s 
judgment in Toy v Musgrove.28 As will be identified more clearly later in this chapter, 
Alfred Deakin and Henry Wrixon QC, both of Victoria, brought Toy v Musgrove to the 
delegates’ attention on several occasions, with the effect of using the competing reasons of 
the six justices of the Supreme Court of Victoria as a plea to ensure that the constitutional 
text being drafted at that Convention addressed the jurisprudential issues at the centre of 
Toy v Musgrove. Reference to Toy v Musgrove in the Convention Debates has received 
some academic attention,29 and was discussed in Ruddock v Vadarlis30 (the Tampa case). 
To date, the High Court has not made any connexion between the reasoning in Toy v 
Musgrove, and the operation of either the executive power of the Commonwealth, or the 
prerogatives of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. 
IV  HENRY WRIXON QC  
It is not the purpose of this work to outline the political, economic and social pressures that 
gave rise to the Federation movement or the Conventions, or conferences which led to 
Federation. That task has been adequately undertaken by others.31 Rather, central to this 
author’s contentions is the necessity to identify those portions of the Convention Debates 
that touch upon the nature and scope of the executive power of the Commonwealth, as well 
as the recognition of the prerogative of the Crown in the text of the Constitution.  
                                                          
28  (1888) 14 VR 349. 
29  J Waugh, “Chung Teong Toy v Musgrove and the Commonwealth Executive” (1991) 2 Public Law 
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30  [2001] FCA 1329 (consisting of Black CJ, Beaumont and French JJ). 
31  See generally, J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 79; J 
A La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, 1; R S French, “The Constitution and the 
People”, R French, G Lindell & C Saunders (editors), Reflections on the Australian Constitution, 60, 64. 
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Nor is it the purpose of this work to identify the contribution of the various members of 
the dramatis personæ. That said, so consequential to the story is one delegate that special 
mention ought to be made of him. 
Henry Wrixon (1839-1913) was a Victorian delegate to the First Convention. Wrixon 
was a member of the Victorian Legislative Council. He was called to the Irish Bar (the land 
of his birth) in 1861, but returned to Victoria in 1863. He was solicitor-general in the 
McColloch ministry in 1870, and held that office for twelve months. He was appointed 
Attorney-General in the Gillies-Deakin ministry in 1886; an office he held until just prior 
to the commencement of the First Convention in March 1891. He was appointed as one of 
her Majesty’s Counsel in 1890. Significantly, as the first law officer of the Crown, Wrixon 
appeared in 1888 for the colony in the politically-charged case of Toy v Musgrove32 before 
six justices at the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Supreme Court found for Ah Toy and 
Wrixon departed for London to appear (as junior counsel) for the colony in the appeal of 
the Supreme Court’s decision to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Board 
heard the appeal on 13, 14 and 19 November 1890 (with judgment delivered on 18 March 
1891),33 and Wrixon was delayed in returning to the Australian colonies. He was absent 
from the commencement of the First Convention on 2 March 1891, until 9 March 1891. 
Wrixon was widely acclaimed for “his thoughtful and scholarly exposition of constitutional 
principles” at the First Convention.34 
Wrixon failed to get elected to the second Convention, and his only legacy in the 
drafting of the Federation Bill comes from the participation in the First Convention.35  
                                                          
32  (1888) 14 VLR 349. 
33  Musgrove v Chun Teeong Toy (1891) AC 272. 
34  A Deakin, The Federal Story: The Inner History of the Federal Cause, 36. 
35  Wrixon was subsequently the President of the Legislative Council of Victoria (1901-1910), and was the 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Melbourne from 1897-1910. 
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V  THE NATIONAL AUSTRALASIAN CONVENTION ,  1891  
The most important contribution to the recognition of the prerogatives of the Crown into 
the constitutional text was at the First Convention, officially known as the National 
Australasian Convention, which was convened in Sydney from 2 March 1891 until 9 April 
1891. 
5 March 1891 
On Monday, 5 March 1891, in the early stages of the Convention and after lengthy 
consideration of the role of the upper house in a new Commonwealth Parliament, Alfred 
Deakin addressed the Convention to draw the delegates’ attention to an issue that has 
recently impacted upon his own colony. Mr Deakin told delegates that “in drawing the 
constitution proposed to be adopted by federated Australasia” they “may not shape it 
without regard to recent interpretations of colonial constitutional rights” which are “to be 
found in the judgment in the case of Ah Toy versus Musgrove, delivered by the Supreme 
Court of Victoria”.36 Deakin told delegates that in that case “the powers of the Executive 
and those conferred upon the colony under the Constitution”37 were the subject of a 
challenge in the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Deakin 
said that the Court’s and the Board’s findings “will demand the most careful consideration 
when the federal constitution is being framed, because it has been the common belief in 
Victoria that we had all the powers and privileges attaching to responsible government, 
sufficient to enable us to perform all the duties and to exercise all the rights devolving 
upon us as a people”.38 Deakin observed that the “gravest doubt” is now thrown upon that 
belief. In telling delegates about Toy v Musgrove he praises then Chief Justice of Victoria, 
George Higinbotham, describing his judgment as one of a lawyer, orator and statesman. 
                                                          
36  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 84. 
37  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 84. 
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Deakin quoted from the judgment of Higinbotham CJ when the Chief Justice said that: 
“It was the intention of the Legislative Council to provide a complete system of 
responsible government in and for Victoria, and that intention was carried into full 
legislative effect with the knowledge and approval and at the instance of the Imperial 
Government by the “Constitution Statute”, passed by the Imperial Parliament”.39 He also 
quoted from the judgment of Kerford J (who was, like Higinbotham CJ, a sometime 
Attorney-General of the colony of Victoria). Mr Justice Kerferd was quoted as saying: “All 
the prerogatives necessary for the safety and protection of the people, the administration of 
the law, and the conduct of public affairs in and for Victoria, under our system of 
responsible government, have passed as an incident to the grant of self-government 
(without which the grant itself would be of no effect) and may be exercised by the 
representative of the Crown in the advice of responsible ministers”.40 
Alfred Deakin told delegates that those two views expressed by the minority in Toy v 
Musgrove “embody the belief which was held until lately in Victoria”.41 He then told 
delegates what the majority held; first quoting from Sir Hartley Williams: “I have been for 
years in common with, I believe, very many others, under the delusion (as I must term it) 
that we enjoyed in this colony responsible government in the proper sense of the term. I 
awake to find, as far as my opinion goes, that we have merely an instalment of responsible 
government”.42 Deakin pointed out to delegates that Holroyd J considered that “we have 
only a measure of self-government”,43 and that a’ Beckett and Wrenfordsley JJ concurred.  
After praising his fellow, but absent, Victorian delegate, Henry Wrixon QC44 (who was 
at that stage yet to arrive in Sydney for the Convention), for arguing Musgrove v Toy with 
                                                          
39  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 85. 
40  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 85. 
41  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 85. 
42  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 85. 
43  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 85. 
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great force and ability before the Privy Council, the Chief Secretary expressed his view 
that:45 
 
The governor-general, as representative of the Queen in these federated colonies, 
should be clothed by statute with all the powers which should belong to the 
representative of her Majesty; he should be above all risk of attack, because he 
should act only on the advice of responsible ministers … 
 
In gently guiding delegates from the concept of responsible government to the devolution 
or investment aspect, Deakin told delegates that in framing a federal constitution “we 
should set out with the explicit claim to possess and exercise all the rights and privileges of 
citizens of the British empire to the same extent that they are possessed and exercised by 
our fellow-countrymen in Great Britain itself”.46 
“Australia”, Deakin said “is entitled to absolute enfranchisement”.47 Recognising the 
complexity of what is meant by the convention of responsible government, Deakin 
observed that “[w]e are dealing with a constitution which has not yet reached the full 
period of its growth, which always has been and always will be steadily progressive, 
expansive, and adaptable to national growth”.48 
There can be no doubt that Alfred Deakin was an eloquent and persuasive orator. And 
the delegates present can reasonably be presumed to have felt the force of Deakin’s plea; 
but in his eloquence, Deakin injected complexity into the framing of the Constitution. His 
gentle hewing back and forth between how to establish the British cabinet system of 
government, and to ensuring the governor-general was “clothed by statute with all the 
powers which should belong to the representative of her Majesty”, served to obscure the 
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attention of the framers from the textual recognition or affirmation that may be prudent to 
ensure that the prerogatives of the Crown are vested and exercised according to the 
delegates’ intentions. 
After some further rhetorical flourish, Deakin offered a prayer that “I trust I have not 
been misunderstood”.49 The just-mentioned contribution to the debate constituted the only 
express reference to the prerogatives of the Crown prior to the drafting of the first draft of 
the Federation Bill for the consideration of the Convention. 
1 April 1891 
On 1 April 1891, the Constitutional Committee (the drafting committee) reported to the 
Convention. The Convention, constituted as the Committee of the Whole, began its 
herculean task of considering the draft Commonwealth Bill clause-by-clause, beginning 
with chapter 1 “The Legislature”. 
At the commencement, the recently arrived Victorian delegate Henry Wrixon QC 
opened the discussion at the start of the consideration of the bill in committee. Wrixon 
flagged his concerns with two aspects of the draft Bill. Relevantly, Wrixon began his 
second criticism by identifying the devolution or investment aspect. He said:50 
 
…. There is a portion of this bill establishing constitutional government, and I 
think it was truly said yesterday that the effect of that portion would be to 
establish in this federation in its ordinary working responsible government. But 
the form in which ministers are to be appointed, I think, wants a little 
consideration, because it involves a very serious point. In clause 4 of chapter II, 
page 13, it is provided:  
 
                                                          
49  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 86. 
50  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 86 
  168 
     
For the administration of the executive government of the commonwealth, 
the governor-general may, from time to time, appoint officers to administer 
such departments of state of the commonwealth as the governor-general in 
Council may from time to time establish, and such officers shall hold office 
during the pleasure of the governor-general, and shall be capable of being 
chosen and of sitting as members of either house of the parliament. 
  
Now, the point I wish to draw attention to is that I do not think the provision will 
convey to those officers thus appointed by the governor the great power and 
authority which, under the English system of government, belongs to a 
responsible minister of the Crown. That is something distinct from the position 
of an officer appointed to administer a department.  
 
Wrixon reminded the Convention of Buron v Denman,51 and at this point Inglis Clark 
interjected: “Read the last line. The clause provides that the officers shall be members of 
the federal executive council!”,52 to which Wrixon responded “It does not connect them 
with the Sovereign”.53 Inglis Clark then compared what is proposed with Canada, and 
Wrixon pointed out that in Canada the ministers are members of the Queen’s Privy 
Council. Inglis Clark was unpersuaded. Wrixon pressed the point:54  
 
… the question has never been raised in Canada; but I think the question 
certainly would be raised here; and, according to my view, I think there can be 
little doubt but that the courts would hold that ministers so appointed did not 
inherit all the great powers of the Queen's ministers, and which powers are yet 
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necessary for the carrying on of the government. If a few words will meet this 
point, I think it is most important that it should be met. 
 
Wrixon then changed the topic to the question of appeals to the Queen in Council. During 
the course of the in-committee consideration of the draft bill, Griffith proposed a small 
amendment to the draft clause that became s 2 of the Constitution. He proposed that the 
words “her Majesty’s” be omitted with the view of inserting the words “the Queen’s”.55  
The amendment was agreed to without debate. 
Then, Richard Chaffey Baker moved that after the word “functions,” in the same clause, 
the following words be inserted “as are contained in schedule B hereto, and such other 
powers and functions not inconsistent there-with”.56 Baker’s purpose was to ensure that 
“[i]t will be seen that we are deliberately making the instructions given to her Majesty’s 
representative part of our Constitution.”57 Clark, Griffith and Deakin contributed to the 
debate on the proposed amendment, with Deakin asking what those enumerated powers 
would be. Baker replied:58 
 
Well, I am not prepared to put in the whole of the powers and functions which 
are to be expressly set forth as having to be performed by the Governor; but I 
want to affirm the proposition that they shall be, as far as possible, contained in 
our constitution. … Among other things I will mention one matter which, I 
think, certainly ought to be inserted in the schedule of this bill, and that is as to 
the manner in which the governor-general is to exercise the prerogative of 
pardon.  
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Baker went on to point out the manner in which the prerogative of mercy is devolved or 
invested (and therefore exercised) in Canada. Baker told the other delegates that the 
governor-general of Canada “acts in matters relating to the interests of the empire as an 
officer of the Imperial Government; but in all other cases it is expressly laid down that he 
is to act on the advice of his responsible ministers”.59 Baker told the delegates that:60 
 
I should like to see in the schedule to this bill all the powers and functions of the 
governor-general [of Australia] which it is possible to define and to reduce to 
writing, so defined. I do not wish that we should have to go to Downing-street 
from time to time to find out what the powers of our constitution are. 
 
At this point Deakin contributed to the debate. In respect of Baker’s proposed schedule of 
powers, Deakin told the delegates that the “first question” which needs to be considered 
was:61 
 
 … whether this is the best means of accomplishing, the end which the hon. 
member has in his mind. If the hon. member proposes to define the powers of 
the governor-general so far as they can be defined, I am cordially with him. The 
matter, indeed, received some attention at the hands of the committee, though 
the question as to the method of definition to be adopted was felt to be 
surrounded with difficulty. The solution which I wish to suggest to the hon. 
member who has now moved his amendment is that it would be better to 
embody in the bill itself anything that we have to say on this subject; and for my 
own part, I cannot conceive that it will be necessary to do anything more-if I 
may repeat what I was urging a few minutes ago in connection with another 
                                                          
59  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 575. 
60  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 575. 
61  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 575. 
  171 
     
subject-than to insert in this bill, and to state on the very face of the constitution, 
that the governor shall invariably act on the advice of his responsible ministers, 
that every act of his shall be countersigned by a responsible minister who shall 
make himself responsible by his signature for that particular act. That will apply 
even to circumstances under which a governor-general changes his ministers.  
 
After some further debate by Griffith, Deakin and Playford, Deakin attempted to satisfy 
Baker’s concerns by suggesting that:62 
 
… we can easily embody it in language; and I would suggest to the hon. 
member, Mr. Baker, that it would meet all the purposes of the schedule which he 
proposes, and do away with what seems to be an indirect method of dealing with 
the matter, to say directly that the governor’s powers shall be limited by the 
necessity on his part of obtaining the signature of a responsible minister to every 
one of his acts. 
 
At this point, and in the context of considering clause 2 in detail, Wrixon drew together the 
threads of the devolution and investment aspect of the debate, and pointed the delegates 
towards achieving the constitutional purpose in the draft chapter that sets out the executive 
government. Wrixon said:63 
 
It seems to me, sir, that if we take care, when we come to the portion of the bill 
dealing with the executive government, to thoroughly establish responsible 
government, we may let this clause go as it is, because whatever functions are 
vested in the governor-general will then necessarily come under the operation of 
responsible government, and we need do nothing further. It is just like the case 
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of the Sovereign herself. She has vast prerogatives, great powers but however 
vast or great they are does not signify to the people of England so long as there 
is responsible government established. Therefore, instead of seeking to limit the 
powers which the Sovereign may depute to the governor-general, or to schedule 
the acts which he may or may not do, we have to take care to thoroughly 
establish responsible government, and, if we do that, the rest will take care of 
itself.  
 
After a small quip by Dr Cockburn, Wrixon went on to say: “You want no definition or 
enumeration of the powers. All you have to take care is that you thoroughly establish 
responsible government, and I think that a few words ought to be added to the bill when we 
come to that portion”.64 Rather bluntly, this topic of debate then ceases, and the 
Convention’s delegates proceed to consider other matters. 
Through this discrete portion of the Convention’s deliberations, and through the 
delegates’ initial consideration as to of how the prerogative was to be devolved or invested 
in the executive government of the Commonwealth, light is thrown upon the recognition or 
affirmation aspect. Baker’s proposal to attach a schedule to the Constitution which sets out 
the Governor-General’s powers and functions is premised upon the idea that the 
prerogative is to tacitly continue to operate in respect of the Commonwealth, and the that 
there is virtue (so he thought) in expressly setting out what those powers and functions are. 
This portion of the debate throws light upon the devolution and investment aspect, as well 
as the recognition and affirmation aspect. 
6 April 1891 
A further five days went by in which the Convention considered draft Chapter I. On 
Tuesday 6 April 1891, the Convention resumed consideration of the proposed Chapter II, 
to be entitled “The Executive Government”. The Convention proceeded to consider draft cl 
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4 of the drafting committee’s recommended provisions. It is important to note that the 
Convention at this point in time made no reference to cl 1 of Chapter II - the clause which 
included the expression, “executive power and authority of the Commonwealth”, and the 
clause that would, in addition to draft cl 6 of Chapter II go on to eventually be enacted as s 
61 in the Constitution. Draft cl 4 read: 
 
For the administration of the executive government of the commonwealth, the 
governor-general may, from time to time, appoint officers to administer such 
departments of state of the commonwealth as the governor-general in council 
may from time to time establish, and such officers shall hold office during the 
pleasure of the governor-general, and shall be capable of being chosen and of 
sitting as members of either house of the parliament. 
 
Such officers shall be members of the federal executive council. 
 
Henry Wrixon returned the debate to the issue raised by Alfred Deakin the previous day. 
What followed was a nuanced and sophisticated debate about the relationship between the 
principle of responsible government, and the powers vested in the ministers and the 
ministry to exercise the common law recognised attributes of the Crown, as the Queen’s 
ministers in England do – that is, about the devolution and investment aspect of the 
relationship. 
Henry Wrixon had a nuanced understanding of the issue of whether the Crown’s 
Victorian ministers were vested with the full prerogatives enjoyed by the Crown in the 
United Kingdom. As identified supra, as the Attorney-General of Victoria, Wrixon was 
counsel in Toy v Musgrove (referred to in the Convention Debates the day earlier by 
Deakin) when the matter was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria.65 
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Furthermore, Wrixon had been counsel for the appellant Musgrove (who was the Collector 
of Customs) when the matter was heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
only four months prior to the Convention in November 1890.66 It was Wrixon who made 
the appellant’s oral submissions to the Privy Council on the question of whether Victorian 
ministers were invested with the necessary power to eject an alien from the colony.67 
Wrixon had a very detailed and nuanced understanding of the issue he was raising with his 
fellow Convention delegates. 
Wrixon began the debate on the text of clause 4, which was ultimately to end up as 
section 64 of the Constitution:68 
 
[Clause 4] may be said to constitute responsible government in the dominion. It 
provides that the governor-general may appoint officers to administer 
departments of state, and it declares that such officers shall be members of the 
federal executive council. I have no doubt that the effect and operation of that 
will be to constitute a system of responsible government in the dominion; but the 
question which I think requires some consideration, and some slight addition to 
the clause, is whether it will clothe them with all the vast constitutional powers 
which, under the system of the English government, belong to responsible 
ministers of the Crown. I myself do not believe that it will. The greatness of 
these powers, and how vast is the authority which any responsible minister of 
the Crown exercises in binding the Crown and the Sovereign, is well known, of 
course, to all my legal friends, and was well illustrated in the old case which I 
mentioned to the Convention before, namely, the case of Buron and Denman. 
The Supreme Court of Victoria has held that similar words in our Constitution 
Act do not carry with them any such implied authority to the minister who holds 
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any such office, on the ground that the statute that created the office and defined 
his duties is not held to carry with it the larger powers to which I have adverted. 
 
Griffith and Downer then made the point that there are no words in the Victorian 
Constitution Act which are “like that”, “[n]or in any constitution!”69 Inglis Clark opined 
that Wrixon’s objective is met by the words “such officers shall be members of the 
executive council”. Wrixon disagreed, and said:70 
 
… In my opinion it is not; but it is a matter for consideration; and, whatever 
opinion may be taken of it, I myself think that the matter should be put beyond 
doubt; for, unquestionably, in carrying out responsible, every-day government, it 
is highly important that the ministers of the Crown here should, in regard to all 
Australian matters, be invested with exactly the same presumptions of authority 
and ratification from the Crown as apply to the English ministers with regard to 
all English matters. 
 
In reading the Official Report of the First Convention, it can be seen that the matter raised 
by Wrixon underwent a refinement during the in-committee stage. The debate commenced 
with the delegates considering how to achieve responsible government, without actually 
using the words “responsible government”. The debate then sharpened; and the devolution 
and investment aspect began to become the focus of the debate. In a lengthy and important 
contribution, Alfred Deakin said that “… it is not our desire that ministers under the 
commonwealth shall be in the same position as ministers under colonial constitutions. If 
there is a doubt as to the authority of a state minister, there should be no doubt as to the 
authority of a minister under this constitution”.71 Speaking directly to the recognition and 
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affirmation aspect, Deakin continued: “… the power of the Crown itself is nowhere 
defined, and cannot be defined under this constitution. It is vast and vague; but all the 
power which the Crown exercises ministers must be able to exercise when the need arises 
…”.72 Returning to the devolution and investment aspect he then called upon Griffith to 
suggest some words that would cure that defect: “Let him use any form of words he 
pleases which will convey to the ministers of the commonwealth the same power of acting 
with that vast and vague authority, under any and every circumstance, which is possessed 
by ministers of the Crown in Great Britain”.73 Deakin concluded by asking why the 
framers should not put in the clause a phrase which conveys “without a scintilla of doubt” 
to the future ministers of the Commonwealth all the powers which are possessed by 
ministers of the Crown in Great Britain? 
Deakin’s contribution to the debate is important and consequential. It sharply identified 
the mischief that was sought to be remedied by the addition of a set of words. After 
Deakin, Griffith made an important concession. He acknowledged that until that point in 
time, he had not appreciated with clarity the nature of the argument being made by Wrixon 
and Deakin, and therefore did not appreciate the need for amending the text of the clause to 
take account of the Victorian delegates’ concerns. This throws light upon Griffith’s earlier 
statement that “we define the extent of the executive power which they are to 
administer”,74 and suggests that by “executive power” he had not yet achieved clarity. 
Griffith acknowledged:75 
 
I am trying to get at the ideas which are underlying the argument of hon. 
gentlemen. I confess I have not got at them yet. The hon. member, Mr. Deakin, 
talks about the powers exercised by the ministers of the Crown in Great Britain. 
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They do not differ in any respect from the powers exercised by ministers of the 
Crown in any other country. 
 
Dr Cockburn made the obvious point: “They are much superior to the powers of ministers 
here”. Deakin concurred: “The powers of our ministers are limited, and theirs are 
unlimited”.76 
At this point the debate crystallised into one about the nature and source of the Crown’s 
powers – a debate about the recognition or affirmation of the prerogatives, as well as their 
devolution upon and investment in the executive government of the Commonwealth. 
Griffith staked out his position as to the meaning of the text, and his understanding of what 
powers were to be vested in the Queen by use of the term “ministers” and the prerogatives 
of the Crown which he believed flowed automatically from the existing text. Griffith 
asked:77 
 
What is the power to be exercised? The sovereign power of the state. The head 
of the state, being one person, cannot do everything himself. He, therefore, has 
ministers, servants nominally of himself, but really of the people, to do that 
work for him. They are called ministers, but it is the power of the head of the 
state which is being exercised all the time. What more words can you use for the 
purpose of saying that? He shall appoint proper officers to do it. 
 
He continued:78 
 
The power is vested in the Queen. For the administration of that power, officers 
shall be appointed. What more can you say? Can you go on and say that when 
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they are appointed they shall have power to do their duty, or say that they shall 
exercise such functions as are usually exercised by officers of state? It is all 
reasoning in a circle. The officers of state will exercise the functions of officers 
of state, and the officers of state are the same in England as anywhere else. The 
more you reason about the matter, the more you will find yourself getting into a 
circle, and coming back to your starting point. What additional power is there? If 
the hon. member will point out any power which can be exercised by the 
sovereign authority which is not expressed by the words, I shall not only be 
willing, but anxious to supply the defect. But I cannot see the defect he is 
pointing to. He assumes that English ministers have peculiar and extra powers. I 
should like to know what they are? They exercise the prerogative powers, of 
course, and the hon. gentleman, I think, has confused the argument used in 
Victoria as to whether colonial ministers have power to exercise the prerogatives 
of the Queen with the question whether they have power to exercise the 
functions conferred upon them by the constitution. The argument in the 
Victorian court was whether a certain royal prerogative could be exercised by a 
colonial government. We cannot propose by a sweeping provision to say that all 
the royal prerogatives shall be exercised by the governor-general-in-council. 
That seems to me to be the nearest to what the hon. member is driving at. If that 
is what he means, then it is a question for fair consideration whether we ought to 
put such-a provision in the bill. But nothing short of that will cover all that he 
has been arguing for. 
 
Deakin pointed out that in Toy v Musgrove:79 
 
… the Supreme Court [noted] that the words “responsible minister of the 
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Crown” appeared in certain statutes passed by the Victorian Parliament since the 
passing of the Constitution; but that they did not appear in the [Victorian] 
Constitution Act … 
 
Deakin then said that if those words had been inserted there, they “would have made a very 
great difference” in the way in which the Supreme Court would have regarded ministerial 
authority in Victoria.80 Somewhat embarrassingly, Griffith then incorrectly said that the 
Privy Council said that was wrong.81 He was corrected by Deakin:82 
 
As far as I am acquainted with their judgment, the Privy Council did not enter 
upon that particular issue at all. They have not even considered the point, to say 
nothing of giving an opinion upon it. The judgment, therefore, remains for what 
it is worth as a judgment of the Supreme Court. If the words my hon. colleague 
desires to introduce had been inserted in the Victorian Constitution Act, the 
ministers of Victoria would have had greater power than they now possess. The 
words the hon. gentleman has just suggested, conveying sovereign power to 
ministers, would be amply sufficient. Those words should be embodied in this 
constitution. 
 
Griffith finished Deakin’s statement: “That is to say, that all the royal prerogatives should 
be exercised by the governor-in-council”. Deakin accepted that, but added:83 
 
Exercised by him through his ministers. Unless that claim be put forward in our 
constitution, we shall have taken and be taken to have accepted something less, 
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and we shall be always liable to be challenged with having exceeded the 
authority of the Constitution with which her Majesty has been pleased to endow 
us. Why should we leave the matter open to doubt? Why should we leave the 
ministers of the commonwealth liable to be challenged in the exercise of their 
duties to the people they represent? Why should we not now put forward the 
claim of ministers of the commonwealth to act for her Majesty and for the 
people of the commonwealth as if they were her Majesty's imperial ministers, 
excepting, of course, in cases where imperial interests are concerned, which 
would necessarily attach to the British Government and the Imperial Parliament? 
 
Importantly, Deakin at this point ceded an aspect of the argument. He acknowledged that 
the prerogatives of the Crown can be split into those rights and powers which could and 
should be exercised by the proposed Commonwealth ministers, and there were 
prerogatives which could only (at that stage) be exercised by the Imperial ministers, for 
Imperial interests. At that point, Victorian delegate, Nicholas Fitzgerald, asked Griffith 
whether, in his opinion, the effect of the insertion of these words would be to enlarge the 
scope of the duties or prerogatives of responsible ministers.84 Sir Samuel responded:85 
 
In my opinion, they would not; and I think, at the same time, that they are 
extraordinary words to put in an act of parliament. No other words I know of 
would cover that for which the hon. member is asking; and it is rather a singular 
thing to ask the Imperial Parliament to do for Australia a thing which it has 
never done for itself. 
 
The Vice President of the Convention (Griffith) continued:86 
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To ask the Crown in one short sentence to surrender, in respect to Australia, all 
its prerogatives is rather an extraordinary thing to do. At this moment I believe 
no one knows what they all are. No one could at once enumerate them all; and 
hon. members may rely upon this, that the enumeration would be carefully gone 
through, and that if there were one prerogative concerning which there was the 
slightest doubt-that is, with regard to its inclusion-parliament would not pass it, 
and it would be quite right, too. We might ask for it; but would it not be a pity to 
lose the constitution because one point could not be granted? For instance, one 
of the royal prerogatives is to declare war. What about that? 
 
The debate sharpened further, and the delegates focused upon the scope of the prerogative 
powers they proposed to convey to the Commonwealth ministers. Additionally, they were 
conscious of frightening the Imperial Government with language that might lead Whitehall 
to think that it was losing prerogative powers to oversee Imperial interests. Deakin told 
delegates that they could “make an exception in favour of imperial interests”; making clear 
that “[w]e have no desire to interfere with the imperial prerogative in matters of war and 
peace”.87 
The debate shifted to the issue of where was the proper place in the Constitution Bill to 
add words which make it clear that the prerogatives of the Crown were devolved or 
invested in the Commonwealth ministry. Griffith asked the Convention if the proper place 
was in the enacting part of the bill. Deakin said no, and said that the proper place is when 
the draftsmen were “dealing with the executive government”. Connecting the powers to the 
governor-general, Deakin said that “the governor-general” should have “power for 
everything”, and then delegate it.88 
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Griffith then appeared to revert to his earlier view. He cautioned that the addition of the 
words would amount to a surrender by the Queen, and should be in the enacting part of the 
bill. He appealed to delegates:89 
 
… I would ask hon. members to pause before they determine upon asking the 
Queen to surrender all her prerogatives in Australia. For my part, I believe that 
all the prerogatives of the Crown exist in the governor-general as far as they 
relate to Australia. I never entertained any doubt upon the subject at all-that is so 
far as they can be exercised in the commonwealth. Certainly the putting in of 
such a phrase as has been suggested ought not to done without very grave 
consideration. 
 
Contemporary readers of the Convention Debates might conclude that Griffith, whilst 
believing that the text he had drafted sufficiently empowers Commonwealth ministers with 
the prerogative, nevertheless is concerned about the location and desirability of expressing 
the principle. In an effort to find a way forward, Queensland delegate, Andrew Thynne, 
sought to achieve Deakin and Wrixon’s objective, whilst also addressing Griffith’s 
concerns about Imperial interests:90 
 
I think the two contending parties might be reconciled without any material 
addition to the clause, but with only a slight re-arrangement of it. I would ask the 
hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, to follow me while I read the clause as I 
propose to leave it: 
 
The governor-general may, from time to time, appoint such officers as may 
be necessary for the administration of the executive government of the 
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commonwealth. Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the 
governor-general, and shall be capable of being chosen and sitting as 
members of either house of parliament. Such officers shall be members of 
the federal executive council, and shall administer such departments of state 
of the commonwealth as the governor-general-in-council may from time to 
time establish. 
 
After Sir Thomas McIlwraith made a contribution,91 Deakin responded to Griffith, saying 
that Griffith’s real objection is to the phrase “responsible minister of the Crown”, and 
that:92 
 
… The hon. member says it is an “epithet,” but nevertheless it points in two very 
valuable directions. It points, in the first instance, to the exercise by ministers of 
all powers in the Crown, and, in the second instance, to the responsibility of 
those ministers to parliament for every action they take in their ministerial 
capacity. In both of these respects the phrase, although it may be called an 
epithet, is an extremely valuable one. Why not meet the case by striking out the 
word “officers,” and make the clause read: 
 
The governor-general may from time to time appoint responsible ministers 
of the Crown. 
 
Deakin demonstrated a clear appreciation of the dual application of the phrase “responsible 
ministers” – it is a source of power, as well as a statement of political operation. Now, the 
President of the Convention, Sir Henry Parkes, stirred: “The hon. member would not find 
                                                          
91  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 772. 
92  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 772-3. 
  184 
     
such a phrase in any English law!”93 Mixing the recognition and devolution aspects, 
Deakin argued:94 
 
We do not desire to introduce words which might seem to claim for Australia 
royal prerogatives; but we do wish to introduce words claiming all the 
prerogatives of the Crown directly relating to Australia. What we say is that 
these clauses, as they stand, do not with sufficient distinctness make that claim, 
and that we should seize every opportunity of placing points of this importance 
beyond all dispute, that we should embody, in these clauses the claim of 
ministers of the commonwealth to exercise all the prerogatives of the Crown 
which may be necessary in the interests of the commonwealth. I would ask the 
hon. member, Sir Samuel Griffith, to himself suggest a phrase, and in default of 
that to accept my hon. colleague's amendment. I would suggest words claiming 
that as regards the interests of the commonwealth, ministers of the Crown here 
should have the same powers as have ministers of the Crown in Great Britain, 
distinguishing Great Britain of course from the empire at large. 
 
With precision, Deakin has brought the debate to the key issue – that of investing the 
Commonwealth ministers with the power to exercise all the prerogatives of the Crown 
which were appropriate for the newly established Commonwealth, and does not offend 
against Imperial interests. Acknowledging that the framers did not seek to usurp the 
Imperial prerogatives, Deakin said in respect of the Commonwealth’s power:95 
 
… all the limits that we want of that absolute power in the commonwealth is, so 
far as it relates to the commonwealth, to exclude all prerogatives relating to the 
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empire outside the commonwealth. There is no pretence to claiming the power 
of proclaiming peace or war, or of exercising power outside our own boundaries; 
but let us have it stated plainly in the constitution that the officers here, called 
heads of departments, shall be absolutely ministers of the Crown. We know 
what that means. 
 
Sir Henry Parkes disagreed; “That is exactly what we do not know!”96 Deakin 
acknowledged that “we do not know what the royal prerogative is. We have not exhausted 
its meaning”, and therefore argued that it would “be better to carry out the principle” by 
expressing it through “the most explicit, indisputable, unmistakable claim to this power”.97 
Sir John Bray expressed the view that Parkes’ suggestion will not achieve that aim. 
Deakin said that “[b]y calling these officers responsible ministers of the Crown, they will 
be empowered to meet all unanticipated contingencies”. Griffith disagreed; “The words do 
not convey” that meaning. Drawing the Convention’s focus back to the decision of Toy v 
Musgrove, Deakin responded:98 
 
They did to the Supreme Court of Victoria. We had a number of judges stating 
that if these words were contained in the Constitution Act of Victoria they would 
adopt a different attitude, and hold that ministers had greater power than they 
now have, those words [“responsible ministers of the Crown”] not being in our 
Constitution Act. Why not employ those words in this constitution, and place 
our meaning beyond doubt? 
 
Sir Samuel then asserted some basal constitutional principles:99 
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It is difficult to know what is our meaning which it is desired to put beyond 
doubt. I agree that in this bill our meaning should be placed beyond doubt, but 
we must first find out what is our meaning. The hon. member uses the word 
“responsible,” which simply means this: that ministers take the brunt of the 
advice which they give in the exercise of sovereign power of any kind. That 
does not give them any additional power. The word “responsible” only means in 
that case that the ministers take the blame. It is not a question of giving 
authority, it is a question as to who is to be punished for the improper exercise of 
authority. The word “ministers” means no more than “officers of state.” It is 
only another epithet. Ministers of the Crown means officers of the Crown where 
there is a Crown. 
 
Deakin had a different view; he said “[t]he words mean something more than that!” 
Griffith then expressed some frustration, saying “[t]he argument is becoming so refined 
that it is impossible to distinguish the differences”. One eminent historian observed that 
“Griffith had trouble seeing the point, although he said he was trying”.100 Griffith went on 
to say:101 
 
Clause 4 says that for the administration of the executive government there shall 
be officers to administer such departments of state as the governor may 
prescribe, and he is to act on their advice. These are expressions that have been 
used so often that, they have become stereotyped; but I think the only authority 
for using in an act the words “responsible ministers of the Crown” is an error on 
the part of a draftsman in Victoria. It has not been followed by any of the other 
colonies. In some customs act somebody or other used the words “responsible 
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minister,” and the Victorian judges thought that having been so used, there was 
something defective in the Constitution Act. I do not draw that inference; I think 
that the defect was in the subsequent act. 
 
Hereupon, Wrixon tried to salvage his cause. He rejected the assertion that the words 
“responsible ministers” adequately achieved his constitutional objective that he set out at 
the start of the debate in response to the holding in Toy v Musgrove. “I am convinced that 
the Convention is making a serious mistake”, he said. Wrixon called on Sir Samuel Griffith 
to suggest the necessary form of words in respect of the devolution and investment aspect, 
to ensure:102 
 
… that a minister in Australia shall have the same position with regard to the 
Crown in all matters Australian, as a minister in England has with regard to all 
matters English. We desire to have that object carried out. I am sorry the 
Convention does not attend to it, because I am sure we are making a mistake. 
 
Wrixon’s contribution, just recited, is a clear assertion that the object of the proposed 
amendments, as the mover intended, and as the Convention ought to have understood it, 
was to devolve and invest the Commonwealth ministers with all the powers of the 
prerogative that English ministers exercise in Great Britain. If there is any doubt, then 
South Australian delegate Sir Thomas Playford affirmed the point:103 
 
We are very much indebted to the hon. member, Mr. Wrixon, for calling 
attention to this matter. There is no hon. member who has had more practical 
experience, in view of recent events, of the necessity for making some provision 
of this kind. His attention has been drawn to the matter by the litigation which 
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has lately taken place on a very nice constitutional question. A decision was 
pronounced by some, at least, of the Victorian judges which forms the position 
for which the hon. member contends, namely, that it is necessary to make an 
amendment in the bill in order to give ministers of the Crown in Australia 
certain prerogative rights which are exercised by ministers in England for the 
benefit of the community.  
 
Advocating against the use of the term “responsible” because it might perpetuate the 
system of responsible government, Sir Thomas nevertheless acknowledged that:104 
 
… we should at least profit by the experience of past years in order to clothe the 
officers of the commonwealth with all the powers which may happen to be 
necessary for the preservation of the rights of the community.  
 
Sir Thomas connects Toy v Musgrove to the debate, saying that “[w]e have the decision of 
some at least of the Victorian judges that the power is not possessed by Victorian 
ministers; but that if certain phraseology had been employed, they would possess the 
power”. Playford then affirms: “We know what we wish to do. We desire to confer on the 
executive ministers the right to exercise this prerogative as far as the commonwealth is 
concerned …”.105 
Kingston then suggested an amendment to the constitutional text which sought to 
achieve Wrixon and Deakin’s constitutional purpose – for interpretative reasons, 
Kingston’s suggestion is important because it was either ignored, or rejected by the 
Convention’s delegates. Kingston said:106 
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I hope the hon. member who has moved the amendment will leave out the word 
to which I have referred, and to which it seems that objection can fairly be taken. 
At the same time, I will promise him that I will do all I can to assist him in 
achieving the object which he has in view in a manner which will not be open to 
the objections which I have urged. It occurs to me that something of the sort 
might be done if we amended section 1 on page 17, which vests the executive 
power and authority of the commonwealth in the Queen, to be exercised by the 
governor-general. Possibly some words might be inserted to show that that 
executive power and authority which would be exercised by her Majesty’s 
representative under the advice of a responsible ministry would extend to the 
exercise of the prerogative which it is now desired to confer; but at the same 
time I sympathise with the remark made by various hon. members that it is a 
very delicate question. We should look very closely at the way in which we 
make any amendment on the subject. The object in view is one which I am 
convinced we ought to strain every nerve to achieve, and I shall be glad, indeed, 
if the hon. member who moved the amendment can arrange with the hon. and 
learned member, Sir Samuel Griffith, for some satisfactory mode of effecting 
what I believe to be a purpose which will commend itself to all. 
 
The “recent events” that Kingston referred to is the Toy v Musgrove decision. The section 1 
on page 17 he referred to is the draft clause investing the “executive power and authority of 
the Commonwealth” in the Queen; the forerunner of the first half of s 61 of the 
Constitution. 
Kingston suggested that clause 1 (that is, the clause which became section 61 in the 
Constitution), be amended to include in the executive power and authority of the 
Commonwealth the power to exercise the prerogative. By the framers declining to adopt 
this suggestion, at the very least, the Convention is implicitly accepting that the devolution 
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and investment aspect of the prerogative is not achieved through clause 1 (ultimately 
section 61 of the Constitution), as it was then drafted. 
Finally, Griffith, the principal drafter of the constitutional text proposed a solution to the 
problem of expressing the Convention’s desire to devolve to, and invest in, the 
Commonwealth ministers the prerogative, but at the same time, leave the Imperial powers 
undisturbed in the hands of the Imperial ministry. Griffith reflected:107 
 
I have been all along trying to meet my hon. friends for the purpose of removing 
any doubt. A form of words has occurred to me since I spoke last, which I 
believe would relieve the minds of hon. members, and does not appear open to 
any objection. I would propose to add to the clause the words “and shall be the 
Queen's ministers of state for the commonwealth.” I would suggest that the hon. 
and learned member should withdraw his amendment. 
 
Henry Wrixon acquiesced. Wrixon said that he would be happy to withdraw his 
amendment; telling delegates “… I think that the addition to the clause of the words 
suggested by the hon. and learned member will adequately carry out what I desire”.108 
Having satisfied delegates that the expression “and shall be the Queen’s ministers of 
state for the commonwealth” vests in the Commonwealth ministers the prerogative in its 
totality, except those powers which should remain with the Imperial Government, Wrixon’s 
amendment was, by leave of the Convention, withdrawn.109  The Official Report of the 
Convention’s Debates then recorded that the amendment, proposed by Sir Samuel Griffith: 
“That the words “and shall be the Queen's ministers of state for the commonwealth” be 
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added to the clause”, was agreed to, and then the amended cl 4 was agreed to by the 
Convention.110 And given that there was no division, we must assume unanimously. 
The deliberative act of amending the draft text can be seen when Sir Samuel Griffith’s 
Successive Stages of the Constitution is examined. Written in Sir Samuel’s distinctive 
handwriting are the words “& Shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Cth” – 
notated on the right-hand side next to the draft clause 4 (the eventual s 64 of the 
Constitution).111 Griffith has marked an “x” at the end of the typed text, “Such Officers 
shall be Members of the Federal Executive Council”, to identify where the handwritten 
addition is to appear in the text. 
It is reasonably clear that it was the collective intention of the delegates to the First 
Convention in Sydney that the inclusion of the words “and shall be the Queen’s ministers 
of state for the Commonwealth” was meant to affirm that the principle of responsible 
government had been adopted in Australia, and that the new ministers of state appointed 
under section 64 would unquestionably have devolved to them the constitutional ability to 
exercise the royal prerogative as it was thought desirable by the framers at that point in 
time for the Commonwealth ministers to exercise. 
All the principal speakers in the debate acknowledged as much. Henry Wrixon and 
Alfred Deakin, both being Victorians and aware of the detail of the Toy v Musgrove 
litigation, clearly evinced a nuanced understanding of the constitutional issues. Sir Samuel 
Griffith, whilst initially stating his belief that the document as drafted already embodied 
responsible government (and therefore, in his view, also empowering the Commonwealth 
ministers with all the powers of state) moved his position to accept a form of words which 
he said responded to the previous speakers’ intention of giving Commonwealth ministers 
the royal prerogative. Griffith appeared to want to leave the scope of that prerogative vague 
so as to ensure that it does not encroach upon the exercise of the prerogative by Imperial 
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ministers relating to Imperial interests. Griffith also wished to avoid using the expression 
“prerogative” (as suggested by Wrixon in his earlier amendment) so as to reduce 
difficulties in having the Constitution enacted by the Imperial Parliament. 
Particularly noteworthy in the debate is the final contribution made by South Australian 
delegate, Thomas Playford, where he suggested that the intention of delegates to vest 
Commonwealth ministers with the royal prerogative may be achieved by amending clause 
1 of the draft Executive Government sections – the “executive power and authority of the 
Commonwealth” provision that went on to become section 61 of the Constitution. 
Playford’s suggestion was not taken anywhere by the Convention’s delegates, and 
immediately after it was made, Griffith proposed the inclusion of the “Queen’s ministers of 
state for the Commonwealth” line for clause 4 (subsequently section 64). It is clear that the 
framers did not intend to textually recognise or devolve the royal prerogative in section 61. 
Whilst the delegates were not expressly debating the source of the prerogative, by 
debating how the prerogative would be devolved on, and invested in, the Commonwealth, 
and, by the label accorded to the Federal Ministers as the “Queen’s Ministers of State”, the 
delegates were considering in detail the second and third aspects – that is, the devolution 
and investment aspect, and the execution aspect of the prerogatives of the Crown. Basal to 
that debate was the underlying assumption that the prerogatives of the Crown inhere in the 
Sovereign, and needed to be devolved or invested in the Governor-General for execution, 
and, furthermore, some positive affirmation needed to be made to ensure that the 
Commonwealth ministers were the ministers responsible for advising the governor-general 
in respect of the exercise of those devolved prerogatives. 
VI  THE AUSTRALASIAN FEDERAL CONVENTION ,  1897-98  
The federation movement experienced highs and lows throughout the course of the 1890s. 
The Second Convention – the Australasian Federal Convention was held in three of the 
colonial capitals; Adelaide and Sydney in 1897, and in Melbourne in 1898. Each of the 
gatherings was described as a “session” of the Convention. The First Session was held in 
  193 
     
Adelaide from 22 March 1897 to 5 May 1897. The Second Session was held in Sydney 
from 2 September 1897 to 24 September 1897. The Third Session was held in Melbourne 
from 20 January 1898 to 17 March 1898. 
The delegates to the Second Convention were elected by their respective colonies;112 
and were not merely parliamentary appointees as the delegates to the First Convention 
were. As such, the delegates to the Second Convention were formally described as 
“representatives”. 
With the passage of time and vagaries of colonial politics, the composition of the 
Australasian Federal Convention differed in some important respects to the National 
Australasian Convention in 1891. Griffith was not a delegate to the Second Convention. 
Having retired from politics, Griffith was appointed as the third Chief Justice of 
Queensland in March 1893. Andrew Inglis Clark, who was again the Attorney-General of 
Tasmania, was absent in the United States at the time of the First Session in Adelaide, and 
he had left the ministry by the time of the Second Session in Sydney. He was appointed as 
a puisne justice of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in June 1898, and therefore, like 
Griffith, could not continue to play a public role in the federation movement. Henry 
Wrixon, by now Sir Henry, was no longer the Attorney-General of Victoria. He had left the 
lower house, and was, by the time of the Second Convention, a member of the Victorian 
Legislative Council. He stood for election as a Victorian delegate to the Australasian 
Federal Convention, but failed to be elected.  
First Session, 14 April 1897 
In the First Session in Adelaide on 14 April 1897, the Convention continued consideration 
of draft Chapter I, “The Legislature”. Towards the end of the day, after rejecting Josiah 
Symon’s suggestion to amend the name of the lower house of the Parliament from the 
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House of Representatives to the House of Commons, the delegates moved to consider the 
drafting of clause 2 which at that point read: 
 
The Queen may, from time to time, appoint a Governor-General, who shall be 
Her Majesty's representative in the Commonwealth, and who shall have and may 
exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen's pleasure, and subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution, such powers and functions of the Queen as Her 
Majesty may think fit to assign to him. 
 
Patrick McMahon Glynn,113 a South Australian delegate and a member of South 
Australia’s House of Assembly, asked:114 
 
Does not this section go a little too far? It seems to me to be making active in the 
Governor-General a prerogative which is practically dormant or dead in the 
Queen. We know at present that there are many prerogatives of the Crown which 
if pushed into exercise might be particularly injurious to the State. For instance, 
there is the power of dismissing the navy and of disbanding the army, and these 
prerogatives are constitutionally dead, but if the Queen chooses to assign powers 
within the limits of this Act they become operative. I therefore move: To add to 
the end of the clause the words: “And capable of being constitutionally 
exercised as part of the prerogatives of the Crown.”  
 
Somewhat inexplicably, without any further debate, the amendment was negatived; and the 
draft clause, as read, was agreed to by the committee. 
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First Session, 19 April 1897 
In the First Session in Adelaide on 19 April 1897, the Convention considered in committee 
draft Chapter II, “The Executive Government”. Commencing with draft clause 58 which at 
that point read, “The executive power and authority of the Commonwealth is vested in the 
Queen, and shall be exercised by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative”.115  
This was the first time the Conventions’ delegates considered the operation of s 61 and its 
relationship to the prerogative in any detail. It is also the most substantial consideration of 
the execution aspect of the exercise of the prerogative by the delegates of any of the 
Federation Conventions. The debate was commenced by the Premier of New South Wales, 
the conservative George Houston Reid, who commenced by speaking of the devolution and 
investment aspect, and then the execution aspect. Reid said:116 
 
It will be observed that in clause 2 of chapter I. there is this provision:  
 
The Queen may, from time to time, appoint a Governor-General, who shall 
be Her Majesty's representative in the Commonwealth, and who shall have 
and may exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen's pleasure, and 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, such powers and functions of 
the Queen as Her Majesty may think fit to assign to him.  
 
I only call the attention of the Committee to that, and pass on to the clause now 
under consideration. For a long time I have been impressed with the view that 
since we are now expressing, in precise written characters, the various functions 
of the Governor, and conditions under which the power of the Commonwealth is 
to be exercised, it would be well in this clause, whilst providing that the 
                                                          
115  Con. Deb. Adel, 1897, 908. 
116  Con. Deb. Adel, 1897, 908. 
  196 
     
Executive power and authority of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the 
Queen, and shall be exercised by the Governor-General as the Queen's 
representative, that we should add that which will in reality be the practice, that 
it is by and with the advice of the Executive Council.  
 
After asking the delegates to “notice that the legislative powers in the Queen are expressed 
under Statute as being exercised with the consent of Parliament”; with the Queen setting 
“her seal upon Acts, and it is attested in the Acts themselves that they are by the authority 
and with the consent of the Parliament-that is, the two Houses of Parliament”, Reid 
continued:117 
 
Now, I think we had better, since we are going to put in black and white the full 
functions of the Commonwealth, state what I deem will be the fact in practice, 
that the executive power is to be exercised by and with the advice of the 
Executive Council. I have looked through the works on the prerogatives of the 
Crown, and I find that they really came as far as anything in these colonies is 
concerned to the question of the right to assemble, dissolve, and prorogue 
Parliament, the pardoning of offenders, the issuing of proclamations, and so on. 
That is about the whole scope of the prerogatives which could be exercised 
under this Commonwealth. In the old country the Queen, of course, is the 
supreme head of the Church. That does not apply here. She has the power of 
making war or peace. That does not apply here. I am simply referring to things 
within the reach and range of this Constitution. In reference to the right to 
assemble, prorogue, and dissolve Parliament, that is always done on the advice 
and consent of the Executive Council. The refusal to receive advice is not an 
executive act at all. An executive act is something which affects the subjects of 
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the country. The refusal to do it affects no one, except that it creates a crisis and 
would probably effect a change of Ministers.  
 
At this point, Edmund Barton interjected (focusing upon the execution aspect): “It is an 
exercise of the prerogative”. Reid takes the interjection, and continued:118 
 
It is an exercise of the prerogative,s which is not an executive act. The refusal to 
accept advice does not fall within that category. The carrying out of the steps 
necessary for the assembling or proroguing of Parliament would, and that would 
be with the advice and consent of the Executive Council. There is not one 
appointment in the United Kingdom which the Queen makes, but that the 
counter signature of a Minister of State is required.  
 
Victorian delegate, Simon Fraser, then asked: “How about a dissolution?”; Reid 
answered:119 
 
Supposing Ministers ask for a dissolution, and the Governor says “no”; that is 
not an executive act. It is a refusal to do an executive act. To issue a 
proclamation would be an executive act. This difficulty would not arise. It 
would leave the independence of the Governor as to accepting the advice of his 
Ministers absolutely intact. In England nothing can reach the state of an act 
affecting the subjects, unless there is the signature of a Minister to it. That is the 
practice all over the world under similar conditions. So I say that if the British 
Constitution were being reduced to black and white, that might be put in. If the 
British Constitution were being drawn up to-day, the main feature would be that 
the Queen must act on the advice of responsible Ministers. The moment she 
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does not you have no constitutional Government at all.  
 
Josiah Symon QC and Reid then had a short discussion in relation to the appointment of 
ministers and the effect of countersigning of appointments by ministers; Reid then returned 
to the relationship between draft cl 2 and the executive power:120 
 
… By section 2 of chapter I., Her Majesty would assign that prerogative to the 
Governor, amongst other prerogatives, which she would assign to him. That 
prerogative would remain in the Governor under section 2, chapter I. This 
executive power and authority of the Commonwealth is something different 
altogether from the prerogative of the Crown. The executive power and authority 
of the Commonwealth is a thing which must be exercised by Ministers. The 
other is a prerogative matter which is safeguarded by the section I have referred 
to.  
 
An unnamed delegate then cried: “What about the dismissal of Ministers?”; to which Reid 
answered: “Even if Ministers are dismissed, they have to hold office until their successors 
are appointed”.121 Kingston corrected Reid: “Not dismissed; they resign”. There was a 
short debate about the practical operation of a minister leaving office. Reid then asked the 
question:122 
 
What necessity was there to put in clause 2 that Her Majesty's representative 
could exercise Her Majesty’s prerogative. What reason was there for it?  
 
                                                          
120  Con. Deb. Adel, 1897, 909. 
121  Con. Deb. Adel, 1897, 909. 
122  Con. Deb. Adel, 1897, 909-910. 
  199 
     
Symon QC answered: “No reason at all”. Reid continued:123 
 
Well, it is put in. If we safeguard in this unnecessary way the prerogative of Her 
Majesty, and the prerogative of the Governor-General, surely we can put in 
black and white the principle of executive action which always is that the 
Governor shall act with the advice of the Executive Council. Why could we not 
understand all this? What is the use of putting it in at all? Did it not follow, as a 
mere matter of course, that if Her Majesty appointed a Governor-General to 
represent her, he would exercise the powers which she had and has?  
 
The Leader of the Convention, Edmund Barton, noted that Reid:124 
 
… admits that what he desires is secured in section 61 [Constitution of 
Executive Council for Commonwealth], which is an adaptation of what is in the 
South Australian Constitution Act, and is somewhat similar to the Victorian Act, 
it is just as well not to take up much time in debating it.  
 
Barton, making a substantial address that focused upon the execution aspect, offered his 
view that:125 
 
Executive Acts of the Crown are primarily divided into two classes: those 
exercised by the prerogative-and some of those are not even Executive Acts-and 
those which are ordinary Executive Acts, where it is prescribed that the 
Executive shall act in Council. These are the offsprings of Statutes. The others 
are Acts so far as they are not affected by Statutes. Now there is no necessity to 
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make any alteration in this clause. The clause has been drafted in precisely the 
ordinary way-it was similarly drafted in 1891-which is simply to express in a 
document of this character the depository of the Executive power in the 
kingdom or the Commonwealth. Moreover there is no necessity to add the 
words: With the advice of the Governor in Council, because in a constitution of 
this kind it is no more possible than it is under the English Constitution for the 
prerogative to be exercised as a personal act of the Crown. The prerogative is 
never in these days exercised as a personal act of the Crown as we understand it, 
but there are certain acts which have become, either by the gradual march of 
statute law or in any other way, nothing but ordinary executive acts and these are 
expressed to be exercisable only with the advice of the Executive Council. There 
are others again which have not been expressly affected by legislation, and while 
these remain nominally in the exercise of the Crown they are really held in trust 
for the people, although they are exercises of the prerogative. This is explained 
by Dicey in “The Law of the Constitution,” and the extract I will read will be 
followed with interest by lay as well as by legal members.  
 
Reid reminded delegates that Professor Dicey was writing of an unwritten constitution. 
Barton pointed out that the Crown only exercises the prerogative upon ministerial advice. 
Barton then explained what he sees as the difference between the exercise of a power by a 
governor, and a power by the governor in council. Barton then quoted Dicey on the role of 
the Cabinet and the exercise of the prerogative – and he did so at some length which it is 
unnecessary for present purpose to traverse.126 
Reid, Barton and Fraser each made a number of small contributions – some more light-
hearted in nature – all focused upon whether the clause – the vesting clause – ought to be 
textually qualified with words to the effect that the executive power of the Commonwealth 
                                                          
126  Con. Deb. Adel, 1897, 910-911. 
  201 
     
is exercised by the governor-general on the advice of the Executive Council. The delegates 
cite and quote Dicey, and Bagehot’s The English Constitution, and generally considered the 
nature of the prerogative as understood in recent British parliamentary history. The 
delegates expressed some concern for how the lawyers of Whitehall will view the 
Australians’ constitutional draftsmanship; concerned that the delegates might have 
incorrectly either expressed or touched upon the prerogatives of the Crown. New South 
Wales Secretary for Lands, Joseph Carruthers, made the final contribution to the debate 
about the nature of the prerogative, and, more importantly (to the delegates at least) how 
the prerogative is kept politically within the grasp of the proposed Commonwealth 
ministry. Carruthers said:127 
 
[Reid’s] new argument shows that if the words were inserted they would at the 
very most be mere surplusage, and if this surplusage will satisfy the minds of the 
hon. members the surplusage is justifiable. I paid particular attention to the last 
argument, that it might possibly expose us to some adverse criticism from the 
home authorities in regard to the drafting of the Bill. I should think we would be 
prepared to put up with a little bit of criticism. We are not supposed to 
understand the whole of the laws of the Empire, and possibly if we make a 
mistake we will stand being corrected. We will not be like little little children-
set our backs up in obstinacy because someone can point out how to do better. 
Mr. Barton first of all recites Dicey to show what occurs under the unwritten 
Constitution of England. But here we are framing a written Constitution. When 
once that Constitution is framed we cannot get behind it.  
 
The debate shifted significantly. Reid asked “[w]hy should we have said the executive 
authority is vested in the Queen?” Carruthers then took the delegates to the heart of the 
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relationship (as he saw it) between the “functions and powers” of the Sovereign in draft 
clause 2, and the “executive power and authority of the Commonwealth” then being 
considered by the committee. Carruthers’ significant contribution addressed the recognition 
and affirmation aspect as well as the devolution or investment aspect. Carruthers said:128 
 
This is a Constitution which the unlettered people of the community ought to be 
able to understand. We have had it cited that in Canada a similar provision is 
enacted. But the provision in Canada is not similar. The provision in Canada 
uses words to this effect:  
 
The executive power and authority of the Commonwealth shall continue 
and be vested in the Queen.  
 
That means simply that that executive power, which by the unwritten 
Constitution or the unwritten law was vested in the Queen, should remain so 
vested. The words “shall continue” have a very marked and clear meaning. You 
cannot “continue” the existence of a thing except in so far as it did exist. Here, 
however, is the creation of its existence. In the next place, in the Canadian 
Constitution there are no such words as we have in clause 2 of chapter I. If the 
Canadian Constitution had these words, how different the arguments would be. 
In clause 2 of chapter I. we specifically deal with the matters of the Queen's 
prerogative, and, having dealt with them, we provide that they shall and may be 
exercised by the Governor. The section reads:  
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  203 
     
The Queen may, from time to time, appoint a Governor-General, who shall 
be Her Majesty’s representative in the Commonwealth, and who shall have 
and may exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen’s pleasure, and 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, such powers and functions of 
the Queen as Her Majesty may think fit to assign to him.  
 
That is the section dealing with the prerogative rights, and all those matters cited 
by Mr. Barton are matters where the Queen must exercise her prerogative, and 
even her prerogative has been limited by the constitutional usage of the mother-
country. Here all these matters, however, have been dealt with in clause 20, and 
are introduced for the first time in Federation Bills in this Bill. For what specific 
purpose? Surely the draughtsmen have some particular purpose in introducing 
this clause 2 of chapter I. It must have some meaning, and what does it really 
amount to? The very words of it clearly show that it relates wholly and solely to 
those matters which are matters of the Royal prerogative. We propose that they 
should be handed down to the Government under the advice of the Executive 
Council there. Then when we come to the next clause:  
 
The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen.  
 
That is totally different from the divesting of prerogative rights-a very different 
thing. Here we are handing over matters totally distinct from the prerogative 
rights, and the argument of my hon. friend goes to show that the executive 
powers must be exercised by and with the advice of the Executive, and if that be 
so, what harm can there be in clearly expressing within the Constitution itself 
what we mean? I hope that we shall not be detained for some hours in discussing 
this, when we have got the admission from Mr. Barton and the Drafting 
Committee that practically without these words the work will have to be done by 
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an Executive Council with a reference to the home authorities and constitutional 
usages. I hope the Committee will adopt the proposal of my hon. friend. In the 
pamphlet, “Notes on the Commonwealth Bill of 1891,” Mr. G. P. Barton says:  
 
It is contended that this clause, as it stands, vests the executive power in the 
Governor-General independently of the Executive; and that it ought to have 
concluded with the words “acting by and with the advice of the Federal 
Executive Council.” If those words had been inserted they would not 
amount to anything more than surplusage. Parliamentary Government being 
established as the basis of the Federation, the Governor-General could not 
act otherwise than “by and with the advice of the Federal Executive 
Council,” unless he was prepared to take the responsibility of acting without 
it and against it.  
 
We do not want to be put in this position, that the Governor could, if he liked, 
exercise this executive responsibility and powers, and we want to have the 
functions as set out in the clause distinguished from the exercise of the Royal 
prerogative. We do not want the Governor to have the power to do wrong; we 
want to have him limited by the terms of the Constitution Act, and kept to the 
straight paths by a Federal Judiciary.  
 
At this point, Reid and Carruthers made two further short contributions to the debate, and 
then the clause – that is the vesting clause – as read, was formally agreed to by the 
Convention delegates during the in-committee stage. 
The Convention then moved to consider clause 59, that: “There shall be a Council to aid 
and advise the Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth, and such 
Council shall be styled the Federal Executive Council; and the persons who are to be 
members of the Council shall be from time to time chosen and summoned by the 
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Governor-General, and sworn as executive councillors, and shall hold office during his 
pleasure”.129 South Australian delegate, Patrick Glynn then questioned the desirability of 
having members of the Executive Council who do not serve as Ministers of the Crown 
(that is, executive councillors who are no longer “summonsed”). Symon attempted to put 
Glynn’s mind (and other delegates’ minds) at rest, when he said:130 
 
[Mr Glynn] has rather found a mare's nest, because he seems to be under the 
impression that the Governor will take it into his head to surreptitiously pack the 
Executive Council to the serious detriment of the Ministers of the State, and the 
public interests generally. We can hardly imagine under the present era of 
responsible government anything of the sort taking place, and if there was any 
idea that the Executive Council might be interfered with it is set at rest by clause 
61, which says that the seven Ministers of State shall form the Executive 
Council. We want some fringe of ornament to the Constitution; it cannot all be 
prosaic.  
 
The clause, as read, was agreed to by the Convention. 
Second Session, 9 September 1897 
In the Second Session in Sydney on 9 September 1897, the Convention continued its in-
committee consideration of the Commonwealth of Australia Bill, commencing with the 
covering clauses of the proposed Bill. Draft covering clause 2 read:  
 
This act shall bind the Crown, and its provisions referring to her Majesty the 
Queen shall extend to her heirs and successors in the sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.  
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Sir George Turner was the first to speak:131 
 
I should like to call attention to these words, “This act shall bind the Crown.” 
We know we have to send this bill to the Imperial Parliament to be passed. I 
cannot see why these words should be inserted. Of course the act will not bind 
the Crown unless the Crown is mentioned. But throughout the whole of the bill 
the Crown will be mentioned, and therefore the Crown will be bound. Sir 
Samuel Griffith has drawn attention to this matter. He says:  
 
This section begins with the words “This act shall bind the Crown” - an 
expression which is at least unusual in statutes, and which is surely unnecessary. 
How can it be suggested that an act in which the Crown is continually 
mentioned, and which establishes a new dominion under the Crown, does not 
bind the Crown?  
 
I fully concur with these remarks. I certainly would urge upon the hon. 
gentleman that he should omit these words.  
 
New South Wales delegate (and future justice of the High Court of Australia), Richard 
O’Connor QC responded:132 
 
The hon. member will admit that it should be put beyond question that every 
portion of this act binds the Crown. It is true there are a number of sections 
which expressly bind the Crown, but this provision is inserted in order that it 
should be put beyond all doubt that every portion of the constitution binds the 
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Crown. Although the form of expression is unusual, it has this to recommend it, 
it is very concise and carries out exactly our meaning. I see no reason for 
omitting the words.  
 
Patrick Glynn made his contribution:133 
 
I would ask … Mr. Barton, whether he thinks that these words are sufficiently 
specific to negative the prerogative of the Crown? The intention undoubtedly is 
to prevent the possibility of our taking away the right of appeal to the Privy 
Council. In Canada the words used were, “Such judgment shall not be 
susceptible to appeal,” but they were held to be insufficient. Lord Cairns, in a 
case in 1876 on which this question turned up, stated that the words must be 
definite and precise, that they must amount to a direct negation of the 
prerogative before they can take away the prerogative. The principal object of 
these words is to take away the royal prerogative so that subsequent portions of 
the bill may be effective. The Canadian act which was passed in consequence of 
that decision begins with the words, “Notwithstanding any royal prerogative.” 
What I would suggest with deference to the judgment of others is that we ought 
in this section to distinctly negative the prerogative, because it will then operate 
right through the act. I think we should begin the clause with the words, 
“Notwithstanding any royal prerogative this act shall bind the Crown.”  
 
The context is important. Although he referred to a case in 1876, presumably Glynn was 
referring to either Théberge v Laudry134 (a decision of the Board from December 1876), or 
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Johnston v Minister and Trustees of St Andrews Church, Montreal135 (also a decision of 
the Board, from December 1877), with both judgments being delivered by Earl Cairns LC. 
It is to be remembered that by preventing “the possibility of our taking away the right of 
appeal to the Privy Council”, Glynn was referring to the prerogative right to appeal to the 
Queen in Council (meaning in reality, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council). Glynn 
was speaking at a time before compromise was achieved that resulted in what ended up 
being s 74 of the Constitution – the right of appeal to the Queen in Council – being 
included in the draft Bill. Glynn’s argument was based on the first principle that the 
prerogatives of the Crown pre-exist the Constitution (and are therefore not originally 
sourced in the Constitution), and survive the enactment of the Constitution, subject to the 
language of the constitutional text. 
An unnamed delegate asked: “Will not those words be too strong?”. Glynn 
responded:136 
 
The fact that Sir Samuel Griffith did not understand the meaning of the words 
proves that they cannot be strong. He, as a distinguished lawyer, must be 
admitted to know that the prerogative must be taken away by express words, or 
it will still remain.  
 
O’Connor responded that Sir Samuel thought “they were not necessary”, and “[t]hat was 
his objection!”137 Glynn retorted, Griffith “did not see the object for which they were 
inserted”. O’Connor replied, “[h]e did not see the necessity!”138 Mr Glynn further 
developed his point:139 
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If the object had been accomplished he would have seen that at once. As the 
hon. and learned member, Mr. O'Connor, has pointed-out, the act does bind the 
Crown. In clause 1 of the constitution the Crown is distinctly stated to be part of 
the commonwealth, and a section in an act of Parliament must bind the Crown, 
because the Crown in one of the consenting parties to the legislation. I would 
call attention to the fact that the prerogative ought to be distinctly negatived in 
the act.  
 
Whilst this small portion of the debates of the Second Session does not demonstrate a wide 
acceptance of the principles therein debated, it does evince that Patrick Glynn was acutely 
aware that the prerogative both pre-dates the Constitution, and survives the enactment of 
the Constitution, to the extent that the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly 
negative the operation of the prerogative, or some part thereof. 
Second Session, 17 September 1897 
In the Second Session of the Convention in Sydney on 17 September 1897, during the in-
committee consideration of draft clause 63 (the forerunner to section 64 of the 
Constitution), the first Premier of Western Australia, Sir John Forrest drew an issue to his 
fellow delegates’ attention:140 
 
I desire to call the attention of … Mr. Barton, to the use in this and other clauses 
of the terms “governor-general in council”, and “governor-general.” It seems to 
me that it will cause less confusion if the term “governor-general” is adopted 
throughout.  
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Barton asked the leader of the Western Australian delegation if he wanted to know why the 
words “in council” are sometimes used and sometimes omitted? Sir John replied “yes”, and 
explained:141 
 
The practice has now become almost general in acts of parliament to avoid the 
use of the words “in council”, and to use only the expression “the governor.” 
The term “governor” constitutionally is well known, and is understood to mean 
the governor acting with the advice of his responsible ministers. If you use the 
words “in council”, a doubt arises as to whether the governor is expected to act 
on his own responsibility or with the advice of his ministers. In the Constitution 
Act of Western Australia there is some confusion owing to the use of the terms 
“governor in council” and “governor.” The term “governor-general” will be 
thoroughly understood, and I think there is no necessity to add the words “in 
council”. In clause 63 it is provided that the appointment of officers to 
administer the departments shall be made by the “governor-general in council”, 
while in clause 64 the designations of ministers holding different offices is to be 
fixed by the parliament or by the “governor-general”. If it were a matter of 
prerogative I do not suppose it would be left to the parliament; as it is not a 
matter of prerogative, I expect the governor-general in council is meant. My own 
experience leads me to the conclusion that the words “in council” should not be 
used if they can be avoided.  
 
Barton replied:142 
 
The distinction is this: Where the act is done by the governor-general or by the 
authority of the Crown it is done upon-prerogative. When the act is not a 
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prerogative act, when it is an administrative or executive act, then the term “in 
council” is used. It is a fallacy to suppose that any distinct act is done by the 
governor of the colony, even upon prerogative, with the advice of ministers. One 
might say more than that.  
 
Forrest then asked where is the prerogative in the last line of clause 64? Barton 
answered:143 
 
I was endeavouring to explain a matter to the hon. member, which it is quite 
evident from his question is not generally understood. The reason of the 
difference in this bill is founded on that question. I am not unmindful that there 
is a difference in clause 63. In that very clause the term “governor” is used in 
one place, and the term “governor-general in council” in another, for this reason: 
that the appointment of ministers is a prerogative act, but the mere establishing 
of a department of state is not an act of prerogative, but an executive act which 
generally requires the authority of a statute, and rests on the authority of a statute 
in this case. That is the reason of the difference in this case, and the hon. 
member will find it running right through the bill. I hope there will be no debate 
on questions of that kind in this Committee. The whole matter was considered at 
very great length in Adelaide by the Constitutional Committee. It was threshed 
out in a long debate there. There was, again, in Adelaide, in Committee of the 
Whole, as my right hon. friend, Mr. Reid, will recollect, a long and keen debate 
on the subject, and I think we all came to an understanding about it. I think the 
hon. member will be assured by any legal member of the Convention that the 
right distinction has been used throughout the bill. In defining those executive 
acts which are done as mere acts of prerogative and those which are done in the 
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ordinary execution or administration of government apart from the prerogative.  
 
The “whole matter” which was considered “at very great length” in Adelaide, and the 
reference to “Mr Reid” must surely be a reference to the debate concerning the Executive 
Government, which was commenced by George Reid on 19 April 1897 at the First Session 
of the Convention. It is important to note that Sir John Forrest and the Western Australian 
delegates left the First Session of the Australasian Federal Convention in Adelaide on 14 
April 1897144 – three days prior to the lengthy debate set out supra; therefore, Sir John 
would have been unaware of the detail of that debate, and the settled nature of the 
constitutional principles therein considered. 
Returning to the present debate, the Victorian delegate (and then current Attorney-
General of the colony), Isaac Isaacs attempted to refine the point:145 
 
If I caught the question of … Sir John Forrest, aright, he drew a distinction 
between clause 63 and clause 64. He has not quite gathered the sense of these 
two clauses. There is no discrepancy whatever between the two. In clause 63 the 
appointment of ministers is by the governor-general. The reference to the 
governor-general in council is not to the appointment of ministers, but to the 
establishment of departments of state. It means that the governor appoints his 
ministers by virtue of the prerogative, but that when he comes to establishing a 
department, he acts by the advice of his ministers. But, in clause 64, the 
expression “governor-general” is used because it would be impossible to put in 
the expression “governor-general in council” there, for this reason: it says the 
ministers shall hold such offices and by such designation as the parliament from 
time to time prescribes, or, in the absence of provision, as the governor-general 
from time to time directs.  
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Ministers are in the first instance to be appointed before there is a council. There 
is not to be a parliament until there is a ministry, and the parliament has to be 
summoned by the governor-general.  
 
There were no further substantive contributions to the debate on this issue. Forrest and 
Barton had a slightly terse exchange about the reasonableness of Forrest’s question, and 
then the Convention moved on after formally agreeing to the clause. 
The significance of this small portion of the debate from the Second Session of the 
Second Convention is that it demonstrated that Edmund Barton (and others) held a view 
that there was a substantive difference between a prerogative act and an “administrative or 
executive act”. A prerogative act (that is, an exercise of the prerogative power) is done by 
the Sovereign and is, without more, done “on advice”; whereas an executive act (according 
to Barton) generally requires the authority of a statute, which necessitates the inclusion of 
the words “in council” so as to ensure that that power is exercised on the advice of the 
Federal Executive Council. This small portion of debate tends to demonstrate that Barton 
held the view that the prerogative did not emanate from the constitutional text. An 
executive act, in this case, “rests on the authority of a statute”; whereas it is implicit that a 
prerogative act rests on the authority of something other than the constitutional text. 
VII  THREE CONCLUSIONS THAT SHOULD BE FORMED  
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify those aspects of the Debates of the 
National Australasian Convention and the Australasian Federal Convention that considered 
the operation of the prerogatives of the Crown, the executive power of the Commonwealth, 
and the relationship between the two. The Official Reports and the Official Records have 
been analysed for more than mere historical interest.  
Interestingly, professional historians have erred in what they say should be made of the 
Conventions’ in-committee consideration of the “Queen’s Ministers of State” affirmation 
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in s 64. Professor John Hirst misread the in-committee consideration of the draft cl 4 on 6 
April 1891. He read that debate as relating to the “executive power of the Commonwealth” 
which is “vested in the Queen and exercisable by the Governor-General”; he pointed out 
that Griffith “wrote those words and defended them”.146 In doing so, he incorrectly 
interpreted the relevant portions of the Debates as relating to s 61 and the executive power 
of the Commonwealth. Professor Roger Joyce in his Samuel Walker Griffith, correctly 
identified the importance of the in-committee consideration in respect of the express 
vesting of the prerogative in the Commonwealth Government,147 but he then erred by 
observing that the affirmation in draft cl 4,148 that the Federal ministers were “Queen’s 
Ministers of States”, did “not survive later revisions”,149 being later versions of the 
Commonwealth Bill. 
Consistent with the permissible interpretational purposes identified in Cole v Whitfield 
and in Singh v Commonwealth, the author has attempted to do two analytical tasks. First, 
the author has sought to identify the contemporary meaning of language used, the subject-
matter to which that language was directed and the nature and objectives of the movement 
towards federation, that can be ascribed to some or all the members of each Convention. In 
this way, the author has attempted to identify “the subject-matter of discussion” and “what 
was the evil to be remedied”,150 or object that the framers sought to address or achieve in 
the choice of constitutional language. Second, the author has sought to identify the 
mischief or object of the framers which demonstrates the correctness of the core argument. 
With history being a relevant – and indeed, in vogue – modality of interpretation, an 
historically-based argument ought to be particularly attractive. 
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As to conclusions that should be drawn, French CJ in Williams [No 1] expressed a view 
that:151 
 
There is little evidence to support the view that the delegates to the National 
Australasian Conventions of 1891 and 1897-1898, or even the leading lawyers at 
those Conventions, shared a clear common view of the working of executive 
power in a federation. The Constitution which they drafted incorporated aspects 
of the written Constitutions of the United States and Canada, and the concept of 
responsible government derived from the British tradition. The elements were 
mixed in the Constitution to meet the Founders’ perception of a uniquely 
Australian Federation. 
 
Whilst the Chief Justice may be correct in opining that there was no “clear common view 
of the working of executive power”, that observation is to be contrasted with the framers’ 
views as to the operation of the prerogative within the Australian constitutional framework. 
 
Three Conclusions 
 
The author has identified three conclusions (or “evils to be remedied”), and consequently 
three purposes or understandings that can be attributed to the framers in relation to the 
prerogative. That is, three interpretative understandings that are clear enough within the 
Debates as falling within the legitimate interpretative purposes identified in either 
Municipal Council of Sydney, or Cole v Whitfield. This author has also identified one 
significant coincidence that, when taken with these three conclusions, adds interpretative 
strength to the three conclusions. 
First, in enacting the words “… and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth” in s 64, the mischief being remedied by the framers was the textual 
                                                          
151  Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 202 [56] (French CJ). 
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recognition or affirmation of the continued operation of the prerogatives of the Crown by 
the Commonwealth, and the devolution or investment of the prerogatives in the Crown in 
right of the Commonwealth. The framers were clearly united in their desire to ensure that 
the constitutional defect (as they saw it) for the colony of Victoria identified in Toy v 
Musgrove – that is, the inability of the Victorian executive government to exercise the 
prerogatives of the Crown (in relevant respects) ought to be expressly corrected in the 
Commonwealth Constitution. As Andrew Inglis Clark wrote in relation to interpreting a 
written constitution:152 
 
… that language must be interpreted by the judiciary consistently with a proper 
use of it as an intelligible vehicle of the conceptions and intentions of the human 
mind, and consistently with the historical associations from which particular 
words and phrases derive the whole of their meaning in juxtaposition with their 
context. 
 
With these principles in mind – the historical associations and the juxtaposition with their 
context – it can be said that so detailed was the debate; so clear was the contribution of 
leading delegates (like Deakin and Wrixon), and the absence of any subsequent debate 
about the appropriateness and utility of the expression “Queen’s Ministers of State” in s 64 
in the First and Second Conventions, all lead to a comfortable conclusion that the 
expression “and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth” ought to 
be accepted as textually recognising the prerogatives of the Crown which are appropriate 
to the Australian context at Federation. Furthermore, it is clear that the “Queen’s Ministers 
of State” expression in s 64 implicitly permits, or requires (as in terms of the devolution 
and investment, and execution aspects) the prerogatives of the Crown in right of the 
                                                          
152  A Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law, 21. Inglis Clark went on to say, at 26: “Its 
interpretation must take place in the light of facts which preceded and led to it; in the light of 
contemporaneous history, and of what was said by the actors and the ends they had in view”. 
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Commonwealth are to be exercised by the governor-general, and that it is for the 
Commonwealth ministers of state to tender the advice to exercise the devolved 
prerogatives. 
Michael Crommelin has said that the inclusion of the “Queen’s Ministers of State” 
reference in what became s 64 “seems hardly adequate as a means of achieving this end 
[being the recognition of the prerogative]”.153 When regard is had to the history of Toy v 
Musgrove, and the contents of the debate about the prerogative set out in this chapter, it is 
difficult to agree with Professor Crommelin’s observation. He is right, the expression is 
“merely descriptive”,154 but that is the point – the description implicitly demands the 
recognition of the prerogative. 
Second, having formed that conclusion about the expression “Queen’s Ministers of 
State” in s 64, we can also form the conclusion that the framers did not see, or identify, the 
vesting clause (s 61 of the Constitution), as recognising, or devolving and investing, the 
prerogatives of the Crown (as were thought appropriate to the Commonwealth at 
Federation) in the Queen. Despite debating the textual options to effect devolution and 
investment of the prerogative during the committee of the whole consideration of draft 
Chapter II (concerning “The Executive Government”) during the National Australasian 
Convention in 1891, no delegate identified the vesting clause as achieving the purpose that 
the delegates were seeking to achieve. 
In fact, again, Professor Crommelin’s observation in respect of what became s 2 of the 
Constitution – that is it “was not seen as the means of conveying these prerogative 
powers”,155 is, respectfully, incorrect if his observation is intended to mean that there was 
no consideration of the conveyance of the prerogative at all during the Conventions. The 
Official Records of the First Session in Adelaide on 19 April 1897, coupled together with 
                                                          
153  M Crommelin, “The Executive”, in G Craven, The Convention Debates, 1891-1898: Commentaries, 
Indices and Guide, 134. 
154  Ibid. 
155  Ibid 134-135. 
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Edmund Barton’s remarks in Sydney to Sir John Forrest demonstrates that there was a 
clear view about the operation of s 2 that was formed by the delegates.156 
Third, as a corollary, it can be concluded that the leading members of the Conventions 
understood that the executive power of the Commonwealth and the prerogatives of the 
Crown were two separate and distinct powers exercisable by the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth. The sharpness of this conclusion is emphasised by the detailed 
explanation of the difference between a prerogative act and an executive act by the Leader 
of the Second Convention, Barton, as set out supra. That Barton identified a textual feature 
(the different uses of the terms “governor-general in council”, and “governor-general”) in 
the draft Federation Bill, demonstrated (coupled with his belief that “any legal member” of 
the Convention would be aware of the distinction) that there was a generally accepted 
differentiation between the identification of prerogative acts and executive acts (and 
therefore prerogative power and executive power) by the members of the drafting 
committees that were charged with placing proposed text before all the delegates. 
Whilst it is possible to identify aspects of the Debates of both the two Conventions 
which show that individual delegates were ignorant of the three objects, purposes or 
understandings identified above, it is suggested that there are matters that give these 
conclusions some weight. The seniority of the delegates who made the key contributions to 
the relevant debates that give rise to each object or understanding; the fact that these 
aspects of the debates involved the delegates who were recognised within and outside the 
Conventions as the leading constitutional lawyers of the day; and the fact that in each of 
these debates, the conclusions that this author has identified were not challenged or 
contradicted in any meaningful way subsequent to the aspect of the debate identified, are 
three matters that weigh against the objects, purposes or understandings being described as 
merely subjective. 
                                                          
156  Con. Deb. Syd, 1897, 805. 
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None of these three conclusions undermine the observation by the Chief Justice in 
Williams [No 1] that there was no clear common view of the working of the executive 
power. This author does not cavil with that observation in respect of the executive power. 
What is posited in contradistinction is that there is sufficient evidence in the Convention 
Debates that the three conclusions described above (relating to the operation of the 
prerogative) are able to be distilled, and are properly attributable to the framers. 
The three conclusions have significant interpretative power. That is, they have 
persuasive force in identifying the legitimate interpretive purposes identified in Municipal 
Council of Sydney, Cole v Whitfield, and Singh, and allow the framers’ intentions to be 
legitimately used as interpretative tools. 
More particularly, the three conclusions are not relied upon to support the core argument 
because they reveal what the leading delegates at the Conventions thought on any one topic 
or issue simpliciter. Rather, they are relied upon because the three conclusions can be 
drawn (and only drawn) having regard to the depth and detail of the consideration of the 
“evil to be remedied” (in the Municipal Council of Sydney sense) during the Debates; 
because of the esteem and learning demonstrated by the leading delegates who contributed 
to those Debates at the relevant points in time; and because of the implicit widespread 
acceptance of the accuracy of each of the leading delegates’ contributions to the Debate at 
the relevant times. Also, in the case of the meaning of “executive acts”, the fact that the 
Western Australian delegates were politely admonished for their ignorance of the matters 
that were thought to be resolved at the First Session in Adelaide has interpretative force. 
The depth and detail in which the Debates went into legitimately permits the drawing of 
the three conclusions which justify the operation of the exceptions contained in Griffith 
CJ’s statement in Municipal Council of Sydney, and Gleeson CJ’s statement in Singh. The 
drawing of these three conclusions is also consistent with what was said by Gleeson CJ and 
McHugh J in Brownlee v The Queen,157 where their Honours opined:158 
                                                          
157  (2001) 207 CLR 278. 
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In the resolution of a problem as to the interpretation of the Constitution, the 
significance of the circumstances surrounding the framing of the instrument will 
vary according to the nature of the problem. An understanding of the context in 
which an instrument was written is ordinarily useful, and sometimes essential, 
for an understanding of its meaning. To recognize that is not to treat the 
subjective understanding of the framers, if it is possible to find any such 
common understanding, as the determining factor in a dispute about 
interpretation. It is simply to accept the historical context in which an instrument 
was written, which such an understanding may reflect, as potentially relevant to 
a question about the meaning of the instrument. Similarly, the genesis of an 
instrument may throw light upon its meaning. In the case of an ordinary statute, 
so much is expressly recognized by s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 
(Cth). The same can apply in the case of the Constitution. 
 
A Significant Coincidence 
 
As foreshadowed, in addition to the three conclusions identified, this author also points to 
an important coincidence which, because of the content of the amendment to the draft 
constitutional text, and the precise time at which the amendment was made, fortifies the 
interpretative strength of the three conclusions drawn in this chapter. 
As French CJ pointed out in Pape,159 the draft constitution, as adopted by the National 
Australasian Convention on 9 April 1891, in Ch II dealing with the Executive Government, 
contained the following two draft clauses: 
 
1. The Executive power and authority of the Commonwealth is vested in the 
Queen, and shall be exercised by the Governor-General as the Queen's 
                                                                                                                                                                                
158  (2001) 207 CLR 278, 285 [8] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J). 
159  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 57 [119]. 
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Representative. 
... 
 
8. The Executive power and authority of the Commonwealth shall extend to the 
execution of the provisions of this Constitution, and the Laws of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The Chief Justice in Pape pointed out that these two draft clauses were reproduced in the 
draft Constitution approved by the Australasian Federal Convention at Adelaide in April 
1897, but were renumbered as cll 60 and 67.160 These two draft clauses were condensed 
into what became cl 61, now s 61 of the Constitution, at the Melbourne Convention in 
1898.161 
What is of particular interest is the timing of the drafting of the text in draft cl 8 from 
1891, and the inclusion of the words “… shall extend to the execution of the provisions of 
this Constitution, and the Laws of the Commonwealth”. A close examination of Griffith’s 
Successive Stages, and in particular, Griffith’s “number 15”, which is described as “Copy 
of Draft Used by Griffith, 1-8 April 1891”, reveals that the inclusion of the statement that 
the Federal Ministers “shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth” was 
added to draft cl 4 of the 1891 draft during exactly the same in-committee consideration as 
the language of draft cl 8, which was therein significantly amended. As can be seen from 
pages 377 and 379 of Williams’ The Australian Constitution, draft cl 8 previously read:162 
 
8. The Executive power and authority of the Commonwealth shall extend to all 
matters with respect to which the Legislative powers of the Parliament may be 
exercised, excepting only matters, being within the Legislative powers of a 
                                                          
160  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 57 [119]. 
161  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 58 [121]. 
162  J Williams, The Australian Constitution, 379; see also Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 777. 
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State, with respect to which the Parliament of that State for the time being 
exercised such powers. 
 
As can be seen from the facsimile of Griffith’s “number 15”, Griffith has struck through all 
the words after the words “extend to” in draft cl 8, and, inserted a slip of paper with the 
words typed, under the heading “Chapter II, Section 8.”: Omit all words after “extend to” 
to end of the section and insert “the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and 
the Laws of the Commonwealth.”163 The words “the provisions of” creep into the draft 
clause before it reappears in Griffith’s “number 16”.164 
In fact, the sequence of events is even more exquisite than that. The language of draft cl 
4 – the provision which was amended to include reference to the Federal Ministers being 
“the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth” – was amended by the delegates 
in-committee on the afternoon of 6 April 1891.165 Immediately after amended draft cl 4, 
the delegates proceeded to a short consideration of draft cl 6, which concerned the sum 
payable from consolidated revenue to the Queen for the salaries of the Ministers, and then 
the delegates moved on to consider draft cl 8 which was then currently drafted pursuant to 
the text described above. Griffith opened the consideration of draft cl 8 by saying:166 
 
This afternoon I have had circulated an amendment which I propose to make in 
this clause. It does not alter its intention, though it certainly makes it shorter. As 
the clause stands, it contains a negative limitation upon the powers of the 
executive; but the amendment will give a positive statement as to what they are 
to be. I move … 
 
                                                          
163  J Williams, The Australian Constitution, 377 and 379 (original emphasis). 
164  Ibid 401. 
165  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 776. 
166  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 777. 
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Griffith then went on to set out the words of his amendment:167 
 
That in line 2 all the words after the words “extend to” be omitted with a view to 
the inclusion in lieu thereof of the words “the execution of the provisions of this 
constitution, and the laws of the commonwealth”. 
 
Quite erroneously, Griffith then went on to say: “That amendment covers all that is meant 
by the clause, and is quite free from ambiguity”.168 The amendment is then agreed to, and 
draft cl 8, as amended, is agreed to. 
Particular attention should be taken of Griffith’s opening words, “This afternoon I have 
had circulated an amendment which I propose to make in this clause”.169 What is Griffith 
referring to? When Griffith’s Successive Stages is examined closely, the circulated 
amendment must be the slip of paper which contains the proposed words of the 
amendment, and found at page 377 of Williams’ The Australian Constitution. Therefore, it 
is clear that there are two factual observations that can be made, and which amount to a 
significant coincidence. First, the delegates amended draft cl 4 to include references to the 
Federal Minister’s being the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth on exactly 
the same day, and indeed the same afternoon, as they considered the language which 
eventually (after the Second Convention) became the closing words of s 61 of the 
Constitution. And secondly, not only did the delegates have a draft bill which contained the 
then draft words for draft cl 8 in front of them whilst they were considering draft cl 4, they 
also had a piece of paper – presumably circulated to all of them – which set out Griffith’s 
proposed amendment to draft cl 8 that the executive power and authority should extend to 
the execution of the Constitution, and the laws of the Commonwealth. 
                                                          
167  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 777. 
168  Con. Deb. Syd, 1891, 778. 
169  Emphasis added. 
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What should be made of this? The fact that the textual affirmation that the Federal 
Ministers are to be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth occurs on the 
exact same day during the in-committee consideration of the wording of draft cl 8 – 
wording that went on to become half of s 61 of the Constitution, and is the text which 
comes the closest to describing the executive power of the Commonwealth – must have 
some interpretative value. If the statement that the executive power of the Commonwealth 
extends to the maintenance and execution of this Constitution, and the laws of the 
Commonwealth is the textual recognition and affirmation of the prerogative, the proximate 
relationship between when these two issues were considered in some depth by the 
delegates is a striking coincidence, and of itself has interpretative value. Why then, when 
crafting the language that became this phrase from s 61, did the framers make no mention 
of it when they were debating in quite some detail how to textually devolve and invest the 
prerogatives of the Crown? Surely it would have been easy for Griffith, or any other 
leading delegate to point to draft cl 8 when they were asked about the recognition of the 
prerogative into the constitutional text? It is a significant coincidence that the text of draft 
cl 8 was so significantly amended – on precisely the same day and afternoon of the in-
committee consideration that dealt with the textual devolution and investment of the 
prerogative – and no member of the First Convention saw “the Executive power and 
authority of the Commonwealth” as in any way touching upon the objective that the 
framers sought to achieve by declaring that the Federal Ministers were to be the Queen’s 
Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. The conclusion to be drawn is that when the 
delegates were considering the inclusion of the prerogative in the constitutional text, and 
also the language of the executive power of the Commonwealth, not a single delegate drew 
any correlation between the two – the natural conclusion to be drawn is that draft cl 8 did 
not then, in the minds of all or any of the delegates present, and should not now, be seen as 
textually recognising, affirming, devolving to, or investing the prerogatives of the Crown. 
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C  H A P T E R  F  I  V E  
CHALLENGING THE ORTHODOXY 
 
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to build upon the analysis of the prerogative in previous 
chapters, draw together various aspects of the theorem, and set out the core of the argument 
advanced in this thesis. 
This is done through four steps. First, this chapter sets out the history of how the High 
Court of Australia has come to see the prerogatives of the Crown being textually 
recognised in the Constitution. The chapter does this by identifying what the older 
authorities of the High Court understood the relationship between the prerogative and s 61 
of the Constitution to be; the chapter then sets out what is the current, or orthodox, view of 
the relationship between the prerogative and s 61 of the Constitution.  
Second, attention is then focused upon the jurisprudence which has emerged in the 
Pape, Williams [No 1], Williams [No 2] and CPCF decisions in relation to the executive 
power of the Commonwealth. That is done by identifying the two schools of thought in 
relation to the executive power of the Commonwealth (the inherent view, and the common 
law view) and how those two schools conceptualise the recognition of the prerogative. 
Support for each of the two schools of thought in the literature is identified. It is necessary 
to delve into s 61 jurisprudence as the High Court continues to hold the view that s 61 
textually incorporates the prerogatives of the Crown.1 
                                                          
1  Cadia Holdings v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195, 226. 
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Third, having traversed these matters, the chapter then sets out the core of the argument 
in this thesis (the “core argument”). The core argument advances a theory that runs counter 
to the orthodoxy that the prerogatives of the Crown are a limb of the executive power of 
the Commonwealth, and are textually recognised in the Constitution by section 61 of the 
Constitution; the theory is that the words “and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for 
the Commonwealth” are a textual recognition and affirmation of the continued existence 
and operation of the prerogatives of the Crown, in that they are exercisable by the Queen’s 
Ministers of State, and are made exercisable by the Commonwealth pursuant to s 61; but 
are not sourced in s 61. 
 
*** 
 
Thirty years ago, Professor Michael Crommelin observed that:2 
 
The executive branch of government was shrouded in mystery, partly 
attributable to the uncertain scope and status of the prerogative. The task of 
committing its essential features to writing was daunting indeed. Moreover, the 
price of undertaking that task would be a loss of flexibility in the future 
development of the executive. Politicians who were the beneficiaries of half a 
century of colonial constitutional development placed a high value upon such 
flexibility. 
 
This uncertainty as to the “scope and status of the prerogative” is the reason this 
dissertation is written. This challenge to the orthodoxy is a by-product of the debate about 
how to (or indeed whether to at all) incorporate the principle of responsible government 
into the Australian Constitution. As the previous chapter set out in detail, the framers 
                                                          
2  M Crommelin, “The Executive”, in Craven (ed), The Convention Debates 1891-1898: Commentaries, 
Indices and Guide, 127, 147, and approvingly quoted by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Re Patterson; ex 
parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 220. 
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struggled to reconcile the principle of responsible government with the American 
constitutional example of two chambers of co-equal power. If the lower house of 
parliament is to be the popular house and the chamber whose confidence is required for the 
formation of a ministry, how is that to be reconciled with an upper house whose confidence 
is required for the passage of appropriation bills and is elected on some other basis than a 
popular election of the people of the new States? The by-product of this debate was an 
examination of the powers of the ministry which was to have the confidence of one or both 
of the chambers of the new parliament, and, the question of who should be answerable to 
which chamber for the advice tendered to the Crown regarding the exercise of the 
prerogative. 
As previously identified, in drafting the Constitution, the First and Second Conventions 
adopted the traditional parliamentary practice, which would have been familiar to all the 
delegates as men of standing in the various colonial parliaments, of considering the bill by 
the Committee of the Whole of the Convention, or “in-committee”. That is, the 
Conventions considered the various drafts of the Commonwealth Bill clause-by-clause. It 
is through this process that constitutional policy issues revealed themselves to the 
delegates, and allowed a sharpness of analysis. In this context, the question of the textual 
recognition of the prerogative came close to the surface while the framers were considering 
the broader issue of the textual recognition of the principle of responsible government. 
Professor Crommelin’s observation supra summarises the sentiments expressed by the 
framers during the in-committee process, and by the uncertain state of the jurisprudence 
that had arisen since Federation in respect of this issue – possibly because of the lack of 
weight attributed to the expressions of opinion by the delegates during the drafting process 
in respect of the recognition of the prerogatives of the Crown. 
Compounding the problem, the pre-Federation state of English jurisprudence left 
precious-few sources of case law for the framers to obtain a sharpened understanding of 
the nature of the prerogative. As already said in the Introduction, “no case on the 
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prerogative came before the House of Lords after the seventeenth century Revolution 
Settlement until the immediate aftermath of the First World War”.3 
II  IDENTIFYING THE ORTHODOX V IEW  
This dissertation challenges two judicially-settled, or orthodox views. It challenges the 
view that the prerogatives of the Crown are textually recognised or affirmed in the 
Constitution by virtue of the words of s 61 of the Constitution. It also, as a consequence of 
that first contested proposition, challenges the method of construing the executive power of 
the Commonwealth. This second challenge is a natural consequence of the first. 
The words of s 61 of the Constitution have been described by a leading constitutional 
scholar as “meagre and highly abstract”.4 A more recent commentator has said of the text 
of s 61: “These meagre words give very little idea of the content of the executive power 
unless regard is had both to the common law and to the federal system within which the 
Commonwealth operates”.5 That statement of methodology sits uncomfortably with what 
Gummow J (then a puisne judge of the Federal Court) said in Re Ditfort; Ex parte Deputy 
Commissioner of Taxation.6 In oft-quoted dictum, his Honour said:7 
 
In Australia … one looks not to the content of the prerogative in Britain, but 
rather to s 61 of the Constitution, by which the executive power of the 
Commonwealth was vested. 
 
This was, prior to Pape, Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2], incorrect. The better view 
prior to that trinity of cases, and consistent with the older authorities outlined below, was, 
                                                          
3  B Hadfield, “Constitutional Law”, in L Blom-Cooper, et al, The Judicial House of Lords, 1876-2009, 
504. 
4  L Zines, “Commentary”, in H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative, C5. 
5  J Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution, 371. 
6  (1988) 19 FCR 347. 
7  (1988) 19 FCR 347, 369. 
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Zines said, that “[t]he nature of what lies within the sphere of the executive branch of 
government necessarily requires an historical understanding”.8 
 
The Older Authorities 
 
Until the Whitlam government, there were very few cases that came before the High Court 
of Australia that considered the operation of the executive power of the Commonwealth. 
The existence and application of the prerogative of the Crown was only ever a secondary 
issue in the earlier cases. 
The first real judicial consideration of the relationship between s 61 of the Constitution 
and the prerogatives of the Crown was offered by Sir Isaac Isaacs in Commonwealth v 
Colonial Combing, Spinning & Weaving Co Ltd (the Wool Tops case),9 where his Honour 
opined:10 
 
Sec[tion] 61 makes three declarations as to the executive power of the 
Commonwealth. Observe, it is not as to the Executive Government of the 
Commonwealth or as to the powers of the Government, but as to the “executive 
power of the Commonwealth.” As to that “power,” it declares that it (a) is vested 
in the sovereign, (b) is exerciseable by the Governor-General as the Sovereign's 
representative, (c) “extends to the execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.” The reference to the 
Governor-General as the representative of the Sovereign must be read with sec. 
2 of the Constitution, which constitutes him such representative. As to the first 
declaration it is a renewed statement of the law and introductory of what 
follows. Blackstone (vol. 1., p. 190) says: “The Supreme executive power of 
these Kingdoms is vested by our laws in a single person, the King or Queen.” In 
                                                          
8  L Zines, “The inherent executive power of the Commonwealth”, (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279. 
9  (1922) 31 CLR 421. 
10  (1922) 31 CLR 421, 437. 
  230 
     
Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. VI., p. 318) it is said: “The executive authority 
is vested in the Crown as part of the prerogative.” The second declaration need 
not be further considered now. The third is very important. It marks the external 
boundaries of the Commonwealth executive power, so far as that is conferred by 
the Constitution, but it leaves entirely untouched the definition of that power and 
its ascertainment in any given instance. 
 
Isaacs J continued:11 
 
But the third declaration is an essential starting-point, and the extent it marks out 
cannot be exceeded. The argument upon those words included various 
contentions; as, for instance, that the executive authority of the Commonwealth 
Government embraced all the common law powers of the Imperial Government, 
and that “laws of the Commonwealth” included the common law - that once find 
a given subject matter within the ambit of the Constitution the legal power to 
make the agreement existed, and, what I regard as very crucial, though I do not 
agree with it, that the written words of the Constitution applied to sec. 61 form 
the only necessary solving test. These contentions convince me that the proper 
construction of the enactment requires a deeper consideration than I should have 
otherwise thought necessary. Sec. 61, when carefully examined, simply applies 
to the new constitutional structure, the Commonwealth, but with the necessary 
adaptation, the basic principle of the law of the Empire that the King is 
indistinguishably the King of the whole Empire, but that the springs of royal 
action differ with locality. 
 
                                                          
11  (1922) 31 CLR 421, 438. 
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Read carefully, it is suggested that this judicial opinion is supportive of the core argument 
set out below. Isaacs J made the point that s 61 is declaratory of the pre-existing state of the 
law – that the executive power belongs to the Crown, and that the executive power is part 
of the prerogative. Isaacs J did not, it is suggested, say that the prerogative stems from the 
executive power, or that s 61 is the source of the prerogative; rather “the Supreme 
executive power” or the “executive authority” is vested in the Crown; and his Honour 
identified Sir William Blackstone and the first Earl of Halsbury as authorities for those 
basal propositions. Read incorrectly, Sir Isaac Isaacs is identified as an authority for the 
proposition that the prerogatives of the Crown are vested in the Crown by virtue of s 61 of 
the Constitution. 
Ten years later, Evatt J appeared to arrive at the same construction of s 61 as Isaacs J did 
in the Wool Tops case. Evatt J said in R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny:12 
 
It is true that sec. 61 of the Constitution declares that the “executive” power of 
the Commonwealth extends to “the execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.” But this declaration, as 
was indicated in the Wool Tops Case (The Commonwealth v. Colonial Combing, 
Spinning and Weaving Co.), only defines the general limits of the King’s 
executive authority in respect of the Commonwealth and does not determine 
what the Executive may lawfully do upon any given occasion. Whatever powers 
or duties are conferred or imposed upon the King’s executive government, by 
any section of the Constitution, or by such portion of the Royal prerogative as is 
applicable, may lawfully be exercised; but sec. 61 itself gives no assistance in 
the ascertainment or definition of such powers and duties. 
 
                                                          
12  (1932) 48 CLR 487, 510-511 (emphasis added). 
  232 
     
Whilst is it contestable as to what Evatt J meant by the phrase, “may lawfully be 
exercised” in the passage above, the better view is, it is suggested, that the source of the 
prerogative powers of the Crown is not s 61 of the Constitution, but the Crown’s attributes 
which are recognised by the common law. His reference to s 61 giving “no assistance in 
the ascertainment or definition of such [prerogative] powers and duties” favours the 
conclusion that s 61 is not the textual source of the prerogative. Evatt J fortified this view 
eight years later in what might be described as his Honour’s leading decision on the 
prerogative – Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Official Liquidator of E.O. Farley Ltd (In 
Liq) – where his Honour said:13 
 
By sec. 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, the “executive power” of the 
Commonwealth became exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's 
representative. This section, however, does not determine whether any specific 
royal prerogative is exercisable by the Governor-General on the one hand or by 
the Governors of the several States on the other. 
 
By “specific royal prerogative” Evatt J should be understood to have referred to the 
different species of prerogatives, like the power to declare war, or the right to royal metals. 
Evatt J is here referring to the structural tension between the Commonwealth and the States 
in terms of those prerogatives (usually in the form of preferences) which can be shared 
between the levels of government, like the right to royal metals. Evatt J’s view was 
endorsed and slightly nuanced by Dixon J in Richard Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd, Re; Uther v 
Commissioner of Taxation (Cth),14 where the future Chief Justice observed in relation to a 
priority of the Commonwealth Crown:15 
 
                                                          
13  (1940) 63 CLR 278, 319. 
14  (1947) 74 CLR 508. 
15  (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
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But the priority which the State Act, by s. 282, is supposed to have destroyed 
and, by s. 297 (1) (d) in the case of land and income tax, to have reduced, is a 
consequence of the King’s prerogative. It is an adjunct of the “Executive power 
of the Commonwealth” that is vested by s. 61 of the Constitution in the 
Sovereign. The prerogative of the Crown representing the Commonwealth, 
being as extensive as in Great Britain, is part of the constitutional law of the 
Commonwealth: cp. Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-
General of New Brunswick. The rule that when the title of the Crown and the 
title of a subject concur, that of the Crown is to be preferred, is a general rule of 
the common law of the Constitution. 
 
Jacobs J’s reasons in Victoria v Commonwealth (the Australian Assistance Plan case) also 
appear to reflect the view expressed by Isaacs J and Dixon J supra. Sir Kenneth said:16 
 
The Constitution envisages the exercise of the prerogative through the 
Governor-General in those matters appertaining to the Government of the 
Commonwealth in its provision by s. 61 that the executive power of the 
Commonwealth extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution. 
Except so far as the Constitution makes particular provision in respect of 
matters otherwise within the prerogative, the prerogative remains unaffected. It 
was always intended that, subject to the Constitution and its expression of the 
subject matters of Commonwealth power, to a large extent the prerogative 
would be exercised on all matters of Australian concern by the Crown on the 
advice of Australian Ministers rather than on the advice of United Kingdom 
Ministers. The extent of its exercise on such advice has throughout the years of 
federation been a growing extent. 
                                                          
16  (1975) 134 CLR 338, 405 (emphasis added). 
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Whilst there are many examples that can be identified where justices of the High Court 
have, or appear to have, expressed a view that the prerogatives of the Crown stem from the 
words of s 61 of the Constitution (and therefore, presumably, the prerogatives obtain their 
scope from those words), it is suggested that the views expressed by Sir Isaac Isaacs, Evatt 
J, Sir Owen Dixon and Sir Kenneth Jacobs above are correct statements of constitutional 
principle. The older authorities, identified supra, ought to be reembraced by the High 
Court of Australia. 
The Emergence of the Orthodox View 
The orthodox (and newer) view is the opposite of that which is outlined above. The 
orthodox view is that the prerogatives of the Crown are textually recognised and affirmed 
in the Constitution by virtue of the opening words of s 61 – that “the executive power of 
the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as 
the Queen’s representative …”.17 In the Communist Party Case,18 Williams J expressed a 
view that:19 
 
The executive power of the Commonwealth at the date of the Constitution 
presumably included such of the then existing prerogative powers of the King in 
England as were applicable to a body politic with limited powers. 
 
The first modern authority that doesn’t qualify this statement with the word “presumably”, 
and articulates the now “well established”20 view is Mason J, who in Barton v 
Commonwealth said that:21 
                                                          
17  L Zines, “Commentary” in H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative, C5. 
18  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
19  (1951) 83 CLR 1, 231. 
20  J Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution, 373. 
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By s. 61 the executive power of the Commonwealth was vested in the Crown. It 
extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of 
the Commonwealth. It enables the Crown to undertake all executive action 
which is appropriate to the position of the Commonwealth under the 
Constitution and to the spheres of responsibility vested in it by the Constitution. 
It includes the prerogative powers of the Crown, that is, the powers accorded to 
the Crown by the common law. 
 
In Pape22 the High Court was asked by the Commonwealth to uphold the appropriation of 
funds for the purposes of a national financial emergency on the basis that the payment was 
lawfully made within the exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth. French 
CJ examined the textual history of s 61 of the Constitution in some detail, and concluded 
that:23 
 
It is not necessary for present purposes to consider the full extent of the powers 
and capacities of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth. Such 
powers as may be conferred upon the Executive by statutes made under the 
Constitution are plainly included. So too are those powers which are called the 
prerogatives of the Crown, for example the power to enter into treaties and to 
declare war. In addition, whatever the source, the Executive possesses what have 
been described as the “capacities” which may be possessed by persons other 
                                                                                                                                                                                
21  Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477 at 498. French CJ approvingly quotes this passage in 
Pape (2009) 238 CLR 1, 61 [130]; French CJ also approvingly quotes in Pape at 62 [131] the words of 
Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ in Davis v The Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93, where their 
Honours said: “... s 61 confers on the Commonwealth all the prerogative powers of the Crown except 
those that are necessarily exercisable by the States under the allocation of responsibilities made by the 
Constitution and those denied by the Constitution itself”. 
22  (2009) 238 CLR 1. 
23  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [126] and [127] (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 
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than the Crown. 
 
The collection of statutory and prerogative powers and non-prerogative 
capacities form part of, but do not complete, the executive power. They lie 
within the scope of s 61, which is informed by history and the common law 
relevant to the relationship between the Crown and the Parliament. That history 
and common law emerged from what might be called an organic evolution. 
Section 61 is an important element of a written constitution for the government 
of an independent nation. While history and the common law inform its content, 
it is not a locked display cabinet in a constitutional museum. It is not limited to 
statutory powers and the prerogative. It has to be capable of serving the proper 
purposes of a national government. … 
 
The High Court again affirmed that the prerogative is an aspect of the executive power of 
the Commonwealth. In Cadia Holdings v State of New South Wales,24 the Chief Justice 
said:25 
 
Prerogative powers and rights enjoyed by the Crown in the colonies before 
Federation may be seen as informing, or forming part of, the content of the 
executive powers of the Commonwealth and the States according to their proper 
functions. 
 
The plurality in Cadia said:26 
                                                          
24  (2010) 242 CLR 195. 
25  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 210 [30], see also [31] (French CJ) (emphasis added). 
26  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 226 [86] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (footnotes omitted); 
approvingly quoted by Gummow and Bell JJ in Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 227 [123]. By 
“includes” Dixon J should not be understood as meaning that the prerogative are incorporated within s 
61 of the Constitution; rather, the prerogative powers are “accorded the Crown by the common law”. 
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The executive power of the Commonwealth of which s 61 of the Constitution 
speaks enables the Commonwealth to undertake executive action appropriate to 
its position under the Constitution and to that end includes the prerogative 
powers accorded the Crown by the common law. Dixon J spoke of common law 
prerogatives of the Crown in England, specifically the prerogative respecting 
Crown debts, as having been “carried into the executive authority of the 
Commonwealth”. 
 
Three years after Cadia, French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ affirmed that the 
prerogatives of the Crown are “now encompassed in the executive power conferred by s 
61”.27 
Furthermore, it is worth noting (and is important in terms of the core argument 
advanced) that there is a division of opinion within the justices of the High Court as to the 
precise language used by the constitutional draftsmen to recognise the prerogative. 
Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ opined in Pape that:28 
 
With that understanding, the phrase “maintenance of this Constitution” in s 61 
imports more than a species of what is identified as “the prerogative” in 
constitutional theory. It conveys the idea of the protection of the body politic or 
nation of Australia. 
 
                                                          
27  Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General (2013) 249 CLR 645, 636. 
28  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 [215]. 
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In contrast to Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ’s reliance upon the words “maintenance of 
this Constitution” in s 61 as being the textual device, French CJ said in Williams [No 1] 
that:29 
 
The mechanism for the incorporation of the prerogative into the executive power 
is found in the opening words of s 61 which vests the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in “the Queen”. This has been described as a “shorthand 
prescription, or formula, for incorporating the prerogative – which is implicit in 
the legal concept of “the Queen” – in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth.”  
 
This division of opinion as to which aspect of the text within s 61 is used to recognise the 
prerogative becomes more important in subsequent chapters. But, for present purposes, 
whilst there is a division of opinion about the precise words in s 61 that effect the 
recognition of the prerogative, until Williams [No 2], it appeared settled that the 
prerogative rights, preferences, capacities, and immunities found textual recognition 
somewhere within the language of s 61’s vesting of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth in the Queen. Williams [No 2] opened the door to challenging that 
conclusion. More will be said in respect of Williams [No 2] in Chapter 7, suffice to say at 
this point the orthodox view is that s 61 textually recognises the prerogatives of the Crown 
in right of the Commonwealth.  
More recently, in CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, French CJ 
summarised his view that:30 
 
Any consideration of the non-statutory executive power must bear in mind its 
character as an element of the grant of executive power contained in s 61 of the 
                                                          
29  (2012) 248 CLR 156, 185 [23], the Chief Justice quoted the words of Professor George Winterton, The 
Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General, 50. 
30  (2015) 255 CLR 514, 538 [42] (French CJ) (emphasis added). 
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Commonwealth Constitution. The history of the prerogative powers in the 
United Kingdom informs consideration of the content of s 61, but should not be 
regarded as determinative. The content of the executive power may be said to 
extend to the prerogative powers, appropriate to the Commonwealth, accorded 
to the Crown by the common law.31 It does not follow that the prerogative 
content comprehensively defines the limits of the aspects of executive power to 
which it relates. 
 
Additionally, and returning to Cadia Holdings, whilst Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ cited Dixon J as authority for the proposition that the “common law 
prerogatives of the Crown in England” have been recognised in the Constitution by being 
“carried into the executive authority of the Commonwealth”,32 it is respectfully argued that 
their Honours have incorrectly read the reasons of Dixon J in Farley’s case. In Farley’s 
case, Dixon J said:33 
 
… the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Crown, which, of 
course, is as much the central element in the Constitution of the Commonwealth 
as in a unitary constitution. The United-States Government did not succeed to 
the sovereignty of the British Crown and therefore inherited none of its 
common-law powers or privileges. The reasons why the United-States 
Government has none but a statutory preference have no application to our 
Constitution: Cf., per Story J., United States v. State Bank of North Carolina. 
The Commonwealth Constitution, an enactment of the Imperial Parliament, took 
effect in a common-law system, and the nature and incidents of the authority of 
                                                          
31  Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195, 226 [86] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon 
and Crennan JJ); see also Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 227–228 [123] (Gummow and Bell JJ). 
32  (2010) 242 CLR 195, 226. 
33  (1940) 63 CLR 278, 303-304. 
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the Crown in right of the Commonwealth are in many respects defined by the 
common law. The prerogative which gives Crown debts priority over those due 
to a subject is in this way carried into the executive authority of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The expression “carried into the executive authority” in Cadia Holdings needs to be read in 
context, and in line with what Dixon J said in the earlier sentences of the passage recited 
above (especially the second last sentence), as well as what Dixon J said in Richard 
Foreman & Sons.34 The use by Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ in Cadia 
Holdings of the expression “carried into the executive authority”, misdescribes the way 
that Dixon J viewed the operation of the relevant constitutional principles.  
Nonetheless, it is now the orthodox constitutional principle regarding the relationship 
between s 61 of the Constitution and the prerogatives of the Crown. It is this orthodox 
view that is challenged in this dissertation. 
III  THE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT  
Having set out what appears to be a dichotomous relationship between the older view and 
the orthodox view as to how the Constitution textually recognises the prerogatives of the 
Crown, it is now helpful (and before setting out the core argument) to identify the two 
schools of thought concerning the construction of s 61 of the Constitution. As a 
consequence of the High Court’s view that s 61 recognises, or “imports”, the prerogative, it 
is necessary to understand in greater detail the frameworks which have developed, or are 
developing, in respect of the scope or ambit of s 61. In particular, attention needs to be 
given to “non-statutory executive power”. By “non-statutory executive power”, reference 
is being made to that type of executive power which does not rely upon the execution and 
maintenance of the laws of the Commonwealth. Non-statutory executive power refers to 
the executive power which is said to arise by operation of the authority to execute and 
                                                          
34  (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
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maintain “this Constitution”. The power is “non-statutory”, as it does not rely upon the 
exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth as a condition precedent to the 
exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth – that is, it does not rely upon the 
pre-existence of a statute. 
As was pointed out in the preface, Chapter II is now “where the action is” in terms of 
current High Court jurisprudential activity. This is evident in the Court’s recent 
determination of five cases that considered the operation of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth – the Pape decision, the First School Chaplains’ Case and the Second 
School Chaplains’ Case (being Williams [No 1], and Williams [No 2] respectively), the 
CPCF decision, and the Plaintiff M68 decision. These five decisions dramatically 
advanced the jurisprudence in relation to Chapter II of the Constitution generally, and s 61 
specifically. A consequence of these decisions is that academic literature that was current 
just a few years ago can now be quite out of date. 
As Kiefel J recently highlighted, “the terms of s 61 do not offer much assistance in 
resolving questions as to the scope of executive power”.35 What is included within the 
expression “executive power” may be “described but not defined”.36 There is no internal 
definition of “executive power” within the text of the Constitution. The Court must look 
more broadly within the constitutional text, or outside the constitutional text, for guidance 
on construing the scope of the executive power. 
The decisions of the High Court and the commentaries of leading constitutional scholars 
in Australia have resulted in the emergence of two broad schools of thought as to how the 
non-statutory executive power is to be understood.  The first is the common law view. The 
common law view sees depth of the non-statutory executive power being ascertained, 
primarily, through reference to the traditional common law recognised authorities in 
Britain. The second is the inherent view. The inherent view sees the depth of the non-
                                                          
35  CPCF (2015) 255 CLR 514, 595 [259] (Kiefel J). 
36  Wool Tops Case (1922) 31 CLR 421, 440 (Isaacs J). 
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statutory executive power being ascertained by reference to qualities that are said to inhere 
in the executive government and the Commonwealth as a body politic. 
The Common Law View 
The common law view is that “the non-statutory aspect of s 61 can only be given sufficient 
meaning by reference to the Crown’s prerogative powers”.37 The common law view sees 
the executive power of the Commonwealth construed, in large measure, by reference to the 
prerogatives of the Crown in British constitutional jurisprudence. The common law view is 
said to have been the “once orthodox position” as to how the “non-statutory executive 
power is to be construed”.38 Pursuant to this school of thought, in judicially reviewing 
executive action, a court focuses upon how the action taken has been historically accepted, 
or not accepted, as a power or function of the Crown recognised by the common law. This 
mode of analysis is primarily an historical one, whereas the inherent view is primarily 
determined (it would seem) in a mixed way – resorting to history, and also partially 
understood in a functionalist sense, having regard to the nation that was sought to be 
established by the framers. 
In defence of the common law view, Black CJ cautioned in the Tampa case against 
seeing in s 61 “some larger source” of power than the traditional common law recognised 
powers of the Crown. Black CJ said:39 
 
It would be a very strange circumstance if the at best doubtful and historically 
long-unused power to exclude or expel should emerge in a strong modern form 
from s 61 of the constitution by virtue of general conceptions of ‘the national 
interest’. This is all the more so when according to English constitutional theory 
new prerogative powers cannot be created. 
                                                          
37  N Condylis, “Debating the Ambit and Nature of the Commonwealth's Non-statutory Executive Power” 
(2015) 39(2) Melbourne University Law Review, 385, 387. 
38  Ibid. 
39  (2001) 110 FCR 491, 501. 
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Chief Justice Black’s reasoning in the Tampa case is, perhaps, the last fulsome articulation 
of the common law view before the emergence of the dominant inherent view, which has 
been widely criticised by constitutional academics. 
The Inherent View 
The inherent (or “nationhood”) view is often traced to the Australian Assistance Plan case, 
where Mason J said that the executive power extended to “enterprises and activities 
peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation and which cannot otherwise be carried on 
for the benefit of the nation”.40 The inherent view gained momentum in the dicta of 
Gummow J, when, as a judge of the Federal Court, his Honour wrote that “[i]n Australia 
… one looks not to the content of the prerogative in Britain, but rather to s 61 of the 
Constitution, by which the executive power is vested”.41 Significant momentum occurred 
in the Tampa case where French J (then a member of the Full Court of the Federal Court) 
proposed an account of the relationship between the prerogatives of the Crown and the 
executive power of the Commonwealth which focused upon the structural considerations 
derived from the distribution of power between three arms of government. French J said:42 
 
[T]he Executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 cannot be treated as a 
species of the royal prerogative … While the Executive power may derive some 
of its content by reference to the royal prerogative, it is a power conferred as part 
of a negotiated federal compact expressed in a written Constitution distributing 
powers between the three arms of government … 
                                                          
40  (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397. The inherent view’s doctrinal heritage can be traced back earlier than the 
AAP case. 
41  Re Ditfort; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347, 369. 
42  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 10 FCR 491, 540 (French and Beaumont JJ; Black CJ dissenting). Black CJ 
based his conclusions exclusively on the prerogative and did not agree with the recognition of an 
executive nationhood power beyond the prerogative. See S Evans, “The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism 
and the MV Tampa” (2002) 13 Public Law Review 94. 
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These developments culminated in Pape.43 The case concerned the validity of aspects of 
the Commonwealth’s fiscal stimulus package, developed in response to the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008. The supporting legislation provided that an individual tax payer 
whose taxable income was below a certain threshold was entitled to a tax bonus in the form 
of a one-off cash payment. The inherent view went from obscure theory to the dominant 
school of thought when French J, by now the Chief Justice of the High Court, said:44 
 
The executive power of the Commonwealth conferred by s 61 of the 
Constitution extends to the power to expend public moneys for the purpose of 
avoiding or mitigating the large scale adverse effects of the circumstances 
affecting the national economy disclosed on the facts of this case, and which 
expenditure is on a scale and within a time-frame peculiarly within the capacity 
of the national government. … The aspect of the power engaged in this case 
involves the expenditure of money to support a short-term national fiscal 
stimulus strategy calculated to offset the adverse effects of a global financial 
crisis on the national economy. 
 
Explaining the inherent view of s 61, the Chief Justice said in Pape that s 61:45 
 
… is an important element of a written constitution for the government of an 
independent nation. While history and the common law inform its content, it is 
not a locked display cabinet in a constitutional museum. It has to be capable of 
serving the proper purposes of a national government. 
  
                                                          
43  (2009) 238 CLR 1. 
44  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 23-24 (emphasis added). 
45  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60. 
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While Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ generally concurred, they gave expression to a 
nationhood power in more expansive terms. Their Honours said that:46 
 
[T]he executive power of the Commonwealth enables the undertaking of action 
appropriate to the position of the Commonwealth as a polity created by the 
Constitution and having regard to the spheres of responsibility vested in it. … 
[Section] 61 imports more than a species of what is identified as ‘the 
prerogative’ in constitutional theory. 
 
The inherent view is a “product of a more recent evolution in constitutional jurisprudence, 
crystallising in Pape”.47 The application of the inherent view to the two limbs of s 61 of 
the Constitution is not straight forward. In respect of the execution and maintenance of the 
laws of the Commonwealth, the inherent view “presents few interpretational difficulties, as 
recourse may be had to the constitutional or legislative provision which the 
Commonwealth is administering to measure the lawfulness of the impugned action”.48 The 
second limb – executing and maintaining “this Constitution” – is analytically problematic. 
Reviewing executive acts which are purportedly done to maintain the Constitution are 
conceptually more difficult, due to what Nicholas Condylis described as the “textual 
ambiguity”.49  
The white-hot issue in relation to the inherent view is: by what criterion, or criteria, 
does the court determine whether impugned executive action falls within the meaning of 
“execution and maintenance of this Constitution”?  
                                                          
46  (2009) 238 CLR 1, 90. 
47  N Aroney, et al, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia; History, Principle and 
Interpretation, 451. 
48  N Condylis, “Debating the Ambit and Nature of the Commonwealth's Non-statutory Executive Power” 
(2015) 39(2) Melbourne University Law Review, 385, 387; and see also Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 
202. 
49  N Condylis, “Debating the Ambit and Nature of the Commonwealth's Non-statutory Executive Power” 
(2015) 39(2) Melbourne University Law Review, 385, 387. 
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Critics have drawn attention to the subjectivity inherent in such a conception of inherent 
executive power.50 Reasonable minds are very likely to differ as to what may be permitted 
by such a power. Zines referred to French J’s approach in Tampa as “highly subjective”.51 
It is one thing to explain s 61 by reference to its role in a federal political compact; it is 
quite another thing to determine its precise content. In certain respects, much of the 
implied power will overlap with the content of the more established executive 
prerogatives, especially those relating to foreign affairs and defence. But as the nationhood 
power is not determinable solely by reference to the legally discernible criteria of the 
common law, it is not at all clear how its outer bounds are to be determined even if the 
question is approached incrementally as cases come before the Court. That is not to say 
that the common law itself always provides clear answers. Rather, the point is that relying 
solely on “national” and “practical” considerations to determine the ambit of the 
maintenance component of s 61 is especially prone to subjective, policy-type 
considerations that are not ideally suited to judicial determination.  
IV  THE CORE ARGUMENT  
The Common Law and the Constitution 
The core argument advanced in this dissertation commences with the most basal of all 
constitutional principles. From Federation it has consistently been said that the 
Constitution “is not an isolated document”; “[i]t has been built on traditional foundations”, 
                                                          
50  See S Evans, “The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa” (2002) 13 Public Law Review 
94; S Evans, “Developments - Australia - Ruddock v Vadarlis (the Tampa Litigation)” (2003) 1 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 123; E Wilheim “MV Tampa: the Australian Response” 
(2003) 15 International Journal of Refugee Law 159. 
51  L Zines, “The inherent executive power of the Commonwealth”, (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279, 
292. 
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and its “roots penetrate deep into the past”.52 In 1947, the then Chief Justice of the High 
Court, Sir John Latham, said in Richard Foreman & Sons that:53 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia was not born into a vacuum. It came into 
existence within a system of law already established. To much of that law the 
Commonwealth is necessarily subject; for example, the Commonwealth has no 
general power to legislate with respect to the law of property, the law of 
contract, the law of tort. In relation to those subjects, speaking generally, it lives 
and moves and has its being within a system of law which consists of the 
common law (in the widest sense) and the statute law of the various States. 
 
Sir John Latham’s successor, Sir Owen Dixon expressed his extra-judicial view that the 
common law was “a jurisprudence antecedently existing into which our system came and 
in which it operates”,54 and that the “general law” was “the source of the legal conceptions 
that govern us in determining the effect of the written instrument”55 of the Constitution. In 
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, all seven judges of the High Court opined 
                                                          
52  J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, vii; Andrew Inglis 
Clark said in his Studies In Australian Constitutional Law, at 5: “… in the case of the Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, the reproduction of portions of the historical and unwritten 
Constitution of the mother country in definite terms imports into Australian constitutional law under the 
Commonwealth many legal relations and consequences which have their origins in the English common 
law.  The constitutional law of the mother country will therefore continue to be a guide and a fountain 
of knowledge and authority on many matters included in the constitutional law of Australia …”. 
53  Richard Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd; Uther v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 CLR 508, 521 
(Latham CJ); see also Theophanous v Herald Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 141 (Brennan J), 
where his Honour said that: “The Constitution and the common law are bound in a symbiotic 
relationship: though the Constitution itself and laws enacted under the powers it confers may abrogate 
or alter rules of the common law, the common law is the matrix in which the Constitution came into 
being … and which informs its text”. 
54  O Dixon, “The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation”, Jesting Pilate, 204; G Hill, A 
Stone, “The Constitutionalisation of the Common Law” [2004] UMelbLRS 1; cf W M C Gummow, 
“The Constitution: Ultimate foundation of Australian law?”, (2005) 79 ALJ 167. 
55  O Dixon, “Marshall and the Australian Constitution”, Jesting Pilate, 166, 174; see also, A Stone, “The 
Common Law And The Constitution: A Reply” (2002) 26(3) Melbourne University Law Review 646. 
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that “[t]he common law supplies elements of the British constitutional fabric”.56 Their 
Honours went on to approvingly quote in Lange57 the following extra-judicial words of Sir 
Owen Dixon:58 
 
We do not of course treat the common law as a transcendental body of legal 
doctrine, but we do treat it as antecedent in operation to the constitutional 
instruments which first divided Australia into separate colonies and then united 
her in a federal Commonwealth. We therefore regard Australian law as a unit. Its 
content comprises besides legislation the general common law which it is the 
duty of the courts to ascertain as best they may. ... The anterior operation of the 
common law in Australia is not just a dogma of our legal system, an abstraction 
of our constitutional reasoning. It is a fact of legal history. 
 
In the canonical decision of Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co, 
Sir Adrian Knox, Sir Isaac Isaacs, Sir George Rich and Sir Hayden Starke observed that the 
Constitution should be “read … naturally in the light of the circumstances in which it was 
made, with knowledge of the combined fabric of the common law, and the statute law 
which preceded it”.59 More recently, French CJ said in Momcilovic v The Queen that:60 
 
The common law in its application to the interpretation of statutes helps to 
define the boundaries between the judicial and legislative functions. That is a 
reflection of its character as “the ultimate constitutional foundation in 
                                                          
56  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 562 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
57  (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564. 
58  O Dixon, “Sources of Legal Authority”, Jesting Pilate, 198, 199-200. 
59  Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 152. 
60  (2011) 245 CLR 1, 46 [42]. 
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Australia”.61 It also underpins the attribution of legislative intention on the basis 
that legislative power in Australia, as in the United Kingdom, is exercised in the 
setting of a “liberal democracy founded on the principles and traditions of the 
common law”.62  
 
As Abraham and Sarah begat Isaac, the common law and the Imperial Parliament begat the 
Constitution Act. The common law is both a source of substantive principles that inform 
the operation of the Constitution, and an aid in its interpretation. For example, in Cheatle v 
The Queen,63 the High Court reaffirmed that “[i]t is well settled that the interpretation of a 
constitution such as ours is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed 
in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of the common 
law’s history”.64 The common law of the British Constitution remains relevant to the 
content and construction of the text, structure and history of the Australian Constitution.65 
The Constitution and the Crown 
Preambles have interpretative power.66 From the opening words of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900, the Imperial Act textually affirms the continued operation 
of the common law of the Crown.67 The preamble proclaims that “[w]hereas the people” of 
the six colonies “have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under 
                                                          
61  Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 182 (Gummow J). 
62  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 587 (Lord Steyn). 
63  (1993) 177 CLR 541. 
64  (1993) 177 CLR 541, 552. 
65  Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278, 285 (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J); J Goldsworthy, “The 
Constitution and its common law background”, (2014) 25 Public Law Review 265, 274. 
66  J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, said at 284 (and 
quoting Lord Thring from his Practical Legislation; on the Composition and Language of Acts of 
Parliament, 1877, 36) that: “The proper function of a preamble is to explain and recite certain facts 
which are necessary to be explained and recited, before the enactments contained in an Act of 
Parliament can be understood”. 
67  H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative, 7. 
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the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution 
hereby established”. As Berriedale Keith said of the reference to the Crown in the 
preamble, the Crown is “the foundation of the Constitution”.68  
The entity described as the “Federal Commonwealth” is the constitutional polity or 
compact created, subject to “the Crown” and “the Constitution hereby established”. The 
text of the Constitution Act points to two fountains of constitutional authority in the 
Commonwealth; “the Crown” and “the Constitution”. Quick and Garran described “the 
Commonwealth” as being “under a double subjection”.69 Indeed, one could go as far as to 
say that the first very principle of Australian constitutional law is that Federal 
Commonwealth is a creature of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament’s written 
constitution. All other constitutional assumptions flow from this first principle. This is not 
to suggest that the principle in Attorney-General v Marquet is wrong.70 Constitutional 
norms (such as the Crown) are “now to be traced to Australian sources”;71 this appears to 
mean that the Crown is the Australian Crown, textually recognised in both the Constitution 
Act and by the common law in Australia.72 
The words “under the Crown” were borrowed from the British North America Act 
1867,73 and are “a concrete and unequivocal acknowledgement of a principle which 
pervades the whole system of Government”.74 Sir Zelman Cowen pointed to the 
establishment of a “federal union under the Crown” as central to the understanding of the 
                                                          
68  A Berriedale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Vol II, 1912, 689. Professor Berridale 
Keith said, at 608, that as to the Constitution’s interpretation, “the constitution itself gives little direct 
guidance”, but that “[I]t provides indeed, in the preamble, an assertion of the purpose of the colonies to 
unite in one indissoluble federal Commonwealth under the Crown of Great Britain and Ireland …”. 
69  J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 300. 
70  (2003) 217 CLR 545. 
71  (2003) 217 CLR 545, 570 [66] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
72  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 80. 
73  The words “under the Crown” in the preamble of the British North America Act 1867 are “a 
fundamental condition on which Canadian executive, legislative and judicial authority exists”, said W P 
M Kennedy, in The Constitution of Canada; An Introduction to its Development and Law, 448. 
74  J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 294. 
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constitutional compact.75 Sir William Harrison Moore said of the words “under the 
Crown” that:76 
 
The recital in the preamble is no mere expression of loyalty, but a statement of 
fact to which the most important legal incidents attach. The Crown establishes 
the Commonwealth, is a part of the Federal Parliament, is the depositary of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth, and retains the power (subject to 
limitations to be considered) of entertaining appeals in Council. So much is 
provided in the Act itself; but the Act does not exhaust the relations of the 
Crown to the Commonwealth. The prerogative runs there as in other dominions 
of the Crown … 
 
The preamble of the Constitution Act is not the only textual affirmation of the subjection of 
the Constitution to the Crown. Section 44(iv) of the Constitution provides that any person 
who “holds any office of profit under the Crown …” shall be incapable of being chosen or 
of sitting as a senator or as a member of the House of Representatives. In this section of the 
Constitution we see the constitutional text presupposing the continued existence of the 
Crown, and therefore the law of the Crown. 
There are two further textual affirmations. The first is s 2 of the Constitution, which 
permits the Queen to delegate “subject this this Constitution”, the “powers and functions of 
the Queen” to the Governor-General. Inglis Clark said that s 2 introduced “into the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth that portion of the common law which invests the 
Crown with its prerogative rights and powers, and such portion of the common law is 
therefore part of the law of the Commonwealth”.77 Although, the better view is that s 2 
                                                          
75  Z Cowen, “The Crown and Its Representative in the Commonwealth” (1992) Commonwealth Law 
Bulletin 304; similarly, Barwick CJ in the First Payroll Tax Case describes the Commonwealth “as a 
statutory Constitution under the Crown”: Victoria v Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 370. 
76  W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 73. 
77  A Inglis Clark, Studies In Australian Constitutional Law, 190 and 206. 
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merely authorises the Queen to delegate, subject to the remaining provisions of the 
Constitution, those “powers and functions” to the governor-general. 
The second further affirmation is s 74 of the Constitution which provides both a textual 
limitation upon the prerogative right of the Queen to entertain appeals from the Queen’s 
dominions,78 and an affirmation that “[e]xcept as provided in this section”, the 
Constitution shall not impair any right which the Queen has, and is pleased to exercise “by 
virtue of Her Royal prerogative” to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to 
Her Majesty in Council. This provision is a modification of the Crown’s prerogative right 
to hear appeals from colonial courts.79 The reference to “Her Royal prerogative” in the text 
of s 74 is an express affirmation that the prerogatives of the Crown are recognised and 
affirmed in the constitutional compact, and that the machinery of the Constitution is 
impliedly intended to operate with the common law of the Crown operating in the 
background. Or, using Sir Owen Dixon’s words, is “antecedent in operation”. 
The centrality of the idea that the constitutional compact was crafted so as to be “under 
the Crown” can be historically traced to the Australasian Federation Conference, held in 
Melbourne in 1890, where the delegates resolved – as the very first resolution – that “the 
best interests of the present and future prosperity of the Australian Colonies will be 
promoted by an early union under the Crown …”.80 
                                                          
78  Falkland Islands Co v The Queen (1863) 1 Moo PC NS 312, where Lord Kingsdown said for the Board, 
“The Queen has authority, by virtue of her prerogative, to review the decision of all colonial courts, 
whether the proceedings be of a civil or criminal character, unless Her Majesty has parted with such 
authority”. 
79  Théberge v Laudry (1876) 2 App Cas 102 (Earl Cairns LC); Johnston v Minister and Trustees of St 
Andrews Church, Montreal (1877) 3 App Cas 159 (Earl Cairns LC); Cushing v Dipuy (1880) 5 App Cas 
409 (Sir Montague Smith); British Coal Corporation v The King [1935] AC 500, 510-523 (Viscount 
Sankey LC), where the Lord Chancellor described, at 511, the discretion to grant special leave to appeal 
as “a residuum of the Royal prerogative of the sovereign”. The Board expressly compared s 74 of the 
Australian Constitution to the equivalent provision in the British North America Act 1867. 
80  Con. Deb. Melb, 1890, xxi-xxii. This resolution, and the subsequent drafting history that flows from it, 
is a further reason why the principle that the Federal Commonwealth is a creature of the Crown and the 
written constitution is the first principle of Australian constitutional law. 
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We see an affirmation of the fundamental nature of the (British) Crown as a feature of 
Australian constitutional jurisprudence which is antecedent to the compact between the 
Australian colonies, and “[p]ervading the [constitutional] instrument”, in the reasoning of 
the plurality in the Engineers’ case.81 We also see an affirmation of the relationship 
between the Crown and constitution of a dominion in the Privy Council’s reasoning in 
Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company Ltd v The King.82 In Bonanza Creek, the Board 
reasoned, in the context of the British North America Act, that “subject to certain express 
provisions in that Act and to the supreme authority of the Sovereign, who delegates to the 
Governor-General and through his instrumentality to the Lieutenant Governors the exercise 
of the prerogative on terms defined in their commissions”, the distribution of executive 
authority follows the distribution of legislative powers.83 The Board’s reasoning was 
premised upon the principle that the Crown continued to inhere within it the prerogative, 
and the prerogative was only modified or displaced to the extent that the constitutional text 
modified or displaced the operation of that inherent feature of the Crown. Whilst noting 
that the British North America Act did not contain an equivalent provision to s 61 of the 
Australian Constitution, the Board nevertheless abstained from considering what the effect 
was of such a provision upon the principle just identified.84  
                                                          
81  Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 146-177, where 
Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ wrote: “For the proper construction of the Australian Constitution it 
is essential to bear in mind two cardinal features of our political system which are interwoven in its 
texture and, notwithstanding considerable similarity of structural design, including the depositary of the 
residual powers, radically distinguish it from the American Constitution. Pervading the instrument, they 
must be taken into account in determining the meaning of its language. One is the common sovereignty 
of all parts of the British Empire; the other is the principle of responsible government. The combined 
effect of these features is that the expression “State” and the expression “Commonwealth” comprehend 
both the strictly legal conception of the King in right of a designated territory, and the people of that 
territory considered as a political organism”. 
82  [1916] AC 566 (consisting of Lord Buckmaster LC, Viscount Haldane, Lord Parker and Lord Sumner). 
83  [1916] AC 566, 580. 
84  [1916] AC 566, 586. 
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What then is “the Crown”? After reciting the various historical uses of the expression 
“the Crown” in Sue v Hill,85 Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ concluded that:86 
 
The phrases “under the Crown” in the preamble to the Constitution Act and 
“heirs and successors in the sovereignty of the United Kingdom” in covering cl 
2 involve the use of the expression “the Crown” and cognate terms in what is the 
fifth sense. This identifies the term “the Queen” used in the provisions of the 
Constitution itself, to which we have referred, as the person occupying the 
hereditary office of Sovereign of the United Kingdom under rules of succession 
established in the United Kingdom. 
 
This sense in which the expression “the Crown” is used accords with the meaning 
attributed to the expression by the Imperial Interpretation Act 1889, which was in force, 
both at the time of the drafting of the Constitution Act by the Conventions, and at the time 
of the enactment of the Constitution Act by the Imperial Parliament.87 Pointing to this 
statutory rule of interpretation, Sir William Wade concluded that “the Crown” is, “[i]n truth 
… simply the Queen”.88 Quick and Garran said that the Crown, “is a term which in 
English law is usually used as an impersonal or abstract description of the occupant of the 
throne”.89 
                                                          
85  Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462. 
86  Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, 502 [93]. 
87  Section 30 of The Interpretation Act 1889 (Imp), provided that: “In this Act and in every Act, whether 
passed before or after the commencement of this Act, references to the Sovereign reigning at the time of 
the passing of the Act or to the Crown shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as 
references to the Sovereign for the time being, and this Act shall be binding on the Crown”, (emphasis 
added). The section was amended by the Interpretation Act 1978, by omitting the words “or to the 
Crown”. 
88  H W R Wade, “The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability”, in M Sunkin and S 
Payne (eds), The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis, 24. 
89  J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 321. 
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Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Sue v Hill made it clear that reference to “the 
Queen” and “the Commonwealth” in s 122 of the Constitution “indicates within the 
structure of the Constitution itself a recognition of the Crown in distinct bodies politic”,90 
and therefore, this author argues that the Crown should be understood as something other 
than the Commonwealth in its legislative, executive or judicial capacities. 
Furthermore, the Constitution Act is proclaimed to be “enacted by the Queen’s most 
Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent” of the Lords and Commons; the 
two houses of the British Parliament. This is a classical statement of constitutional 
principle; it is the Crown that enacts laws “by and with the advice and consent of” the 
Parliament at Westminster.91 The presence of this assertion in the preamble affirms the 
principle that the Constitution was born of the common law, and that the legal authority for 
the establishment of the Commonwealth at the time of federation came from the Crown, 
acting within its common law right to “enact” legislation with the “advice and consent” of 
the Imperial Parliament. As the majority said in the Engineers’ case at a time before the 
demise of the doctrine of the unity of the Crown:92 
 
The Constitution was established by the Imperial Act 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12. The 
Act recited the agreement of the people of the various colonies, as they then 
were, “to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution 
hereby established.” “The Crown,” as that recital recognizes, is one and 
indivisible throughout the Empire. Elementary as that statement appears, it is 
essential to recall it, because its truth and its force have been overlooked, not 
                                                          
90  Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, 497 [81]. 
91  The Prince’s Case (1606) 8 Co Rep 1A, 77 ER 481 (Coke LCJ); R (Jackson & Ors) Attorney-General 
[2006] 1 AC 262, 306 (Lord Hope). 
92  Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 152-153 (Knox 
CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). Each of these passages has been expressly affirmed by Barwick CJ in 
State of Victoria v The Commonwealth (1970) 122 CLR 353; in the case of the first quoted passage, at 
366-367, in the case of the second quoted passage, at 370-371. 
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merely during the argument of this case, but also on previous occasions. …  
 
… Though the Crown is one and indivisible throughout the Empire, its 
legislative, executive and judicial power is exercisable by different agents in 
different localities, or in respect of different purposes in the same locality, in 
accordance with the common law, or the statute law there binding the Crown … 
 
… The Act 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12, establishing the Federal Constitution of 
Australia, being passed by the Imperial Parliament for the express purpose of 
regulating the royal exercise of legislative, executive and judicial power 
throughout Australia, is by its own inherent force binding on the Crown to the 
extent of its operation. 
 
Whilst the Constitution Act binds the Crown, the Crown, and the “special body of law 
having grown up around it”93 which might be described as the common law of the Crown, 
are basal to any analysis of the content and construction of the Australian Constitution – 
and understanding its text, structure and history. In the words of Leslie Zines, “the 
Commonwealth was born into a common law world where rules existed as to the powers 
and legal position of the Crown, which the Commonwealth inherited as a government of 
the Queen”.94 
A further textual point ought to be made. The Constitution’s text differentiates the 
senses in which the Queen, the Governor-General (acting pursuant to text of the 
Constitution), and the Governor-General (acting pursuant to a delegated authority on 
behalf of the Queen) have their powers and functions vested in them. The text of the 
                                                          
93  M Loughlin, “The State, the Crown and the Law”, in M Sunkin, S Payne (eds), The Nature of the 
Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis, 35, and citing R Anson’s The Law and Custom of the 
Constitution, Vol II The Crown [1886], (Fourth Edition by A B Keith, 1935); and A B Keith’s The King 
and the Imperial Crown. 
94  L Zines, “The inherent executive power of the Commonwealth” (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279, 280. 
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Constitution expressly identifies the existence of some powers and functions vested in the 
Queen in her Royal person (for example, ss 2, 58, 59 and 60). The text of the Constitution 
identifies powers and functions of the Governor-General which are exercised on the 
Queen’s behalf (for example, ss 2, 58 and 61). And the Constitution establishes original 
grants of power or functions to the Governor-General (for example, ss 58, 63, 64, 83 and 
126). Therefore, some of the Governor-General’s powers and functions are not an 
assignment of the Sovereign’s powers and functions – but flow directly from the text of the 
Constitution. Each of these three different forms of expressing regal or vice-regal authority 
in the Constitution support the proposition that there are some powers and functions of the 
Queen (that Her Majesty retains in her Australian dominion after the enactment of the 
Constitution Act) that have not been expressly delegated to the Governor-General, or 
appropriated to the Governor-General as original grants of constitutional authority. The 
Constitution is not a complete code of royal authority. 
The Crown’s common law rights, preferences and capacities  
Sir Samuel Griffith said in 1915:95 
 
It is clear law that in the case of British Colonies acquired by settlement the 
colonists carry their law with them so far as it is applicable to the altered 
conditions. In the case of the eastern Colonies of Australia this general rule was 
supplemented by the Act 9 Geo. IV., c. 83. The laws so brought to Australia 
undoubtedly included all the common law relating to the rights and prerogatives 
of the Sovereign in his capacity of head of the Realm and the protection of his 
officers in enforcing them, including so much of the common law as imposed 
loss of life or liberty for infraction of it. 
 
                                                          
95  R v Kidman & Ors (1915) 20 CLR 425, 435. 
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The first Chief Justice continued: “When in 1901 the Australian Commonwealth was 
formed, this law continued to be the law applicable to the rights and prerogatives of the 
Sovereign as head of the States as before, subject to any such local repeal”.96 
The Crown, and the common law rights, capacities, preferences and immunities of the 
Crown, pre-date the Constitution, and the expressed recognition and continuance of the 
Crown within the constitutional framework of the Commonwealth, means that the 
prerogatives of the Crown are textually recognised as emanating from their pre-existing 
source – the Crown – and recognised by the operation of the common law. 
The Constitution establishes a new framework for the vesting and exercising of the 
powers described as “legislative”, “executive” and “judicial” powers of the 
Commonwealth; that is, of the powers established by, or flowing from, the new 
Constitution. The pre-existing common law relating to the Crown remains unaffected 
unless expressly or impliedly affected or modified by the words of the new Constitution. 
The Constitution vests the executive power of the Commonwealth in the Queen. The 
executive power of the Commonwealth ought to be understood as the common law 
executive power, as amended or modified by the express and implied requirements of the 
Constitution – principally the modifications effected by Chapter II of the Constitution.97 
That is, the executive power of the Commonwealth is the power to execute or maintain 
(that is, administer)98 the Acts of the Parliament, or the common law rights, preferences, 
capacities or immunities of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. The executive power 
of the Commonwealth is not the source of the common law rights, preferences, capacities 
or immunities; merely the power to execute or maintain those rights, preferences, 
                                                          
96  (1915) 20 CLR 425, 435. 
97  Cf, Williams [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416, 467 [76], [77], and [79]. 
98  A Deakin, “Channel of Communication with Imperial Government: Position of Consuls: Executive 
Power of the Commonwealth”, in P Brazil & B Mitchell (eds), Opinions of Attorneys-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia with opinions of Solicitors-General and the Attorney-General’s 
Department, Vol I, 131. 
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capacities or immunities. The affirmation of those prerogatives must be found in some 
place other than the opening words of s 61 of the Constitution. 
The Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth 
The inclusion in section 64 of the Constitution of the words “… and shall be the Queen’s 
Ministers of State for the Commonwealth” recognises and affirms within the constitutional 
text the common law rights, preferences, capacities and immunities of the Crown – with 
those prerogatives being the common law rights, preferences, capacities and immunities of 
the Crown suitable for the exercise by the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth.99 
In this way, Dixon J was correct in Richard Foreman & Sons; the prerogatives of the 
Crown are “an adjunct of the ‘Executive power of the Commonwealth’ that is vested by s 
61 of the Constitution in the Sovereign”,100 that is, they are incorporated or sourced from 
“the common law of the Constitution”,101 and are, as “an adjunct” of the executive power, 
executed and maintained (or administered) by the executive government of the 
Commonwealth. As an adjunct of the executive power, the prerogatives are something 
added to the executive power, but are not an essential part of it. 
Section 61 does not, of itself, incorporate the prerogatives of the Crown. Section 61 
merely confirms the continued investment of the executive power in the Queen (and 
making it exercisable by the governor-general) – that is, the power to execute, maintain or 
administer – in the Queen (and the governor-general). The rights, preferences, capacities 
and immunities of the Crown (that is, centuries old attributes of the Crown), are recognised 
by the common law and are executed or administered pursuant to the power vested by s 61; 
the continued presence and operation of those rights, preferences, capacities and 
immunities is recognised by the common law, and is affirmed by the textual recognition in 
                                                          
99  Ibid. Attorney-General Deakin uses the expression “The King’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth” in the Vondel opinion, as Edward VII was then the reigning Sovereign. 
100  (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
101  (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
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the “Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth” affirmation in s 64, and also by 
the references to the “powers and functions of the Queen” in s 2 and “Her Royal 
prerogative” in s 74 of the Constitution. 
Section 61 speaks of a power, being the executive power of the Commonwealth; the 
section does not expressly or impliedly refer to the preferences, capacities or immunities 
(and, arguably, “rights” are different to a “power”).102 Textually, the section cannot be 
stretched beyond the linguistics of the outer limits of the word “power”. For the text of the 
Constitution to incorporate a recognition of continuing preferences or immunities (and 
rights), then another provision, or a part of a provision, needs to do this work – and that is 
the purpose of the addition of the affirming words that the ministers of state, appointed 
pursuant to section 64 of the Constitution are to be “the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth”. As argued in Chapter 4, the implied purpose of this text goes beyond 
recognition of a positive power – to the characteristics of the Crown, and the Queen’s 
Ministers of State. That is, the “apparently innocuous words” in s 64 textually affirm the 
fullness of the prerogatives of the Crown as continuing to be vested in the Queen, and 
available to be delegated by s 2 of the Constitution, or exercised by s 61 of the 
Constitution. Dr John Waugh is apposite:103 
 
… for lawyers of the 1890s what we see as questions of the scope of executive 
power were questions of delegation from the Crown. In that sense, it was more 
natural that some in the Convention would think of the chain of delegation to 
ministers, rather than the abstract definition of the matters that came within the 
executive power of the Commonwealth, when they tried to ensure that the 
Commonwealth had particular capacities. 
                                                          
102  See Chapter 6. 
103  J Waugh, “Lawyers, Historians and Federation History”, in R French, G Lindell and C Saunders (eds), 
Reflections on the Australian Constitution, 30. 
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V  THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE COMMONWEALTH  
It is not the primary purpose of this dissertation to advance a theory in relation to the metes 
or bounds of the executive power of the Commonwealth. What has sought to be done is 
describe the relationship between the prerogatives of the Crown and the executive power 
of the Commonwealth, and this has been done by correctly placing the prerogative within 
the text, structure and history of the Constitution. Having done this, it becomes possible to 
reflect upon the nature of the executive power more broadly. If it is accepted that the 
prerogative is a constitutionally-affirmed set of attributes of the Crown, recognised by the 
common law, and executed or maintained by operation of the executive power, the 
question then becomes: what constitutional work, other than executing and maintaining the 
prerogatives, does s 61 of the Constitution do? 
The General Character of the Executive Power of the Commonwealth 
Detached from the prerogative, the executive power of the Commonwealth is, and should 
be able to be construed as a species of power, defined in a functionalist sense, and in 
contradistinction to the legislative and judicial power.104 The executive power is able to be 
construed in “the contrasted sense”.105 The executive power of the Commonwealth 
“extends to” the “execution and maintenance” of the Constitution, and of the laws of the 
Commonwealth. The power is a power; it is not a preference, capacity or immunity. It is 
not a constitutional quality (as the prerogative is), but a power. The executive government 
must look outside the language of s 61 to locate recognition of any preferences, capacities 
or immunities that are vested in the Queen, and the Queen’s ministers and other officers. 
Textually, the executive power has two aspects: the “execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution”; and the “execution and maintenance … of the laws of the Commonwealth”. 
The later aspect is the statutory executive power as it applies to the Acts of the Parliament 
                                                          
104  Williams [No 2] (2014) 252 CLR 416, 467-468 [78]; R v Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 425, 438 (Griffith CJ), 
and 440 (Isaacs J). 
105  New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CL5 54, 89 (Isaacs J). 
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of the Commonwealth, and delegated legislation. The former aspect is the non-statutory 
executive power as it applies to the provisions and rules of “this Constitution”, and not the 
statutes of the Parliament of the Commonwealth. 
Both the statutory and non-statutory executive powers are functional in nature. They 
take their character from being expressed powers; expressed in contradistinction to one 
another, and in a written constitution that distributes each of the powers to a separate 
constitutional actor. Whilst each of the legislative, executive and judicial powers is a 
function that was recognised in the tradition of the common law, they are modelled on the 
expression of those powers in the United States Constitution. They are modelled primarily 
on the functionalist distribution of legislative, executive and judicial functions and powers 
in the American instrument. The text, structure, and drafting history of each of the powers, 
traceable as they are to Andrew Inglis Clark’s first draft in 1891, leads to the conclusion 
the executive power (and the legislative and judicial powers) ought to be first and foremost 
defined or described in a functionalist sense. As the leading admirer of the American 
instrument at the First Convention, Inglis Clark’s initial draft (which was the frame that 
Griffith used to prepare his first draft) was very much modelled on the United States’ 
Constitution – both in text and structure. Inglis Clark wrote in his Studies that:106 
 
[The judiciary] cannot interpose until the exercise of its authority is invoked by 
litigation, and its decisions, are confined to the determination of the rights and 
liabilities of the parties to the litigation, and the rights and liabilities of all other 
persons who could invoke its interposition by litigation of a like nature. 
Moreover the enforcement of its decisions is the duty of the depositaries of the 
executive power, and hence the strength of the judiciary is dependent upon the 
confidence in its impartiality, integrity, and ability which its judgments create in 
the public mind and in the executive and legislative departments of the 
                                                          
106  A Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law, 25. 
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Government. 
 
Under the heading “Distribution of Governmental Powers” in his Studies, Inglis Clark 
wrote that:107 
 
… by vesting the three powers separately in the Crown, the Parliament and the 
Federal Judiciary, without any further descriptions of the three powers than such 
as are contained in the three words “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial,” the 
Constitution necessarily indicates that the ambit of each power shall be 
determined by the essential and intrinsic meaning of the single descriptive word 
applied to it. The legislative power conferred by the Constitution upon the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth is therefore clearly a power to make laws: and 
the executive power which the Constitution declares to be vested in the Crown is 
the power to execute, that is to enforce, the laws of the Commonwealth. 
 
Again, Inglis Clark ascribed a functionalist meaning to the executive power of the 
Commonwealth when he went on to write:108 
 
It is evident that the legislative power of the Commonwealth must be exercised 
by the Parliament of the Commonwealth before the executive or the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth can be exercised by the Crown or the Federal 
Judiciary respectively, because the executive and the judicial powers cannot 
operate until a law is in existence for enforcement or exposition. 
 
As a consequence, as Isaacs J said, “[t]he Executive cannot change or add to the law; it can 
only execute it”,109 or, in the words of Barton J, the executive government is to “enforce 
                                                          
107  Ibid 37 (original emphasis). 
108  Ibid 38. 
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and uphold the laws”.110 The executive power of the Commonwealth cannot contain 
within itself a power to change or add to the law, otherwise the executive power ceases to 
be characterised as a power to execute or maintain. That is why the prerogative ought be 
described as, to use the description of Dixon J, “an adjunct of the ‘Executive power of the 
Commonwealth’ that is vested by s 61 of the Constitution in the Sovereign”,111 because 
the prerogative right, preference, capacity or immunity is recognised by the common law 
of the Crown and the particular right, preference, capacity or immunity is connected to, or 
added to (like an adjunct), the executive power which is the constitutional authority to 
undertake executive action to give the particular prerogative effect. Dixon J’s adjunct 
description sits comfortably with the statement of Isaacs J in Le Mesurier v Connor that the 
executive power is a “generic term”, and its “specific limits have to be determined 
aliunde”.112 The executive power of the Commonwealth permits the Queen and the 
Governor-General to execute and maintain “this Constitution”,113 and the laws of the 
Commonwealth. As Starke J said in the Wool Tops case, s 61:114 
 
… simply marks out the field of the executive power of the Commonwealth, and 
the validity of any particular act within that field must be determined by 
reference to the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, or to the 
prerogative or inherent powers of the King. 
 
Importantly, the preamble, and ss 2 and 64 of the Constitution are part of “this 
Constitution”; therefore, the execution and maintenance of the rights, preferences, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
109  R v Kidman & Ors (1915) 20 CLR 425, 441 (Isaacs J). 
110  New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, 72 (Barton J). 
111  Richard Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd; Uther v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
In this sense, “adjunct” is used as an adjective and therefore means “connected or added to something”. 
112  Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481, 514. 
113  J B Harper, “The Crown as the Source of Legal Powers in Australia”, (1935-1938) 1 Res Judicatae 310. 
114  (1922) 31 CLR 421, 461. 
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capacities, and immunities expressly and impliedly provided for in those two provisions is 
permitted to be done by the Queen and the Governor-General. Again, Evatt J in R v Hush; 
Ex parte Devanny said:115 
 
[Section 61 of the Constitution] only defines the general limits of the King’s 
executive authority in respect of the Commonwealth and does not determine 
what the Executive may lawfully do upon any given occasion. Whatever powers 
or duties are conferred or imposed upon the King’s executive government, by 
any section of the Constitution, or by such portion of the Royal prerogative as is 
applicable, may lawfully be exercised; but sec. 61 itself gives no assistance in 
the ascertainment or definition of such powers and duties. 
 
This understanding of the way the executive power of the Commonwealth operates is 
consistent with the reasoning in Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2], in that the executive 
power is not a power which is legislative in character (being a source of lawmaking 
authority) and exercisable by the Crown – in the sense of being the power that can be 
invoked and then relied upon for the subsequent invocation of the incidental power. It is 
consistent with the principle of responsible government that the executive power is not 
construed as a primary authorisation, permitting subsequent execution and maintenance – it 
is the power to execute and maintain, and therefore relies upon the (actual or potential) 
invocation of a legislative power, or an inherent attribute of the Crown. That is not to say 
that the incidental power is not a legislative power; rather, the incidental power on its own 
is of such a character as to necessitate to reliance upon either another head of legislative 
power, or a narrow reading of what is said to be incidental. This reasoning is consistent 
with the warning given by Kiefel J in Williams [No 1], where her Honour said:116 
 
                                                          
115  (1932) 48 CLR 487, 510-511 (emphasis added). 
116  Williams [No 1] (2102) 248 CLR 156, 370 [581] (Kiefel J). 
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Considerations as to the supremacy of Parliament which underlie the doctrine of 
responsible government may provide a basis for limiting executive power to 
certain of the legislative heads of power. As was pointed out by the plaintiff and 
the Solicitor-General of Queensland in argument, if the Executive’s power to 
spend was unlimited, s 51(xxxix) [of the Constitution], when used to support the 
executive power, might operate to extend that power beyond those matters 
which may, expressly or impliedly, be otherwise the subject of legislative 
power. In that event the relationship between the Executive and the Parliament 
and the dominant position of the Parliament may be altered. Such an extension 
of power may enable the Commonwealth to encroach upon areas of State 
operation and thereby affect the distribution of powers as between the 
Commonwealth and the States. 
 
This reasoning necessitates a construction of the executive power as a functionalist power, 
which should not be construed so as to permit the executive government of the 
Commonwealth to effectively legislate on the basis of the use of the executive power, and 
without the necessary reliance upon a head of legislative authority. This reasoning lends 
itself well to the description of Dixon J that the prerogative is “an adjunct” of the executive 
power of the Commonwealth.117  
The framers had before them one cardinal text that was referred to by the delegates 
throughout the Federation Conventions. James Bryce’s The American Commonwealth was 
then recently published, and influential to the framers in two respects. First, influenced by 
Bryce (and directly via Inglis Clarke) the structure of the written constitution was modelled 
on the American instrument. Second, again influenced by Bryce, some of the text (for 
example, the opening words of ss 1, 61 and 71 of the Australian Constitution) was 
modelled upon the corresponding provisions in the American instrument. In that the 
                                                          
117  Richard Foreman & Sons Pty Ltd; Uther v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
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framers copied the structure and some of the text of the American instrument; Lord Bryce’s 
explanation about the relationship between the legislature, executive and judiciary was at 
the framers’ fingertips:118 
 
… the national legislature has the right to legislate, the national executive to 
enforce the Federal laws and generally to act in defence of national interest, the 
national judiciary to adjudicate. All other legislation and administration is left to 
the several States, without power of interference by the Federal legislature or 
Federal executive. 
 
Given the canonical status that The American Commonwealth had during the Federation 
Conventions, Lord Bryce’s description of the legislative, executive and judicial 
departments in purely functionalist terms is weighty reason for concluding that each of the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers should (except where the constitutional text 
requires otherwise) be primarily described functionally. 
What is to be made of the use of the words, “extends to” in s 61? In its natural and 
ordinary meaning, these words denote that the executive power consists of something else, 
but extends to the matter or matters that it is stretched to include. In this case, the execution 
and maintenance of the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth. 
If the executive power of the Commonwealth is functionalist in nature; it is best 
described when contrasted against the legislative and judicial powers of the 
Commonwealth. The executive power, of necessity, relies upon the (actual or potential) 
exercise of the legislative and judicial powers of the Commonwealth. The difficulty is, in 
its pure form, an executive power (that is, a power to execute, administer or complete) 
interacts with the legislative power in a symbiotic mutualistic way – if the Parliament 
enacts a statute, the executive government is required to administer that statute. The stimuli 
                                                          
118  J Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol I, 49. 
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for the exercise of the executive power is the potential,119 or actual, exercise of the 
legislative power. This is what is meant by pure functionalism. 
Section 61 does not create pure functionalism. The executive power of the 
Commonwealth is a special species; the executive power extends beyond the execution and 
maintenance of the laws of the Commonwealth. As s 61 says, the executive power extends 
to the execution and maintenance of “this Constitution”. That is, the ambit of the executive 
power is extended beyond purely executing and maintaining the laws of the 
Commonwealth in a symbiotic way. An additional matter is included within the 
functionalist operation of the executive power, and that is the execution and maintenance 
of “this Constitution”. The execution and maintenance of the Constitution does not require 
the in tandem operation of the legislative and judicial powers of the Commonwealth – but 
it often does. The execution and maintenance of the Constitution includes such things as 
the execution of the prerogatives of the Crown.  
If we are to accept that the prerogatives of the Crown are textually recognised by the 
preamble and ss 2, 44(vi), 64 and 74 of the Constitution, and are recognised by the 
common law, then those powers, preferences, capacities and immunities are impliedly 
recognised in “this Constitution”, as that expression is used in s 61. The execution and 
maintenance of these common law attributes is an act of executing or maintaining “this 
Constitution”. The source of the attributes is the Crown; the functionalist authority to give 
effect to those attributes is the executive power of the Commonwealth. It is not pure 
functionalism (as understood in a federal compact which creates independently operating 
legislature, executive and judicial powers), as the execution and maintenance of the 
prerogative does not require the potential or actual exercise of the legislative power to 
occur. 
                                                          
119  “Potential” in the sense that the acts associated with the enactment of legislation are done as a precursor 
to the enactment of the legislation by the executive government. For example, the preparation of bills or 
delegated legislation. This may be said to be in contrast with the holding in Williams [No 2]. 
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In summary, the wording of s 61 of the Constitution, in that it describes the executive 
power of the Commonwealth as extending to the execution and maintenance of the 
Constitution and of the laws of the Commonwealth, necessarily uses the words “extends 
to”. The subject matter of the section extends beyond a purely functionalist construction of 
the executive power. The use of the words “extends to” is consistent with the core 
argument. 
The Statutory Executive Power of the Commonwealth 
The executive power of the Commonwealth is the power to execute and maintain (that is, 
the power to administer)120 the Constitution, and the laws of the Commonwealth. The 
executive power of the Commonwealth ought to be primarily understood in this 
functionalist sense. As Dixon J said in Cain v Doyle: “The legislative power is to make the 
laws which the Crown is to execute and maintain”.121 “[E]xecute or maintain law”, was 
said by the then Chief Justice and others in the Boilermakers’ case, to “imply a duty to 
actively watch the observance of those laws, to insist on obedience to their mandates, and 
to take steps to vindicate them if need be”.122 As Knox CJ and Gavan Duffy J said in the 
Wool Tops case, “execution” means “the doing of something immediately prescribed or 
authorised by the Constitution or Commonwealth laws”.123 
                                                          
120  A Deakin, “Channel of Communication with Imperial Government: Position of Consuls: Executive 
Power of the Commonwealth”, in P Brazil & B Mitchell (eds), Opinions of Attorneys-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia with opinions of Solicitors-General and the Attorney-General’s 
Department, Vol I, 129, 131. 
121  (1946) 72 CLR 409, 423. 
122  (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). Their Honours were quoting 
with approval the earlier words of Isaacs J in State of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 
CLR 54, 93. 
123  (1922) 31 CLR 421, 432. 
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The Non-Statutory Executive Power of the Commonwealth 
As a functionalist power, the executive power is an authority that is always in a state of 
flux. As the legislature enacts a greater apparatus for the executive to cling on to, the 
executive power enlarges; as the legislature enacts a smaller apparatus for the executive to 
attach its executive action to, the executive’s domain of action shrinks. Additionally, the 
executive power of the Commonwealth permits the executive government to exercise those 
powers, functions and attributes, that are expressly and impliedly attributed to the 
Governor-General, or the Crown, through the words “execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution”.  
This author is respectfully in agreement with Williams J, when his Honour summarised 
the operation of s 61 of the Constitution in the Communist Party case, and said:124 
 
Section 61 provides that the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in 
the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's 
representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth. The execution of the 
Constitution in the section “means the doing of something immediately 
prescribed or authorized by the Constitution without the intervention of Federal 
legislation” (The Commonwealth v. Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving 
Co. Ltd. (1922) 31 CLR, at p 432 ). The maintenance of the Constitution 
therefore means the protection and safeguarding of something immediately 
prescribed or authorized by the Constitution without the intervention of Federal 
legislation.  
 
If we are to accept that “this Constitution” in s 61 of the Constitution implies more than the 
common law of the Crown; and therefore implies more than the prerogatives of the Crown, 
                                                          
124  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 231. 
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then what is “this Constitution”? The answer must be the express and implied doctrines, 
powers or rules incorporated (or recognised) in the Constitution. But it cannot be any 
doctrine, power or rule that is said to be expressed by the text of the Constitution, or 
implied into the Constitution; rather, there must be two limitations.  
First, the power to give effect to “this Constitution” pursuant to s 61 of the Constitution 
must necessarily be of an executive character (or have come to be accepted as the 
executive’s function in the “history and usages of British legislation and the theories of 
English law”),125 as the power is an executive power. This is a textual requirement. The 
executive action which is permitted must be “executive” in nature, as that word is used in s 
61, and in contradistinction to the “legislative” and “judicial” words used in ss 1 and 71 of 
the Constitution respectively. The “meagre words” of s 61 are not “devoid of meaning or of 
implication”,126 and the implication that arises by the use of the words “executive power”, 
when the text and structure of the instrument also utilises the contrasting words “legislative 
power” and “judicial power”, is that the use of the word executive must draw its meaning 
from contrasting that function of government from the two other described functions. That 
said, this limitation is undermined by the operation of chameleon doctrine. 
Second, the power to give effect to “this Constitution” pursuant to s 61 of the 
Constitution must necessarily be in conformity with the Constitution; that is, the executive 
action permitted by s 61 cannot be action which is prohibited by the Constitution. An 
example of an action or an activity of the executive that is not authorised pursuant to s 61 
is where that purported executive action is in breach of some doctrine, power or rule 
emanating from the Constitution. More specifically, where the purported executive action 
is in breach of an expressed or implied limitation upon the executive, like the executive 
exercising a function which is exclusively the domain of the judicature – for example, the 
sentencing of an individual to imprisonment. The arrest and detention of a person for the 
                                                          
125  Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, 101-102 
(Dixon J). 
126  Williams [No 1] (2012) 248 CLR 156, 362 [560] (Kiefel J). 
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purposes of bringing them before a court is executive action consistent with the 
Constitution; arresting and detaining a person indefinitely is executive action inconsistent 
with the Constitution, as the executive action is contrary to the implied requirement that 
only a court may order that a person be detained indefinitely. Arresting and detaining is 
atypical executive action; the first limitation – that the action is “executive” in nature – is 
present. The length and purpose of the detention determines whether the second limitation 
on the non-statutory executive power has been usurped. 
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C  H A P T E R  S  I  X  
THE SUBSTRATUM OF THE CORE ARGUMENT 
 
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 5 articulated the core argument and offered a description of the executive power of 
the Commonwealth (which is made possible by doctrinal clarity having been achieved in 
respect of the prerogative). The articulation of the core argument is the completed 
statement of the theorem – it is not a complete argument as to why the core argument is 
correct. This Chapter identifies and tabulates six aspects of evidence or argument, which 
support the core argument. That is, each of the arguments in this chapter is a supporting 
argument (or pillar) which fortifies the strength of the core argument. Each of those pillars 
relies upon one or more modalities of interpretation (or reasoning). That is, if it is said that 
looking to history, for example, is a valid and informative way of interpreting the 
Constitution, then each of the historical aspects which are identified in this chapter point 
towards the correctness of the core argument. 
II  THE MODALITIES OF INTERPRETATION  
In a series of scholarly articles, Federal Court judge Susan Kenny considered the High 
Court’s use of six different “modalities” of interpretation in performing its function of 
interpreting the Constitution.1 The six modalities of interpretation are said to be: historical, 
                                                          
1  S C Kenny, “The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2002 Term” (2003) 26 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 210; S C Kenny, “The High Court of Australia and modes of constitutional 
interpretation” (FCA) [2007] FedJSchol 10; S C Kenny, “The High Court of Australia and Modes of 
Constitutional Interpretation” in T Gotsis (ed), Statutory Interpretation: Principles and Pragmatism for 
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textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential modes. Justice Kenny borrowed this 
framework from the American constitutional scholar, Philip Bobbitt, who, in his twin 
works, Constitutional Fate, and Constitutional Interpretation, set out these six 
constitutional modalities. Bobbitt described a modality as “the way in which we 
characterise a form of expression as true”.2 The modalities are a type or form of reasoning 
– and it is implicit in the resort to one or more modes of reasoning that each of those forms 
of reasoning are legitimate, and have interpretative force. Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Stephen Breyer, described modalities more plainly as “basic 
tools” which “[a]ll judges use … to help them accomplish the task”.3 Breyer said that 
“most judges agree that these basic elements – language, history, tradition, precedent, 
purpose and consequence – are useful” in construing legal text, but that judges do not agree 
“about just where and how to use them”.4 
Philip Bobbitt wrote in his Constitutional Interpretation:5 
 
These six modalities of constitutional argument are: the historical (relying on the 
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the 
words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average 
contemporary “man in the street”); structural (inferring rules from the 
relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets out); 
doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from 
those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the 
Constitution); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                
a New Age (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 2007) 45. A further use of Bobbitt’s “modalities 
of interpretation” can be seen in N Aroney, “Towards the “Best Explanation” of the Constitution: Text, 
Structure, History and Principle in Roach v Electoral Commissioner” (2011) 30 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 145. 
2  P Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, 11. 
3  S G Breyer, Active Liberty, Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, 7. 
4  Ibid 7-8. 
5  P Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, 12-13. 
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particular rule). 
 
Utilising Bobbitt’s modalities, Nicholas Aroney has written in relation to the use of these 
interpretive methods that:6 
 
… when closely analysed, there is a special relationship between arguments 
based on text, structure and history that is not shared by ethical and prudential 
arguments when these are not adequately tethered to the Constitution considered 
as a document. When text, structure and history are meticulously examined the 
findings of each inquiry tend to reinforce the others. Insights acquired through 
careful investigation into the historical process by which a constitution came 
into being, for example, often shed light on otherwise unnoticed textual details 
and overlooked structural relationships. Underlying principles, motivating 
purposes and even prudential compromises which demonstrably shaped the 
document are also illuminated by textual-structural-historical inquiry, and a 
more thorough, detailed and informed understanding of the constitution emerges 
as a result. 
 
Modalities of interpretation is another way of articulating the strength of a given argument, 
and each modality invites the reader to utilise one or more tools of interpretation. In 
reflecting upon the use to be made of tools of constitutional interpretation, Chief Justice 
French said, extra-curially, that:7 
 
… they require attention to be paid to the nature and content of the text, its 
drafting history as illustrated by the successive drafts at the Conventions, as well 
                                                          
6  N Aroney, “The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2012 Term, Explanatory Power and the 
Modalities of Constitutional Interpretation” (2013) 36 UNSW Law Journal 863. 
7  R S French, “Interpreting the Constitution – Words, History and Change” (2011) Vol 40 Monash 
University Law Review, 29, 43. 
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as the informed commentaries of those who were involved in, or close to, the 
drafting process. Historical facts of the time may be relevant to an understanding 
of the purpose of words that, taken out of context, might mislead. The common 
law which is the ether in which all legal texts are embedded, is also a necessary 
part of that understanding, not least because the interpretative mechanisms are, 
for the most part, derived from the common law. 
 
This chapter applies these modalities of interpretation to support the core argument. In 
particular, emphasis is placed upon the combined textual-structural-historical modalities 
outlined by Professor Aroney in the quotation above. By reference to one or more of these 
modalities and the supporting evidence, the strength of the core argument is pressed – 
demonstrating why the core argument in Chapter 5 is true. 
III  DOCTRINAL H ISTORY  
Referring to the High Court, Sir Isaac Isaacs said:8 
 
… it is the duty of this Court, as the chief judicial organ of the Commonwealth, 
to take judicial notice, in interpreting the Australian Constitution, of every 
fundamental constitutional doctrine existing and fully recognized at the time the 
Constitution was passed, and therefore to be taken as influencing the meaning in 
which its words were used by the Imperial Legislature. 
 
The history and character of the “fundamental constitutional doctrine” known as the 
prerogative was set out in Chapter 2. In particular, the history as to how the prerogative 
predated the emergence of the Montesquieuian division of governmental powers – into the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers – was traced. The chapter makes it clear that the 
executive function, or executive part of government, that is the power to give effect to the 
                                                          
8  Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 393, 411-412. 
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executive or ministerial part of government is one of the many prerogatives of the 
Sovereign. 
As a pillar in support of the core argument, it is contended that in understanding the 
place of the prerogative within the Australian constitutional framework, it is first necessary 
to correctly understand the constitutional landscape, as it was prior to the enactment of the 
Constitution Act. It is only through this process that the constitutional text is correctly 
illuminated. The doctrinal history of the prerogative is that the prerogative evolved from a 
set of qualities or attributes of the reigning Sovereign to a relatively well-defined set of 
rights, preferences, capacities and immunities, recognised by the common law. The 
prerogative’s features emerged from the fog of antiquity. They became a description of the 
King’s majesty in the post-Conquest Angevin Empire, and took shape as rights, 
preferences, capacities and immunities in the tumultuous seventeenth-century. In the long 
struggle between Crown and Parliament, the Crown’s prerogative was gradually reduced to 
a set of rights, preferences, capacities and immunities that were vested in the Sovereign, 
but were exercised in most part on the advice of the Sovereign’s ministers of state. In this 
way, the prerogative became democratised – the Parliament could debate the exercise of 
the prerogative, and the Parliament could regulate or extinguish any limb of the 
prerogative.9 As the prerogatives were doctrinally sourced to the Crown and recognised by 
the common law, the Parliament could, in executing a statute, modify or extinguish a 
prerogative of the Crown, and ministries became accountable to the Parliament for the 
advice given to the Sovereign in exercising the prerogative. 
The prerogative was inherited by the Australian colonies as part of the colonisation of 
the Australian continent by the British Crown.10 Indeed it was the exercise of a single 
prerogative of the Crown – the annexation of New South Wales – which brought the 
English common law to the continent. 
                                                          
9  Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Limited [1920] AC 508. 
10  B H McPherson, The Reception of English Law Abroad, 98; see also Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 
175 CLR 1, 34-35 (Brennan J). 
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The prerogative was always seen in the Australian colonies as including the power to 
execute the laws and administer the colony. What William Forsyth, not long before 
Federation, called “the executive power of the Crown”,11 permitted the Sovereign to give 
administrative effect to the special rights, preferences, capacities and immunities vested in 
the Sovereign. 
This is the doctrinal heritage into which the new Commonwealth was born. It is against 
the backdrop of the common law, and this doctrinal heritage that the prerogatives of the 
Crown in right of the Commonwealth ought to be construed. 
The prerogatives of the Crown pre-dated Federation. The question then becomes; what, 
if anything did the enactment of the Constitution Act do to affect the antecedent body of 
doctrine? Given that there was nothing for the Constitution to do to establish the 
prerogative, what did the Constitution Act do to recognise or modify it? 
As set out in the core argument, the Constitution presupposes the continued existence of 
the common law, and the Constitution Act expressly recognises that the Commonwealth 
was established under the Crown, and under the Constitution. The text of the preamble, ss 
2, 44(iv), 64 and 74 of the Constitution each textually recognise and affirm the continued 
existence of the Crown, and the preamble, s 2, 64 and 74 textually recognise and affirm the 
continued operation of the prerogative within the Commonwealth context. In particular, s 
64, by its use of the words “and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth”, gave both explicit recognition of the continued operation of the 
prerogatives of Crown in the Commonwealth context, and of the devolution or investment 
of that prerogative in the Commonwealth. 
There is nothing in the use of the words the “executive power of the Commonwealth” in 
s 61 which ought to lead to the conclusion that the textual notion of that one common law 
power of the Crown – the power to execute the laws – ought to exclude the operation of the 
remaining common law rights, preferences, capacities or immunities. 
                                                          
11  W Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law and the Various Points of English 
Jurisprudence, Collected and Digested from Official Documents and other sources, 180. 
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When regard is had to the doctrinal history of the prerogative, it permits an 
understanding of the prerogative consistent with the core argument. The prerogative’s 
doctrinal history is a pillar that supports the correctness of the core argument. 
IV  THE FRAMERS’  INTENTIONS  
Andrew Inglis Clark wrote in his Studies in 1901:12 
 
It has been repeatedly stated that the fundamental rule for the interpretation of a 
written law is to follow the intention of the makers of it as they have disclosed it 
in the language in which they have declared the law. 
 
Chapter 4 set out the drafting history s 64 of the Constitution – the affirmation that the 
members of the Federal ministry “shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth”. In doing so, this thesis has sought to demonstrate the authorial intention. 
There are two interwoven propositions. First, the framers were either already familiar 
with Toy v Musgrove13 before the First Convention or, by reason of the Debates, became 
well aware of it during the Conventions. Second, not only were the delegates very aware of 
Toy v Musgrove, by their individual contributions to the in-committee consideration of 
draft cl 8 of Chapter II (subsequently s 64 of the Constitution), the resolution that was 
passed to amend that draft clause, and by the actions of all of the delegates, the framers can 
be taken to have clearly collectively intended that their addition to s 64 of the Constitution 
of the affirmation that the Federal ministers “shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth” affirmed their desire to “clothe the ministers individually with that power 
and authority which ministers in Great Britain possess as responsible ministers of the 
                                                          
12  A Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law, 19. 
13  (1888) 14 VLR 349; see also J Waugh, “Chung Teong Toy v Musgrove and the Commonwealth 
Executive”, (1991) 2 Public Law Review 160. 
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Crown”.14 In this respect, Dr John Waugh agreed: “the intention [of the framers] was 
clear”.15 
The facts of the case, and the reasons for decision of the six justices of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria, have been canvassed in Chapter 3. Toy v Musgrove was the constitutional 
case of the twenty years leading up to Federation. It was widely reported in the newspapers 
of every Australian colony.16 It would have been known to any serious statesman in the 
Colony of Victoria, and would have prudently been considered by Crown Law officers in 
the other colonies. 
Three factors are relevant. First, the decision was contemporaneous with the First 
Convention. Second the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had heard the case in 
1890 and 1891, resulting in Henry Wrixon being late to arrive at the First Convention as a 
Victorian delegate. Third, Henry Wrixon and Alfred Deakin informed the delegates of the 
First Convention of the words and effect of the Supreme Court’s Toy v Musgrove decision, 
and the Board’s judgment in Musgrove v Toy. Each of these factors meant that the decision, 
and the constitutional principles ventilated in that decision was of great assistance in the 
process of construing the Constitution. The notoriety of the litigation, the centrality of the 
constitutional issues considered, the proximity of the litigation to the First Convention, and 
the nexus between the Supreme Court’s decision and the way in which the Debates of the 
First Convention unfolded (and, in particular, the resulting text of “the Queen’s Ministers 
of State for the Commonwealth” in s 64), all strongly support the contention that the 
decision in Toy v Musgrove can, and should, be used to assist in both understanding the 
relationship between the prerogative and the executive power of the Commonwealth, and 
in that respect, advancing the core argument. 
                                                          
14  Con Deb. Syd, 1891, 768-9. 
15  J Waugh, “Lawyers, Historians and Federation History”, in R French, G Lindell and C Saunders (eds), 
Reflections on the Australian Constitution, 29. 
16  See Chapter 3. 
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This is not the place to restate in detail the nature of the litigation, or the reasons of the 
six members of the Supreme Court of Victoria. That has already been done in Chapter 3. 
Rather, the point to be made here is to identify how a connexion (for interpretative 
purposes) is to be made between that litigation and the core argument. This is done through 
three methods.  
First, so central was the Toy v Musgrove decision to the drafting of the expression “… 
and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”, that it is almost 
impossible to avoid the explanatory power of the connexion made by the framers to the 
decision, and their choice of language in ss 2, 61 and 64. That connexion commands that 
interpretive significance be placed upon the reasons for the decision in Toy v Musgrove 
when construing s 64 of the Constitution.  
Second, the method of connecting Toy v Musgrove to the interpretation of the 
Constitution is to focus upon the case for its doctrinal value. In shedding light upon the 
nature of the prerogative received by the Commonwealth, and the operation of s 2 of the 
Constitution – which allows the Sovereign to assign to the Governor-General those 
“powers and functions” of the Sovereign – this sits comfortably with the majority’s 
reasoning in Toy v Musgrove that a governor only has those prerogative powers and 
functions that are delegated to him (or her) by the Sovereign. 
Third, the use of the Official Records of the First and Second Conventions is now a 
routine aspect of constitutional interpretation. As has already been identified in Chapter 4, 
the High Court in Cole v Whitfield17 made clear that reference could be made to the 
Convention Debates “for the purpose of identifying the contemporary meaning of language 
used, the subject to which that language was directed and the nature and objectives of the 
movement towards federation from which the compact of the Constitution finally 
emerged”. 
                                                          
17  (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385. 
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In this sense, the core argument is supported by the historical materials set out in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the three conclusions and the coincidence that can be drawn from the 
historical materials, and which are set out at the end of chapter 4. The Toy v Musgrove 
litigation is connected to the core argument by the framers in the Convention Debates – by 
their explicit, and repetitious use of the reasons of the judges of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria in that landmark decision in drafting the language of ss 2, 61 and 64 of the 
Constitution. 
Chapter 4 draws three conclusions. The first two relate to the intentions of the framers 
in respect of the wording of s 64 of the Constitution, and the third relates to what the 
framers said, or did, or did not say or do, in relation to the wording of s 61 of the 
Constitution. The strength of these three conclusions (coupled with the significant 
coincidence) identified at the end of Chapter 4, support the correctness of the core 
argument, and serve as strong historical reasons for accepting the core argument. 
V  ARTICLE II  AND CHAPTER II  
Textual and structural modes of interpretation can be invoked by contrasting the text and 
structure of the United States Constitution and the Australian Constitution. This has been 
done before.18  
Article I, section 1 of the United States Constitution states that: “All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
Senate and House of Representatives”. Section 1 of the Constitution provides that: “The 
legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, which 
shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, and which is herein-
after called “The Parliament,” or “The Parliament of the Commonwealth.” 
                                                          
18  Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, 89-91 (Dixon 
J); R v Kirby & Ors; ex parte Boilermarkers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 274-279 (Dixon 
CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ); E M Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation; W G 
Buss, “Andrew Inglis Clark’s Draft Constitution, Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, and the 
Assist from Article III of the Constitution of the United States”, [2009] 33 Melbourne University Law 
Review 718. 
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Article II, section 1 of the United States Constitution states that: “The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”. Section 61 of the 
Constitution provides that: “The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the 
Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and 
extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the 
Commonwealth”. 
Article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution states that: “The judicial Power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and 
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, 
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office”. Section 71 of the Constitution provides that: “The judicial power 
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High 
Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such 
other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief 
Justice, and so many other Justices, not less than two, as the Parliament prescribes.” 
The similarity of the text and structure between the two constitutions is striking. The use 
of similar phraseology to commence Article II, section 1, and Chapter II, section 61 is 
obvious; and the fact that these provisions each commence a new Article, or Chapter, 
which of itself concerns one of Montesquieu’s trinity of powers (legislative, executive and 
judicial powers) is also obvious. This led the majority in the magisterial Boilermakers’ case 
– the locus classicus of the High Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence – to ascribe 
constitutional significance to this similarity in the text and structure, and to describe the 
adoption of the United States Constitution’s text and structure as no “mere draftsman's 
arrangement”.19 As the majority in the Boilermakers’ case said:20  
                                                          
19  R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (“the Boilermakers’ case”) (1956) 94 CLR 254 
(Dixon, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
20  Boilermakers’ case (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275. 
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If you knew nothing of the history of the separation of powers, if you made no 
comparison of the American instrument of government with ours, if you were 
unaware of the interpretation it had received before our Constitution was framed 
according to the same plan, you would still feel the strength of the logical 
inferences from Chaps. I, II and III and the form and contents of ss. 1, 61 and 
71. It would be difficult to treat it as a mere draftsman's arrangement. Section 1 
positively vests the legislative power of the Commonwealth in the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth. Then s. 61, in exactly the same form, vests the executive 
power of the Commonwealth in the Crown. They are the counterparts of s. 71 
which in the same way vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth in this 
Court, the federal courts the Parliament may create and the State courts it may 
invest with federal jurisdiction. This cannot all be treated as meaningless and of 
no legal consequence. 
 
The so-called “chameleon doctrine” aside, consistent with the reasoning in Boilermakers’, 
and in reliance upon the text and structure of the Constitution, each of the constitutionally 
entrenched “powers” – the legislative, executive and judicial powers – ought to be defined 
or described in a functionalist sense, and in contradistinction to each other. Just as the 
majority in Boilermakers’ were particular about the need to confine the activities of the 
judicature to exercises of judicial power, the majority, in excluding matters from the ambit 
of the judicial power, touched upon what it means to “execute or maintain laws”. The 
majority quoted with approval the earlier words of Isaacs J in New South Wales v 
Commonwealth,21 where his Honour said:22 
 
                                                          
21  (1915) 20 CLR 54. 
22  Boilermakers’ case (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271; and quoting Isaacs J in New South Wales v 
Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, 93. 
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Courts do not execute or maintain laws relating to trade and commerce. Those 
words imply a duty to actively watch the observance of those laws, to insist on 
obedience to their mandates, and to take steps to vindicate them if need be. But a 
Court has no such active duty: its essential feature as an impartial tribunal would 
be gone, and the manifest aim and object of the constitutional separation of 
powers would be frustrated. A result so violently opposed to the fundamental 
structure and scheme of the Constitution requires, as I have before observed, 
extremely plain and unequivocal language. 
 
Whilst this statement concerns the characterisation of the power and functions of courts, 
the same meaning applies to the description of the work to be done by the executive – the 
words used in s 61 of the Constitution. That this description is expressly approved by the 
majority in Boilermakers’ is further, and even more weighty reason to conclude that if 
judicial power is understood in a functionalist (or Montesquieuian sense), then so ought the 
executive power. 
It is argued that, similarly, it is no mere draftsman’s arrangement that Article II, section 
1, and Chapter II, section 61 of the two constitutions are so similar. To borrow what the 
majority said in Boilermakers’, this “cannot … be treated as meaningless and of no legal 
consequence”. Quick and Garran made the point in the preface to their great work in 1901 
that:23 
 
There is hardly a phrase in [the Constitution] without a history, or without 
analogy with a phrase which in some other Constitution has been the subject of 
exhaustive arguments and judicial decisions. The Commentaries of the great 
American jurists, and the numerous judgments on constitutional questions given 
by the Supreme Court of the United States during the last century, are full of 
                                                          
23  J Quick, R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, viii. 
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profound reasoning which is applicable to the words of this Constitution. 
 
In the early decision of D’Emden v Pedder,24 Griffith CJ, speaking for the Court, 
expressed the view that in comparing the language in the United States Constitution and 
the Australian Constitution:25 
 
So far, therefore, as the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth are similar, the construction put upon the former by the 
Supreme Court of the United States may well be regarded by us in construing 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth, not as an infallible guide, but as a most 
welcome aid and assistance. 
 
Griffith CJ continued:26 
 
We cannot disregard the fact that the Constitution of the Commonwealth was 
framed by a Convention of Representatives from the several colonies. We think 
that, sitting here, we are entitled to assume—what, after all, is a fact of public 
notoriety—that some, if not all, of the framers of that Constitution were familiar, 
not only with the Constitution of the United States, but with that of the Canadian 
Dominion and those of the British colonies. When, therefore, under these 
circumstances, we find embodied in the Constitution provisions 
undistinguishable in substance, though varied in form, from provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States which had long since been judicially 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of that Republic, it is not an unreasonable 
inference that its framers intended that like provisions should receive like 
                                                          
24  (1904) 1 CLR 91. 
25  (1904) 1 CLR 91, 112. 
26  (1904) 1 CLR 91, 113. 
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interpretation. 
 
Having regard to the canonical nature of the Boilermakers’ case, and with these 
interpretative principles in mind, it is instructive to examine how the Supreme Court of the 
United States has construed the operation of Article II of the United States Constitution. In 
the leading modern decision that considered the scope of the executive power in the United 
States – Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer27 – in his concurring judgment, Associate 
Justice Robert Jackson said:28 
 
The Solicitor General seeks the power of seizure in three clauses of the 
Executive Article, the first reading, “The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.” Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I 
quote the interpretation which his brief puts upon it: “In our view, this clause 
constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the Government is 
capable.” If that be true, it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered to add 
several specific items, including some trifling ones.  
 
The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed 
the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description 
of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were 
creating their new Executive in his image. Continental European examples were 
no more appealing. And, if we seek instruction from our own times, we can 
match it only from the executive powers in those governments we disparagingly 
describe as totalitarian. I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk 
of all conceivable executive power, but regard it as an allocation to the 
presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated. 
                                                          
27  343 US 579 (1952) (the Steel Seizure case). 
28  343 US 579, 640-641 (1952). 
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There are two constructional points to be made. First, the text and structure of the vesting 
clause of the executive power of the President of the United States, and Article II more 
generally, is strikingly similar to that of Chapter II of the Constitution. They both 
commence with a declaration about which constitutional entity shall be, or is, invested with 
the executive power, and then Article II and Chapter II proceed to set out a number of 
express, or particular, executive powers or authorisations – some modelled on traditional 
British prerogative powers, others particular to the United States or the Commonwealth. 
Second, Justice Jackson rejected a submission that Article II, section 1, “constitutes a grant 
of all the executive powers of which the Government is capable”. In keeping with the 
objects and causes of the American Revolution, his Honour opined that the executive 
power ought not be construed as including “the prerogative exercised by George III”. 
Justice Jackson concluded that the executive power vested in the President of the United 
States of America is to be found in the wording of Article II, including the particularised 
executive powers which are expressly stated in the Article. He rejected the suggestion that 
the executive power is to be understood by reference to the prerogatives of the King. This 
is the orthodox view of the American presidency. It was said that the founders of the 
American Republic:29 
 
… were not content merely to erect higher barriers against encroaching power or 
to formulate new and more explicit charters of the people’s liberties. In their 
ambitious desire to root out tyranny once and for all, they went beyond what 
Englishmen of 1215 or 1688 had attempted: their new constitution destroyed 
“the kingly office” outright and “absolutely divested [it] of all it’s rights, powers 
and prerogatives,” so that “all other persons whatsoever shall be and for ever 
remain incapable of the same: and that the said office shall henceforth cease and 
                                                          
29  G S Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 135-136; see also A Tomkins, Public 
Law, 39. 
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never more either in name or substance be re-established within this colony”. 
The Americans, in short, made of the gubernatorial magistrate a new kind of 
creature, a very pale reflection indeed of his regal ancestor. 
 
John Adams proposed the stripping “of most of those badges of domination, called 
prerogatives”, and, in the context of the drafting of the constitution of Virginia, Thomas 
Jefferson would call this type of executive magistrate, an “Administrator”.30 It should also 
be noted that there has been a counter-argument that the American Revolution ought not be 
characterised as a rejection of royal authority.31 Nevertheless, Justice Jackson’s reasoning 
in the Steel Seizure case adopted this anti-prerogative version of history. 
In explaining how the founders of the American Constitution crafted their executive 
magistrate, James Bryce said:32 
 
Assuming that there was to be such a magistrate, the statesmen of the 
Convention, like the solid practical men they were, did not try to construct him 
out of their own brains, but looked to some existing models. They therefore 
made an enlarged copy of the State governor, or to put the same thing 
differently, a reduced and improved copy of the English king. He is George III 
shorn of a part of his prerogative by the intervention of the Senate in treaties and 
appointments, of another part by the restriction of his action to Federal affairs, 
while his dignity as well as his influence are diminished by his holding office for 
four years instead of for life.33 His salary is too small to permit him either to 
                                                          
30  G S Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 137. 
31  E Nelson, The Royalist Revolution, Monarchy and the American Founding; and T Helfman, “Crown 
and Constitution”, (Book Review)(2015) Harvard Law Review, Vol 128, 2234. 
32  J Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol I, 48-49. 
33  Lord Bryce wrote in a footnote here: “When the Romans got rid of their king, they did not really 
extinguish the office, but set up in their consul a sort of annual king, limited not only by the short 
duration of his power, but also by the existence of another consul with equal powers. The Americans 
hoped to restrain their President not merely by the shortness of his term, but also by diminishing the 
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maintain a Court or to corrupt the legislature; nor can he seduce the virtue of the 
citizens by the gift of titles of nobility, for such titles are altogether forbidden. 
Subject to these precautions, he was meant by the constitution-framers to 
resemble the State governor and the British king, not only in being the head of 
the executive, but in standing apart from and above political parties. He was to 
represent the nation as a whole, as the governor represented the State 
commonwealth. The independence of his position, with nothing either to gain or 
to fear from Congress, would, it was hoped, leave him free to think only of the 
welfare of the people. 
 
If it is accepted that the text and structure of s 61 of the Constitution is an appropriation of 
the text and structure of Article II, section 1 of the United States Constitution, then, it is 
reasonable to argue that, absent some other textual indicator, the framers of the 
Constitution were importing the American idea of “the executive Power”. 
VI  S IMILARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO CONSTITUTIONS  
The Australian Constitution was drafted by the framers to suit the needs of a federation 
where residual power was to be left to the newly created States, and the federation was to 
combine the fabric of the system of responsible government (which was very familiar to 
each of the delegates of the two Conventions) with the idea of a bicameral parliament in 
which each chamber had almost co-equal power in respect of legislation. 
Whilst the framers were colonial statesmen within an Empire whose constitution was 
primarily founded on the common law, the political compact which was to become the 
Australian Federation needed to be founded on a written text. The fact that the compact 
would be founded on a written text was not, of itself, an innovation; what was an 
innovation for the framers was the crafting of a written text which established a federation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
power which they left to him; and this they did by setting up another authority to which they entrusted 
certain executive functions, making its consent necessary to the validity of certain classes of the 
President’s executive acts. This is the Senate, where more anon”. 
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The framers had before them two models for a written constitution. The British North 
America Act 1867 was a recently enacted written constitution enacted within the 
framework of the British Empire, and against the background of the common law. The 
other example was that of the United States’ Constitution. Perhaps because of the influence 
of the writings of James Bryce, and his The American Commonwealth, and perhaps 
because under the early influence of the Tasmanian Attorney-General and delegate, 
Andrew Inglis Clark, the early drafts of the Commonwealth Bill appropriated the text and 
structure of the United States Constitution as the primary structural example of a written 
constitution; and in some respects, it was a significant textual model for the 
Commonwealth Bill. 
Recourse to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
Just as the judges of the High Court are permitted to have recourse to the common law and 
principles of constitutional jurisprudence established by the courts at Westminster in 
construing the words of the Constitution, they are also permitted to look to the American 
jurisprudence on the construction of the American constitutional text. Before the original 
three justices took their seats on the High Court, Inglis Clark wrote in his Studies:34 
 
The constitutional law of the mother country will therefore continue to be a 
guide and a fountain of knowledge and authority on many matters included in 
the constitutional law of Australia, but in regard to many other portions of it the 
historic decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which were 
delivered by Chief Justice Marshall and his associates during the first half 
century of the Republic cannot fail to be followed in Australia wherever the 
language to be interpreted is substantially the same as that to which the 
irresistible reasoning of those decisions was applied. 
 
                                                          
34  A Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law, 5. 
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Once the original three justices who constituted the High Court of Australia took their seats 
in 1903, this principle of constitutional interpretation quickly took hold. In D'Emden v 
Pedder,35 Griffith CJ observed that:36 
 
We are not, of course, bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. But we all think that it would need some courage for any Judge at 
the present day to decline to accept the interpretation placed upon the United 
States Constitution by so great a Judge so long ago as 1819, and followed up to 
the present day by the succession of great jurists who have since adorned the 
Bench of the Supreme Court at Washington. So far, therefore, as the United 
States Constitution and the Constitution of the Commonwealth are similar, the 
construction put upon the former by the Supreme Court of the United States may 
well be regarded by us in construing the Constitution of the Commonwealth, not 
as an infallible guide, but as a most welcome aid and assistance. 
 
Sir Samuel said when the Court finds “embodied in the Constitution provisions 
undistinguishable in substance, though varied in form, from provisions of the Constitution 
of the United States which had long since been judicially interpreted by the Supreme Court 
of that Republic, it is not an unreasonable inference that its framers intended that like 
provisions should receive like interpretation”.37 
Not long after, in affirming this rule of construction in Deakin v Webb, the Chief Justice 
gave this rule of construction a particularly originalist flavour:38 
 
                                                          
35  (1904) 1 CLR 91. 
36  (1904) 1 CLR 91, 112; see also New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54, 68 (Griffith CJ) 
where the Chief Justice accepted that recourse may be had to the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
37  (1904) 1 CLR 91, 113. 
38  (1904) 1 CLR 585, 616. 
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… the reasoning of the Supreme Court [of the United States] in Dobbins's Case 
… derives additional weight from the circumstance, adverted to in the judgment 
of this Court in D’Emden v. Pedder … , that, the interpretation of the American 
Constitution as to this point having been long since settled by judicial decision, 
it is a reasonable inference that it was intended by the framers of the Australian 
Constitution, when adopting similar language, that like provisions should 
receive like interpretation. 
 
These statements of principle are sourced from the original leading cases in the High Court 
which established the doctrine of immunities – a doctrine which was subsequently rejected 
in the Engineers’ case in 1920.39 Nonetheless, there are other occasions where the judges 
of the High Court have had regard to the similarities in language between the United 
States’ Constitution and the Australian Constitution in construing the language of the 
Australian Constitution.40 Sir Owen Dixon saw Australia’s constitutional law as standing 
“midway between the two great common law systems” of England and the United States. 
He said: “We study them both; we feel that, in some measure, we understand them both, 
and we seek guidance from both of them”.41 
The similarity between the text and structure of the United States Constitution and the 
Australian Constitution, particularly in respect of the wording of ss 1, 61 and 71, means the 
High Court could do two things. First, the High Court could conclude that given that the 
framers clearly appropriated the text and structure of the American instrument (as the High 
Court did in the Boilermakers’ case in respect of judicial power), the High Could should 
                                                          
39  (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
40  Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ); 
R v Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41 (Isaacs J and Higgins J); South Australia v Victoria (1911) 12 CLR 667 
(Griffith CJ and O’Connor J); Bank of NSW v Commonwealth (“Bank Nationalisation case”) (1948) 76 
CLR 1 (Starke J and Dixon J); Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v O'Reilly (1962) 107 CLR 46 
(Dixon CJ and Menzies J); Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367 (Windeyer J); Brown v R (1986) 160 
CLR 171 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson J and Brennan J); Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338 (Mason 
J). 
41  O Dixon, “Two Constitutions Compared”, Jesting Pilate, 103. 
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also conclude that the Constitution’s text and structure imports an American understanding 
(that is, a functionalist understanding) of the executive power. Secondly, the High Court 
should conclude that the Article II jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States 
is relevant (or at least helpful) in construing the scope of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth; particularly in relation to how the Supreme Court of the United States has 
construed the words “the executive Power”, and the words to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”, in Article II of the American instrument.  
United States jurisprudence 
The jurisprudence surrounding Article II, section 2 and the Take Care clause is decidedly 
anti-monarchical. The founders of the American Republic clearly rejected a system of 
government which recreated part of the executive authority that Blackstone “fashioned for 
the British King”.42 
The United States Constitution is based upon the principle of construction that it is one 
of enumerated powers. Chief Justice John Marshall said: “This government is 
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle that it can exercise 
only the power granted to it … is now universally admitted”.43 From this first principle, 
the Vesting clause and Take Care clause can be construed. 
In terms of the Vesting clause, Louis Fisher said that there was a difference of opinion 
as to the nature of the executive power between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. 
Hamilton favoured a broad construction of “executive power”, saying that the enumerated 
executive power requires a “comprehensive grant in the general clause”.44 In contrast, 
Madison rejected a broad executive power in relation to foreign affairs, saying that: “The 
power of making treaties and the power of declaring war, are royal prerogatives in the 
                                                          
42  L Fisher, The Law of the Executive Branch: Presidential Power, 62. 
43  McCulloch v Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819). 
44  L Fisher, The Law of the Executive Branch: Presidential Power, 64. 
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British government, and are accordingly treated as executive prerogatives by British 
commentators”.45  
Similarly, Adolphe de Chambrun wrote in 1874 that the legislative, executive and 
judicial departments of government “are co-ordinate in degree to the extent of the powers 
delegated to each of them. Each, in the exercise of its powers, is independent of the other, 
but all, rightfully done by either, is binding upon the others”.46 As was pointed out, the 
right to establish courts of justice “flows from the same source which determines the extent 
of the legislative and executive powers of government”. 
As already identified, the canonical decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
as to the scope of the Vesting clause and Take Care clause was that of Youngtown Sheet & 
Tube Co v Sawyer47 in 1952, and the concurring reasons of Associate Justice Robert 
Jackson. In the Steel Seizure case, as it is oft-described, Jackson J set out three categories 
of executive action as being authorised by the executive power. The first category was 
executive action done “pursuant to an express of implied authorisation of Congress”,48 the 
second category was where the President acts “in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority”.49 Jackson J’s third category was where the President undertakes 
“measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress”.50 
In more recent scholarship, Professors Jack Goldsmith and John Manning have shone 
light upon what they describe as the President’s “completion power”, as an understudied 
feature of executive power.51 Goldsmith and Manning described the President’s 
completion power as the President’s “authority to prescribe incidental details needed to 
                                                          
45  J Madison, The Writings of James Madison, 150 (original emphasis); L Fisher, The Law of the 
Executive Branch: Presidential Power, 69. 
46  A de Chambrun, The Executive Power in the United States: A Study of Constitutional Law, 1874, 53, 
and quoting the Supreme Court of the United States in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 18 How. 331 (1885). 
47  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
48  343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). 
49  343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952). 
50  343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952). 
51  J Goldsmith, J F Manning, “The President’s Completion Power” (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 2280. 
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carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of congressional 
authorisation to complete the scheme”.52 The power is said to complement, but does not 
derive from particular statutory commands. They said that Congress can limit it. An 
example of congressional limitation is the denial of authority to undertake certain 
executive action by certain means “or by specifying the manner in which a statute must be 
implemented”.53 Goldsmith and Manning sourced this completion power to the dissenting 
judgment of Chief Justice Vinson in Youngstown.54 In their Yale Law Journal article, 
Goldsmith and Manning identified a number of decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States that are said to be consistent with this theory of a completion power.55 
IX  THREE TEXTUAL REASONS  
The textual mode of constitutional interpretation requires close attention to the precise 
language of the constitutional text to ascertain meaning from the choice of words – rather 
than from the purpose of the text, or the surrounding circumstances. In this respect, three 
aspects of the words used in ss 1, 2, 61 and 71 ought to be considered in close detail. 
It is suggested that each of the three arguments below are consistent with the core 
argument in that they either lead to the conclusion that s 2 is a textual recognition of the 
Crown’s ability to delegate (or assign) the prerogative powers and functions to the 
governor-general, or lead to the conclusion that the power spoken of in s 61 is not as wide 
in ambit so as to include the rights, preferences, capacities or immunities of the Crown – 
and that textual affirmation must be found somewhere other than s 61 for those rules of the 
common law. 
 
                                                          
52  115 Yale Law Journal 2280, 2282 (2006). 
53  115 Yale Law Journal 2280, 2282 (2006). 
54  343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952) (Vinson CJ). 
55  Zemel v Rusk 381 U.S. 1 (1965), 8-9; Dames & Moore v Regan 453 U.S. 654 (1981), 686; Loring v 
United States 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 
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The word “Power” 
It is recalled that s 61 of the Constitution commences with the words that: 
 
The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is 
exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative … 
 
The executive power is just that, a power. Section 61 uses the word “power”, and does not 
include words to the effect of rights, preferences, capacities or immunities. Textually, it is 
very difficult to stretch the meaning of the word “power” to include preferences, capacities 
or immunities. To say that a species of power is vested in the Queen, and to find within that 
species a related, but clearly different species of constitutional authority, is to stretch the 
meaning of the word “power” well beyond the ordinarily acceptable natural meaning of the 
word. 
The word “power” in s 61 should also be construed against the surrounding 
circumstances, and the parallel use of the word “power” in ss 1 and 71. In those two 
sections, the power must surely mean a species of constitutional authority that permits the 
constitutional organ that the power is invested in to exercise the authority, and that 
authority is a deliberative authority – it is not a word that implies, in its ordinary meaning, 
the inclusion of preferences, capacities, or immunities. This textual criticism as to how s 61 
is supposed to recognise the capacities and immunities of the Crown was made by Leslie 
Zines not long after the Tampa case. The late Professor Zines wrote, with a hint of 
sarcasm, that:56 
 
… it is not clear why the immunities and privileges of the Commonwealth 
derived from the prerogative are to be taken as having been granted by s 61. 
These matters do not easily fit within the terms of the provision. They are not 
                                                          
56  L Zines, “The inherent executive power of the Commonwealth” (2005) 16 Public Law Review 279, 282. 
Professor Zines makes the same criticism in his commentary in H V Evatt, The Royal Prerogative, C14. 
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related to particular powers of government, but operate to the benefit of the 
Commonwealth by virtue of the fact that it is a government of the Queen. They 
are the same privileges and immunities that apply to the States and to all the 
Queen’s other realms unless altered by statute. It was stated in each edition of 
The High Court and the Constitution: “It would, of course, be straining the 
ordinary meaning of words to regard these privileges and immunities as 
‘powers’ within s 61 of the Constitution.” This was wrong. The High Court has 
had no difficulty.  
 
The use of the word “power” in s 61, and that word, and not a wider expression like 
“authority”, is a textually-based reason supporting the contention that what s 61 speaks 
only of is the species of constitutional authority which is to be understood in 
contradistinction to the legislative and judicial power – both being positively framed 
constitutional powers. The language of s 61 and the presence of the word “power” is a 
textually-based pillar to the core argument. 
Section 2 of the Constitution 
Section 2 of the Constitution provides that: 
 
A Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her Majesty's 
representative in the Commonwealth, and shall have and may exercise in the 
Commonwealth during the Queen's pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, 
such powers and functions of the Queen as Her Majesty may be pleased to 
assign to him. 
 
The language of s 2 must have some work to do in the constitutional scheme. The words 
“powers and functions”, set as they are before the words “of the Queen”, express 
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ownership or association to the Queen, and appear to command that those words ought to 
be construed as being powers and functions that the Queen is recognised to have, herself.57 
It may be argued that the Queen would, without the presence of s 2, already have the 
constitutional authority to appoint a governor-general for the Commonwealth of Australia, 
and to delegate to that governor-general the authority to exercise that part of the 
prerogative that the Crown wishes to repose in the vice regal representative. 
Absent a constitutional text that provides for it, the power to appoint a governor (or 
governor-general) is a prerogative right of the Crown.58 Textually, the presence of s 2, in 
that it affirms the presence of an acknowledged prerogative power, and, in doing so, 
affirms the already existing common law authority of the Crown to delegate (or assign) the 
Crown’s “powers and functions” to the governor-general, is an indicator that the powers 
and functions referred to in s 2 ought be understood as referring to matters pertaining to the 
prerogative. This statutory power has been used on at least four occasions.59 
Put simply, the textual argument here is that the presence and purpose of s 2, in that the 
section refers to the “powers and functions of the Queen”, ought to be textually contrasted 
with the words “executive power of the Commonwealth” in s 61 which allows the 
conclusion that the subject matter of s 61 is likely to be something different to that in s 2. 
Section 2 would have no constitutional work to do if, by “executive power”, s 61 included 
all the prerogative powers and functions of the Crown – it would have been textually 
                                                          
57  See J Quick and R R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 387-400 
where, in addition to the textual argument described above, Quick & Garran point to the framers’ 
intention that the words “of the Queen” are intended to refer to the powers and functions, being the 
prerogative powers and functions of the Queen. 
58  J Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, 34; S Amos, Fifty Years of the English Constitution, 1830-1880, 
157. 
59  The first was an assignment under the Instructions to the Governor-General on 29 October 1900 of the 
power to grant pardons and to remit fines, penalties and forfeitures. The second was an assignment of 
the power to declare war against specified foreign powers in December 1941. The third was an 
assignment of the power to appoint Ministers Plenipotentiary and certain other diplomatic officers and 
to grant exequaturs in respect of foreign consular representatives on 2 November 1954. The fourth was 
an assignment on 30 May 1973 of the powers to appoint Ambassadors and High Commissioners to 
represent Australia and to give the agreement for Ambassadors and High Commissioner representing 
other countries in Australia. 
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unnecessary to include the contents of s 2, as s 61 would have covered the field. This 
remains so even if the purpose of s 2 was for the future conveyance of powers and 
functions of the Queen that were to remain the Queen’s Imperial powers and functions and 
were not intended to be conveyed to the Commonwealth at the establishment of the 
Commonwealth. If that were its purpose, the argument remains the same. 
This last argument – that s 2 must have work to do, and therefore there is a difference 
with the work to be done by s 61 – is especially the case when the ordinary rules of 
statutory construction are applied. In contrasting the text of ss 2 and 61, a conclusion 
would be drawn that the words in s 2 are not to be construed as having no meaning. 
Sections 1, 71 and 61 - “shall be vested” and “is vested” 
A further contention about the text can be made when comparing the United States 
Constitution and the Australian Constitution. Article II, section 1 of the United States 
Constitution commences: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America”. Whereas, s 61 of the Constitution commences with the words: 
“The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by 
the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative …”. What do we make of the 
noticeable difference in the precise wording of the vesting clause between the “shall be” 
statement in the United States Constitution, and the “is” declaration in the Constitution? 
This may be thought of as more than a draftsman’s slip when one looks at the legislative 
and judicial power vesting clauses in ss 1 and 71 of the Constitution. Section 1 provides 
that “The legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, 
which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives …”. Section 71 
provides that “[t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal 
Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, …”. 
There is an explanation for this. It is argued that the difference in language between 
“shall be” and “is” can be explained by having regard to the nature of the powers in 
question, as they were understood prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act. 
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Prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act (and prior to the establishment of 
representative government in each of the colonies), the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers in the Queen’s dominions were all vested in the Queen. The Queen had authority to 
enact legislation by reason of the Queen’s legislative prerogative. The Queen had authority 
to execute and administer the law in the dominions by reason of the Queen’s executive 
prerogative; and the judges exercising the judicial power were exercising the Queen’s 
judicial prerogative. All three powers were vested in the Queen. The continued operation 
of the Queen’s legislative and judicial prerogatives in the colonies evaporated when the 
Imperial Parliament established colonial legislatures and courts. 
The enactment of the Constitution Act saw the legislative and judicial powers recast in 
the new body politic, and given to newly established constitutional bodies. The legislative 
power was given to the Federal Parliament (which was to consist of the existing 
constitutional body, being the Queen, and two new constitutional bodies – a Senate, and a 
House of Representatives). The judicial power was to be given, not to the Queen, but “a 
federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia”. These two modifications 
are to be contrasted with the executive power. The executive power was vested in the 
Queen prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act, and, after the enactment of the 
Constitution Act, s 61 continued this investiture in the Queen of executive power. This is 
how we should understand Sir Isaac Isaacs’ statement in the Wool Tops case that in respect 
of the opening words of s 61, “[a]s to the first declaration it is a renewed statement of the 
law and introductory of what follows”.60 Sir Isaac Isaacs continued to approvingly quote 
Lord Halsbury when he said that “[t]he executive authority is vested in the Crown as part 
of the prerogative”.61 
The Constitution uses the expression “shall be” in ss 1 and 71, where a power of the 
Commonwealth was being vested in a newly established constitutional body – in the 
                                                          
60  Commonwealth & the Central Wool Committee v Colonial Combing, Spinning & Weaving Co Ltd 
(Wool Tops case) (1922) 31 CLR 421, 437. 
61  (1922) 31 CLR 421, 437, quoting H S Gifford (Earl Halsbury), Halsbury’s Laws of England, (1905-
1916) Vol. VI, 318 (emphasis added). 
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legislative power’s case, the Parliament of the Commonwealth, and in the judicial power’s 
case, in the High Court of Australia. In contradistinction to this, the expression “is” was 
used where the Constitution merely declares that the power is vested in a pre-existing body, 
which already has invested in it the power being described – in the executive power’s case, 
in “the Queen”. 
The Constitution invests the legislative power and judicial power in the Federal 
Parliament and the High Court respectively, therefore the constitutional text uses the words 
“shall be”, whereas the Constitution declares an existing fact, that the executive power is 
invested in the Queen, and therefore the words “is vested” is used in s 61. 
Articles I, II and III of the United States Constitution use the words “shall be vested” in 
respect of the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the United States. The work to 
be done by the opening words of each of these articles is to vest the powers in newly 
established constitutional bodies – the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court of 
the United States. None of these three Articles make a declaration of an existing 
constitutional fact – unlike s 61 of the Constitution. 
XI  THE EARLY OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL  
A clearer understanding of the relationship between the prerogative and the executive 
power of the Commonwealth can be gleaned by looking at how the executive government 
of the Commonwealth understood its own constitutional authority at the time of Federation 
and in the early years of Federation, prior to the High Court of Australia creating a body of 
case law. Additionally, given that many of the leading figures in the pre-War 
Commonwealth Parliaments were leading figures during the drafting of the Constitution, 
we can obtain the double-advantage that those who were involved in the drafting may 
bring to their new roles in the Commonwealth Parliament considerable learning and insight 
as to the constitutional structure of the Commonwealth. 
It is suggested that the locus classicus for determining what powers the executive 
government of the Commonwealth thought it had is a consideration of the legal advice 
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given by the first law officer of the Commonwealth, the Attorney-General. In the well-
known Vondel opinion,62 Alfred Deakin advised then Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, in 
1902 that:63 
 
The scope of the executive authority of the Commonwealth is therefore to be 
deduced from the Constitution as a whole. It is administrative, as well as in the 
strict sense executive; that is to say, it must obviously include the power not 
only to execute laws, but also to effectively administer the whole Government of 
which Parliament is the legislative department. 
 
There is, however, another and fundamental consideration upon which it is only 
necessary in this connection to touch briefly, but the importance of which can 
scarcely be overestimated. 
 
The executive authority of the Commonwealth, unlike its legislative authority, is 
derived in the first instance directly and immediately from its fountain-head, the 
Crown. Executive power exists antecedently to, and independently of, 
legislation; and its scope must be at least equal to that of the legislative power – 
exercised or unexercised. For the exercise of many executive powers no 
legislation is needed, and this is especially the case in the administration of 
external affairs. In the very matter under discussion – the maintenance of treaty 
obligations – there has been no legislation by the States, and none is required. 
But the Commonwealth, by virtue of the legislative power vested in it, is now 
responsible for the performance of these obligations, and must have the 
                                                          
62  A Deakin, “Channel of Communication with Imperial Government: Position of Consuls: Executive 
Power of the Commonwealth”, in P Brazil & B Mitchell (eds), Opinions of Attorneys-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia with opinions of Solicitors-General and the Attorney-General’s 
Department, Vol I, 129. 
63  Ibid 131. 
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executive power necessary to fulfil all its obligations. 
 
… section 61 points also to executive powers which belong to prerogative. ‘The 
executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable 
by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative.’ These words are 
advisedly declaratory, not enacting; they express the broad constitutional 
principle that the whole body of the prerogative, so far as it is capable of 
exercise in relation to the affairs of the Commonwealth, is exercisable by the 
Governor-General and, of course, exercisable, in accordance with the principles 
of responsible government, by and with the advice of Commonwealth Ministers. 
 
Shorn of prerogative powers, the Commonwealth Executive would be a mere 
appendage to the Parliament – a board of subordinate officers exercising such 
powers as might be conferred upon it, but without independent authority of any 
kind. Such a conception of the executive is wholly at variance not only with 
every principle of English constitutional law, but with the clear and 
unmistakable provisions of the Constitution. Responsible government, though 
far more clearly established there than in any of the State Constitutions, would 
then be much more restricted in authority, character, and domain than it is in the 
States under their less explicit charters. ‘The King’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth’ – so described for the first time in a great constitutional 
document – would, individually and collectively, be less His Majesty’s 
Ministers than are the members of the State Executives; the vast fund of powers 
held by the Crown in trust for the people would disappear; and the 
Commonwealth, instead of inheriting the fullest development of constitutional 
rights and privileges, would find its new political organisation had dwindled 
from a national to a municipal body, for making and executing continental by-
laws. 
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When one first reads this, it is tempting to conclude that Deakin has expressed a view that, 
as the third paragraph above put it, “section 61 points also to executive powers which 
belong to the prerogative”. Absent an understanding that the executive power of 
government is part of, but not the whole of, the prerogatives of the Crown, it is easy to 
form the conclusion that Deakin has expressed a view that the opening words of s 61 
textually incorporate the prerogatives of the Crown into the constitutional text. 
Such a reading of the Vondel opinion would be a mistake. When careful attention is 
applied to all four quoted paragraphs, it can be seen that Deakin’s view of the executive 
power of the Commonwealth and his description of the prerogative is consistent with the 
core argument. Deakin made five points.  
First, there is a “fundamental consideration” which can “scarcely be overestimated”, 
and that is the “executive authority” (note, authority, not power) of the Commonwealth is 
derived from its fountain-head, “the Crown”. 
Second, Deakin made the point that in addition to executive power erected by statute, 
“section 61 points also to executive powers which belong to the prerogative”. He recited 
the opening words of s 61 of the Constitution, and then said that these “words are 
advisedly declaratory, not enacting; they express the broad constitutional principle that the 
whole body of the prerogative is exercisable by the Governor-General”. In asserting this, 
Deakin should not be understood to be saying that the opening words of s 61 of the 
Constitution incorporate (or are “enacting”) the prerogative, rather, he should be 
understood as affirming that section 61 “points also to executive powers which belong to 
the prerogative”, that is, the section “points” to (not “includes”) those executive powers 
“which belong to prerogative”, that is, the prerogative is the larger doctrine, and executive 
power is a species of prerogative. 
Third, Deakin’s affirmation that the words are “advisedly declaratory, not enacting” is 
consistent with the core argument herein advanced that the executive power is an existing 
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species of constitutional authority that pre-dates Federation, and the affirmation does not 
concern the prerogative. 
Fourth, when carefully read, Deakin’s description of the opening words of s 61 of the 
Constitution as “advisedly declaratory, not enacting,” coupled with his observation that the 
words express the broad constitutional principle that the whole body of the prerogative … 
is exercisable by the Governor-General” is directly on point in respect of the core 
argument. That is, the whole body of the prerogative is exercisable by the Governor-
General, meaning that the textual recognition or affirmation of the prerogative is to be 
found elsewhere to s 61, but, by operation of s 61 being the power to execute and maintain 
the Constitution, the prerogative (having been recognised or affirmed somewhere else in 
the Constitution) is exercisable by the Governor-General. It is the power to exercise, or 
give expression to, a constitutional attribute, not a source of the constitutional attribute. 
This is consistent with Dixon J’s description of the prerogative as an “adjunct” to the 
executive power.64 
Fifth, this conclusion is further reinforced by Deakin’s description of the 
“Commonwealth Executive” if it was “[s]horn of prerogative powers”. Deakin then made a 
reference that required familiarity with the origins of the text, Toy v Musgrove, and the 
framers’ inclusion of the words “and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the 
Commonwealth”, in the words of s 64 of the Constitution. Deakin’s description of “[t]he 
King’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”, is taken directly from s 64 of the 
Constitution, and is a reminder of the contents of the Debates of the First Convention on 6 
April 1891.65 Deakin’s observation that these words were used “for the first time in a great 
constitutional document”, supports the argument that the “the vast fund of powers held by 
the Crown in trust for the people” were recognised in, or affirmed by, the Constitution 
through the use of those words in s 64. Deakin’s use of the words, the “King’s Ministers of 
                                                          
64  (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
65  The expression “Queen’s Ministers of State” is, by then in 1902, expressed as the “King’s Ministers of 
State”, as a consequence of the accession of Edward VII. 
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State for the Commonwealth”, and what that affirmation means gives context to his earlier 
statements that “section 61 points also to executive power which belong to prerogative”, 
and that the opening words of s 61 are “declaratory, not enacting”, that the prerogative “is 
exercisable by the Governor-General”. The context permits the conclusion to be drawn that 
Deakin saw s 61 as a declaration that the prerogative is exercisable by the Governor-
General, but not expressly sourced in s 61 of the Constitution. Indeed, having regard to the 
contents of the fourth paragraph quoted above, it is clear that Deakin saw the words “and 
shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”, as being a textual 
recognition or affirmation of the continued operation of the prerogatives of the Crown in 
the context of the Commonwealth. 
Alfred Deakin’s Vondel opinion has been cited to illustrate the strength of the core 
argument. Deakin was a delegate to the Conventions. He made detailed addresses to the 
First and Second Conventions about the textual recognition, devolution and investment of 
the prerogatives of the Crown in the then Commonwealth Bill. Deakin was considered to 
be learned in the law, and he was the first occupant of the office of Attorney-General for 
the Commonwealth. The fact that Deakin was recorded as providing his official opinion in 
a way (this author says) that accords with the core argument ought to be afforded 
interpretative weight, and acts as a further pillar to the core argument.  
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C  H A P T E R  S  E V E N  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION  
It has been the purpose of this dissertation to argue that the Constitution recognises and 
affirms the prerogative – not through the text of s 61, and not through any inherent view of 
the executive power of the Commonwealth, but through the affirmations in s 64. The core 
argument, emanating from first principles as it does, is not the totality of the argument. The 
substratum of the core argument identified a collection of textual, structural and historical 
reasons why the core argument ought to be accepted. In this chapter, some aspects of the 
High Court of Australia’s two most recent executive power cases – Williams [No 2] and 
Plaintiff M68 – are considered, to identify where the core argument accords (or fails to 
accord) with the emerging jurisprudence. This chapter also reflects upon curial supervision 
and restraint of the exercise of the prerogative, as well as reflecting more generally on the 
prerogative as a core aspect of a political constitution. 
II  WILLIAMS [NO 2]  
A recent High Court decision that shines light on the doctrinal foundations of the executive 
power of the Commonwealth is the Second School Chaplains’ case, Williams [No 2].1 The 
plurality judgment consisted of five of the Court’s members; with the sixth, Crennan J, 
delivering a separate, but concurring set of reasons.2 Lengthy as they are, paragraphs [80] 
                                                          
1  (2014) 252 CLR 416. 
2  (2014) 252 CLR 416, 471 [99]. 
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to [83] are worth reciting in full as those paragraphs are the most recent authoritative 
statement of principle by the High Court. In Williams [No 2] the plurality said:3 
 
[80] The history of British constitutional practice is important to a proper 
understanding of the executive power of the Commonwealth. That history 
illuminates such matters as why ss 53-56 of the Constitution make the 
provisions they do about the powers of the Houses of the Parliament in respect 
of legislation, appropriation bills, tax bills and recommendation of money votes. 
It illuminates ss 81-83 and their provisions about the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund, expenditure charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund and 
appropriation. But it says nothing at all about any of the other provisions of Ch 
IV of the Constitution, such as ss 84 and 85 (about transfer of officers and 
property), ss 86-91 (about customs, excise and bounties), s 92 (about trade, 
commerce and intercourse among the States), or ss 93-96 (about payments to 
States). And questions about the ambit of the Executive's power to spend must 
be decided in light of all of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, not just 
those which derive from British constitutional practice. 
 
[81] Consideration of the executive power of the Commonwealth will be assisted 
by reference to British constitutional history. But the determination of the ambit 
of the executive power of the Commonwealth cannot begin from a premise that 
the ambit of that executive power must be the same as the ambit of British 
executive power. 
 
[82] It may be assumed that, as the Commonwealth parties submitted, “what 
might be described as the inherent or traditional limits on executive power, as 
                                                          
3  (2014) 252 CLR 416, 469 (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ.) 
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they emerged from the historical relationship between Parliament [at 
Westminster] and the Executive, have not hitherto been treated [in Australia or, 
for that matter, in Britain] as the source of any general limitation on the ability 
of the Executive to spend and contract without legislative authority”. But it by 
no means follows from this observation that the Commonwealth can be assumed 
to have an executive power to spend and contract which is the same as the power 
of the British Executive. 
 
[83] This assumption, which underpinned the arguments advanced by the 
Commonwealth parties about executive power, denies the “basal consideration” 
that the Constitution effects a distribution of powers and functions between the 
Commonwealth and the States. The polity which, as the Commonwealth parties 
rightly submitted, must “possess all the powers that it needs in order to function 
as a polity” is the central polity of a federation in which independent 
governments exist in the one area and exercise powers in different fields of 
action carefully defined by law. It is not a polity organised and operating under a 
unitary system or under a flexible constitution where the Parliament is supreme. 
The assumption underpinning the Commonwealth parties’ submissions about 
executive power is not right and should be rejected. 
 
The contents of these paragraphs give considerable support to the core argument, or to a 
number of aspects of the core argument. 
First, it has been opined that the executive power of the Commonwealth ought to be 
construed, and its scope determined, in a functionalist sense. That is, the executive power 
of the Commonwealth, legislative power of the Commonwealth, and judicial power of the 
Commonwealth ought to be defined and construed in contradistinction to one another; that 
is, in a functionalist sense – the power to make, execute or administer, or interpret the laws 
of the Commonwealth. Another way of saying this is that the executive power is 
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understood in a correlative sense. Williams [No 2] provides considerable authority for this 
proposition when the plurality expressly accepted the Commonwealth’s two submissions 
that: “a polity must possess all the powers that it needs in order to function as a polity”; 
and “the executive power is all that power of a polity that is not legislative or judicial 
power”. In accepting these submissions, the High Court has implicitly adopted what this 
author has described as the functionalist and correlative description of executive power. 
Second, whilst the Court observed that “[t]he history of British constitutional practice is 
important to a proper understanding of the executive power of the Commonwealth” it also 
observed that that history illuminated some provisions of the Constitution, but “says 
nothing” about a variety of other provisions in the Constitution which are an aspect of the 
executive government. In doing so, the High Court hints at a construction of the executive 
power of the Commonwealth in similar terms to the “executive Power of the President” in 
the United States. In the United States Constitution, some of the express executive powers 
(as opposed to the general vesting of executive power in the President by Article II, section 
1) are executive powers that have been replicated in the American constitutional text, and 
cherry-picked from the prerogatives of the British Sovereign soon after the War of 
Independence. In this sense, “British constitutional practice” does indeed “illuminate” the 
construction of these powers or functions in the United States Constitution. Similarly, just 
as there are “other provisions” of the Constitution that British constitutional practice “says 
nothing at all about”, like ss 84 and 85 (the transfer of officers and property to the 
Commonwealth), ss 86-91 (in relation to customs, excise and bounties), or ss 93-96 (in 
relation to payments to the States), there are provisions of the United States Constitution 
which concern the executive power, and the executive government, which British 
constitutional practice says nothing about. 
Quite apart from the fact that the declaration that “the executive power of the 
Commonwealth is vested in the Queen” is a declaration of an existing fact, this does not 
prohibit the executive power of the Commonwealth being construed in accordance with the 
core argument – as a power whose scope is ascertained in a functionalist sense, and is 
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modified to the extent of the express and implied requirements of the Constitution. That is, 
it is the power to execute and maintain (or administer) the Constitution and the laws of the 
Commonwealth, modified so as to include those express executive functions (or particular 
powers) that the Constitution vests in the Queen, or her representative, the Governor-
General. Examples of those express executive functions (or particular powers) include 
those functions or powers that have been cherry-picked from the prerogative – like the 
power to summon, prorogue and dissolve the Parliament,4 or appoint or dismiss the 
Queen’s ministers of state.5 Those traditional prerogative powers have been crystallised 
into express executive powers through their express recognition in the constitutional text. 
To summarise this point: the High Court in Williams [No 2] has begun the process of 
construing the executive power of the Commonwealth in the same way as the Supreme 
Court of the United States has construed the executive power of the President – by 
describing the power in a functionalist and correlative sense, and by identifying that there 
are aspects of the power that are borrowed from (or “illuminated”) by British constitutional 
practice, and there are aspects of the power that are autochthonous to the Australian 
constitutional framework. 
III  PLAINTIFF M68  AND THE REASONS OF GAGELER J  
The most recent decision of the High Court which involved a close examination of the 
executive power of the Commonwealth was Plaintiff M68, which was heard in October 
2015, with judgment proclaimed and reasons published on 3 February 2016. The case 
concerned the Commonwealth’s ability to process “unlawful non-citizens” off-shore in the 
Republic of Nauru at a regional processing centre. 
All seven justices considered aspects of the non-statutory executive power. Gageler J 
(over more than 18 pages of The Commonwealth Law Reports),6 set out what amounts to 
                                                          
4  The Constitution, s 5. 
5  The Constitution, s 64. 
6  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 90-109 [115]-[175]. 
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almost a general theory of the executive power of the Commonwealth. Whilst no other 
justice (or any party) thought it necessary to express a comprehensive view on the 
executive power, and none of the parties made submissions to that effect, Gageler J used 
Plaintiff M68 to advance (as pure obiter) some of his rather novel views. There are two 
aspects which ought (for the present purposes) to be highlighted. 
Attention is drawn to the overarching theme of his Honour’s reasons in Plaintiff M68 – 
namely, functionality, or functionalism. Gageler J identified Professor Finn’s description of 
the Crown as “a personalized and functional view of the Queen”.7 His Honour described 
the “peculiarly functionalised” conception in which the framers, and their forefathers, 
established responsible government in the Australian colonies. 
His Honour’s identification of the “careful appropriation and adaption of constitutional 
precedent to local circumstances” in crafting the role of the executive government and its 
relationship with the Parliament and the Judicature,8 accords with the role of the executive 
power described in the core argument articulated in Chapter 5. 
Attention is also drawn to the way his Honour commenced his consideration of the 
“executive government in the constitution”. Gageler J started by explaining the operation 
of the executive government in terms of how “[t]he framers of the Australian Constitution 
engaged in … appropriation and adaption of constitutional precedent”.9 Gageler J said that 
the executive power “can only be understood within [a] historical and structural 
constitutional context”.10 His Honour grounded his understanding of the executive 
government upon an originalist form of interpretation. In contrast with many earlier cases, 
his Honour did not cite one word from the Official Records, or anything done at the 
Federation Conventions. His Honour might have sought to describe an originalist view; but 
his originalism isn’t directly anchored to the authorial intention. The risk associated with 
                                                          
7  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 394 [117], quoting from P Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia, 1987, 
4. 
8  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 393-394 [115]. 
9  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 393-394 [115]. 
10  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 397 [129]. 
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articulating a historically-anchored theory of the Constitution without reference to the 
Federation Conventions is evident in his Honour’s recitation of the description of the 
Commonwealth ministers as the “Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”11 in s 64. The 
clear purpose behind the incorporation of that was to affirm that the “Queen’s Ministers of 
State for the Commonwealth”, were recognised as being able to exercise the prerogatives 
of the Crown that were appropriate to the newly established Commonwealth polity. 
There are two aspects of his Honour’s theory about “the nature of executive power” and 
the “[l]imitations on executive power” that touched upon the relationship between the 
prerogatives of the Crown and the executive power of the Commonwealth that ought be 
highlighted. 
The first concerned a consequence of the true nature of the relationship between the 
prerogatives and the executive power. In Plaintiff M68, Gageler J referred to the decision 
of Brennan J in Davis v Commonwealth,12 and, adopting Sir Gerard’s language, referred 
exclusively to the depth of Commonwealth executive power when he said that “an act done 
in execution of an executive power of the Commonwealth is done in execution of one of 
three categories of powers or capacities: a statutory (non-prerogative) power or capacity, a 
prerogative (non-statutory) power or capacity, or a capacity which is neither a statutory nor 
a prerogative capacity”.13 Gageler J explained:14 
 
In framing those categories of actions which the Executive Government is 
empowered to undertake in relation to subject-matters with respect to which the 
Executive Government is empowered to act, Brennan J used the term 
“prerogative” in the strict and narrow sense in which it had been used by Sir 
William Blackstone in the middle of the eighteenth century: to refer only to 
                                                          
11  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 395 [119]. 
12  (1988) 166 CLR 79, 108. 
13  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 398 [132]. 
14  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 398-399 [133] (Internal footnotes omitted). 
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“those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone, in contradistinction to 
others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects”. 
He framed the second and third categories of permissible acts so as together to 
cover the wider sense in which Professor Dicey had used the same term in the 
late nineteenth century, after the emergence of responsible government in the 
United Kingdom: to refer to “the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, 
which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown” and thereby to 
encompass “[e]very act which the executive government can lawfully do without 
the authority of [an] Act of Parliament”.  
 
Gageler J went on to say in Plaintiff M68 that:15 
 
The tripartite categorisation posited by Brennan J has utility in highlighting, in 
relation to acts done in the exercise of a non-statutory power or capacity, the 
essential difference between an act done in the execution of a prerogative 
executive power and an act done in the execution of a non-prerogative executive 
capacity.  
 
An act done in the execution of a prerogative executive power is an act which is 
capable of interfering with legal rights of others. An act done in the execution of 
a non-prerogative executive capacity, in contrast, involves nothing more than the 
utilisation of a bare capacity or permission, which can also be described as 
ability to act or as a “faculty”. Such effects as the act might have on legal rights 
or juridical relations result not from the act being uniquely that of the Executive 
Government but from the application to the act of the same substantive law as 
would be applicable in respect of the act had it been done by any other actor. In 
                                                          
15  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 399 [134]-[135] (Internal footnotes omitted). 
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this respect, the Executive Government “is affected by the condition of the 
general law”. Subject to statute, and to the limited extent to which the operation 
of the common law accommodates to the continued existence of “those rights 
and capacities which the King enjoys alone” and which are therefore properly to 
be categorised as prerogative, the Executive Government must take the civil and 
criminal law as the Executive Government finds it, and must suffer the civil and 
criminal consequences of any breach. 
 
There is much to commend this view. His Honour’s explanation that an act done in the 
execution of the prerogative is capable of interfering with the legal rights of others, 
whereas, an act done in execution of a non-prerogative right or capacity “involves nothing 
more than the utilisation of a bare capacity or permission”, perfectly accords with the 
relationship between the prerogative and the executive power advocated for in the core 
argument. It is the prerogative right or capacity which (according to the common law) 
permits the Crown to change legal rights (like declaring war, bestowing honours, et cetera); 
the executive power is merely the constitutional authority to give this right or capacity 
effect within the machinery of government. 
Additionally, his Honour’s contrasting of a prerogative right or capacity with either a 
statutory, or non-statutory (and non-prerogative) right or capacity, as a “bare capacity or 
permission”, in this author’s view correctly, reflects the nature of the right or capacity 
which is able to be executed or maintained pursuant to s 61 of the Constitution. Non-
prerogative rights or capacities (that is, statutory executive power, and non-statutory 
executive power which does not rely upon the common law of the Crown) does not permit, 
of itself, the creation or changing of legal rights as between parties. The authority 
permitted by s 61 is a bare capacity or permission. This way of describing the role of a 
prerogative right or capacity, as being given administrative effect by s 61 squares 
comfortably with the description of the prerogative as “an adjunct” of the executive power 
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of the Commonwealth by Dixon J in Richard Foreman & Sons.16 This explanation also has 
the advantage that as a matter of constitutional policy, it reduces the likelihood or capacity 
for the Commonwealth to attempt to find new non-prerogative rights or capacities within 
the non-statutory executive power of the Commonwealth by inferring from the text of the 
Constitution some right or capacity which would permit the executive government of the 
Commonwealth to adjust the rights of parties without a statutory (or prerogative) basis. 
There is a second aspect of his Honour’s reasons that warrants attention in the present 
context in what Gageler J said about the textual recognition of the prerogative rights, 
capacities and immunities in the Constitution. Gageler J said in Plaintiff M68 that:17 
 
The tripartite categorisation posited by Brennan J [in Davis] also has utility in 
highlighting, in relation to acts done by the Executive Government in the 
exercise of non-statutory power or capacity, the essential similarity between an 
act done in the execution of a prerogative executive power or capacity and an act 
done in the execution of a non-prerogative executive capacity. The essential 
similarity lies in the identity of their provenance.  
 
Non-prerogative executive capacities, no less than prerogative executive powers 
and capacities, are within the non-statutory executive power of the 
Commonwealth which is constitutionally conferred by s 61 of the Constitution 
and which is accordingly constitutionally limited by s 61 of the Constitution. Its 
constitutional limits are to be understood (as distinct from merely interpreted) in 
light of the purpose of Ch II being to establish the Executive Government as a 
national responsible government and in light of constitutional history and the 
tradition of the common law.  
 
                                                          
16  (1947) 74 CLR 508, 531. 
17  (2016) 257 CLR 42, 400 [137] and [138]. 
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With respect, this identification of the “provenance” of the prerogative “executive power or 
capacity”, and the non-prerogative “executive capacities” as being “constitutionally 
conferred by s 61 of the Constitution” should not be accepted as correct constitutional 
principle. To do so would be to ignore the matters set out in Chapter 5 and 6, and would 
ignore the work that the framers intended the phrase, “and shall be the Queen’s Ministers 
of State for the Commonwealth” to do in s 64 of the Constitution. The provenance of the 
prerogative executive rights, preferences, capacities and immunities is the common law; 
section 61 provides the constitutional machinery for operationalising these rights, 
preferences, capacities and immunities. 
IV  IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW  
A noticeable development over the past two decades in Australian constitutional law has 
been the anchoring of the principles of judicial review to the text and structure of the 
Constitution.18 This constitutionalisation of judicial review has resulted in the retention of 
the distinction between errors within jurisdiction, and errors outside jurisdiction,19 whereas 
Britain has abolished the distinction.20 The constitutionalisation of judicial review has also 
seen the entrenchment of the availability of prerogative (or constitutional writs) in Federal 
courts,21 and the entrenchment of the supervisory jurisdiction in the State courts.22 
The constitutionalisation of judicial review also required the anchoring of the purpose 
and tools of judicial review to the constitutional text. If the principle of legality is implicit 
in the Constitution, then the limits, and proper purpose, of judicial review (in terms of 
reviewing legislative enterprise, or executive action) comes into sharp focus. 
                                                          
18  S Gageler, “Deference”, (2015) 22 AJ Admin L 151; see also A P Greenwood, “Judicial Review of the 
Exercise of Discretionary Public Power”, Address given to the Queensland Chapter of the Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law, Brisbane, 27 April 2017. 
19  Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
20  R v Lord President of the Privy Council, ex parte Page [1993] AC 682. 
21  Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82. 
22  Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2009) 239 CLR 531, 580-581 [98]-[99] (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
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If the core argument is correct, and the prerogative is merely executed and maintained 
by the executive power of the Commonwealth, and is recognised by the common law, then 
the question becomes, what is the purpose and limits of judicially reviewing a purported 
act of prerogative authority? Attention needs to be focused upon whether the traditional 
procedural review versus merits (or substantive) review distinction23 ought to remain. 
Attention also needs to focus upon how the courts should ascertain justiciability. Finally, 
the utility of an explicit doctrine of judicial restraint and deference ought to be considered. 
These matters are topics for consideration that arise as a consequence of the way in which 
the prerogative operates in Australian constitutional law. 
These issues are equally engaged by an examination of the purpose and limits of 
judicial review of both statutory executive power, as well as non-statutory executive power. 
This author wishes to also focus upon the possibility (and, indeed, desirability) for there to 
be a difference in the purpose and limits between non-prerogative executive power and 
prerogative executive power.  
In considering these aspects of judicial review, it is suggested that assistance can be 
drawn by examining the British position, particularly through the lens of the House of 
Lords’ decision in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs (No 2).24 This decision was one of the House of Lords’ last appeals which 
concerned the recognition and reviewability of the prerogative. Bancoult [No 2] was a 
controversial decision, and the litigation associated with the controversy continues to be 
the subject of curial attention.25 
                                                          
23  Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 622 (Brennan J); Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 
36 (Brennan J); Abede v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, 579-580 [195] (Gummow and Hayne JJ) 
and 587 [223] (Kirby J); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 
611, 651-652 [132] (Gummow J); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 
164, 174 [23] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
24  [2009] 1 AC 453 (“Bancoult [No 2]”) 
25  R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 4) [2016] UKSC 35; 
[2016] WLR (D) 344; R (Bancoult (No 3) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2014] EWCA Civ 708. 
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Since R v Criminal Injuries Compensation; Ex parte Lain,26 and affirmed in Council of 
Civil Service v Minister for the Civil Service,27 it has been orthodox that an exercise of 
prerogative right is amenable to judicial review, where the exercise of the prerogative right 
is thought to be justiciable. This development has received some recognition in the High 
Court of Australia,28 but it is still yet to be authoritatively confirmed by the Court.29 In 
Bancoult [No 2], Hoffman LJ observed that:30 
 
The principle of the sovereignty of Parliament, as it has been developed by the 
courts over the past 350 years, is founded upon the unique authority Parliament 
derives from its representative character. An exercise of the prerogative lacks 
this quality; although it may be legislative in character, it is still an exercise of 
power by the executive alone. Until the decision of this House in Council of 
Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, it may have 
been assumed that the exercise of prerogative powers was, as such, immune 
from judicial review. That objection being removed, I see no reasons why 
prerogative legislation should not be subject to review on ordinary principles of 
legality, rationality and procedural impropriety in the same way as any other 
executive action. 
 
All five Law Lords agreed that the delegated legislation (emanating from an Order in 
Council, and therefore the prerogative) is judicially reviewable.31 
                                                          
26  [1967] 2 QB 864. 
27  [1985] 1 AC 374. 
28  Attorney-General v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 35 (Brennan J). 
29  M Aronson, et al, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability, 134 [3.110]. 
30  [2009] 1 AC 453, 482-483 [35]. 
31  Bancoult [No 2] [2009] 1 AC 453, 482-483 [35] (Lord Hoffman), at 490 [69] (Lord Bingham), at 502 
[105] (Lord Rodger), at 508 [122] (Lord Carswell), at 515-516 [141] (Lord Mance). 
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In drawing the core argument, and therefore describing the executive power of the 
Commonwealth as something different in nature and differently sourced, to the 
prerogative, there presents the question: is the exercise of the prerogative to be judicially 
reviewed in anyway different from the exercise of statutory executive power, or non-
prerogative non-statutory executive power? 
Statutory executive power does not present a significant analytical challenge. Gone are 
the days in which the Commonwealth Parliament enacted short statutes to achieve 
legislative objectives, permitting and requiring the executive officers of the 
Commonwealth to “fill in” the gaps between the legislative activity, and the executive 
action required to administer those brief statutes. For example, unlike the Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901,32 the Migration Act 1958 spells out in great detail the machinery of 
the decision-making activities of executive officers of the Commonwealth. The 
comprehensiveness (and complexity) of the drafting of modern statutes has resulted in a 
much reduced domain for officers of the executive government to exercise choice and 
discretion in the invocation of statutory powers; primarily because in so many areas of 
government activity, the legislature has provided the executive with a near-code. 
Non-prerogative non-statutory executive powers present a much greater challenge, and 
are not as analytically straight forward as statutory executive power. The non-prerogative 
non-executive power must be sourced in the express or implied terms of the Constitution. 
It arises because s 61 charges the Queen with the execution and maintenance “of this 
Constitution”. The articulation of a constitutional right which does not find explicit 
expression in the Constitution is fraught with analytical difficulty; so too is the 
determination of limits of that right. For example, putting aside prerogative rights, 
preferences, capacities, and immunities, what other constitutional doctrines or 
constitutional principles (either expressly or implicitly) does the Constitution permit the 
executive to execute or maintain? 
                                                          
32  The Immigration Restriction Act 1901 comprised of a mere 19 sections and ran for just 7 pages of the 
then Commonwealth statute book. 
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It is not the role of this dissertation to articulate a comprehensive theory of non-
statutory executive power. Nonetheless – the chameleon doctrine aside – it must be the 
case that non-statutory executive power must be, generally speaking, executive in nature. 
That is, a function or activity that is characterised as executive – it cannot be legislative or 
judicial in character. That is not to say that it must be purely understood in Montesquieuian 
terms as being strictly “executive”. After all, the High Court looks to English legal history 
to determine what functions are properly reposed in the Courts.33 Similarly, an 
examination of English and Australian legal and political history can aid and assist in 
characterising a function as executive; but executive it must be to be a non-prerogative 
non-statutory executive power. Therefore, generally speaking,34 acts or activities that alter, 
by way of creating the rights of parties are not executive, they are legislative or judicial in 
nature. Recognising that this assertion does not sit comfortably with Griffith University v 
Tang,35 there is a qualitative distinction between the alteration of rights as a consequence 
of administrative decision-making under an enactment, and the promulgation of new rights 
and obligations. 
Prerogative non-statutory executive powers – or, properly expressed, non-statutory 
powers arising from the execution and maintenance of the prerogatives of the Crown – are 
different in character. The execution and maintenance of those powers may (and, quite 
often does) result in an alteration of an individual’s rights. When the Crown declares war, 
the Crown alters the rights of those who have an allegiance to a hostile Sovereign. When 
the Crown bestows honours, the Crown alters the rights of those who receive an honour. 
And when the Crown exercises a proprietary right, like the right to royal metals, the Crown 
                                                          
33  R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 394 
(Windeyer J). 
34  And recognising that the High Court has acknowledged that “the affecting of legal rights and 
obligations” is necessarily an aspect of a decision of an administrative character: Griffith University v 
Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 128 [79]-[80] (Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
35  (2005) 221 CLR 99. 
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is altering the rights of those who might have had quiet enjoyment of their lands when the 
Crown seeks to retrieve the gold and silver that it has a proprietary right to. 
Whilst it is reasonable for a court to consider whether the right or rights exist, the 
substantive review of those rights, that is, the review of them for some reason other than 
the continued availability of the right (which crystallised in British jurisprudence in 
Bancoult [No 2]), in terms of some of the standards of review – like unreasonableness – is 
inconsistent with the text and structure of the Australian Constitution.36 The pre-Federation 
position (and the understanding that the framers almost certainly had, but perhaps contrary 
to English law)37 was that if a court concluded that the prerogative right, preference, 
capacity or immunity had been engaged, then that was the end of the matter – there was no 
review of the exercise of that power for unreasonableness or proportionality because the 
exercise of prerogative powers was, historically, not apt for judicial review. 
The execution and maintenance of a prerogative (or common law) right, preference or 
capacity of the Crown (as understood in the Blackstonian sense) is just that – the execution 
or maintenance of the common law attribute of the Crown. Whilst the execution or 
maintenance may be reviewed – that is, the act done to give effect to the right, preference 
or immunity may be judicially reviewed, the very nature of the prerogative right does not 
admit substantive review as to whether the executive action is warranted. 
In a system of government that implicitly adopts a division of legislative, executive and 
judicial powers, and which also impliedly provides for ministerial responsibility to the 
elected legislature, there is little room for the justiciability of exercises of the prerogatives, 
                                                          
36  Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, 
24-25 [76] (McHugh and Gummow JJ); see also Attorney-General v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 35 and 36 
(Brennan J), Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986)162 CLR 24, 40 (Mason J). 
37  Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173 (Lord Halsbury LC), who said that in the exercise of a discretion, the 
proper exercise of a discretion requires “that something is to be done according to the rules of reason 
and justice, not according to private opinion” (at 173); The Lord Chancellor cited Coke LCJ in Rooke’s 
Case (1598) 5 Rep. 99b as authority for that proposition. The Lord Chancellor added that the exercise of 
discretionary power be “not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular” (at 179). See an 
affirmation of this in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 363 (Hayne, 
Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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beyond mere procedural review. In a system of government that incorporates both a 
separation of powers as well as responsible government, accountability for the exercise of 
powers that alter rights (and, are therefore not usually justiciable) lies with the legislature. 
That accountability is political and ought to be rendered at the dispatch box and in 
parliamentary committees. 
This observation is a significant one as it has other consequences. The prerogatives are 
the prerogatives of the Crown. They are exercisable by the governor-general and his or her 
delegate officers of the Commonwealth. But there is an implicit limitation in that 
observation. The prerogatives, being common law attributes of the Crown which permit the 
alteration of rights may only be exercised by the governor-general, or his or her ministers 
and their delegates – being persons whose exercise of those common law attributes can be 
held to account in, and by, the legislature. There is a special quality to the exercise of 
powers where the person exercising that power is both legally and politically accountable 
for the exercise of the power. Officers of statutory agencies, who are not under the 
command of one of the Queen’s ministers of state charged with administering that 
department of state, do not have a superior who is answerable at the dispatch box for the 
exercise of power. This is both a textual and structural requirement of the Constitution. It is 
an implication drawn from the language of s 64 of the Constitution. 
An officer of a statutory agency (which is not under the command of one of the Queen’s 
ministers of state) is limited to the exercise of statutory executive power; such an officer 
cannot exercise on the governor-general’s behalf the prerogatives of the Crown. For 
example, an officer of the Australian Fisheries Management Authority might be exercising 
power on behalf of the Commonwealth (as part of a Commonwealth statutory agency) 
under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 and the Fisheries Administration Act 1991, but 
that power that he or she exercises is exclusively statutory executive power. The exercise 
of that power is limited to the language of the statute. The authority to take executive 
action pursuant to a non-statutory executive power, or to execute or maintain a common 
law attribute of the Crown is a power vested exclusively in those who are either personally, 
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or through their masters, answerable to Parliament, in the sense that the minister is able to 
direct that executive action. This is a necessary structural implication arising as a 
consequence of representative and responsible government. 
In terms of judicial review of the prerogative non-statutory executive power (as well as 
non-prerogative non-statutory executive power), it is perhaps time for the High Court to 
revisit the question as to whether the Court should adopt an explicit standard of judicial 
deference or restraint when judicially reviewing executive action. As Lord Hope said in R v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte Kebilene (in a slightly different context), 
sometimes:38 
 
…. difficult choices may have to be made by the executive or the legislature 
between the rights of the individual and the needs of society. In some 
circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an 
area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, 
to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or decision is 
said to be [impugned]. 
 
Whilst it might be said to be contrary to the principle in Marbury v Madison,39 there may 
be some value in the emergence in Australian jurisprudence of a Chevron-like principle40 
of the courts deferring to the judgment of the executive arm of government (which has 
heretofore been resisted)41 where the executive is better placed to make informed decisions 
about the appropriateness and reasonableness of different interpretative choices open to the 
executive. Extra-curially, Justice Gageler has averred to as much; arguing that a Chevron-
                                                          
38  [2000] 2 AC 326, 381. 
39  1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
40  Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 467 US 837 (1984). 
41  Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, 151-
152 [40]-[42] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ) (“City of Enfield”). 
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like principle of construction would be consistent with the principle in Marbury v 
Madison.42 Justice Gageler said:43 
 
Chevron deference involves a court construing ambiguous language within an 
agency’s empowering statute as including within the scope of the authority so 
conferred by the statute a capacity or discretion for the agency to adopt and to 
act on such interpretation of that ambiguous language as the agency considers to 
be appropriate, subject to the condition that the agency interpretation is 
reasonable.  
 
Justice Gageler pointed out that Chevron deference was quite recently explained in the 
Supreme Court of the United States as follows:44 
 
Chevron is rooted in a background presumption of congressional intent: namely, 
“that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute” administered by an agency, 
“understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost by the 
agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever 
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” Chevron thus provides a stable 
background rule against which Congress can legislate. Statutory ambiguities will 
be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but 
by the administering agency. Congress knows to speak in plain terms when it 
wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, 
agency discretion. 
 
                                                          
42  S Gageler, “Deference”, (2015) 22 AJ Admin L 151, 156; and contrary to what was argued in City of 
Enfield (2000) 199 CLR 135, 152-153 [43]. 
43  S Gageler, “Deference”, (2015) 22 AJ Admin L 151, 153. 
44  S Gageler, “Deference”, (2015) 22 AJ Admin L 151, 153, quoting City of Arlington v Federal 
Communications Commission 569 US    ; 133 S Ct 1863, 1868 (2013). 
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Justice Gageler opined that:45 
 
The point of Chevron, not unlike the point of Hickman, is that the provision of 
the content of statutory language can be committed by statute to the zone of 
discretion, or authority or jurisdiction, conferred on an administrative decision-
maker without violation of the judicial duty to ensure that the administrative 
agency stays within that zone of discretion. 
 
There are textual and structural reasons why Chevron deference ought to emerge within 
Australian constitutional jurisprudence. Section 75(v) of the Constitution entrenches the 
availability of the writs of mandamus and prohibition. This provision is the source of the 
High Court’s jurisdiction to review executive action. As Gleeson CJ said in Plaintiff S157, 
it “secures a basic element of the rule of law”.46 
Scalia J observed in United States v Mead Corporation (obviously in the American 
context), “[j]udicial control of federal executive officers [is] principally exercised through 
the prerogative writ of mandamus”, and continued to observe that “[t]hat writ generally 
would not issue unless the executive officer was acting plainly beyond the scope of his 
authority”.47 As a consequence, ambiguities in the reach of executive authority should be 
“left to reasonable resolution by the Executive”,48 as they would have been by an Article 
III court reviewing the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing an executive officer to do 
(or forbearing from doing) some public duty or act.49 
The same textual and structural reason exists within the Australian context. Section 
75(v) entrenches the availability of the writ of mandamus to control the behaviour of 
                                                          
45  S Gageler, “Deference”, (2015) 22 AJ Admin L 151, 156. 
46  (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482 [5]. 
47  533 US 218 (2001), 242; albeit, Scalia J was in dissent. 
48  533 US 218 (2001), 243. 
49  A Bamzai, “The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation” (2017) 126 Yale Law 
Journal 908, 913. 
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officers of the Commonwealth. As Gleeson CJ pointed out in Plaintiff S157, the framers 
sought to incorporate the three writs of s 75(v) for the expressed reason to ensure that the 
High Court could “exercise its function of protecting the subject against any violation of 
the Constitution or any law made under the Constitution”.50 
Just as the pre-Federation supervisory jurisdiction is entrenched within the text of s 73 
of the Constitution,51 the pre-Federation character and limitations of the writ of mandamus 
are incorporated into the operation of s 75(v) of the Constitution. As Thomas Tapping said 
in 1853:52 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court to command the execution of a particular act or 
duty, the subject matter of the writ [of mandamus], must be clear, otherwise it 
will not interfere. 
 
If the duty is not clear, then it is ambiguous; and that ambiguity is resolved in favour of 
judicial deference to the exercise of executive power. The explicit entrenchment of the writ 
of mandamus in s 75(v) arguably leads to the conclusion that a Chevron-like doctrine of 
judicial deference has a role to play in Australian jurisprudence. 
An explicit doctrine of judicial deference and restraint is not currently a part of 
Australian constitutional jurisprudence.53 As Federal Court judge Nye Perram has said: 
“the flip side to the doctrine [of the separation of powers] is a prohibition on the judiciary 
usurping executive functions where they are reposed in the executive by legislation or 
directly by the [C]onstitution itself”.54 The emergence of doctrinal clarity around the 
                                                          
50  (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482-483 [5]. 
51  Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580 [97]-[98] (French CJ, Gummow, 
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53  City of Enfield (2000) 199 CLR 135. 
54  J Eyers, “Courts curb executive power”, The Australian Financial Review, 3 September 2010, 39. 
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nature of the non-statutory executive power, and, as is argued for in this dissertation, the 
emergence of a prerogative non-statutory executive power which is understood in the 
context of the core argument, will require further examination as to whether there ought to 
be a principle of interpretation (therefore a restraint on reviewability) as to the institutional 
choices that are available to the executive government when seeking to invoke a non-
statuary executive power or a prerogative right.  
As was made abundantly clear by Pape, having established there was power, it is almost 
impossible for the High Court to substantively review (in the merit review sense) the 
exercise of a non-statutory executive power. The same could be said for the exercise of 
prerogative rights. The emergence of an explicit doctrine of judicial deference in Australia 
would sit comfortably against the backdrop of the prerogative understood as the common 
law recognised attributes of the Crown which are not ordinarily susceptible to judicial 
review. 
V   IN DEFENCE OF THE PREROGATIVE  
Reconciling the text, structure and history of the Constitution (particularly reconciling 
what it means to be “under the Crown”) requires the anchoring of any theory of the 
prerogatives of the Crown to the constitutional framework established by the framers at the 
Federation Conventions. That framework cannot be truly described as historical if it is not 
anchored to the actual words and ideas expressed by the framers at the Federation 
Conventions. That is not to say that the subjective views of individual framers will be 
paramount; merely, any reconciliation of the text and structure with the history of the 
Constitution necessarily requires a reconciliation of the actual words and ideas expressed at 
the Federation Conventions, thereby anchoring the history if the collective intention of the 
framers’ can be properly ascertained. 
There can be no doubt that it was the collective intention of the framers that they were 
seeking to replicate representative and responsible government. They sought to include the 
Westminster system of government – that is ministerial (or Crown) responsibility to the 
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elected legislature – into the Australian Federal compact. Whilst the framers were drafting 
a legal document, utilising a written constitution; they were also seeking to replicate a 
political model of government, whereby, according to the Diceyan theory, the ultimate 
mechanism of accountability is through the ministers maintaining the confidence of the 
democratic chamber of parliament. The framers sought to establish both a legal 
constitution and a political constitution. The Australian Constitution incorporates both the 
political and legal theories of constitutionalism. To appropriate the words of Adam 
Tomkins in respect of the British Constitution, the Australian Constitution “uses politics as 
the vehicle through which the purpose of the constitution (that is, to check the government) 
may be accomplished”.55 
The continuing doctrinal relevance and strength of the prerogative (recognised as it is 
by the common law, and exercisable as it is by the Queen’s ministers of state) is that the 
prerogative is, contrary to modern views, a robust and accountable part of a political 
constitution.56 The ongoing political accountability for the exercise of the prerogative is 
regularly observable. Two examples will suffice. 
The first example is the exercise of the war prerogative. The decision to commit 
Australian troops and military assets to the invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003 was 
taken by the ministry of the day in exercise of the prerogative right and capacity for the 
Crown to engage in military force. The decision was highly controversial, and the 
government of the day came under considerable political pressure to justify the initial 
decision to join United States’ forces and participate in combat operations, and that 
decision’s ongoing effects. The decision to participate in combat operations was a political 
issue at the subsequent Federal election in 2004, with the then Leader of the Federal 
Opposition committing to withdrawing the troops “by Christmas”.57 The government was 
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re-elected at the election, but it was necessary for the government to defend its exercise of 
the prerogative right and capacity in the political domain. The exercise and operation of the 
war prerogative has been criticised by informed commentators.58 That criticism is focused 
upon strengthening the mechanisms for the political accountability for the exercise of the 
prerogative, rather than the mechanisms for legal accountability. 
The second example is the exercise of the honours prerogative. The Sovereign is 
described as the fountain of honour.59 The Queen retains the prerogative to establish, and 
amend, orders or societies of honour. For example, when the then prime minister advised 
the Queen to re-establish the practice of appointing Knights and Dames in the Order of 
Australia, the Queen exercised her prerogative right to amend the Constitution of the Order 
of Australia (a prerogative instrument) to give effect to those changes.60 Similarly, and 
with much less media attention, when an earlier prime minister advised the Queen to grant 
to all living and future Governors-General the title of “The Honourable” for life, the 
decision was an exercise of the Queen’s prerogative authority, and was made known by a 
notice in the Commonwealth Gazette advising that “Her Majesty The Queen has given 
approval for the title of “the Honourable” to be granted to Australian Governors-
General”.61 A similar decision was made in relation to Administrators of the Northern 
Territory.62 On each of these occasions, on the face of the gazette, it appears that the Queen 
has exercised the power, and the Governor-General is merely notifying that the right has 
been exercised. 
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When the then prime minister recommended the appointment of the Duke of Edinburgh 
as a Knight of the Order of Australia, the prime minister suffered significant public 
ridicule, and, arguably, this event was a significant marker which led to the loss of the 
prime minister’s political authority within his own party, ultimately contributing to the loss 
of his premiership. 
The use and misuse of the prerogatives of the Crown engages the operation of the 
political constitution, with political consequences for the misuse of the prerogatives. Due 
to the inherently political nature of many of the prerogative’s rights, preferences, 
capacities, and immunities it is often the case that the subject-matter of the exercise of the 
executive power to give effect to the common law right, preference, capacity or immunity 
defies substantive curial supervision. This does not (to borrow a phrase) “create islands of 
power immune from supervision and restraint”,63 rather, the supervision and restraint is 
achieved through political means, just as the framers envisaged and responsible 
government requires. 
By affirming that the source of the rights, preferences, capacities and immunities of the 
Crown is the Crown (and recognised by the common law), the High Court would be 
permitting the continuation of the best (ascertainable) understanding of the framers’ 
understanding of the place and role of the prerogative in the Constitution. And in doing so, 
would leave the resolution of the tension between the exercise of the Crown’s rights, and 
the interests of individual members of the community, to the elected arms of government. 
In doing so, the tension between the interests of the individual, and the interests of the 
Crown requires (to borrow a statement from a different context) “the political articulation 
of a community’s sense of itself, an articulation which, as our institutions have evolved, is 
the province of the legislature rather than the judiciary”.64 
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VI  CONCLUSION  
When reflecting upon the Constitution soon after its centenary, after pointing out the origin 
of the “apparently innocuous words” (being, “and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State 
for the Commonwealth) in s 64 of the Constitution, Dr John Waugh wrote:65  
 
I do not mean to suggest that Deakin and Wrixon were right in 1891 about 
‘responsible ministers’, or that the words they proposed for s 64 of the 
Constitution could have had the effects they intended. Readers of the 
Convention Debates are familiar with the delegates’ intermittent muddles and 
confusion, and with intentions that miscarried or were simply rejected. My point 
is that a broad historical context is needed to explain the origins of the words of 
s 64. The Convention Debates are only the start. The context, assumptions and 
preconceptions of the 1890s are important too. 
 
It has been the purpose of this dissertation to prove that Dr Waugh was too timid, and that 
the contribution made to the drafting of s 64 by Alfred Deakin and Henry Wrixon in 1891 
is properly reflected in the construction of that section, and of the executive power of the 
Commonwealth. 
Whilst the common law itself must accord with the Constitution, “the Constitution itself 
is informed by the common law”. The common law of the Crown (and the prerogatives of 
the Crown that are recognised by the common law) are a textually affirmed aspect of the 
Constitution. The “context, assumptions and preconceptions” that existed in the lead up to 
the Federation Conventions, and in the drafting of the Constitution warrant that conclusion, 
and the core argument made in this dissertation. 
Understanding the prerogative; what it is; where it came from; how it evolved 
throughout the course of Roman, English, British and then Australian history; and how it 
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predated the rise of the Montesquieuian trinity of powers, are all essential to understanding 
the prerogative’s relationship with the executive function and power of government.  
This dissertation has sought to demonstrate that the prerogative and the executive power 
are two separate constitutional concepts (both in history and within the text of the 
Australian Constitution). Within the text of the Constitution Act, the preamble, and ss 2 
and 74 textually imply the continued operation of the prerogatives of the Crown 
(recognised as they are by the common law). Section 64, through the use of the expression 
“and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth”, expressly affirms 
that the Queen continues to be invested with Her prerogative, and that (in combination 
with s 61) the Queen (acting through her delegates) exercising the executive power of the 
Commonwealth is the constitutional actor who is empowered to give executive, or 
administrative effect to those common law recognised rights, preferences, capacities and 
immunities which inhere within the Crown. 
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